Drumcree: a Struggle for Recognition

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ABSTRACT: This paper attempts to explain what motivates the Catholic community in Portadown in their opposition to routing Orange Parades through their neighbourhoods. It argues that the parades issue cannot be fully explained in terms of a conflict over two equal but opposing sets of rights, or as a localised manifestation of a power struggle between the two ethno-national communities in Northern Ireland. Rather, it is best understood as a struggle against the sectarianism that governs relations between the two communities, and which Catholics experience as a violation of their dignity and rights. This violation effectively maintains their subordinate status by undermining their self-confidence, self-esteem and self-respect. This, in turn, diminishes their ability and willingness to participate in and to benefit from the socioeconomic and cultural life of one of the most prosperous provincial towns in the north of Ireland.

Background

Portadown town is located at the intersection of river, road, canal, and rail links and was at the centre of the 18th century 'Linen Triangle' where a form of 'proto-capitalism' developed following the second plantation of Ulster, when Portadown became something of a 'frontier town'. A combination of factors, Frank Wright (1987) argues, gave rise to an unusually close relationship between upper and working class Protestants, and is what lies behind the town's sectarian history and reputation. The town is reputed to be one of the most prosperous provincial towns in Northern Ireland, it is also reputed to be the most sectarian and, as the map (page 7) indicates, it is strongly segregated. With a Protestant population of 22,000 it is the most important town in David Trimble's 'Upper Bann' Constituency. Trimble is a member of the Orange Order and his rise to leadership of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) followed soon after his high profile role in the Drumcree stand-off of 1995. Since the partition of Ireland, five District Masters of the Portadown Orange lodge have held prominent positions in the Ulster Unionist Party. Ties between the various Loyal Orders, the Ulster Unionist Party, and entry into the government of Northern Ireland are well documented (see Harbinson
1973; Farrell 1976). These ties are replicated at a local level in Portadown where a succession of the town’s Lord Mayors and many councillors have been prominent members of the Orange Order. In May 1978 the local District Master was able to use his position to reverse a decision to allow a recreation centre to open on Sunday. On another occasion a number of prominent Orangemen were among a group of Craigavon councillors who were surcharged and barred from holding public office for their sectarian discrimination against a nationalist sports club in Lurgan.

Portadown’s Catholic community of 6,000 is heavily concentrated in the Corcraine and Ballyoran wards of Craigavon borough. There are about 4,000 on the electoral registers of these two 95 per cent Catholic wards, many of them having moved here as a result of widespread intimidation in the early 1970s. In May 1997, the year of ‘Drumcree III’, two Independent Nationalist Community Candidates, Joe Duffy and Breandan MacCionnaith were elected to represent the area on an ‘anti-parades ticket’. The nationalist turnout of 2,795 was up by more than 45 per cent from 1993, when one Sinn Fein and one Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) candidate stood. MacCionnaith’s was the highest ever first preference, nationalist vote in the town, a clear indication of the socio-political importance of the Drumcree parades’ issue in the minds of the Catholic/Nationalist electorate in Portadown.

The ‘parish of Drumcree’ has a history stretching back at least as far as the early 15th century and the present Church of Ireland church at Drumcree, the ‘Church of the Ascension’, is situated on a pre-Reformation site. The Catholic parish of Drumcree shares much of the same territory and includes the constituency now represented by Duffy and MacCionnaith. The Church of the Ascension was consecrated such in 1856, but the history of violence associated with Orange gatherings at the church goes back at least as far as the ‘First Sunday’ of July 1795. This date was three months before the ‘Battle of the Diamond’ at nearby Loughgall when the ‘Orange boys’ became known as the ‘Orange Order’. The violence associated with Orange marches in the town led a local magistrate to attempt to dissuade Orangemen from entering the Tunnel in 1827. In 1835 the belligerence of Portadown Orangemen was the subject of a petition submitted to a Parliamentary Select Committee investigation into Orange Lodges. That investigation led to the voluntary dissolution of the Grand Orange Lodge in 1836, but Portadown Orangemen set up a secretive, provisional Grand Lodge and Orange marches and sectarian riots continued to disrupt the life of the town throughout the 19th century. Following the murder of a Catholic man from the Tunnel during an Orange parade in May 1905 the MP for West Belfast, Joe Devlin, said there was an alternative route available to the Orangemen and asked the Chief Secretary to, ‘issue an order prohibiting such assemblies from marching through the Catholic quarter of the town’ (Portadown News, 12 August 1905). The violence associated with Orange parades abated in the 1940s but in 1950 the parades problem surfaced again when eight Catholics appeared in court on charges arising
out of an Orange demonstration in Obin Street. Part of the defence argument was that the Orange ‘trailing of coats’ was provocative and that an alternative route was available. (Garvaghy Road Residents’ Coalition (GRRC) 1997; Garvaghy Residents 1999).

More recently Bryan (1999) has observed that, ‘Loyalist paramilitaries appear to have a closer relation to the Orange Order in Portadown than in Belfast’. Local Catholics are very aware of this and believe the security forces, particularly the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), are also part of that relationship. This belief goes back at least as far as March 1972 when an estimated 10,000 loyalists attended a ‘Vanguard’ rally in the town. Vanguard was described by Steve Bruce as, ‘the coming together of all three strands of loyalism: dissident politicians, Protestant trade unionists, and the vigilantes in the UDA’ (Bruce 1992, p. 82). David Trimble was Deputy Leader of the Vanguard alliance and the Reverend Martin Smith, Grand Master of the Orange Order, and the Lord Mayors of Portadown and Lurgan shared the platform. The rally was followed by a three-day siege of the nationalist district, during which there were no deliveries of food and the electricity supply was cut off. At one stage a squad of armed RUC men led loyalist mobs, some carrying RUC riot gear, in an attack on the Tunnel. They retreated from the area only after being engaged in an exchange of gunfire with local Irish Republican Army (IRA) personnel. The following July, during an IRA truce, the British army led the RUC into the Tunnel to secure the area for an Orange parade to Drumcree. After a night of rioting they bulldozed barricades off the street and permitted a contingent of hooded loyalists in paramilitary garb to march into the street and form an honour guard for the ‘church parade’ to Drumcree. After the church service the masked men formed up and escorted the Orangemen back to town along the Garvaghy Road. These events were cited as formative experiences by a number of those who participated in my research for this ethnography.

Methodology

Given the strength of the sectarian divisions in the town and the very real threat of loyalist violence it would not have been possible for me (a nationalist resident) to have safely or adequately researched either Orange or Protestant experiences and perspectives. Hence this ethnography is wholly concerned with the experiences, perceptions and behaviour of the Catholic community that is concentrated in the Garvaghy Road and Obin Street (or ‘Tunnel’) areas in the north-west corner of Portadown, in the parish of Drumcree. The threat of sectarian attack or victimisation has also meant that I have been obliged to conceal the identities of those who participated in my research.

In order to avoid any tendency to drift towards essentialist explanations, or to interpret the situation as being simply the result of a historically established pattern of relationships, I have prioritised the views, feelings and experiences of members of the subject community. Although I begin with a brief account of the history of violence associated with Orange parades in Portadown and have used secondary
quantitative material to outline the structural relations between the two communities in the town, my approach relies heavily on discourse analysis. This method has involved analysing the way in which members of the Catholic community talk about the situation, how they articulate their understandings of their situation and all other relevant expressions of views and identity; the use of ethno-political symbols, murals, axioms and rhetoric, violent and peaceful protests. This approach was supported by observing the behaviour and activities of groups and individuals in the Catholic/Nationalist district and by studying documents and statements issued by the ‘Garvagh Road Residents’ Coalition’. I have also studied local and mainstream print and electronic media reports on the ‘parades issue’ throughout 1997 and 1998.

My research relied heavily on recordings of informal and unstructured interviews with 32 female and 25 male residents between the ages of 17 and 84. The majority of them were between 30 and 45 years of age. Forty-four of them were not active members of any community or political groups and they were randomly selected. Members of focus groups included two SDLP activists, two from Sinn Féin, five members of the Garvagh Road Resident’s Coalition, and four members of the Drumcree Community Co-op.

Being a resident of the area has meant that I have been involved in many casual conversations and have heard the views of many more residents and activists. Consequently my own views on Orange parades are fairly well known and I thought it necessary to make some attempt to avoid leading participants into expressing or formulating their views in ways that reflect my own. With this in mind I arranged to have a number of group conversations recorded in my absence, with some participants remaining ignorant of my identity and others having a minimal amount of information as to the purpose of the exercise. I also recorded some conversations that were broadcast on a pirate radio station operating in the Garvagh area during the 1998 stand-off.

Identity

The debate about the conflict in Northern Ireland has turned increasingly to questions of identity and how ethnicity and political identities are linked (Whyte 1990). The subject of ethnicity itself can be approached from various perspectives. Barth (1969, p. 7) argued for more attention to, ‘the ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses’. Bell and Freeman (1974, p. 10) talk of ethnicity as being ‘characteristic, distinctive, cultural or sub-cultural traits that set one group off from others’. And Smith (1991, p. 20) highlighted the importance of the ‘sense of unique collective solidarity’. However, in explaining the situation at Drumcree, Abner Cohen’s view of ethnicity is most pertinent. Cohen (1994, p. 97) sees ethnicity as, ‘fundamentally a political phenomenon, as the symbols of the traditional culture are used as mechanisms for the articulation of political alignments. It is a type of informal interest grouping’. The problem here is that interests vary widely across N. Ireland and, as Whyte and others have
pointed out, there are wide variations in the nature of Catholic—Protestant relations across the North. Nevertheless, Portadown is often referred to as a microcosm of the conflict. It might also be viewed as an extreme variant of the wider conflict where the issues underlying the conflict are more readily identifiable and accessible to study.

In Portadown the issue of ethno-political identity is by far the most readily identifiable factor affecting relations, with religion being the primary ethnic marker. Ethnicity is ‘an array of symbolic strategies for solving most or all of the basic problems of organizational articulation’ (Cohen 1974, p. 97) and sectarian parading is perhaps the most visible and probably the most potent of symbolic strategies. McGarry and O’Leary (1995, p. 457) note that ‘ethnic groups can maintain themselves and continue to fight each other in the face of significant acculturation’. And in Portadown there is indeed little to set Catholics and Protestants apart as distinct ethnic groups - other than the flying of flags, wall murals, and painted kerbstones.

McGarry and O’Leary (1995) hold that ‘the crucial endogenous cause of conflict has been the presence of two competitive ethno-national communities within the same territory’ (p. 356). And they go on to argue that ethnic markers provide evidence of ‘common origin and shared experiences, a basis for recognising members and non-members, and therefore potential friends and potential “strangers”’ (p. 357). All across Northern Ireland such ‘ethno-national competition’ is largely conducted through claims to localised territories which provide the ‘cultural intimacy’ within which the semantic boundaries of ethno-political identity are constructed in a ‘social poetics’ through which ‘the highly localised specificity’s that sometimes give nationalism distinctive meaning’ are negotiated (Herzfeld 1997, p. 11). Here, in everyday face to face interactions ‘The self has primacy in the creation of locality, in rendering boundaries meaningful, in the interpretation of national identity’ (Cohen 1994, p. 132). Therefore it is only by focusing on the ‘self-driven aspects of behaviour’ (Cohen 1994, p. 7) that we might hope to explain the motivations for what appears to outsiders to be irrational or intrinsically sectarian behaviour.

In the public debate about Drumcree the issue is generally held to be about two sets of conflicting rights. Orangemen argue that their parades are ‘cultural traditions’, ‘celebrations’, ‘displays of pageantry’, and ‘demonstrations of strength’, which provide ‘a sense of tradition’ and ‘a testimony and statement of beliefs’ (Grand Orange Lodge 1995, p. 2). However, Bryan (1999) explains Orange parades as having ‘defined respectability and controlled public space… marked status, defined a community and were signifiers of power’. Bryan’s analysis touches on both the objective and subjective benefits acquired through Orange parading and we might expect to find the strategy has parallel, disadvantageous consequences for the Catholic community. Though they are intrinsically related, the objective disadvantages for Catholics are more readily identifiable than the subjective ones and an appreciation of them will facilitate an
understanding of the subjective affects, and of Catholics’ perceptions and responses to Orange parading.

In the 1960s Portadown was merged with the nearby town of Lurgan to create the ‘new city’ of Craigavon; about which O’Dowd says ‘the two towns have preserved their sectarian distinctiveness and are internally divided on ethnic lines, though in different ways’ (1993, p. 41). The Catholic quarter of Portadown contains about 1,200 households. It is physically separated from the rest of town by the River Bann, a railway and bypass, car parks, waste ground, walls, fences, and a slip road. One of only three access routes to town was turned into a pedestrian underpass in the early 1970s; this change is regarded locally as part of an old strategy of commercially and socially segregating Catholics. Apart from a public park and one small council-owned community hall all services and facilities within the area are the products of local, entrepreneurial, community, or church initiatives. All public facilities, government offices, commercial, administrative, medical, and sports amenities are situated in or beyond the town centre—which is considered to be hostile, loyalist territory.

Most large employers are located in the Seago industrial estate on ‘the other side’ of town and the three factories within the Catholic district have a history of discriminating against Catholics: the largest of these has 90 Catholic employees out of 600. In his 1993 study O’Dowd noted that Catholic males are three times, and females four times, more likely to be unemployed in Portadown than are members of all other denominations. Comparing Portadown with Lurgan he noted: ‘Interestingly, the gap is widest in the most successful economy, suggesting that success in creating new jobs does not necessarily mean greater inter-community equality’ (p. 55). The Robson Index (1995) shows a high level of inequality in the town. Taking account of a broad spectrum of indicators, including environment, skills, socialisation, and resource base, this index shows that the Catholic quarter suffers the highest levels of deprivation in the whole of Craigavon and was ranked 67 out of 500 in an overall deprivation matrix. However, the clear evidence of socioeconomic discrimination against Catholics in Portadown is not sufficient to explain the intensity of their opposition to a ‘traditional church parade’. And, as Darby observed, ‘discrimination may have contributed to the emergence of community disorder but it is not sufficient to explain the intensity of the conflict and we must take account of the cultural and political identities of the two communities’(1983, p. 80).

Given the history of inequality and discrimination against Catholics in Portadown it is not surprising to find that the most common expressions of identity among my informants were couched in negative terms, a very conscious and widespread sense of alienation from the town:

HELEN: I moved into town about 20 years ago and it struck me how marginalised the people out here were. People who were born and brought up in Portadown had absolutely no sense of identity with Portadown as a town.
BERNADETTE: ... definitely it's not our town—unless you were sure of yourself and were able to hold your head up.

NULA: When you're out of it—the last place you'd say you're from is Portadown.

MICK: Portadown is the most bitter town in Ireland—and I lived in North Belfast... but there's a rabid bitterness down here.

This sense of alienation is usually expressed, initially, in terms of territoriality: 'Catholics can't go up the town' is a familiar refrain. Violent and other sectarian abuses occur with a frequency sufficient to sustain a persistent atmosphere of dread and suspicion among Catholics:

GERALD: People are stuck into one street in the Nationalist area. They wouldn't go to bars... on the other side of town—for obvious reasons—the sectarian attacks... going back to the early 70s has proved that the fears of Catholics are not unfounded ('The Town With 'Tunnel' Vision'. BBC Radio 4, 1986).

DENICE: I have to bring my 17 year old son to the opticians... he doesn't want me with him... but he has learned to accept that I have to go with him. You're feeling humiliated for them and you're feeling hurt.

Mothers fear for their children, teenagers fear attack by loyalist gangs and harassment by the security forces; they feel they are identifiable by their demeanour, their wariness—averting their eyes, looking over their shoulders—and by the direction from which they are coming or in which they are going. Men and women express similar fears about working, travelling, and socialising beyond the boundaries of the Catholic area. They feel cut-off and excluded:

EILEEN: I always say we in Drumcree are living in—like a bubble, and you pass out of the bubble, like a sci-fi thing, and your brain clicks into gear as you pass through that bubble wall, and people are doing that and they are not even aware of it... It's all that sort of instinctive fear that you're living with... You shouldn't have to live like that.

TERRY: [Catholics] see this area as their town, they're not involved in the rest of the town. They see this very much as a village that just happens to be beside the town.

Some Catholics also resent attempts by local unionist journalists and councillors to portray the town in a positive light because this denies their experience of it:

How much longer am I and the community in which I peacefully reside to be brought on sentimental tours of the area as if it were once a romantic vision of middle England (Letter to Portadown Times, 6 June 1997).

Catholics do of course go to town, but they do so when they consider it safe. Besides fearing physical attack they feel alienated and threatened by sectarian symbols, loyalist posters, occasional shop signs refusing 'Fenian money', and by the open sale of loyalist paramilitary paraphernalia.

EILEEN: It's a whole amalgamation of things; flags, bunting, the way they use it for Orange parades.
These symbols of dominance act as constant reminders of the threat of being insulted or accosted by loyalists - and subsequently victimised by patrolling security forces:

ARAN: These two boys were standing beside me in Gino’s [clothes’ shop] and one of them said to the other, “Look at the state of me, I look like a fucking Fenian”.

ROSALYN: She never knew me from Adam but when she seen I wasn’t wearing a poppy she deliberately ignored me and served another woman.

DANNY: I heard him on the intercom to the boys in the timber yard saying, “There’s a Fenian in the camp” - but sure where else was I going to go.

Because of the fear that a response might provoke an incident or identify the victim for future harassment this type of low-grade sectarianism is usually suffered in silence.

CIARAN: The police take their side, they let them go on a bit and come over later.

FRANK: It’s like when they kicked Robbie Hamill to death and the cops said, “Rival gangs clashed”. They always say that. You get a kicking and think yourself lucky you don’t end up in court.

Every one of my interviewees could readily cite instances when they, their children, or friends, were insulted, harassed, or attacked in the town. The small size of the community, the close network of relationships, and the limited number of places in which to socialise, means that reports of such incidents quickly circulate - along with details of the victim’s identity. They often have difficulty explaining what life is like for them in Portadown and usually begin by citing sectarian murders, assaults, and attacks on Catholic-owned property. But when they relax into a conversation they soon begin to talk of being personally insulted and humiliated, and they sometimes contrast the subdued nature of Catholics to the ‘brazenness’ of many Protestants. Sometimes they ‘get on a roll’ and surprise themselves at the frequency of such experiences, how they have affected their feelings about themselves, their relationships with Protestants, and their future decisions:

EMMA: I was serving in a canteen, and I was wearing a wee crucifix, and this Protestant man said, real friendly like, “You should watch that, there’s people in here and they’d take that the wrong way”. Like it was just a wee crucifix. And then somebody told me he was an awful bigot.

BERNADETTE: If you’re cowardly, Oh! They’ll give it to you; they’ll make you feel so small that you are not worth even stepping over. But whenever you stand up for yourself they’ll back off a wee bit.

HELEN: The whispering community syndrome - why are we always walking out insulted. Why are we not challenging... anyone with their bigoted views, not even to say, “I’m a Catholic and I’m insulted”, but just to put your viewpoint across as equal. Our walking out, the silent protests that we make, who cares?
However, despite apparently feeling obliged to stand up to sectarian prejudice, people weigh-up the potential risks against the possible benefits of confronting bigots. For example Bernadette admitted giving a Protestant name in a fishing-tackle shop when she overheard men joke about, 'catching a good Fenian'. But she relished telling how, while working as a home help for a Protestant woman, she answered bigoted remarks, 'with a joke with a jag and laugh it off—knowing you'd got your point home'. And though Helen condemned the 'whispering community syndrome', she acknowledged that she whispered too and sometimes eschewed responding to the prejudicial remarks of a Protestant friend and colleague. Emma left her job soon after the crucifix remark and moved on again because of a similar type of subtle sectarianism—a form of abuse that may be becoming increasingly preferred as more overt sectarianism becomes less tolerated:

EILEEN: It's more subtle now than hanging flags on your machine at work. I couldn't even put it into words, but you know what is being done to you, you feel it!

GENE: Sometimes it's so subtle you walk out wondering if it's all in your head and maybe you're paranoid, and you say nothing

DENICE: To understand the whole situation you need to come and live here; really and truly, you've got to come and live here. We have said that to reporters—"Why don't you come back in October with a hidden camera and walk with us into town to see exactly how we live?"

The relatively small total population and the proportion of Protestants to Catholics means that it is relatively easy to become identifiable and there is a general reluctance to do anything that might expose one as having nationalist or republican sympathies, or even as being a Catholic:

CIARAN: I play football for a Catholic team [and] they get to know you're a Catholic and if they know that they'll say, 'Well he's a Catholic, we'll get him'.

When writing about the 'hyper sensitivity' of young Protestants to the sectarian spatialisation of residential space in a predominantly Catholic town, John Darby suggests the real issue is power and dominance—about 'which political symbols and whose political presence will predominate' (1986, p. 151). Catholics in Portadown are similarly 'hyper sensitive': but for them the real issue is the ever-present danger of being humiliated, assaulted, or murdered. This perception of danger has caused them to become hyper sensitive to every manifestation and nuance of sectarianism in their interactions with Protestants, to stereotyped insults, snubs, sectarian jokes, racial slurs, to assumptions and prejudices, and to personal and tactile avoidances. Catholics respond to these stereotype-based actions in a 'variety of tactically informed ways' (Herzfeld 1997, p. 164). They have learned to identify the religious/political identity of others by their name, address, associates, interests, educational background, speech, and even by their dress sense. Both Catholics and Protestants use these skills to avoid provoking controversy but the subordinate Catholic community in the town uses them
primarily to avoid being victimised. Ten Catholics have been murdered in and around the town centre, one man suffered brain damage and is paralysed and others have survived beatings, knife attacks, and petrol-bomb, grenade, and bomb attacks on their homes and social venues. When they do go to town or to work they wear politically neutral colours and often use the anglicised version of their Christian names. Some give the name of their terrace or side street in the hope they will not be identified with the stigmatised Catholic district. Some also present themselves as being politically neutral, indifferent, or pacifist. However, complete avoidance is the preferred tactic for many; but the high degree of dependence on access to workplaces, services and facilities where they are greatly outnumbered by Protestants, means that this is not normally possible and other tactically informed coping mechanisms are practised. I will discuss these issues later: my point here is to convey the depth of Catholic alienation and to show that, for this subordinate community, territoriality is more to do with avoiding victimisation than with whose political symbols predominate.

Community

Though many Portadown Catholics have long felt excluded, isolated, and vulnerable, their predicament has not previously engendered the degree of community solidarity one might expect in such circumstances. Various explanations are offered:

KEVIN: Within the community there’s a sort of social class barrier.

TOM: ... it was in the barracks before the meeting was over. Portadown [Catholics] never stood together for nothing. They had a hard fight down the Tunnel but the people up in Ballyoran didn’t give a shit.

ANNIE: People weren’t politically naive. They didn’t want to know. There’s too many of them and its, “If it doesn’t affect my family, what do I care?”

Fear of informers, clannishness, class, factionalism, and self-interest are all offered as explanations for an absence of solidarity in the past. One elderly informant suggested that, as far back as the 1930s, Catholic clergymen undermined working class and republican politics by denouncing activists as ‘communists’. Another man argued that the church is more concerned with ecumenism and power than with justice:

TOM: [The church] needs us to be submissive to them while they are submissive to the state.

Nevertheless, even those most critical of the church admire the work of individual clergymen; one Jesuit is regarded as having been ‘the visionary’ in setting up the Drumcree Co-op and another is admired for his high profile role in the parade controversy. This involvement, along with recent statements from the Catholic hierarchy, is believed to have helped broaden support for the protest by lending it an air of respectability and moral rectitude. Affinities involving clan,
class, clique, faction and religious and political ideologies have long been divisive factors within the community. Some SDLP supporters complain of snobbishness among party supporters:

EILEEN: A lot of people round here would think the SDLP is a wee step up.

NOREEN: Some of them think their shit doesn’t smell.

Another argued that snobbery is a minor issue and that commitment to non-violence is what constrains their participation in a campaign they perceive as being, ‘too republican-dominated and they don’t want to be labelled republicans’. The Knights of Columbanus, a charitable Catholic sodality, was also cited as being divisive through constituting an organisational link between the church, middle-class interests, and the SDLP. It is believed to work behind the scenes to maintain a social hierarchy by taking positions of influence on various boards and committees, and by appropriating economic aid which they can allocate to groups that are not thought to threaten the status quo:

FRANCIS: They believe there is an elite in society and they should be the ones to make decisions. They represent middle-class interests [and think we] just don’t have the wherewithal to help run a community... [that] we are not safe hands to put money into, that that’s traditionally the Knights’ role.

Fear of attack by loyalist paramilitaries and of being harassed or ‘fingered’ by the security forces for loyalist attack were cited as major disincentives to participation in anything that appears to challenge status quo. These perceived threats have deterred some people from taking leadership roles or being seen to support anything that might be interpreted as pro republican:

DONNA: You get the different groups and you get the strong personalities... and they can see the wrongs... and they’ve beat their heads off the wall and has got nowhere.

EAMON: More than anything they [RUC] don’t like organisers, and that leaves the way open for middle of the road SDLP and DFJ ones.

Boundaries between the various groups within the community are maintained through patterns of socialising; different factions, clans, and classes tend to keep to their own company or social venues—pubs, amateur drama, choir, bands etc. Boundaries are also maintained by gossip and rumour, which Scott calls anonymous forms of communication and aggression (1990, pp. 142-149). These forms include what is locally recognised as a particularly cutting type of ‘slagging’:

TOM: It’s a backbiting humour.... I think there’s so many different factions in the community, and different perspectives, or there was, and when they’re slagging they fall into them and very quickly it gets ugly.

IRIS: I think people put you down if you’re trying to better yourself at all.... It happens everywhere... but then [we are] close knit, [we] know everything about each other.
Despite the enduring divisions that exist among people in the area it is still possible to talk about there being a community. This is because the relative similarity or difference is not a matter for 'objective' assessment; it is a matter of feeling, a matter which resides in the minds of the members themselves (Cohen 1985, p. 21).

The 'feeling' of community among Catholics is largely a product of shared experiences and familiarity with a local folk model. Older people reminisce about there once having been a great sense of community in the Tunnel while in the newer estates along Garvaghy the feeling of community is a more recent phenomenon:

EILEEN: It's taken so long for a sense of community to gel, it takes a generation. Now there's a settling, and there's a sense of confidence in knowing who is around you. It becomes a bigger family .... I think that raises a sense of pride.

INTERVIEWER: Has the parades' issue affected this?

EILEEN: Well I suppose it has enhanced it, again it's us and them. If people feel they're banding together for a cause then that raises their pride. But that could have a detrimental effect for if this is all settled soon people will have to latch onto something else for that feeling.

Eileen's observations support Barth's functionalist explanation of ethnic boundaries as 'categories of ascription and identification by the actors themselves which define groups occupying reciprocal and therefore different niches but in close interdependence' (1969, p. 19). Though this is of limited use in explaining the subjective side of identity formation the situational and contextual factors affecting identity formation cannot be dismissed. Jenkins (1994, p. 214) observed that.

Political parties and politicians may foster ethnic categorisation though public rhetoric, legislative and administrative acts and the distribution of resources via client networks.

This point is particularly salient with regard to Orange parades through Garvaghy, parades which provide, 'a point of articulation for relations of power within the community' (Bryan 1999). My informants were well aware of these power relations and also talked of a relationship between Orange parades, loyalist paramilitary violence, security policy, clientalist Orangeism, and the socio-economic and cultural status of Catholics. So they see Orange parades more as an expression of the relations of power between the two communities.

TOM: Behind that look of a pantomime... people can laugh at their bowler hats and whatnot—but them fuckers, a lot of them are businessmen with deep interests in business throughout the North.

This general awareness lies behind much of the rioting that accompanies Orange parades through Catholic territory. A member of the Drumcree Faith and Justice group (DFJ) talked about riots as being expressions of anger and resentment that
are prone to erupt when there is no organised opposition and when peaceful opposition is repressed or goes unheeded.

**Mobilisation, habitus and the ‘chill factor’**

The first attempt to build an organised response developed out of the H-Block hunger strikes when a small group emerged with the objective, adopting the rhetoric of the time, ‘of decriminalising this community’ by campaigning against Orange parades.

JOHN: Actually stopping the parades wasn’t the objective, not for everybody anyway. It was more about exposing the sectarianism and hypocrisy.

This group researched local history so as to refute Orange Order, RUC, and local newspaper claims that disturbances related to Orange parades were a recent phenomenon and inspired by Republicans. Though they were harassed, had their homes searched, and received death threats from the RUC, who were then being accused of operating a ‘shoot to kill policy’, they continued writing to newspapers, staged street protests, and sent a petition containing approximately 1,000 signatures to the Northern Ireland Office (NIO). Support for their campaign grew significantly in 1985 when, on Saint Patrick’s Day, a local Catholic band parade was forcibly disrupted by the RUC. Having previously granted Saint Patrick’s Accordion Band permission to make a complete circuit of the Catholic district the RUC forced them off the road when a few loyalists staged a ‘prayer meeting’ near a small Protestant enclave at the bottom of the Garvaghy Road. The meeting was led by UUP councillor, Arnold Hatch, a prominent member of the Loyal Orders. The H-Block group dissolved when Orange parades were barred from the Tunnel in 1985-86 but some of its members became active in the GRRC campaign and their historical research was synopsised in a GRRC submission to the Parades’ Commission in 1996.

In July 1985 a ‘People Against Injustice Group’ was formed, later called the ‘Drumcree Faith and Justice Group’. They retrospectively outlined their objectives as being to inform Orangemen how Nationalist felt about their parades and to question RUC impartiality, to show how Catholics and Protestants should get on with each other, and to demonstrate the effectiveness of non-violent action (DFJ 1989). They organised peaceful protests, issued news-sheets, held discussions with the RUC, but were unsuccessful in every attempt to engage the Orange Order in any form of dialogue. By 1994 they reluctantly accepted their peaceful protests were ‘becoming part of the problem’, in that they were serving to police the parades for the RUC and misrepresent the strength of peoples’ feelings. In 1995 they joined other community groups to form the ‘Garvaghy Road Residents’ Coalition’, which stated its objective as being ‘to harness the resentment and anger which Orange parades created into a constructive and peaceful campaign’ (GRRC 1996, p. 29). The GRRC contacted other residents’ groups, petitioned the RUC and NIO ministers, staged protests, and drew as much media attention as possible to
the parades issue. When the Orange Order refused to meet them they called on the ‘Mediation Network’ to intercede. They filed for a protest march to Carlton Street Orange Hall on July 9th 1995; their protest was blocked by the RUC and ‘Drumcree One’ ensued. This ‘crisis’ ended when an agreement was brokered by the ‘Mediation Network’, an agreement which Ian Paisley and David Trimble immediately denied and went on to participate in an ‘Orange victory’ parade through the town centre.

Local Catholics often say the parades protest is simply about preventing Orange marches in their neighbourhood, however, many of my interviewees understood the protest as being about deeper and wider issues and talked of it as being about ‘breaking the back of sectarianism’ and breaking free of ‘old mindsets’ in order to create a better life.

INTERVIEWER: What does that mean, ‘that age’ and, ‘rocking the boat’?

DONNA: That age means we have lived our lives in this town and we know where we can go, where we can work. ‘Why rock the boat?’ .... This is the mindset. I mean I have to struggle with it too

INTERVIEWER: Where did that mindset come from?

IRIS: It was just surviving.

JOHN: My da used to say, “An education will get you nowhere, you’d be better with a trade”.

PHILOMENA: My grandparents’ and parents’ attitude was—it’s safer just to keep your head down and your mouth shut and survive.

These comments indicate a growing frustration with the local variant of what Bourdieu calls ‘habitus’ - ‘a system of models for the production of practices and a system of models for the perception and appreciation of practices’ (1990, p. 131). This set of ‘unreflected dispositions’ is also alluded to in local explanations for the absence of a popular struggle against sectarianism in the past.

GEROGINE (84 years old): You see we weren’t wide-awake then. The generation that’s coming on now is smarter and has a bit of education.

Lack of education, ‘just surviving’, repression, an absence of leadership, and resignation are all offered as explanations for the persistence of the habitus that finds expression in phrases like ‘keep your head down’, ‘don’t rock the boat’, and ‘the whispering community syndrome’. This habitus is recognised as being part of the ‘sectarian habitus’ which Bell (1990) identified as pervading much of N. Ireland. Some of my informants speculated on the nature of the Protestant habitus and the Orange Order’s role in maintaining it:

OLIVER: Those ‘good Protestants’ are as conditioned as most of the Catholic people have been when they sit back and say nothing.
BERNADETTE: Maybe it's drummed into them, maybe it's ignorance, maybe it's easier for them to want to believe it. Maybe it's easier for them to deal with rather than think that they are doing something wrong or offensive.

And, with a blend of pragmatism and idealism they talk of a need for change there, too, if things are to change at all, and they see the protests against Orange parades as helping promote that change:

MAXINE: Orangemen and their women haven't had to fight, they only had to march. We have fought. We fought for them sometimes, a lot of the time.

JIM: I think the Garvaghy Road highlighted, more than anything, that all the equality legislation that the British Government brought in over the years wasn't working. You were still second-class citizens in the eyes of the state and even with the mechanisms in place, the Fair Employment cases were few. A hundred, nothing.

While the value of structural changes brought about by equality legislation are recognised, they are not seen as having sufficiently impacted on the habitual sectarianism that underpins the socio-economic disparities between the two communities. Many people, including Catholics engaged in cross-community activities, are highly sceptical of the ability of groups working for reconciliation to make any real change to that sectarian habitus. They tell of 'seeds of distrust' of Catholic community workers being sown by 'two-faced' council administrators and some representatives of Protestant community associations who obstruct access to 'ordinary Protestants'. And they talk of cross-community work being made the preserve of 'nice people in middle class meetings'. Their high level of involvement in community activities ensures that their experiences and views are widely known and this awareness reinforces Catholic perceptions of a widespread anti-Catholic bias among Protestants. This perception is regularly reinforced by media coverage of the views of local Unionists. Orangemen and loyalists and by biased reports in the local newspaper. But it is ultimately confirmed through personal experiences of sectarian abuses that tend to peak with the Orange marching season. Consequently Catholics are in no doubt that Orangeism is at the heart of the problem and modifications to the scale, speed, or frequency of their parades are not at all likely to make any difference to how they are perceived or received in the Catholic district:

TOM: The Orange Order is the wedge that keeps the people apart.

KEVIN: It's also because of the way the Orange Order thinks.

Orangeism is perceived as having institutionalised an anti-Catholic ethos and as being the single most responsible agent for maintaining the sectarian habitus. This perception is supported by knowledge of the association of Orangemen with loyalist paramilitaries, of Orange links with the UUP and its influence at state and local governmental level, and of the role its members have played in local government discrimination against Catholics. The GRRC's 1996 submission to the Parades' Commission cites these and lists the names of local Orangemen who have
practised sectarian discrimination when holding public office. The result is that Portadown is seen as the pre-eminent example of the sectarian nature of the ‘Orange state’ and protesting against Orange parades is a way of challenging a pervasive sectarian ethos.

Much of the emotional energy behind the protests is generated by personal experiences of what is commonly called the ‘chill factor’, referred to as ‘psychological torture’ by one male interviewee, and is often alluded to in conversations about parades and respondents’ relations with Protestants. It intensifies with the marching season when Catholics are ‘given the silent treatment’, ‘cold shouldered’, ‘shunned’, ‘ignored’, ‘ostracised’, ‘insulted’, ‘humiliated’, ‘harassed’, ‘intimidated’, attacked, and occasionally murdered. Protestants outnumber Catholics by four to one in Portadown, but due to discrimination the ratio can rise to over six to one in factories and in public places. The result is that many Catholics, being spatially segregated but heavily dependent on access to predominantly Protestant industrial, commercial, administrative, and recreational centres, experience the ‘chill factor’ as relatively isolated and vulnerable individuals. In these circumstances they are naturally reluctant to respond to sectarian abuses which can be so subtle or cryptic that a complaint can lead to victims being accused of sectarianism; or to an intensification of the problem with little chance of finding people willing to listen or to corroborate one’s version of events. Jobs, prospects, property, and physical safety may be jeopardised. The easy option then is to swallow one’s pride, ‘keep your head down’, ‘don’t rock the boat’, and ‘just survive’. However, continuously swallowing one’s pride has a price—a loss of self-respect:

PADDY: You had to suppress your anger and decide which was more important, expressing your feelings or working, as simple as that. Now I chose work over expression. Now I can’t say I was ever happy about that, but it was the lesser of two evils. I’m not sure now that it was the lesser of two evils—but it was what I decided at the time. But I’ve paid a price for it—I was always humiliated.

The chill factor is experienced as part of a yearlong cycle of abuse that peaks with the Orange marches through Catholic neighbourhoods. For that reason alone my informants relate the chill factor to Loyal Order demonstrations which are held to be traditional celebrations of Protestant culture by an organisation claiming to be the defender of the Protestant ascendancy and the upholder of civil and religious liberties for all (Grand Orange Lodge 1995, p. 4).

My informants mentioned a variety of ways in which they responded to the humiliating chill factor: ‘bitching’ at home or swapping stories with their Catholic colleagues and friends and venting their indignation, often simply through deriding known Orangemen. This behaviour provided them with some reassurance as well as a release of anger and frustration. It is in such conversations that ‘the battle to assert the self against its subversion’ is fought (Cohen 1994, p. 106). The Catholic community provides an arena for the recovery of self-esteem through providing a safe place, a ‘cultural intimacy’, from what Scott calls the ‘hidden
transcripts of indignation' (1990, p. 7). What Scott means here are the type of 'off-stage' expressions of indignation mentioned above and he interprets them as being the 'weapons of the weak' where the 'infrapolitics of subordinate groups' is negotiated in 'low profile forms of resistance' (Scott 1990, p. 19). The situation in Portadown is not as extreme as those from which Scott derived his insights and the 'hidden transcripts' are neither as uniform or as hidden and split off from the public transcript as he suggests. Rather, as Howe argues, 'there is a range of subtly different discourses mixing and weaving elements from several forms of account... [sharing] certain elements but organised in different ways according to the kind of audience present' (1998, p. 546). The Unionist, Orange, RUC, and journalistic assertions that the trouble surrounding Orange parades is a recent phenomenon and a Republican plot is confirmation of the depth of Catholic alienation and demonstrates the effectiveness and resilience of this low profile form of resistance. The 'off stage' transcripts complement the historical narrative which was circulated locally and included in the GRRC submission to the Parades' Commission in 1996 and 1997. Hobsbawm regarded historical narratives as providing, 'a legitimator of action and cement of group cohesion' (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983, p. 12). The 'off stage' transcripts serve a similar purpose in what has been described as a process through which the 'certain definable properties of the local folk model are negotiated and confirmed' (Holy & Stuchlik 1981, p. vi). The transcripts of indignation are fundamental to the related processes of identity formation, group cohesion, and legitimisation, for they are where Cohen's 'self' really does 'have primacy in rendering boundaries meaningful' (1994, p. 132).

The particularly aggressive nature of local 'slagging' can also be partially explained in terms of Scott's observation that,

certain forms of social strife... far from constituting evidence of disunity and weakness, may well be the sign of an active, aggressive social surveillance that preserves unity (1990, p. 131).

Slagging serves as a check on those whose ideas or responses might be premature, excessive, jeopardise the safety of the community, or undermine its moral standing. The off-stage transcripts ensure that, contrary to appearances, relations between the dominant and the dominated are never entirely static. However, while they remain 'low profile' their impact on the pattern of relations is bound to be limited.

The willingness to take the suppressed transcript into the public domain is often, 'a matter of individual temperament, and bravado' (Scott 1990, p. 210). One respondent (Donna) implied as much when she said, 'you get the strong personalities who can see the wrongs and have beat their heads off a wall'. Scott (1990) suggests the support necessary for low profile resistance to become high profile is usually related to changes that suddenly lower the danger of speaking out. But this does not explain the parade protests that went on during the violent years of the early 1980s and there can be no doubt that the hunger-strikes to
recover political status in the H-Blocks were an important motivating factors for some members of the group. Nevertheless active participation in that campaign was limited and Scott’s observation does help explain the high level of participation in the GRRRC protest, which took off soon after the Republican and Loyalist cease-fires of 1994 and received much more popular support.

While my interviewees were often aware of the significance of the parades protest in relation to the bigger political picture none of them thought of the protest as an attempt to win any form of coercive power over the Protestant or Orange community. The only references to power that I have detected have been in relation to the success of the GRRRC campaign in highlighting the sectarian nature of Orangeism and RUC bias, and in focussing attention on the plight of Catholics:

JIM: Garvaghy Road starkly brought out, on the media and around the world, that what the British Government were doing for Nationalist here, for ordinary Nationalists on the street, was nothing. The world knows now that we are still second class citizens—no matter what legislation was brought in.

PHILOMENA: The state is an Orange state and this is just them being forced to show their claws.

These comments reflect Lukes’ explication of the dimensions of power that have to do with, ‘control over the agenda of politics and of the ways in which potential issues are kept out of the political process’ (1974, p. 21).

My informants tended to talk of the protest more in terms of a struggle for acceptance, recognition, respect, fairness, and equality, than in terms of power or dominance:

JOANNE: Acceptance is an awful big word in what is going on… just accept that we are here and we do have feelings and thoughts about what goes on. What we want is a little bit of respect—just a bit of respect.

SEAMUS: If you are treated as a lesser being then you’re diminished—but if you feel on equal terms with someone, then you have a different attitude to life.

MAXINE: We want to be treated as they are. We’ll take nothing from them—but we want our rights as human beings—cause that’s what we are.

EILEEN: You can tell people they are equal or whatever, but it’s when they feel it…and I think people are starting to feel it.

That ‘feeling of equality’ was evident prior to the 1998 re-routing from Garvaghy and appears to have more to do with a growing sense of pride in the community’s struggle. This feeling can be understood in light of Scott’s view that peoples’ sense of self-respect is restored through the public declaration of their indignation. As Scott explains, ‘The public declaration of the hidden transcript, because it supplies part of a person’s character that had earlier been kept safely out of sight, seems also to restore a sense of self-respect and personhood’ (1990, p. 210). Conversations among Catholics in Portadown often contain references to aspects of personhood that are intrinsic to people’s sense of self and well-being; to
'respect', 'self-respect', 'dignity', 'pride', and 'worth'. These moral categories refer to the 'non-contingent' aspects of self-identity which Cohen says are 'morally superior to the social self precisely because of its resistance to social pressure, its absoluteness' (1994, p. 126). This moral grammar can also be found in the statements and documents through which the GRRC has publicly declared the hidden transcript - for example, in this reference to July 1985 when only the 'church parade' to Drumcree was permitted through the 'Tunnel':

This was not seen as an acceptable compromise by the residents of the area who knew well that it takes only one Orange march to deny their identity, undermine their self-esteem, insult the whole community... (GRRC 1997)

In the GRRC submission to the Parades' Commission issues of dignity and respect are highlighted and it is argued that Orange parades in Catholic areas are 'blatantly insensitive to the feelings, dignity and rights of the minority community'; and that 'the issue is one of 'moral justice' (GRRC 1996, p. 4). GRRC spokesman Breandan MacCionnaith also makes frequent references to issues of respect and personhood:

They have shown a complete lack of respect for the nationalist community by refusing to hold face to face talks. By refusing this basic human respect the Orange Order have made real progress impossible (Portadown Times, 24 July 1998).

When Orangemen vilify MacCionnaith (as they are wont) they vilify the whole community, for the community representative is, as Bourdieu (1990, p. 139) puts it, 'the group personified'. Along with the Orange refusal to enter into face to face talks and their derogatory remarks about the community, this vilification provokes the type of indignation felt by everyone who has ever experienced the chill factor. Indeed, the GRRC's success rests largely on how well it has articulated those feelings. Anthony Cohen touches on this point when explaining that a community responds to encroachment on its boundaries when its members 'feel the message of this vocal assemblage, though general, to be informed directly by their own experiences and mentalities' (1985, p. 109).

The community protest against Orange demonstrations in Garvaghy is a protest against the sectarian abuses that must often be endured in silence by individual Catholics who are not usually in a position to confront their abusers. The relative safety of the cease-fires and the anonymity of the growing numbers of protesters provided a safer atmosphere in which to participate in a public expression of long suppressed resentment and indignation. The presence of large numbers of international observers in the Nationalist district during July is greatly appreciated by protestors, as they are believed to provide some sense of protection from excessive violence by the security forces. The intense media coverage is also viewed as providing some protection and this also encourages participation in the protests. However, the media coverage also discourages others, for while it provides some protection from excessive RUC violence and arbitrary arrest and prosecution, it also inhibits many who would be at risk of attack or dismissal if identified. I heard this point being made on a number of occasions by people who
were reluctant to be seen protesting and the sincerity of those making the point was confirmed to me in my observations of behind-the-scenes activities. This group included people whose party political or factional allegiance would normally inhibit their involvement with other groups. This weakening of boundaries within the community can be explained by reference to the universality of the experience of injury to self-identity and the accuracy of its articulation in the GRRC campaign. The moral grammar through which that injury finds expression is mirrored in nationalist, and perhaps more so in republican demands for recognition of nationalist identity, culture, and ‘parity of esteem’; supporting Herzfeld’s observation that ‘Ultimately, the language of national or ethnic identity is... a language of morality’ (1997, p. 43).

Both parading and protesting are the principal elements of a performative discourse through which the two ethno-political groups are struggling to win the ‘symbolic capital’ necessary to obtain effective ‘symbolic power’. ‘Symbolic capital’ means ‘economic or cultural capital which is acknowledged and recognised’. ‘Symbolic power’ is the power to ‘conceal or reveal things which are already there’ (Bourdieu 1990, pp. 135, 138). Historical events and circumstances have established Drumcree as the site of a ritualised enactment of the metapolitical conflict between two communities whose ethnic markers are, ‘mechanisms for the articulation of political alignments’ (Cohen 1974, p. 97). On the objective level Drumcree is the premier site for the enactment of ritualised performances intended to ‘show up and show off certain realities... to manipulate one’s self image [and] the image of one’s position in the social space’ (Bourdieu 1990, p. 134). On the subjective level it is the site of a struggle to change ‘the categories of perception and evaluation of the social world, the cognitive and evaluative structures’ (Bourdieu 1990, p. 134). In this symbolic space the two groups are struggling for the power to conceal or to reveal, so to retain or to change. the objective structures of Northern Irish society through winning recognition for their competing world views. This is what residents mean when they talk of ‘exposing the claws of Orangeism’, ‘exposing the sectarianism and hypocrisy’, ‘struggling with old mindsets’, ‘breaking the back of sectarianism’, and of ‘fighting for them sometimes’.

The axiom ‘no talking—no walking’, the tricolours, sit-down protests, murals depicting dancing colleens and Orange petrol bombers, food convoys, and images of mass being celebrated before a barricade of armoured cars, are all part of the residents’ moral argument. That is not to say, however, that they are contrivances and the most eloquent statement, images of being beaten off their own streets by the RUC, is an experience most people would much rather forego. Though its propaganda value was recognised, the frightening prospect of submitting to another beating in 1998 was an important consideration for many of those who voted in a secret ballot, on May 5th, to invite outsiders to help stage a mass demonstration in July 1998.
EUGENE: How many times do you need to get a beating to get the point across?

GEORGE: Who in their right minds would vote to get beat up?

That plan was scaled down when the danger and the difficulty of controlling a very large crowd was realised. Some of those who voted against it gave that reason; others thought the propaganda value (or ‘symbolic power’) of another public beating was still a necessary sacrifice in the struggle for recognition of the situation of the town’s Catholic community (for ‘symbolic capital’). Bourdieu calls this essentially symbolic conflict a struggle ‘for the production of common sense (meaning) for a monopoly over legitimate naming’ (1990, p. 135). That struggle is one of the primary motivations for participation in the. often punishing, protest against Orange parades which are perceived as being legally approved, public demonstrations of the moral, social, and cultural inferiority of Catholics. This perception is grounded in the everyday experiences of individuals who often have difficulty communicating the subtleties of persistent, low-grade sectarian abuse without appearing petty, prejudiced, or preposterous. Common experiences of personal denigration are what informs the ‘common sense’ of Catholics who see the Drumcree ‘church parade’ as a euphemism for (or ‘illegitimate naming’ of) collective denigration through symbolic demonstrations of supremacy. Scott writes that, ‘the imposition of euphemisms on the public transcript [masks] the many nasty facts of domination and [gives] them a harmless or sanitised aspect’ (1990, p. 53). And the nasty facts behind the Drumcree ‘church parade’ are, in the minds of my informants, the perpetuation of a sectarian habitus that denigrates Catholics, justifies their socio-economic marginalisation, and encourages violence against them.

Conclusions: inclusion and exclusion

Axel Honneth (1995) has suggested that social conflicts be interpreted as struggles to create the conditions necessary for self-realisation through establishing relations of mutual recognition. He argues that, when people are denied recognition they feel compelled to achieve what is sensed as being a ‘vital’ human need (by ‘recognition’ Honneth means ‘the granting of certain status’). That vital human need is a deeply felt personal need for recognition of the dignity and worth of the individual and the struggle to achieve it kicks in when the ethnicity, status, dignity, or physical integrity of subordinate groups is systematically disrespected. Drawing on the work of Mead, Honneth (1995, pp. 171-179) argues that the development and maintenance of personal identity is heavily dependent on social relationships because, as his translator Jole Anderson, puts it:

The very possibility of identity-formation—depends crucially on the development of self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem. These three modes of relating practically to oneself can only be acquired and maintained intersubjectively, through being granted recognition by others whom one also recognizes. As a result, the conditions for self-realization turn out to be dependent on the establishment of relationships of mutual recognition (p. xi).
Honneth (1995) identifies three groups of experiences of disrespect that constitute a denial of recognition. Most fundamental is personal degradation inflicted through 'forms of practical maltreatment' (p. 132), physical abuses and murder. Second is the denial of equality of treatment, or legal rights, through structural exclusion. The third group consists of 'evaluative forms of disrespect' (p. 134), meaning the denigration of individual or collective ways of life through insults to people's honour, dignity, or status. The effects of such denials of recognition are evident in the expressions my informants use to describe their feelings of being insulted and humiliated by Orange parades. They constitute what Honneth refers to in the subtitle of his book as 'The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts'. Honneth argues that the negative emotional reactions of shame, indignation, and rage 'comprise the psychological symptoms on the basis of which one can come to realize that one is being denied social recognition' (1995, p. 136). The impulse to share these feelings in the 'off stage transcripts', where people express their indignation and recover their self-esteem, is where that realisation is nurtured and can become the motivational impetus to collective action.

The Catholic community in Portadown is, like every community, an aggregate of individuals and groups who place different emphasis on a variety of ideologies, needs, and values. Some are more conscious of their ethno-political identity than others and the degree of enthusiasm for such issues may be related to socio-economic and factional interests and to class aspirations or pretensions. However, the compulsion to achieve what is sensed as being a vital human need, a deeply felt personal need for recognition of the dignity, worth, and status of members of the minority community, has diluted these divisions and many feel a growing sense of community, of solidarity and pride. Indeed, widespread experiences of denigration and familiarity with the moral grammar of indignation would explain why the parades protest in Portadown quickly won support among all sections of the Catholic community in Northern Ireland—including those who hold neither 'Nationalist or republican beliefs, but even among those who are politically or religiously indifferent or even mildly unionist' (SDLP Assembly Member Alban Maginness, Irish News, 21 September 1998).

The moral grammar through which the hidden transcript has been proclaimed has provided what Honneth (1995, p. 163) describes as a

semantic bridge between the impersonal aspirations of a social movement and their participants' private experiences of injury, a bridge that is sturdy enough to enable the development of collective identity.

And that moral grammar constitutes a link between personal identity, community identity, and ethno-national identity through forming what Herzfeld refers to as an 'encoded discourse about inclusion and exclusion' (1997, p. 43).

If the moral grammar of indignation is conceptualised as forming the architecture of a semantic bridge that supports the world-view of Catholics, then the foundations of that bridge are personal experiences of the three forms of disrespect that constitute a denial of recognition. It is not what Frank Burton
argues are the ‘three constitutional elements of the Catholic weltanschauung’, namely ‘communalism’, ‘sectarianism’, and ‘republicanism’ (1978, p. 128). It is my view that, in so far as each of these may exist, they are merely the consequences of the long-term denial of recognition that the Catholic community in Northern Ireland has had to endure. And it is also the experiences of disrespect that constitute a denial of recognition that have obliged Portadown Catholics to perfect and practice the art of ‘telling’—which Rosemary Harris recognised as a means by which to avoid provoking controversy (1972, pp. 146-147). Harris’ structural functionalist approach may have caused her to overlook the dynamic role of telling and I would suggest that it is better understood as part of the strategy of low profile resistance which vulnerable and dependent Catholics use to maintain the boundaries of the social space necessary for the recovery of personal and collective identity. It only appears to stabilise relations while actually providing a safe social space in which a critique of power could be nurtured—until such time as the sectarian habitus upon which those relations are based could be realistically challenged. As such it is part of the dynamic of change.

Expressions of indignation were a regular feature of my informants’ responses to questions about how they feel about Orange marches and how they feel about how they are treated or regarded in the town. Their references to experiences and feelings of being individually and collectively humiliated, demeaned, and degraded are expressions of injury to self-esteem, self-respect, and self-confidence; three ‘non-negotiable aspects of personhood’, three ‘vital needs’ that can only be fully realised ‘within the intersubjectively established value-system of one’s society’ (Honneth, 1995, p. 88). For this reason, the parades issue cannot be fully explained solely in terms of two equal but conflicting sets of rights, or simply in terms of a power struggle between two ethno-political camps. A more comprehensive explanation of the issues involved requires that it be seen as a largely symbolic struggle between a dominant and a subordinate group; a struggle through which the subordinate group aspires, for very pragmatic reasons, to change the nature of relations between the two communities in order that their own human rights might be fully recognised and juridically guaranteed. It is a struggle to expose, so as to break out of, a habitual sectarianism that perpetuates the socio-economic and cultural subordination of Catholics by undermining their sense of self. That sectarian habitus is experienced as being annually reinvigorated through Orange parading rituals which, with the indulgence of the Church of Ireland, reassert the moral and social supremacy of the dominant group. Since the inception of the Orange Order in 1795 these rituals have been imposed with violence and the threat of violence or further socio-economic exclusion. And since the inception of the Northern Irish state until July 1998 they have been endorsed by the state and facilitated by its security forces.

Historical events and circumstances have established Drumcree as the site of a ritualised enactment of a struggle between a dominant and a subordinate community whose ethnic markers signify their political alignments. While
Orangemen seek to retain, the residents seek to change the way in which Orangeism is perceived and evaluated, both in the wider world and within the wider Protestant community. The residents' protest is aimed at revealing and communicating the realities behind what Orangemen present as a 'church parade', a 'cultural tradition', and a 'civil right'. It is a struggle to obtain recognition of their status as full and equal citizens and to have this guaranteed under law. It is, therefore, a struggle for recognition of the most basic human rights.

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