Pastine, Tuvana and Pastine, Ivan (2008) Politician Preferences, Law-Abiding Lobbyists and Caps on Political Lobbying. Public Choice. ISSN 0048-5829

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Abstract

The effect of a contribution cap is analyzed in a political lobbying game where the politician has a preference for the policy position of one of the lobbyists. In contrast to the previous literature where the politician has no preference over policy alternatives, we find that a more restrictive binding cap always reduces expected aggregate contributions. However, the politician might support a barely binding cap over no cap on contributions. The cap always favors the lobbyist whose policy position is preferred irrespective of the identity of the high-valuation lobbyist. The introduction of politician policy preferences permits an analysis of welfare tradeoffs of contribution caps. Even a barely binding cap can have significant welfare consequences.

Item Type:	Article
Keywords:	All-pay auction; campaign finance reform; explicit ceiling;
Academic Unit:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Finance and Accounting
Item ID:	1138
Identification Number:	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9555-3
Depositing User:	Ms Sandra Doherty
Date Deposited:	13 Jan 2009 14:02
Journal or Publication Title:	Public Choice
Publisher:	Springer Verlag
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	Publisher
Use Licence:	This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available here

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