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Politician Preferences, Law-Abiding Lobbyists and Caps on Political Lobbying.

Pastine, Tuvana and Pastine, Ivan (2008) Politician Preferences, Law-Abiding Lobbyists and Caps on Political Lobbying. Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting, NUI Maynooth. (Unpublished)

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Abstract

The effect of a contribution cap is analyzed in a political lobbying game where the politician has a preference for the policy position of one of the lobbyists. In contrast to the previous literature where the politician has no preference over policy alternatives, we find that a more restrictive binding cap always reduces expected aggregate contributions. However, the politician might support a barely binding cap over no cap on contributions. The cap always favors the lobbyist whose policy position is preferred irrespective of the identity of the high-valuation lobbyist. The introduction of politician policy preferences permits an analysis of welfare tradeoffs of contribution caps. Even a barely binding cap can have significant welfare consequences.

Item Type: Other
Keywords: All-pay auction, campaign finance reform, explicit ceiling.
Subjects: Social Sciences > Economics, Finance & Accounting
Item ID: 1138
Depositing User: Ms Sandra Doherty
Date Deposited: 13 Jan 2009 14:02
Publisher: Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting, NUI Maynooth
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