Politician Preferences, Law-Abiding Lobbyists and Caps on Political Lobbying.

Pastine, Tuvana and Pastine, Ivan (2008) Politician Preferences, Law-Abiding Lobbyists and Caps on Political Lobbying. Public Choice. ISSN 0048-5829

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The effect of a contribution cap is analyzed in a political lobbying game where the politician has a preference for the policy position of one of the lobbyists. In contrast to the previous literature where the politician has no preference over policy alternatives, we find that a more restrictive binding cap always reduces expected aggregate contributions. However, the politician might support a barely binding cap over no cap on contributions. The cap always favors the lobbyist whose policy position is preferred irrespective of the identity of the high-valuation lobbyist. The introduction of politician policy preferences permits an analysis of welfare tradeoffs of contribution caps. Even a barely binding cap can have significant welfare consequences.

Item Type: Article
Keywords: All-pay auction; campaign finance reform; explicit ceiling;
Academic Unit: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Finance and Accounting
Item ID: 1138
Identification Number: 10.1007/s11127-009-9555-3
Depositing User: Ms Sandra Doherty
Date Deposited: 13 Jan 2009 14:02
Journal or Publication Title: Public Choice
Publisher: Springer Verlag
Refereed: Yes

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