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Understanding and Assessing Heidegger’s Topic in Phenomenology in Light of His Appropriation of Dilthey’s Hermeneutic Manner of Thinking

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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses Heidegger’s controversial advancement of Husserl’s idea of philosophy and phenomenological research towards ‘the Being-Question’ and its relation to ‘Dasein’. It concentrates on Heidegger’s elision of Dilthey and Husserl’s different concepts of ‘Descriptive Psychology’ in his 1925 Summer Semester lecture-course, with Husserl’s concept losing out in the competition, as background to the formulation of ‘the Being-Question’ in Being and Time (1927). It argues that Heidegger establishes his own position within phenomenology on the basis of a partial appropriation of Dilthey’s hermeneutical manner of thinking, an appropriation that was later radically called into question by Lévinas on Diltheyean-hermeneutical-philosophical grounds.

Introduction

Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) is generally regarded as one of the most important thinkers of the twentieth century. Heidegger is also regarded, in particular, as one of the most influential figures of the new phenomenological movement in philosophy that was inaugurated in Germany by Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) at the turn of the twentieth century and which spread rapidly throughout Europe and further field in the first half of that century. Yet, despite this prominence, agreement has not been reached about what Heidegger’s topic in philosophy exactly is,1 or about the precise nature and actual extent of the influence that Husserl’s phenomenological manner of thinking had upon Heidegger’s ‘path of thinking’ (Denkweg) about ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ (die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein), more often abbreviated by Heidegger as simply ‘the Being-question’ (die Seinsfrage), Heidegger’s famously self-declared topic of research in philosophy and phenomenological research in his unfinished essay Being and Time (1927).2 Two years prior to the publication of Being and Time, however, Heidegger, in his 1925 Summer Semester lecture-course delivered at Marburg University, remarks to his students that one should look towards Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911), and not to Husserl, to find the origins of the topic in philosophy and phenomenological research with which he is concerned, for, in Heidegger’s estimation,

As superior his analyses in the particular certainly are, Husserl does not advance beyond Dilthey. However, at least as I [Heidegger] see it, my guess is that even though Dilthey did not raise the question of [the meaning of] being and did not even have the means to do so, the tendency to do so was alive in him.3

In this article I want to take seriously Heidegger’s indication to his students that whilst Husserl’s phenomenological analyses are of little use to him in his own effort ‘to raise anew (wiederholen) the question of the meaning of Being’,4 Dilthey’s manner of thinking certainly is, even if Dilthey himself did not deploy his energies in that direction. The relation of Heidegger’s ‘way of thinking’ about
'the Being-Question’ both to Dilthey’s hermeneutic manner of thinking and to Husserl’s phenomenological manner of thinking, nevertheless, is much more intricate than that as intimated by Heidegger to his students in his 1925 lectures, for, in this article I will argue that Heidegger uses, at least implicitly, central features of Dilthey’s hermeneutic method of enquiry, in particular Dilthey’s interest in the experience of language, in order to correct Husserl’s unphenomenological manner of reflection whilst advancing Dilthey’s hermeneutic towards ‘the question of the meaning of Being’, notwithstanding Heidegger’s highly controversial and repeated claim throughout his career in philosophy that this issue had been left ‘unthought’ (ungedacht) by Husserl in phenomenology and phenomenological research. In other words, Heidegger’s development of phenomenology towards ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ and its relation to Dasein is better understood less in terms of a philosophical dialogue (Auseinandersetzung) between him and Husserl, as both professed by Heidegger in various places and re-iterated by several critics in recent commentary on the Husserl-Heidegger philosophical relationship, and more in terms of an appropriation of Dilthey’s hermeneutic manner of thinking, just as Heidegger himself intimates in his 1925 lectures but without elaborating upon — an appropriation of Dilthey’s manner of thinking, however, that was later to be radically called into question by Lévinas on Diltheyean hermeneutic-philosophical grounds, or so shall I argue in the concluding section of this article. Hence the title which is also the argument of this article: ‘Understanding and Assessing Heidegger’s Topic in Phenomenology in Light of His Appropriation of Dilthey’s Hermeneutic Manner of Thinking’.

I

Heidegger’s Elision of Dilthey and Husserl’s Concepts of Descriptive Psychology

In his 1925 lectures Heidegger suggests to his students that there is an ‘inner kinship’ between Dilthey’s manner of thinking in his 1894 Berlin Academy Essay ‘Ideas towards a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology’ and Husserl’s descriptive-psychological analyses in the two Volumes of his Logical Investigations (1900-1901). There is, however, no ‘inner kinship’ between Dilthey’s analysis of human experiences and Husserl’s analyses. In ‘Ideas towards a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology’, Dilthey attempts to describe and analyze human experiences from the point of view of their structural totality and inherent historical (and linguistic) depth-dimension. Thus plays, poems and novels, as well as State laws, social systems, art, music, economies, philosophies and religions, all document and articulate, in Dilthey’s eyes, something meaningful about the historically evolving nature of man’s self-understanding that is never always complete but always partially unfolding in and through history and life itself, and yet, always belonging to a greater whole of understanding of the kind of being that we ourselves are. Thus Dilthey saw his work (after Kant) in terms of a ‘Critique of Historical Reason’. In the Logical Investigations Husserl analyses the experiences of a normative logical consciousness as such — the ‘life’ of an abstract (ahistorical) logical consciousness as such — and seeks intuitively verifiable descriptions of essential and invariant a priori features of logical acts of reasoning. Husserl learned his descriptive method not from Dilthey, but from
Franz Brentano (1838–1917) when attending the latter’s lectures on ‘Descriptive Psychology’ at Vienna University from 1884 to 1886. It is true, then, that both Dilthey and Husserl (and Brentano of the Vienna period) call their work ‘descriptive psychology’, as Heidegger instructs his students in his 1925 lectures, but identity in terms is not equivalent to identity in concepts. Behind the terminological agreement that exists between Dilthey and Husserl (and Brentano) on ‘Descriptive Psychology’ there are real and major substantial disagreements in concepts of ‘Descriptive Psychology’. Which method of ‘descriptive psychology’ that is being appealed to and defended by Heidegger in the development of his own thought towards ‘the question of the meaning of Being’, therefore, is not just of nominal significance but of philosophical-conceptual significance as well. In effect, I will argue that what occurs in the 1925 lectures is an elision by Heidegger of Dilthey and Husserl’s concepts of descriptive psychology, with Husserl’s concept losing out in the competition. Before addressing this matter in Heidegger’s thinking, then, it will be useful to note firstly and briefly some of the salient features of Brentano’s descriptive method that were so influential in the development of Husserl’s thought, before examining Dilthey’s descriptive method and Heidegger’s subsequent fusion of both methods of ‘descriptive psychology’ in the elaboration of his own topic of research in philosophy and hermeneutical-phenomenological research: ‘the question of the meaning of Being’.

By the time Husserl attended Brentano’s lectures from 1884 to 1886 in Vienna, Brentano had begun to apply his new descriptive-psychological method of analysis, which he had devised some ten years earlier in his unfinished study Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874), to the task of clarifying the meaning of concepts employed in the normative disciplines of Logic, Ethics and Aesthetics. This task, of course, was not the original function of descriptive psychology. Rather, in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, the main task that Brentano set for descriptive psychology was to clarify the meaning of concepts for the science of psychology, or, more precisely, the meaning of two central terms used in current scientific debate, namely, ‘physical phenomenon’ and ‘psychical phenomenon’. This clarification was necessary for Brentano because, in his view, there existed much ‘confusion’ among scientists over the meaning of these terms and ‘neither agreement nor complete clarity has been achieved regarding the delimitation of the two classes’. Thus Brentano informs us that he found ‘no unanimity among psychologists’ about the meaning of these basic terms for their science. ‘And even important psychologists’, Brentano further remarks, ‘may be hard pressed to defend themselves against the charge of self-contradiction’ in the way in which they used and understood the meaning of these terms. This ‘lack of agreement’, coupled with ‘misuse’, ‘confusion’, and ‘self-contradiction’ by some eminent scientists concerning the meaning of the physical and the psychical, was, in Brentano’s estimation, impeding the evolution of the natural sciences in general, especially physics, and the budding new science of psychology in particular, which Brentano now considers as ‘the crowning pinnacle’ of the natural sciences, that is to say, as ‘the science of the future’. Since Brentano, however, could not settle the dispute about the meaning of these terms among psychologists and physicists by appealing to any well-founded theory elaborated in natural science, nor resolve this difficulty by drawing upon any debatable meaning which these terms may have enjoyed in any particular philosophical or historical understanding of the physical and the psychical, his only alternative was to check the meaning of these terms against the facts of
experience itself. And that meant for Brentano, now following Locke’s approach, against the experience of ‘physical phenomena’ given to outer perceptual-sense experience and the experience of the ability of consciousness to reflect upon itself and to have itself, ‘psychical phenomena’ (i.e., its own psychical-act experiences), as a content for reflection in inner perception. After the domain of each of these two basic classes of phenomena, presented via outer and inner perception respectively, had been appropriately demarcated and the meaning of the terms ‘physical phenomenon’ and ‘psychical phenomenon’ clearly agreed, the ensuing task of the natural science of psychology, so Brentano believed, would be to explain, using the method of the natural sciences, how such ‘psychical phenomena’ or ‘psychical-act experiences’ (and their immediate objects) came into existence and went out of existence for that ‘mentally active subject’. Thus Brentano drew a sharp distinction within the science of empirical psychology between what he called ‘Descriptive Psychology’ and ‘Genetic Psychology’. ‘Genetic Psychology’ is the natural-scientific part of the science of empirical psychology. Its main task is to explain, through observation, hypotheses and experimentation, how the phenomena of immediate consciousness really and truly exist when we are not immediately aware of them, e.g., colours (physical phenomena) as light-waves (or light-particles), sounds as sine waves, etc., that is to say, as the theoretically constructed objects of natural science. We could say that the natural scientist begins with ‘physical phenomena’ (e.g. colours) only to demonstrate that this is not the way they really and truly exist (for colours exist as light waves, light particles, and are ‘effects of stimuli’ on the retina and in the brain etc.). ‘Descriptive Psychology’, on the other hand, does not rely on natural-scientific theories, nor on ‘outer (sense) perception’, nor on hypothetical reasoning, but on ‘inner perception’ and direct ‘intuition’ of the phenomena themselves (i.e. psychical-act experiences and their objectivities). The task of the descriptive part of psychology is to yield clear and unambiguous descriptions of the phenomena in question themselves, ‘removing all misunderstanding and confusion concerning them’; that is to say, the sole aim of descriptive psychology is to clarify for use in natural science in general and for the natural science of empirical psychology in particular the meaning of the terms ‘physical phenomenon’ and ‘psychical phenomenon’. In Brentano’s scheme of things, then, though both descriptive psychology and genetic psychology constitute the natural science of empirical psychology as he understands it, in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint descriptive psychology serves a preparatory function for empirical psychology; its task is to clarify intuitively what genetic psychology later has to explain causally.

Brentano, therefore, never advocated the method of the natural sciences for the descriptive part of the science of empirical psychology. Rather, Brentano held firmly to the Lockean conviction that knowledge of consciousness and its contents in descriptive psychology is to be gleaned directly (non-hypothetically) from reflection within consciousness itself. Furthermore, Brentano was equally adamant that the descriptive part of the science of psychology sought ‘truths of reason’, and not truths concerning ‘matters of fact’. Only descriptions of phenomena based on ‘truths of reason’ and grasped ‘at one stroke and without induction’ can remove any possible self-contradiction or ambiguity about the meaning of the phenomena themselves in question, and that are to be later studied by natural science. Comparatively speaking, then, descriptive psychology, like mathematics, ‘is an exact science, and that in contrast, genetic psychology, in all
its determinations, is an inexact one.'

From an epistemological point of view, therefore, knowledge of incorrigible, intuitively demonstrable, \textit{a priori} features and structures that are embedded in the actual experiences of consciousness and its objectivities is sought in the ‘descriptive’ part of the science of empirical psychology. This methodological requirement Husserl also rigorously adheres to and advances in the development of his own descriptive-\textit{eidetic}-psychological investigations, though Brentano himself, as Husserl himself later remarked, much to his own disappointment, ‘could not recognise his [Husserl’s] ideas [e.g., ‘the intuition of essences’] as the fruition of his [Brentano’s] own ideas’. Nevertheless, this descriptive method of reflection on consciousness and its objectivities, i.e., on ‘intentional consciousness’ is staunchly promoted by Husserl both in the \textit{Logical Investigations} and in his version of Kantian transcendental idealism defended in \textit{Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book, General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology}.

According to Brentano, then, the natural sciences, including genetic psychology (empirical psychology), concern themselves only with knowledge-claims pertaining to ‘matters of fact’, and to ‘matters of fact’ construed from a particular natural-scientific-theoretical standpoint. In this regard, the scientific method of observation by hypothesis by experimentation is simply not suited to the task of solving disagreements between psychologists and scientists over the meaning of basic concepts that are deployed in the natural science of empirical psychology. Nor is the method of the natural sciences, as Brentano later argued, capable of clarifying the meaning of concepts deployed in the normative disciplines of Logic, Ethics and Aesthetics, but descriptive \textit{a priori} analysis of the essential features of particular psychical-act experiences, including the psychical-act experiences of normative consciousness as such, can — as Brentano proposes in his lectures on ‘descriptive psychology’ at Vienna University in the 1880s, therein developing ‘descriptive psychology’ in a direction hitherto unimagined by him in the 1870s. In maintaining this radical distinction between ‘laws of fact’ and ‘laws of norms’ in his lectures at Vienna, however, Brentano, in effect, joins in the ‘Back to Kant’ counter-movement against naturalism, positivism and historicism that had emerged in Germany in the late nineteenth century. And here, Husserl, with his refutation of any attempt to base the validity of logical (and ethical) laws on inductive generalisations of empirical psychology in Volume One of the \textit{Logical Investigations} (1900) (and in other writings on logic), joins his mentor in the ‘Back to Kant’ movement too, for, as Heidegger correctly notes to his students in his 1925 lectures about Husserl’s \textit{Logical Investigations},

\begin{quote}
Husserl, like Brentano, showed that the laws of thought are not the laws of the psychic course of thinking but laws of what is thought; that one must distinguish between the psychic process of judgement, the act in the broadest sense, and what is judged in these acts. Distinction is made between the real intake of the acts, the judging as such, and the ideal, the content of the judgement. This \textit{distinction between the real performance and ideal content} provides the basis for the \textit{fundamental rejection of [naturalism in the form of logical] psychologism}.
\end{quote}

Thus, it was at a time (from about the mid- to late 1880s) when Brentano was developing his novel idea of descriptive psychology in his Vienna lectures as an autonomous science that clarifies the foundations of concepts deployed in the normative disciplines of Logic, Ethics and Aesthetics that Husserl attended his
lectures and encountered a style of thinking and a method of questioning that had such a formative impact on Husserl’s initiation into and understanding of the tasks of philosophy, as we now know and as Heidegger correctly points out to his students.

It is undoubtedly true, then, that Dilthey, Husserl and Brentano of the Vienna period, all called their work ‘descriptive psychology’, but this does not imply that there is an ‘inner kinship’ between Dilthey and Husserl’s (or between Dilthey and Brentano’s) concepts of descriptive psychology, as Heidegger also asserts in his 1925 lectures. The ‘kinship’ that does exist between Dilthey’s descriptive-hermeneutic-historical method and Husserl’s descriptive-scientific-eidetic method is primarily negative in character; both of their methods reject the applicability of the method of the natural sciences in the study of the meaning of experiences that are characteristically lived by humans: the experiences of a valid, normative logical consciousness as such being Husserl’s selected topic of investigation ‘for a decade’ (1890–1900), culminating in his Logical Investigations;\(^{37}\) the experience of ‘Being as thing (Sein als Ding)’ given to outer perceptual-sense experience and of the experience of ‘Being as (conscious) experience (Sein als Erlebnis)’ given to inner perception being the particular acts of perception that are selected for comparative descriptive-eidetic analyses by Husserl around 1907–08,\(^{38}\) and later documented by Husserl in his (in)famous reduction of the natural standpoint to the transcendental-phenomenological-standpoint in Ideas I (1913); the experiences of the whole of ‘life’ being Dilthey’s topic of investigations from about the mid-1860s to the latter’s unexpected death in 1911.

Heidegger, however, believes that there is a common source to Husserl and Dilthey’s concepts of descriptive psychology and it is from Brentano’s ‘descriptive psychology’, and stresses two points to his students in his 1925 lectures. Firstly, he maintains that ‘the decisive move’ towards the ‘idea of a descriptive psychology’ that begins in Brentano’s Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874) ‘had a profound impact on Dilthey [in the 1894 Academy essay]’, and secondly, he remarks that ‘the truly decisive aspect of Brentano’s way of questioning is to be seen in the fact that Brentano became the teacher of Husserl, the subsequent founder of phenomenological research’;\(^{39}\) That Brentano (the descriptive psychologist) had a profound impact and influence on Husserl’s initiation and formation in philosophy can not be doubted, but a glance by anyone, including Heidegger, at Brentano’s idea and method of descriptive psychology and Dilthey’s idea and method of descriptive psychology would reveal very different approaches to and concepts of descriptive psychology.\(^{40}\) It is thus difficult to see how Heidegger could justify the claim that he does make to his students in his 1925 lectures that the idea and method of descriptive psychology first muted in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint and developed by Brentano in his Vienna lectures in the 1880s and early 1890s — ‘Brentano’s way of questioning’ — had any direct influence on Dilthey’s idea and method of descriptive psychology sketched in his 1894 Academy essay. Dilthey’s descriptive method goes in the opposite direction to Brentano’s and Husserl’s descriptive method.\(^{41}\) Unlike Brentano’s (and Husserl’s) descriptive method, Dilthey’s method does not attempt to understand the whole of life experiences in terms of its discrete parts, i.e., as abstractable and analyzable mental events occurring, somehow, in consciousness — in his 1894 essay Dilthey famously called this latter approach ‘brooding (Grübelet) over oneself’.\(^{42}\) Rather, Dilthey sought to
understand and to analyse the meaning of the parts (individual experiences) in terms of the whole (of life), i.e., Dilthey sought a descriptive-hermeneutic-analytic understanding of the meaning of life itself that is historically embedded and expressed in particular life experiences themselves and in the products of such life experiences (e.g. plays, poems, cultural objects etc.) from within the overall context of their lived experience. Thus Dilthey’s descriptive method seeks to understand individual life experiences from the whole of life experiences, i.e., from the entire context in which and through which such experiences are expressed, and vice versa, i.e., the whole of life that is partially expressed in such products themselves.

The influential figure lying behind Dilthey’s descriptive-hermeneutic method sketched in his 1894 Academy essay, of course, is not Brentano as intimated by Heidegger in his 1925 lecture-course, but Schleiermacher as Heidegger himself indicates in a short series of public lectures which Heidegger also gave around this time in 1925, at Kassel, on ‘Wilhelm Dilthey’s Research and the Current Struggle for a Historical Worldview’. In these lectures Heidegger remarks that it was ‘under Schleiermacher’s influence, [that] Dilthey saw knowledge within the context of the whole of life’, and so, ‘the 1860s were decisive [for Dilthey], not because of neo-Kantianism but because of Dilthey’s tendency to understand the human condition on the basis of a total comprehension of the human being’. After completing his doctoral dissertation ‘De principiis ethicii Schleiermacheri’ in 1864, the 1860s culminated for Dilthey, as Heidegger notes, in the publication of the first part of his biography on The Life of Schleiermacher in 1870 (which Heidegger recommended to one of his doctoral students to read in 1918). Dilthey’s researches were extensive, but, as Heidegger also remarks, ‘(O)nly two major works appeared during his life time, and they both remained at volume one: The Life of Schleiermacher [1870] and Introduction to the Human Sciences [1883].’ And other essays that were published during his life time were always, as Heidegger comments, ‘preliminary, incomplete, and on the way’, and ‘entitled “Contributions to […]”, “Ideas Concerning […]”, “Attempts at […]”.’ Indeed, it was only after Dilthey’s death that these ‘incomplete’ essays (which had been scattered in various journals), with other unpublished essays, were collated and published in Dilthey’s Collected Works in 1914. Throughout his academic career, then, Dilthey devoted himself to developing the hermeneutic manner of thinking, both in his published and unpublished writings, and, ‘especially from 1883 onwards,’ as one historian of philosophy notes, ‘Dilthey drew a sharp distinction between the abstractness of Kant’s thought and his own concrete approach [to the whole of life].’

By comparison to Dilthey, in the 1860s the influential figure lying behind Brentano’s early philosophical career is not Schleiermacher, but Aristotle. In 1862 Brentano completed and published his doctoral dissertation On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle (which Heidegger first read in 1907). This was followed by his 1866 habilitation thesis on The Psychology of Aristotle, in Particular His Doctrine of the Active Intellect, which was published in 1867. Thus in the 1860s Brentano had earned for himself the reputation of a young but significant Scholastic commentator on Aristotle (and Aquinas). In the 1870s, however, Brentano turned his attention away from the Aristotelian world view, and adopted a ‘modern conception’ of psychology that defines its ‘experiential basis’ and modus operandi by way of ‘the inner perception of our own psychical phenomena’. In this decade, and throughout the 1880s and into the 1890s, the
dominant figure behind Brentano’s philosophizing is Descartes, followed by Locke and Hume, where access to consciousness and its contents is regarded ‘as peculiarly direct and certain as compared with our knowledge of anything else’.\(^\text{55}\) Indeed, in *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1874) Brentano now argues that we can define ‘psychology’, contra Aristotle and the Aristotelians, as a science ‘without a soul’;\(^\text{56}\)

(F)or whether or not there are souls, the fact is that there are psychical phenomena [whose existence is given and guaranteed *via* ‘inner perception’ as is evident from the context]. Nothing, therefore, stands in our way if we adopt the modern definition [of psychology as the science of psychical phenomena] instead of defining psychology as the science of the soul. Perhaps both are correct. The differences, which still exist between them, are that the old definition contains metaphysical presuppositions from which the modern one is free […]\(^\text{55}\). Consequently, the adoption of the modern conception simplifies our work. Furthermore, it offers an additional advantage: any exclusion of an unrelated question not only simplifies, but also reinforces the work. It shows that the results of our investigations are dependent on fewer presuppositions, and thus lends greater certainty to our convictions.\(^\text{57}\)

It is this very ‘modern definition’ and ‘modern conception’ of philosophical psychology that advances the method of inner reflection on the nature of consciousness and its objectivities that Dilthey decidedly did not adopt from the very outset of his studies in the 1860s, and throughout his career in philosophy — it being thoroughly abstract (ahistorical).\(^\text{58}\) For Dilthey, therefore, both the dominant natural-scientific approach to the study of ‘man’ in empirical psychology and the modern self-reflective model of ‘consciousness understanding itself’ championed by Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant, Brentano (the descriptive psychologist) and Husserl (the descriptive-eidetic psychologist) are equally inappropriate methods to be deployed in the study of the meaning of experiences that are characteristically lived by human beings and that are addressed in the ‘human sciences’ (*Geisteswissenschaften*).\(^\text{59}\) Thus it is of importance to draw attention to the point, as Bambach does, that,

The term *Geisteswissenschaft(en)* is a crucial term for Dilthey […]. The term signifies for Dilthey that group of studies dealing with the cultural spirit of humanity: history, psychology, economics, sociology, philosophy, anthropology, politics, religion, literature, and others. It is to be carefully differentiated from the term *Naturwissenschaft*, which includes all the fields in the natural sciences. The differences between these two branches of study are not merely terminological but, more fundamental, also *methodological*. Nature is ‘explained,’ as Dilthey puts it, but spirit is ‘understood.’ This difference between explanation (*Erklären*) and understanding (*Verstehen*) points to the centrality of hermeneutics for a theory of the human sciences.\(^\text{60}\)

We can thus understand why Dilthey would have been particularly impressed by the *first volume* of Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*, the *Prolegomena*, when it appeared in 1900, wherein ‘naturalism in the particular form of psychologism, specifically psychologism in the particular field of logic’, as Heidegger points out to his students, is refuted,\(^\text{61}\) but less than impressed by the ensuing second volume, published in the following year in 1901, and in two parts, comprising the Six Logical Investigations — which Heidegger notes elsewhere, are ‘three times as long’ as volume one\(^\text{62}\) — wherein Husserl clarifies, through descriptive-eidetic-psychological analyses, the experiences of a (abstract, ahistorical) *normative logical consciousness as such*. Dilthey’s idea of a
descriptive psychology begins with what Husserl (and Brentano) leaves out, namely, with the lived nature of human experiences themselves, and seeks a comprehensive understanding of the meaning of those experiences in the facticity of their lived, historical, social, personal, mundane and, ultimately, temporal existence. Meaning is to be found within those experiences themselves, in the context of their lived nature, and not by way of either factual-inner perception or eidetic-intuitive inspection of intentional consciousness and its contents in inner reflection as advocated by the Brentanean-Husserlian school of descriptive a priori psychology from about the mid-1870s onwards.

It was, therefore, in opposition to both the natural-scientific and the self-reflective model of consciousness reflecting upon itself approaches to studying the meaning of human experience that Dilthey proposed an alternative method of studying human experience (Erlebnis) for the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften), one that would describe and analyze, without dissecting into atomic units, the way in which human life experience expresses its own understanding of its life experience, from poetry to prose.63 Thus Dilthey argued,

Because our mental life finds its fullest and most complete expression only through language, […] explication finds completion and fullness only in the interpretation of the written testimonies of human life.64

It was by taking this cue from Dilthey, however, that Heidegger managed to overcome ‘a main [methodological] difficulty (eine Hauptschwierigkeit)’ regarding how to actually conduct ‘the manner of thinking that calls itself phenomenology’, with which he tells us he struggled for many years in his early career in philosophy as he read and re-read Husserl’s texts in phenomenology from 1909 onwards and after he became Husserl’s assistant-lecturer in philosophy at Freiburg University from 1919 to 1923, ‘teaching and learning in Husserl’s proximity.’65 Heidegger’s solution to his difficulty was as simple as it was revolutionary in comparison to Husserl’s established way of doing phenomenology: the way to practice ‘phenomenological seeing’, so Heidegger argues, is to hear what is expressed in the words themselves.66 Thus in Heidegger’s Diltheyean-inspired, hermeneutic way of doing phenomenology, ‘hearing’ what is expressed in the written word must re-place, and so, dis-place ‘seeing’ that which is retrievable in and through consciousness’s reflection upon itself, i.e., Husserl’s stipulated way of doing phenomenology.67 Or, perhaps more accurately speaking, for Heidegger, it is only through hearing what is expressed in the written word that seeing what is talked about is made present.68 Hence Heidegger’s singular but characteristic hermeneutic style or ‘way of thinking’ (Denkweg) about his topic in philosophy and phenomenology as he goes about ‘researching’ and ‘engaging’ with what is ‘said’ and ‘written’ about ‘the meaning of Being’, but with particular reference to that which is left ‘unthought’ (ungedacht) by the author but nevertheless implicitly expressed in the testimony of that author’s text and inviting ‘retrieval’.69 This is in-deed, both in theory and in practice, a generous application of Dilthey’s hermeneutic manner of thinking to issues in philosophy and phenomenological research, and to the topic of the question of the meaning of Being in particular, just as Heidegger intimates to his students in his 1925 lecture course.70
II
Hearing Replaces Seeing (Dilthey Replaces Husserl)

The following gloss by Heidegger in his 1925 lectures at Marburg University, purportedly on the theory of linguistic expression and perception elaborated by Husserl in the Sixth Logical Investigation, indicates the extent to which Heidegger, in his ‘way of thinking’, has internalised his methodological switch and adherence to Dilthey’s hermeneutic approach, for, according to Heidegger,

It is […] a matter of fact that our simplest perceptions and constitutive states are already expressed, even more, are interpreted in a certain way. What is primary and originary here? [Heidegger rhetorically asks, and he answers.] It is not so much that we see the object and things […] rather the reverse; we see what one says about the matter. 71

Because Heidegger situates his commentary above directly on Husserl’s text of the Logical Investigations, some commentators have been lead to believe — wrongly, in my opinion — that here Heidegger is unearthing and developing something embryonic in Husserl’s position of the Sixth Logical Investigation. 72 Such is clearly not the case. What Heidegger is defending here is a version of Dilthey’s views on the way linguistic acts of meaning contain the highest step in the expression of meaning in human experience, and not Husserl’s actual position in the Sixth Logical Investigation, for whom ‘(S)ignitive acts constitute the lowest step: they possess no fullness whatever [my emphasis]’. 73 In direct contra-distinction to Husserl’s views on this matter, Dilthey argued, in his well-known triad, that all human experience (Erlebnis) contains implicitly some form of understanding (Verstehen) which in turn is completed and raised to a higher level of meaning in expression (Ausdruck). 74 From a Diltheyean-hermeneutic point of view, therefore, it is not a fact of linguistic experience, as Husserl would lead us to believe in the Sixth Logical Investigation, that linguistic acts of meaning are ‘empty-intending acts’ requiring perceptually founded objects to ‘complete’ their meaning (whatever ontological status such ‘intentional objects’ may have). It is a fact of linguistic experience, however, that the meaning and understanding of an individual (lived) experience is not ‘crossed out’ but ‘raised’ and ‘intensified’ in its meaning in its expression, be it in a word, a sentence, a poem, a play, a story, a philosophical treatise, or an object of culture etc. 75 And this, of course, can be said of and includes ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ itself because it too, the meaning of Being (Sinn des Seins), as Heidegger insists in Being and Time, pushing Dilthey’s manner of thinking in a direction that Dilthey himself did not go, ‘can be something unconceptualised (unbegriffen), but it never completely fails to be understood (es ist nie völlig unverstanden)’. 76 That is to say, we all, as a matter of fact, have some implicit understanding what it means to be a being in Being (Seinsverständnis), and this ‘fact of life’, or ‘issue’ is both open to and invites hermeneutic expression and inquiry. If this is the case, then Heidegger is quite right to stress in Being and Time that for him, ‘(O)nly as [Diltheyean-hermeneutic] phenomenology, is ontology [the study of the meaning of Being] possible.’ 77 And so, Heidegger’s argument pointedly unfolds in Being and Time, despite the latter’s incompleteness, that the question of the meaning of Being must be traced back to the lived experience (or ‘facticity’) of the ‘There’ (Da) of ‘Being’ (Sein), and in which one finds oneself implicated as that-which-is (als Seiendes) in Being with some ‘understanding of Being (Seinsverständnis)’. 78 In
this ‘reduction’, Heidegger clearly composes a Kierkegaardian-existentialistic rendering of Dilthey’s triad of Erlebnis-Verstehen-Ausdruck in terms of the expressed concern about what goes about (es geht um) and is at issue for that being’s understanding of its own being in being in Dasein, at the basis of his attempted retrieval of ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ in his unfinished essay of Being and Time.79 And yet, this existentialistic rendering of Dilthey’s thesis is configured upon a possibility that Heidegger found inherent in Dilthey’s hermeneutic manner of thinking, and not one that is discernible, as Heidegger correctly indicates to his students in his 1925 lectures, in Husserl’s early descriptive-eidetic-psychological analyses of the Logical Investigations or in Husserl’s later transcendental-idealistic analyses of Ideas I (1913) and Ideas II (1924).80

III
Some Conclusions and Some Critical Assessments

According to Heidegger, the ‘understanding of Being’ that is definitive of Dasein’s mode of being-in-the-world differs from any understanding of Being that is gained in and through cognitive-reflection on that-which-is, or on beings as beings. In point of fact, identifying and pointing to ‘that-which-is’ (das Seiende) that either comes into existence or goes out of existence cannot add to or subtract from Dasein’s ‘understanding of Being’ (Seinsverständnis) because such indication presupposes the facticity of some understanding of Being already there for Dasein, but whose meaning has been deferred in the process. It is, therefore, both a central contention and a fundamental limit in Heidegger’s formulation and elaboration of ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ in Being and Time that there is ‘an understanding of Being’ that is always and already present implicitly in Dasein, the back behind of which we cannot go, i.e., that we cannot think, when addressing ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ in phenomenology and phenomenological research. Heidegger thinks that (t)his position on the facticity of Dasein in phenomenology and phenomenological research is unchallengeable and unquestionable, for, pointing to that-which-is or beings in their being, will, as noted above, obstruct the issue at hand, or at least it will lead to a fundamental mis-targeting of the issue at hand (die Sache selbst) that Heidegger wishes to address in his ‘Being-question’. ‘Doesn’t insistence on what is,’ Heidegger rhetorically asks in his late lecture ‘The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking’, ‘block access to what-is?’ (Versperrt die Insistenz auf dem Beweisbaren nicht den Weg zu dem, was ist?) .81 And, of course, insistence by us on what is does indeed prevents access to the way what is, is because insistence on the being of the being of beings invariably deflects attention from the ‘(implicit) understanding of Being’ that is already presupposed as a precondition for and in any such (actual or possible) ostentation. And yet, the latter is the way the meaning of what-is is, that is to say, the way the meaning of what-is is lived, understood and expressed, however unconceptualised, so Heidegger insists in Diltheyean-phenomenological fashion.

For Heidegger, then, questions pertaining to the ‘understanding of Being’ and to the being of the being of beings must be kept not only distinct but also unrelated in his starting-point in philosophy and phenomenological research. The former belongs to phenomenology, just as Husserl insists, the latter remains
outside of phenomenological remit, just as Husserl also insists. The ‘understanding of Being’ and the being of the being of beings, therefore, are entirely different concepts of being in Heidegger’s philosophy. Heidegger himself clearly recognizes this distinction in *Being and Time*. Heidegger, in point of fact, insists on this distinction in *Being and Time* precisely because his ‘way of thinking’ about ‘the Being-Question’ and its relation to *Dasein* clearly requires it. Heidegger, however, does not explore this distinction any further in *Being and Time* (or in later works). Heidegger’s starting point and finishing point in philosophy and phenomenological research, therefore, remains asserted, not argued for, nor vouchsafed, and the same throughout his path of thinking about ‘the Being-Question’, namely:

Entities are [Heidegger’s emphasis], quite independently of the experiences by which they are disclosed, the acquaintance in which they are discovered, and the grasping in which their nature is ascertained. But [the meaning of] Being ‘is’ only in the understanding of those entities to whose Being something like an understanding of Being belongs.

In order for Heidegger to maintain this position, nevertheless, Heidegger must acknowledge, as de Boer acutely points out, *that there is a being* [small ‘b’] of the being of entities that *precedes* the Being of the understanding of Being [big ‘B’]. Heidegger does not turn to the significance of this first being of the being of entities that is not reducible to the understanding of Being of those entities deposited in *Dasein*, in his ‘path of thinking’ about ‘the Being-question’. The being of the being of entities is set aside, and not returned to in the development of Heidegger’s thought, just as it had been set aside and not returned to in the development of Husserl’s thought either. Here Heidegger joins Husserl (and joins Dilthey to Husserl). Recall Husserl’s famous transcendental reduction. Outside of all that we can know and actually do know about things given to outer perceptual-sense experience, there is ‘nothing’ of any intelligible or sensible nature to know ‘in itself’; there is only ‘nonsensical thought’. *That* such things or entities *are* is not a matter for phenomenology and phenomenological research. Likewise, outside of the apodictic knowledge of the existence of a currently lived psychical-act experience (and its intentional object, if it exists) in an act of immanent perception — whose non-existence is inconceivable — lies *its* existence; but *that* such an experience exists (in its temporal facticity as Dilthey understands it) in immanent perception is not a matter for phenomenology and phenomenological research in *Husserl’s definition of phenomenology*. The facticity of individual (lived) experience is to be ignored because its meaning is not susceptible to scientific analysis and scientific generalization or to conceptual analysis in any form, in Husserl’s eidetic eyes. There can be no eidetic science of the ‘thiness’ of a particular experience here and now. And precisely because the essential features of such lived-experiences is all that counts *methodologically* in Husserl’s definition of phenomenology, the very lived nature of the particular experiences themselves in their uniqueness must be passed over and not entertained as a matter for philosophy and phenomenological research. This is what Heidegger means, influenced by his reading of Dilthey, when he emphasizes in his 1925 lectures to his students in his ‘immanent critique’ of Husserl’s philosophical starting-point that ‘the being of the intentional [acts of consciousness] […] *gets lost precisely through them* [i.e. through both the eidetic and the transcendental reductions]*. And yet *Heidegger himself* does not return to *this facticity* of the
life experiences in *Dasein*. That I exist, that you exist, that you die, that I die are not the concern of Heidegger’s phenomenology either, but my understanding of myself in anticipation as a being-for-death (*Vorlaufen zum Tode*) is. Outside of one’s own actual understanding of oneself as a being-for-death, that you are murdered, or that blood-lust and domination ‘exists’ (not in Heidegger’ sense of that term) is not the concern of *Dasein in Being and Time*. It is at this point that Lévinas, taking up Dilthey’s comprehensive perspective on a philosophy of life, raises the following critical question from within both Husserl and Heidegger’s phenomenologies and their respective phenomenological researches: is not the very anonymous existence of things that are and of experiences that are a presupposition itself requiring and inviting a hermeneutic investigation? Pursuing this matter for investigation, however, would lie both beyond and outside of the dual limits which Husserl set in the transcendental reduction on the ‘understanding of Being’ as thing given to outer perceptual-sense experience and as (conscious) experience immanently perceived, and beyond and outside of the existential-phenomenological reduction and limit set by Heidegger on ‘the understanding of Being’ as that which is hermeneutically deposited and retrievable in anxious anticipation, in the present, of one’s own death in the future in *Dasein* as the root of the ‘understanding of Being’ and the sole ‘matter at stake’ that needs to be thought methodologically in philosophy and phenomenological research. Rather, pursuing this facticity of the ‘understanding of Being’ in life experiences for hermeneutic inquiry would require, *inter alia*, acknowledging the primacy of the existence of one’s own fellow human being outside of any ‘understanding of Being’ that is capable of being retrieved either by way of Husserlian transcendental-phenomenological reduction to one’s own actual, perceptual intentional consciousness and its objectivities or by way of Heideggerean analysis of *Dasein* for whom *that being’s own being alone* is what counts in the ‘understanding of Being’. And, in point of fact, Heidegger himself suggests as much to his students in his 1925 lectures, for, as Heidegger queries (rhetorically) against Husserl’s analyses of *Ideas II* (which he had received in unpublished manuscript-form from Husserl earlier in the year) and answers (rhetorically) in favor of a hint given by Dilthey:

> How is the life of the other originally given? As an epistemological question, it is presented as the problem of how we come to know an alien consciousness. But this way of posing the question [by Husserl] is mistaken because it overlooks the fact that life is primarily always already life with others, a knowledge of them as fellow human beings. Yet Dilthey never pursued these questions any further. What is essential for him is that the structured context of life is acquired, and thus determined by its history.

Whether Heidegger is correct in his estimation that Dilthey never pursued any further the question pertaining to the significance of the existence of one’s own fellow human being in ‘the fact that life is primarily always already life with others’, or not, Heidegger certainly does not and cannot press this issue any further because his existentialistic rendering of Dilthey’s triad of *Erlebnis-Verstehen-Ausdruck* in terms of the expressed concern that Dasein has for its own being as that which lies at stake in *Dasein* precludes him. Nevertheless, if Heidegger, following Dilthey, is right, and if our ‘understanding of Being’ extends equally to the world, myself and my fellow human being, then the critical question that Lévinas raises against Heidegger’s appropriation of Dilthey’s
manner of thinking is this: how can I reach ‘an understanding of Being’ that is not mine but shareable and therefore for the common good of each and any understanding of Being that I can and do reach? Focusing on Dasein — i.e. on the awareness of the ‘There (Da)’ of Being (Sein), and in which one finds oneself implicated as a being in being and as a being-for-one’s-own-death — methodologically excludes a prioristically such an ethical (or ‘metaphysical’ in Lévinas’s sense) possibility within (hermeneutic) phenomenology and phenomenological research. Heidegger’s insistence in Being and Time on the ontic-ontological priority of ‘the understanding of Being’ in Dasein as that the-back-behind-of-which we cannot think, then, is itself a presupposition, an assertion that needs to be tested for its hermeneutic-phenomenological credentials. This is why Lévinas, in his work in philosophy and phenomenological research, therefore, believes it philosophically necessary to bring Dilthey’s manner of thinking back-into-step with itself, as it were, and in the direction of the ‘otherness’ of the ‘other’, in order to out-step Heidegger’s appropriation and stultification of Dilthey’s hermeneutic in the existential analytic of Dasein promoted in Being and Time.91

According to Dilthey, ‘(T)he religious thinker, the artist, and the philosopher create on the basis of lived experience.’ Seen in this light, ‘Biblical verses [that contain the expression and understanding of life experiences of the prophets] do not function here as proof’, as Lévinas points out against Heidegger’s ‘account’ or ‘story’ and ‘formulation’ of man’s self-understanding in the historical unfolding of ‘the Being-Question’, ‘but as testimony of a tradition and an experience.’92 ‘Don’t they’, therefore, Lévinas rhetorically asks, ‘have as much right as Hölderin and Trakl to be cited?’,93 and to be invited, in any engagement of man’s reflection on his and her self-understanding? And of course they do, if you follow Dilthey’s philosophy of life; however, if you follow Dilthey’s starting-point in philosophy — and Heidegger professes he does — here there can be no ‘science’ of man’s self-understanding, only hermeneutic ‘retrieval’ and ‘interpretation of’ the significances-of-the-way-of-life that unfolds in and through human experiences (Erlebnisse) themselves.94 And this entails, both hermeneutically and philosophically, no prioritizing by Heidegger of Dasein’s concern for its own being-for-death in ‘the understanding of Being’ (Seinsverständnis), and no aprioristic exclusion of the significance of ‘the call’ (der Ruf) that one’s own fellow human being makes, in conscience, on my ‘understanding of Being’ — ‘an understanding of Being’ that Heidegger acknowledges extends to and includes, equally, not only oneself and the world but also one’s own fellow human being, but of whom scant treatment can be found or heard in Being and Time, or in Heidegger’s earlier or later works.

NOTES

1 This controversy concerning what exactly Heidegger’s topic in philosophy is, is well summed up by Otto Pöggeler, a student of Heidegger’s, when he remarks in his 1983 ‘Afterword to the Second Edition’ of Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers (1963) that: ‘in the case of Heidegger, one can validly assert that by means of Sein und Zeit he decisively altered the significant phenomenological philosophy of Husserl and Scheler, that due to Oskar Becker he brought along the way with him a philosophy of mathematics and through Bultmann a new theology, and that with new impetus he later, above all, decisively determined continental European philosophy. To be sure, in all of these effects the dispute about what was ultimately at issue in Heidegger’s thinking remained.’ Martin Heidegger’s Path of Thinking, trans. by Daniel Magurshak and

2 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962, 2000); Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1927, 1957), also published, in a separate printing, in Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, ed. by Edmund Husserl, Vol. 8 (1927), 1–438. Though published as a work in phenomenology, ascertaining the philosophical influence of Husserl’s phenomenology in Heidegger’s Being and Time (and in other works) is quite difficult. After making the point that ‘Husserl’s phenomenology was of paramount importance for the conception and composition of Being and Time,’ one recent commentator, alas, is forced to continue and to admit, ‘yet it is difficult to say exactly what the nature and scope of his [Husserl’s] influence on Heidegger amounted to in the end.’ Taylor Carman, Heidegger’s Analytic. Interpretation, Discourse, and Authenticity in ‘Being and Time’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 53. Unless the nature and scope of Husserl’s influence on Heidegger’s philosophy is determined, however, it will be difficult to substantiate the claim that Husserl’s phenomenology was of paramount importance for the conception and composition of the philosophy of ‘the Being-question’ attempted by Heidegger in Being and Time.


5 Cf. Martin Heidegger, ‘The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking’, in M. Heidegger, On Time and Being, trans. by Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1972; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), pp. 55–73 (p. 72); ‘Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens’ (1964), in Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1969). Taking his cue from Husserl’s (and Hegel’s) call (Ruf) to go back ‘to the thing itself’, Heidegger remarks: ‘We have chosen a discussion of the call “to the thing itself” (“zur Sache selbst”) as our guideline (als Wegweiser). It was to bring us to the path (auf den Weg) which leads us to a determination of the task of thinking at the end of philosophy. […] From the perspective of Hegel and Husserl — and not only from their perspective — the matter of philosophy (Die Sache der Philosophie) is subjectivity. It is not the matter as such that is controversial for the call, but rather its presentation (ihre Darstellung) by which the matter itself becomes present. […] The two methods [of Hegel and Husserl] are as different as they could possibly be. But the matter as such, which they are to present, is the same, although it is experienced in different ways. But of what help are these discoveries to us in our attempt to bring the task of thinking to view? They don’t help us at all as long as we do not go beyond a mere discussion of the call and ask what remains unthought (ungedacht) in the call “to the thing itself.”’ Questioning in this way, we can become aware (Auf diese Weise fragend, können wir darauf aufmerksam werden) how something which it is no longer the matter of philosophy to think conceals itself (sich etwas verbirgt) precisely where philosophy has brought its matter (inwiefern gerade dort, wo die Philosophie ihre Sache […] gebracht hat) to absolute knowledge and to ultimate evidence (ins absolute Wissen und zur letztgültigen Evidenz).’ (p. 63–64:70–71, my emphases.)

6 History of the Concept of Time, p. 24. Heidegger even remarks that ‘(In a letter to Husserl, he [Dilthey] compared their work to boring into a mountain from opposite sides until they break through and meet each other. Dilthey here found an initial fulfilment [in Husserl’s Logical Investigations] of what he had sought for decades and formulated as a critical program in the Academy essay of 1894: a fundamental science of life itself’ (ibid.). What Heidegger does not point out to his students, however, is that whilst Dilthey certainly did compare his work to Husserl’s as boring into the same mountain [=Erlebnisse] they did so from opposite sides, and when they meet, it is Husserl who has to give way to Dilthey, not Dilthey to Husserl, in any ‘[interpretive] science of life’.

Brentano's next published work after *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* was in Ethics, *Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis* (Leipzig, 1889); *On the Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong*, trans. by Roderick M. Chisholm & E. Schnerwind (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969). In the Foreword to this study, Brentano announces this as part of his new work in descriptive psychology.
its causal activity, produces presentations of colours and sounds and various other forms, that we are afraid, get angry, feel pleased and experience other emotions. But that which these mental activities refer to as their content and which really does not appear to be external is, in actuality, no more outside of us than in us. It is mere appearance, just as the physical phenomena which appear to us in waking life really correspond to no reality although people often assume the opposite. Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, pp. 175–6. Thus if we compare (unphenomenologically) ‘physical phenomena’ in the sense of sensorially perceived objects to what a natural scientist discovers and establishes as a matter of natural-scientific fact as the object of its research, Brentano thinks (naturalistically) that we are justified in concluding that the sensorially perceived objects or so-called qualia or secondary-qualities of outer perceptual-sense experiences have a merely phenomenal mode of existence by comparison to the actual (wirklich), real (extra-mental) mode of existence discovered in natural science, for: ‘I believe that I will not be mistaken if I assume that the definition of natural science as the science of physical phenomena is frequently connected with the concept of forces belonging to a world which is similar to the one extended in space and flowing in time; forces which, through their influence on the sense organs, arouse sensation and mutually influence each other in their action, and of which natural science investigates the laws of co-existence and succession. If those objects [‘physical phenomena’] are considered as the objects of natural sciences, there is also the advantage [over ‘physical phenomena’ considered as sensorial objects of actual acts of outer perceptual-sense from a descriptive-psychological point of view, as is evident from the context] that this science appears to have as its object something that really and truly exists’ (pp. 99–100). Earlier in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Brentano had already asserted the point: ‘The phenomena of light [colours], sound, heat, spatial location and locomotion which he [the natural scientist] studies are not things which really and truly exist. [Instead] They are signs of something real, which, through its causal activity, produces presentations of them [e.g. colours, sounds etc.] for the experiencing

15 Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, p.77.
16 Ibid., p. 77.
17 Ibid., p. 86.
18 Ibid., p. 77.
21 John Locke famously held that all our knowledge came from the twin founts of sensation and reflection. Cf. J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. R. Woolhouse (London: Penguin, 1997), Book II, ch 1. The way consciousness knows itself, according to Locke, is by reflecting on its own contents. Brentano never relinquishes this Cartesian-Lockean assumption concerning the manner in which consciousness can, in light of its own evidence, gain knowledge about itself from within itself, in the elaboration of his idea of descriptive psychology. In a ‘Supplement’ to a re-issue of his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Brentano re-iterates and stresses this point: ‘The fact that the mentally active subject has himself as object of a secondary reference, regardless of what else he refers to as his primary object, is of great importance’ (p. 276–77). This assumption, however, is premised on acceptance of a radical metaphysical separation of a lucid mind and opaque body within the being of human subjectivity, a metaphysical assumption that was later to be called into question by others, residing outside of Brentano’s school of descriptive psychology, on existential-phenomenological grounds. Cf. Philip Bartok, ‘Brentano’s Intentionality Thesis: Beyond the Analytic and Phenomenological Readings’, Journal of History of Philosophy, vol. 43, no. 4 (2005) 437–60, esp. p. 443 and pp. 445–446.
22 Brentano also coined the term ‘Psychognosie’ for the descriptive part of the science of empirical psychology and the term ‘psychognost’ for the descriptive psychologist. He borrowed the idea of dividing the science of empirical psychology into two component parts of a descriptive and a genetic part from a model that occurred in other natural sciences. ‘In the same way as orognosy and geognosy precede geology in the field of mineralogy, and anatomy generally precedes physiology in the more closely related field of the human organism, psychognosy [descriptive psychology] […] must be positioned prior to genetic psychology’ Descriptive Psychology, § 1 ‘Psychognosy and Genetic Psychology’, pp. 3–11 (p. 8). Cf. also Brentano’s letter to his friend and former student Oscar Kraus in 1895, published in Appendix to Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint: ‘My school distinguishes between a psychognosy and a genetic psychology (in distant analogy to geognosy and geology)’ (pp. 369–370, trans. mod.). Cf., also, Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, p. 34.
23 ‘It is true that in dreams we have presentations of colours and sounds and various other forms, that we are afraid, get angry, feel pleased and experience other emotions. But that which these mental activities refer to as their content and which really does not appear to be external is, in actuality, no more outside of us than in us. It is mere appearance, just as the physical phenomena which appear to us in waking life really correspond to no reality although people often assume the opposite’. Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, pp. 175–6. Thus if we compare (unphenomenologically) ‘physical phenomena’ in the sense of sensorially perceived objects to what a natural scientist discovers and establishes as a matter of natural-scientific fact as the object of its research, Brentano thinks (naturalistically) that we are justified in concluding that the sensorially perceived objects or so-called qualia or secondary-qualities of outer perceptual-sense experiences have a merely phenomenal mode of existence by comparison to the actual (wirklich), real (extra-mental) mode of existence discovered in natural science, for: ‘I believe that I will not be mistaken if I assume that the definition of natural science as the science of physical phenomena is frequently connected with the concept of forces belonging to a world which is similar to the one extended in space and flowing in time; forces which, through their influence on the sense organs, arouse sensation and mutually influence each other in their action, and of which natural science investigates the laws of co-existence and succession. If those objects [‘physical phenomena’] are considered as the objects of natural sciences, there is also the advantage [over ‘physical phenomena’ considered as sensorial objects of actual acts of outer perceptual-sense from a descriptive-psychological point of view, as is evident from the context] that this science appears to have as its object something that really and truly exists’ (pp. 99–100). Earlier in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Brentano had already asserted the point: ‘The phenomena of light [colours], sound, heat, spatial location and locomotion which he [the natural scientist] studies are not things which really and truly exist. [Instead] They are signs of something real, which, through its causal activity, produces presentations of them [e.g. colours, sounds etc.] for the experiencing
subject).’ (p. 19). Brentano does not explain how or why such real objects of scientific discovery (e.g. light rays, sine waves) actually produce, causally, the so-called \textit{qualia} or secondary-qualities (e.g. sounds, colours) of outer perceptual-sense experience, or the relevance of such natural-scientific facts for descriptive psychology.

24 ‘Psychology, like all natural sciences, has its basis in perception (\textit{Wahrnehmung}) and experience (\textit{Erfahrung}). Above all, however, its source is to be found in the \textit{inner perception} (\textit{inner Wahrnehmung}) of our own psychical phenomena (\textit{inneren psychischen Phänomen}). We would never know what a thought is, or a judgement, pleasure or pain, desires or aversions, hopes or fears, courage or despair, decisions and voluntary intentions if we did not learn what they are through \textit{inner perception} of our own phenomena. Note, however, that we said that \textit{inner perception} (\textit{inner Wahrnehmung}) and not introspection, i.e. \textit{inner observation} (\textit{innere Beobachtung}), constitutes this primary (\textit{erste}) and indispensable source (\textit{unentbehrliche Quelle}) of psychology.’ \textit{Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint}, Book I, Psychology as a Science, Chapter 2 ‘Psychological Method with Special Reference to its Experiential Basis’ (‘Über die Methode der Psychologie, insbesondere die Erfahrung, welche für sie die Grundlage bildet’), § 2., p. 40–4, trans. modified.

25 ‘(S)ince neither agreement nor complete clarity has been achieved regarding the delimitation of the two classes [of physical and psychical phenomena] […] Our aim is to clarify the meaning of the two terms \textit{“physical phenomenon”} and \textit{“psychical phenomenon,”} removing all misunderstanding and confusion concerning them.’ \textit{Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint}, p. 77–78.

26 This position, nevertheless, contains metaphysical dualistic assumptions of a lucid mind and an opaque body in human subjectivity. Cf. supra, n. 21.

27 Cf. Edmund Husserl, \textit{Phenomenological Psychology. Lectures, Summer Semester 1925}, trans. by John Scanlon (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), p. 28. \textit{Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925}; Hua Vol. IX, ed. by Walter Biemel (1968). In these lectures Husserl refers to Brentano ‘as path finder’ (\textit{als Wegbereiter}) in this entire area of descriptive-psychological research, cf. ‘Section (d) Brentano as pioneer for research in internal experience—discovery of intentionality as the fundamental character of the psychic’, pp. 23–7. Reflecting on the philosophical relationship between Brentano’s descriptive psychology and his own \textit{Logical Investigations}, however, Husserl also remarks about their essential methodological difference. ‘The \textit{Logical Investigations}’, Husserl recalls, ‘are fully influenced by Brentano’s suggestions, and should be readily understandable in view of the fact that I was a direct pupil of Brentano. And yet the idea of a descriptive psychology has undergone, in the \textit{Investigations}, a new change and also an essential transformation through an essentially new method, so much so that Brentano himself did not recognise it as the fruition of his own ideas.’ (p. 28). Brentano, of course, could not recognise Husserl’s descriptive-\textit{eidetic}-psychology as a fruition of his own ideas, given Brentano’s views on (Husserl’s) ‘essences’ as ‘fictional entities’, which any descriptive-\textit{empirical} psychology would find incomprehensible. Cf. Brentano, \textit{Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Appendix} (1911), Supplementary Remarks, IX ‘On Genuine and Fictitious Objects’, pp. 291–301. Cf., also, De Boer, \textit{The Development of Husserl’s Thought}, pp. 297–298.


In his 1925 Summer Semester Lecture course at Freiburg University, Husserl explicitly draws attention to his students of the fact that the task and significance of his Logical Investigations (1900–1901), which were ‘the results of my ten years effort’, lay in providing ‘eine Klärung der reinen Idee der Logik im Rückgang auf die im logischen Bewußtsein, im Erlebniszusammenhang logischen Denkens sich vollziehende Sinngebung oder Erkenntnisleistung’. Hua IX, § 3. ‘Aufgabe und Bedeutung der Logischen Untersuchungen’, p. 20; Phenomenological Psychology. Lectures, Summer Semester 1925, p. 22.


Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, pp. 20–23.

Heidegger would have encountered this difference in concepts of ‘descriptive psychology’ ab initio in his early career in philosophy, for, around the time he introduced himself to Husserl’s Logical Investigations in his first semester at Freiburg University in 1909, he was being introduced to Dilthey’s hermeneutic line of thinking in his theology classes. In a letter to Karl Löwith on September 13, 1920, Heidegger informs him that ‘I don’t have Dilthey’s works, only detailed excerpts, in part hand-copied by me as a theologian in 1909–10.’ Quoted by Theodore Kisiel in The Genesis of Heidegger’s ‘Being and Time’ (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 524, note 43. Cf., also, Heidegger’s remarks about his introduction to hermeneutics in his early student’s days in his 1922 ‘Vita, with an Accompanying Letter to Georg Misch’, in Becoming Heidegger: On the Trail of His Early Occasional Writings, 1910–1927, ed. by Theodore Kisiel and Thomas Sheehan (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007), pp. 104–109 (p. 107). During the time that he read and re-read Husserl’s Logical Investigations in he years following 1909, and Husserl’s Ideas I, when it was published in 1913, Heidegger continued to be interested in Dilthey’s work, and in many other thinkers outside of Husserl’s phenomenology, for, as he recalls in 1957: ‘What the exciting years between 1910 and 1914 meant for me cannot be adequately expressed; I can only indicate it by a selective enumeration: the second, significantly enlarged edition of Nietzscbe’s The Will to Power, the works of Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky in translation, the awakening interest in Hegel and Schelling, Rilke’s works and Trakl’s poems, Dilthey’s Collected Writings.’ M. Heidegger, ‘A Recollection (1957)’ in Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker, ed. by Thomas Sheehan (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, Inc, 1981), p. 22. According to Heidegger himself, it was as early as 1915 that ‘my [Heidegger’s] aversion to history, which had been nurtured in me by my predilection for mathematics, was thoroughly destroyed’. ‘Curriculum Vitae 1915’ in Becoming Heidegger, pp. 7–8 (p. 8). (Husserl, of course, was a trained mathematician before seriously studying philosophy with Brentano, and attempted to apply Brentano’s descriptive-psychological analysis to arithmetic in his first work in philosophy, published in 1891, The Philosophy of Arithmetic. Mathematics was the model of exact scientific knowledge for Brentano, too, in the elaboration of his idea of descriptive psychology. See supra, n. 29.) Heidegger credits his conversion to the significance of historical-hermeneutics in philosophy to his study of Fichte, Hegel, Rickert, Dilthey, and ‘lectures and seminar exercises [in history]’ of Prof. Finke. (ibid.). By the time Heidegger wrote his letter to Georg Misch (Dilthey’s son-in-law) in 1922, then, Heidegger is clearly convinced, as his remarks and emphasis indicate, that his own researches in philosophy and phenomenology is bringing out ‘the positive tendencies of “life philosophy”, and moving towards a “principled meditation-on-meaning” [Befinnung] within phenomenological research and its direction’ (p. 104). Thus Heidegger concludes, contra Husserl’s idea of phenomenology, and in Diltheyean fashion, that ‘(L)ife is approached [by Heidegger] as the basic comprehensive object of philosophical research. The self-illuminating comporting of factic life to itself is, on the cognitive level, interpretive exposition [Auslegung]; the principled scientific development of this exposition is phenomenological interpretation [Interpretation]; the genuine logic of philosophy is accordingly a principled phenomenological hermeneutics.’ (ibid.). Kisiel’s study corroborates Gadamer’s claim that Heidegger’s main ‘breakthrough to the topic’ of his philosophy and hermeneutic phenomenology dates as early as 1919, in his “war-emergency semester” lecture-course, entitled ‘The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldviews’. Cf. Kisiel, Genesis, p. 16. Though Heidegger read and read Husserl’s texts in phenomenology from 1909 onwards, by the time of the publication of Being and Time in

34 Hence the critical title of de Boer’s article, ‘The Descriptive Method of Franz Brentano: Its Two Functions and Their Significance for Phenomenology’ (my emphasis).
37 In his 1925 Summer Semester Lecture course at Freiburg University, Husserl explicitly draws attention to his students of the fact that the task and significance of his Logical Investigations (1900–1901), which were ‘the results of my ten years effort’, lay in providing ‘eine Klärung der reinen Idee der Logik im Rückgang auf die im logischen Bewußtsein, im Erlebniszusammenhang logischen Denkens sich vollziehende Sinngebung oder Erkenntnisleistung’. Hua IX, § 3. ‘Aufgabe und Bedeutung der Logischen Untersuchungen’, p. 20; Phenomenological Psychology. Lectures, Summer Semester 1925, p. 22.
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40 Heidegger would have encountered this difference in concepts of ‘descriptive psychology’ ab initio in his early career in philosophy, for, around the time he introduced himself to Husserl’s Logical Investigations in his first semester at Freiburg University in 1909, he was being introduced to Dilthey’s hermeneutic line of thinking in his theology classes. In a letter to Karl Löwith on September 13, 1920, Heidegger informs him that ‘I don’t have Dilthey’s works, only detailed excerpts, in part hand-copied by me as a theologian in 1909–10.’ Quoted by Theodore Kisiel in The Genesis of Heidegger’s ‘Being and Time’ (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 524, note 43. Cf., also, Heidegger’s remarks about his introduction to hermeneutics in his early student’s days in his 1922 ‘Vita, with an Accompanying Letter to Georg Misch’, in Becoming Heidegger: On the Trail of His Early Occasional Writings, 1910–1927, ed. by Theodore Kisiel and Thomas Sheehan (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007), pp. 104–109 (p. 107). During the time that he read and re-read Husserl’s Logical Investigations in he years following 1909, and Husserl’s Ideas I, when it was published in 1913, Heidegger continued to be interested in Dilthey’s work, and in many other thinkers outside of Husserl’s phenomenology, for, as he recalls in 1957: ‘What the exciting years between 1910 and 1914 meant for me cannot be adequately expressed; I can only indicate it by a selective enumeration: the second, significantly enlarged edition of Nietzsche’s The Will to Power, the works of Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky in translation, the awakening interest in Hegel and Schelling, Rilke’s works and Trakl’s poems, Dilthey’s Collected Writings.’ M. Heidegger, ‘A Recollection (1957)’ in Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker, ed. by Thomas Sheehan (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, Inc, 1981), p. 22. According to Heidegger himself, it was as early as 1915 that ‘my [Heidegger’s] aversion to history, which had been nurtured in me by my predilection for mathematics, was thoroughly destroyed’. ‘Curriculum Vitae 1915’ in Becoming Heidegger, pp. 7–8 (p. 8). (Husserl, of course, was a trained mathematician before seriously studying philosophy with Brentano, and attempted to apply Brentano’s descriptive-psychological analysis to arithmetic in his first work in philosophy, published in 1891, The Philosophy of Arithmetic. Mathematics was the model of exact scientific knowledge for Brentano, too, in the elaboration of his idea of descriptive psychology. See supra, n. 29.) Heidegger credits his conversion to the significance of historical-hermeneutics in philosophy to his study of Fichte, Hegel, Rickert, Dilthey, and ‘lectures and seminar exercises [in history]’ of Prof. Finke. (ibid.). By the time Heidegger wrote his letter to Georg Misch (Dilthey’s son-in-law) in 1922, then, Heidegger is clearly convinced, as his remarks and emphasis indicate, that his own researches in philosophy and phenomenology is bringing out ‘the positive tendencies of “life philosophy”, and moving towards a “principled meditation-on-meaning” [Befinnung] within phenomenological research and its direction’ (p. 104). Thus Heidegger concludes, contra Husserl’s idea of phenomenology, and in Diltheyean fashion, that ‘(L)ife is approached [by Heidegger] as the basic comprehensive object of philosophical research. The self-illuminating comporting of factic life to itself is, on the cognitive level, interpretive exposition [Auslegung]; the principled scientific development of this exposition is phenomenological interpretation [Interpretation]; the genuine logic of philosophy is accordingly a principled phenomenological hermeneutics.’ (ibid.). Kisiel’s study corroborates Gadamer’s claim that Heidegger’s main ‘breakthrough to the topic’ of his philosophy and hermeneutic phenomenology dates as early as 1919, in his “war-emergency semester” lecture-course, entitled ‘The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldviews’. Cf. Kisiel, Genesis, p. 16. Though Heidegger read and read Husserl’s texts in phenomenology from 1909 onwards, by the time of the publication of Being and Time in
1927 Heidegger had thoroughly internalized (and advanced) Dilthey’s position and critique of Husserl’s idea of phenomenology in his own definition and methodological practice of phenomenology as hermeneutic phenomenology.


42 ‘Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology (1894)’, p. 63. In comparison to historical research, then, the ‘descriptive method’ proposed by Brentano and Husserl, in Dilthey’s eyes, is profoundly abstract and solipsistic, and tantamount to ‘brooding (Grübelei) over oneself’. In Being and Time, however, Heidegger explicitly maintains that his analysis of ‘being-towards-death’, from a methodological point of view, is a form of ‘brooding’ over one’s own death, but ‘of course’, Heidegger adds, ‘such brooding over death does not take away from it its character as a possibility [of actual Dasein]’ (p. 305). In fact, Heidegger goes as far as to hold that this is an existential task (requirement) of one’s life, and so: ‘this possibility [disclosed in anticipation, Vorlaufen zum Tode] must not be weakened; it must be understood as a possibility, it must be cultivated as a possibility, and we must put up with it as a possibility, in the way we comport ourselves towards it [in such brooding]’ (p. 306). Dilthey, of course, eschewed any such brooding about oneself as a proper methodological requirement of understanding the concreteness and historicality of anything in human life, including the meaning of death.


Cf. Kisiel, Genesis, p. 72.


Ibid., p. 248–249.

In 1957 Heidegger recalls his youthful excitement over the arrival of Dilthey’s Completed Writings in 1914. See supra, n. 40. Kisiel notes that Heidegger’s 1920 Summer Semester Lecture course ‘Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression: Theory of Philosophical Concept Formation’ begins ‘with an extensive bibliography of Dilthey’s then widely scattered works’ (Genesis, p. 524, note 43). Kisiel also notes that in Heidegger’s Winter Semester Course 1919–1920 on ‘Basic Problems of Phenomenology’, Heidegger concludes this course with an account of the origins of the history of ideas and the birth of ‘historical consciousness’, and of the significance of ‘factual experience of life’ in the particular experiences of the early Christian community in the emergence of the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften), but, ‘(O)ne thing that Heidegger does not tell his class is that this brief reading of the history of ideas comes in large part, sometimes almost word for word, from two short chapters of Dilthey’s Introduction to the Human Sciences’ (Genesis, p. 77).

About Heidegger’s own later, citation in Being and Time (1927) of the influence of Dilthey’s thought on his thinking in the mid-1920s, Gadamer remarks that ‘(T)his dating of his influence is much too late’. Hans-Georg Gadamer, ‘Martin Heidegger’s One Path’, in Reading Heidegger from the Start. Essays in his Earliest Thought, ed. by Kisiel and van Buren (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), pp. 19–34 (p. 22). The influence, Gadamer observes, ‘has to have been sometime before 1920’ because about his earlier days lecturing at Freiburg University (1915–1923) Heidegger himself had recounted the story to Gadamer in Marburg in 1923 ‘how burdensome it had been to lug home the heavy volumes of the Berlin Academy publications that contained Dilthey’s late work’ (ibid.).


This reputation as a Scholastic still surrounded Brentano in Vienna, for, Husserl recalls that he went to Brentano’s lectures (in 1884) ‘at first merely out of curiosity, to hear the man who was the subject of so much talk in Vienna at that time, but whom others (and not so very few) derided as a Jesuit in disguise, as a rhetorician [viz.], a fraud, a Sophist, and a Scholastic.’ Husserl, ‘Reminiscences of Franz Brentano, p. 47. Cf. also Rolf George, ‘Brentano’s Relation to Aristotle’, in *Die Philosophie Franz Brentanos*, ed. by Roderick M. Chisholm & Rudolf Haller (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1978), pp. 249–266.


*Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, p. 11

Ibid., p. 18–19.


‘Man does not apprehend what he is by musing over himself, nor by doing psychological experiments, but rather by history’ (Dilthey, ‘Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology’, p. 63). Behind this is also Dilthey’s sharp distinction between the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften) and a group of sciences that are referred to in German as the *Geisteswissenschaften* that are concerned about understanding the human being and the latter’s achievements. Translating *Geisteswissenschaften* as the ‘mental sciences’ in English is somewhat misleading, however, because the *Geisteswissenschaften*, as Dilthey lists them, comprise such sciences as: ‘history, national economy, the sciences of law and of the State, the science of religion, the study of literature and poetry, of art and music, of philosophical world-views, and systems, finally psychology’. Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, Vol. 7, p. 369.

Charles Bambach, Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism (New York: Cornell University Press, 1995) p. 128–129, note 2, my emphasis. Sometimes, Dilthey even leaves ‘psychology’ out from the list of sciences that comprise the *Geisteswissenschaften*, for, when psychology refers to the natural science of psychology, the latter approach has to abstract from the lived nature of ‘man’ in order to see and analyse ‘man’ like any other object of natural science (i.e. from the point of view of a theoretical, abstract construction e.g. in terms of atoms, or infra-atomic particles etc). Cf., Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, Vol. 7, p. 369. Unlike the *Geisteswissenschaften* that attempt, in Dilthey’s view, to get behind ‘the external expression to an inward spiritual structure (the “spirit” of Roman law, of Baroque art and architecture, and so on)’ in order to re-live (Erleben and Nacherleben) the meaning, values, attitudes, ideals and understanding of life deposited and expressed in such external products of culture, ‘the physicist can scarcely be said to attempt to relive the experience of an atom or to penetrate behind the relations of infra-atomic particles to a spiritual structure expressed in them. To introduce such notions into mathematical physics would mean its ruin. Conversely, to fail to introduce them into the theory of the culture sciences is to forget that “he who explores history is the same who makes history” [Dilthey].’ Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, Vol. 7, p. 373.


Heidegger grounds all of the difficulties he experienced in trying to understand Husserl’s method of philosophising into ‘one main difficulty’ (eine Hauptschwierigkeit), namely, ‘the simple question [of] how thinking’s manner of procedure (die Verfahrensweise des Denkens) which called itself “phenomenology” was to be carried out.’ ‘My Way to Phenomenology’, p. 76:83. Heidegger does not tell us in this autobiographical sketch, however, what part, if any, Dilthey played in overcoming this struggle. It is a well-known fact that Heidegger read other thinkers, outside of Husserl’s text in phenomenology — Heidegger singles out his
‘phenomenological readings’ of Aristotle’s philosophy, for example, in ‘My Way to Phenomenology’ (p. 79) — and these influences coloured his reading of Husserl’s ‘phenomenology’. In addition to Aristotle, Heidegger reminds us elsewhere about his avid readings of the works of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Dostoevsky, Hegel, Schelling, Rilke, Trakl, and Dilthey, at the same time as he read and re-read Husserl’s texts in phenomenology. See supra, n. 40 and 48. For a brief, clear and sympathetic treatment of Heidegger’s interest in Aristotle’s work, and the significance of the latter for Heidegger in his ‘confrontation’ with Husserl’s phenomenology, see Thomas Sheehan, ‘Hermeneutics and Apophansis: the Early Heidegger on Aristotle’, in Franci Volpi et al., Heidegger et la idée de la phénoménologie (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988), pp. 67–80.


68 There are, clearly, resonances of Schleiermacherian biblical-hermeneutics at play here in Heidegger’s ‘way of thinking’; however, these are outside the scope of this present article to entertain.

69 We can thus understand why ‘Husserl’, as Heidegger recalls, ‘watched me in a generous fashion, but at the bottom in disagreement’ (‘My Way into Phenomenology’, p. 79), while Heidegger, as Husserl’s assistant at Freiburg University from 1919 to 1923, worked on Husserl’s earlier Logical Investigations and on ‘phenomenological readings’ of Aristotle and of other thinkers drawn from the history of philosophy. Husserl, in fact, had secured this position for Heidegger at Freiburg on a twofold basis: (1) that he needed Heidegger to introduce students to the beginnings of phenomenological research and (2) that it would provide financial security for Heidegger. Cf. Hugo Ott, Martin Heidegger: A Political Life, trans. by Allan Blunden (London: Fontana Press, 1993), pp. 115–116.

70 This style of philosophising in his lectures, in which Heidegger engaged his students, became part of the allure of Heidegger’s way of thinking. Cf. Rüdiger Safranski, Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil, trans. by Ewald Osers (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1998), Ch. 6 ‘Revolution in Germany and The Question of Being’ (pp. 89–106), especially Safranski’s account and analysis of Heidegger’s use of the example of perceiving a lectern, where the ‘experiencing’ of the lectern in terms of ‘it worlds’ (es welten) ‘in Lecture Hall 2 of the University of Freiburg on a grey February day in 1919’ (pp. 94–96) becomes a kind of enactment of a perception whereupon ‘(L)ooking at the lectern, we can participate in the mystery that we are and that there exists a whole world that gives itself to us’ (p. 105). Many of Heidegger’s students in the 1920s (e.g. Gadamer) found it very difficult to discern whether Heidegger was engaged in the delivery of an original interpretation of a selected author’s texts in his lecture courses, e.g., of Aristotle’s views, or engaged in the lectures in the presentation of his own (Heidegger’s) novel ideas about ‘the question of the meaning of Being’. Cf. Ted Sadler, Heidegger and Aristotle (London: Athlone Press, 1996), pp. 12–13.

71 History of the Concept of Time, p. 56.


73 Husserl, Logical Investigations, §37, p. 761.

74 As early as 1919 at the University of Freiburg, and throughout the 1920s, Heidegger is already using this triad as a critique of Husserl’s theory on ‘intuition’ and ‘expression’ documented in the Sixth Logical Investigation, ‘although’, as Kisiel remarks, ‘the fairly loyal gloss of Husserlian terminology in the early stages of the course [Marburg Summer Semester 1925 lecture course] disguises this.’ Genesis, p. 373.
Lévinas points out, conducted without reference to any genuine exteriority, and thus from the analysis of to the modern Cartesian solipsistic starting-point in philosophy. Heidegger's interest in and least for evading most, if not all of the philosophical controversies that emerge from and in relation that his appeal to Rationality of Transcendence thought.


Though Seinsverständnis extends equally to the world, myself and the being of my fellow human being, what Heidegger has to say about one’s fellow being is notoriously absent in his thought. Cf. De Boer, 'Lévinas on Theology and the Philosophy of Religion', in his The Rationality of Transcendence, pp. 169–183 (p. 175, note 15). Heidegger, nevertheless, believes that his appeal to Seinsverständnis as a basic fact of experience is sufficient for dismissing, or at least for evading most, if not all of the philosophical controversies that emerge from and in relation to the modern Cartesian solipsistic starting-point in philosophy. Heidegger's interest in and analysis of Dasein, whose own being in Being is what is at stake for that being, however, is, as Lévinas points out, conducted without reference to any genuine exteriority, and thus from the height of subjectivity.

93 Ibid., p. 66.

94 Cf. Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’ in Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper Collins, 1977), pp. 193–241. Here, Heidegger is quite right to correct himself (in 1946/47) over not dispensing with ‘the inappropriate concern with “science” and “research”’ that he now realises was not contained in ‘the essential help of phenomenological seeing’ in his attempt to adhere to a hermeneutic-methodology in phenomenology in his earliest days in philosophy, up to and including the publication of Being and Time and other works, i.e., before his ‘turning’ (die Kehre) (p. 235). Some commentators take this as a (veiled) criticism of Husserl’s idea of phenomenology and of the latter’s stress on ‘science’ and ‘research’ (into the intricate web of intentional consciousness); but this cannot be the case because the context is clearly in relation to Heidegger’s own self-professed earlier ‘way of thinking’ in phenomenology that called itself ‘scientific’. Relinquishing the concern for ‘science’ and ‘research’ would, of course, contradict Husserl’s very definition of phenomenology, but it would not contradict ‘the essential help of phenomenological seeing’ that a genuine hermeneutic phenomenology or ‘a principled phenomenological hermeneutics’, to quote Heidegger from his letter to Misch in 1922, would bring in its definition. See supra, n. 38. From Husserl’s perspective, the scientific credentials of Heidegger’s early phenomenology did leave much to be desired, for, as Husserl tells us, after devoting two months to studying Heidegger’s Being and Time (and other works), he ‘arrived at the distressing conclusion that philosophically I [Husserl] have nothing to do with this Heideggerian profundity, with this brilliant unscientific genius […]’; that he may be involved in the formation of a philosophical system of the kind which I have always considered my life’s work to make forever impossible. Everyone except me has realised this for a long time.’ Edmund Husserl, ‘Letter to Alexander Pfänder, January 6, 1931,’ trans. by Burt Hopkins, in Edmund Husserl, Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger (1927–1931): The ‘Encyclopedia Britannica’ Article, The Amsterdam Lectures, ‘Phenomenology and Anthropology’ and Husserl’s Marginal Notes in ‘Being and Time’ and ‘Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics’, trans. and ed. by Thomas Sheehan & Richard E. Palmer (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Press, 1997), Appendix 2, p. 482.