Introduction to Volume 2

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Whatever our perspective on the world around us, we cannot help wondering whether globalization and the end of the Cold War has actually brought us greater insecurity, rather than the increased security promised. The processes of internationalization unleashed by globalization have undermined the once dominant national security model. But the globalization paradigm has not itself been too concerned to map out the new global (in) security dilemmas. We have only rather generalized theories of “global risk” (Beck 1999) and wishful aspirations for a “global civil society” (Kaldor 2003). This general introduction thus seeks to develop a fruitful encounter between the globalization paradigm and the new (and old) forms of security and insecurity now becoming manifest across the world with greater intensity.

The security dilemmas we all face in the post–Cold War era can be dealt with in various ways. We could just be fatalistic and accept security concerns as an inevitable part of the human condition read in Hobbesian terms. We could also seek to mitigate security and risk challenges through amelioration and conflict containment. Or, finally, as Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler argue we can pursue a “transcender logic [which] argues that human society on a global scale can construct a radically new world order, and in so doing escape the dangers of the past” (2008, 18). Whether this view is overly optimistic is a matter of opinion, but it at least offers a framework to pursue postconflict security strategies. Nor does this view deny that world politics in the twenty-first century will be characterized by deep uncertainties, growing and unpredictable risks, as well as generalized turmoil. Indeed, Booth and Wheeler point to how “the global agenda will be uniquely dominated by an era of converging global challenges, with potentially catastrophic global and local impacts” (268). There will be new challenges overlaid on old ones, combining in new and unsettling modalities. The point is, can we deal with the era of uncertainty and risk by denying it or hiding from it or simply coping with it, or should we seek to address its root causes? This encyclopaedia seeks to address the complex cluster of security challenges in the era of globalization. Our focus is particularly on what is new, and our lens is a critical one that avoids facile orthodoxies. The challenges are very serious, and so our thinking must be equally serious and
focused on a critical understanding of current reality and, wherever possible, on seeking mechanisms for transcending the security dilemma.

We start this introductory chapter by examining the diverse ways in which globalization has redefined the nature of security. Security threats are now increasingly global—from global warming to global hunger, to global terrorism—and thus the national or statist security paradigm is inadequate. We expand on this theme in the next section dealing with the simultaneous “widening” of security (to take on nonmilitary threats) and its “deepening” (to go further than the nation-state into society). This leads us to a sustained review of the new human security paradigm seen by its supporters as the replacement for the national security paradigm and by its detractors as vague and unable to be operationalized. Turning to more recent dramatic events in world affairs since 2001, we consider the notion that we are entering a new era of permanent war or permanent security. Finally, we turn to the broader picture of globalization with its winners and losers and ask whether a global civil society can be constructed to take us beyond the current state of seemingly limitless insecurity as the dominant human condition.

SECURITY

Globalization creates greater economic, political, social, and cultural interactions across the globe and is thus a source of great dynamism. However, security analysts argue that “many different aspects of globalisation now combine to increase the dangers of a variety of transnational threats from weapons proliferation, cyber attacks, ethnic violence, global crime, drug trafficking, environmental degradation and the spread of infectious disease” (Davis 2003, 1–2). From this rather wide range of perceived threats, it is clear that two in particular are at the top of the list. The first is the environment and the cluster of issues under the label of global warming that clearly pose transnational risks (see Environmental Insecurity entry in volume 1). The second is the issue of global terrorism (see Terrorism entry in volume 1) with the likes of Al Qaeda being “able effectively to exploit new communications technologies, global financial networks, and the ease of movements of people” (Davis 2003, 1). Between them these twin perils are creating great turbulence by posing security threats in a conventional sense and undermining human security in a broader sense.

Globalization’s security implications have led to a number of attempts at “redefining security” (Mathews 1989). Since the end of the Cold War, a narrow military conception of national security has now seemed not only redundant but also inadequate. Jessica Mathews was already arguing in 1989 that “global developments now suggest the need for a broadening definition of national security to include resource, environmental and demographic issues” (162). National sovereignty had already been undermined by the increased freedom of financial flows in the 1980s and by the information and communications technology revolution (see Internet and Human [In]Security entry). Environmental strains now clearly transcended national borders. From a global development perspective, there was a simultaneous move to broaden the definition of
security, to include economic vulnerability and dependency in the global South (Thomas 1987). External military threats were seen as less important in the South than economic vulnerability and state weakness. The issue of external dependence, becoming more accentuated rather than less in the era of globalization, is seen as the main context-setting element for the majority of the world’s population.

Taking a broad overview of the globalization and security field, we note a fairly general recognition that there are now new security challenges that cannot be dealt with on the basis of national security or by purely military means. Even the proponents of traditional military conceptions of security accept a tendency toward the internationalization of security. Notions of collective security now come to the fore, whether dealing with global warming or global terrorism. The old binary opposition between the external (international) and the internal (national) can no longer be credibly sustained. Crime, drugs, people trafficking, and terrorism are as much inside as outside the national borders (see Crime entry). State security is no longer effective even in its own terms, never mind from the perspective of the many millions across the world for whom their own state is the main source of insecurity. While state security is clearly an urgent issue in relation to the real or perceived terrorist threat, as an overall paradigm it is, we argue, of declining effectiveness.

Whether globalization has increased or diminished global security is not entirely or easily decidable. Jan Aart Scholte systematically goes through all the main issues at stake and finds arguments for and against on all counts (2005, chap. 9). While global connectivity may disincentive war in the global North, the increasingly global reach of armed forces has facilitated military intervention in the global South. While global consciousness has promoted ecological awareness, many global activities are heavily polluting. Globalization’s impact on security is clearly contradictory across and at all levels. Likewise, while globalization has brought to the fore global threats and the need for transnational responses, the national security paradigm is far from defunct in practice. As David Held and others put it, “The doctrine of national security remains one of the essential defining principles of modern statehood . . . For if a state does not have the capacity to secure its territory and protect its people, then its very raison d’être can be called into question” (1999, 145). This verdict is clearly reflected in the U.S. response to the attack on the symbols of national political, economic, and military power in September 2001.

Critical security theorists now argue for the need “to develop a new [security] paradigm around the policies likely to enhance peace and limit conflict” (Rogers 2000, 119). This is a broad agenda indeed, insofar as true global security would entail a reversal of current socioeconomic polarization, unsustainable growth patterns, and unbridled global military aggression. While this transformative view of security in the era of globalization is unlikely to be mainstreamed, there is still a considerable widening of traditional notions of security. The U.S. National Security Strategy statement of 1994 thus declared unambiguously that “not all security risks are military in nature. Transnational phenomena such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, environmental degradation, rapid population growth and refugee flows also have security implications”
The broadening of security from this state perspective relates to the understanding that soft power can often complement hard power. It is indeed the rise of soft power that could be seen as the defining characteristic of the era despite the more traditional hard power response to 9/11.

DEEPER SECURITY

The widening security agenda can be seen as simply increasing the state’s securitization of such issues as migration, health, and food in a way that does not essentially challenge the traditional security paradigm in its essentials (see entries for Migration and Health in this volume, and Food Security/Fisheries in volume 1). But we might ask, what would be the implications of a deeper conception of security? In 1993 the UN Development Programme (UNDP) declared paradigmatically that “the concept of security must change—from an exclusive stress on national society to a much greater stress on people’s security, from security through armaments to security through human development, from territorial to food, employment and environmental security” (cited in Hough 2004, 13). This move by the UN was congruent with its concern to promote the “human face” of globalization in contrast with the dominant powers’ then-prevalent adherence to free and unrestricted market mechanisms and such multilateral economic organizations as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The step was part of the broader move toward a post-Washington Consensus on economic matters, as it were.

It was not only the soft power approach of the UN, though, that sought to deepen the traditional concept of security. From the mid-1990s onward, such nation-states as Canada and Ireland, as well as the Scandinavian countries, also began, at least rhetorically, to advance the notion of human security (see next section). Canada’s foreign minister from 1996 to 2000, Lloyd Axworthy, consistently argued for human security in the UN and forcefully advocated the creation of the International Criminal Court. Critics could easily argue that this move was simply a middle-ranking power’s bid to gain exposure in the international arena through a distinctive foreign policy. Furthermore, the policy was couched in the language of soft power in the sense of the pursuit of state interests by other means, rather than a pursuit of global interest however that might be defined. Nevertheless, despite these reservations, it has been noted, “the Canadians . . . have been in the forefront of campaigns to ban the use of land mines, and reform the UN Security Council so that it is less constrained by power politics” (Hough 2004, 14).

In the academic domain there occurred around that same time a parallel process of deepening of security as a theoretical paradigm. In the early 1980s, the influential work of Barry Buzan had already begun the process of widening security, with his People, States and Fear (1983) adding the categories of economic, societal, and ecological security to that of military security. It was the state and not the individual, however, that remained the reference point for security insofar as the state was seen as the primary agent for the reduction of insecurity. By the early 1990s, this view proved unsustainable, particularly in
Europe. With Ole Weaver, Buzan developed the concept of societal security, a notion that effectively deepened the traditional idea of state security (Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde 1998). In post–Cold War Europe, sovereignty was seen as less important than issues of identity (including culture, religion, and language) in societies changing rapidly, not least through the increase of mass migration. Societies were seen as complex organizations, and the challenges they faced were conceived of as much more diffuse and less easy to categorize than were, for example, the traditional security challenges made by other powers.

The deepening of security through the development of a concept of societal security was designed, however, not to replace state security but to complement it. The reconceptualization of security is thus incomplete here. There is here a reified understanding of identity as an objective given and little understanding of security as a social construction. Also at play here is an implicit Eurocentrism insofar as it quite uncritically privileges a Western conception of security and securitization (of, say, Islam). Above all, the deepening of the security paradigm by what has become known as the Copenhagen School seems to ignore the gendered nature of security as concept and practice. A gender perspective (see entry for Gender) entails not just adding new issues (widening), but also genuinely reconceptualizing (deepening) security. To understand globalization, conflict, and security today we require a gendered approach that can deconstruct the patriarchal state, unpack the gendered nature of identity, and explore the links between militarism and patriarchy (see Tickner 2001). Social relations and processes on a global scale are all inherently gendered, and thus security challenges affect men and women differently.

From a critical security perspective, the widening and deepening operations carried out within the mainstream paradigm since the end of the Cold War and the onset of globalization have clear limits. It has been argued that the events of 2001–2003 (9/11, Afghanistan, and Iraq) have in fact taken us back to the days when state security reigned supreme—when state security trumped that of the individual, and state-led military power rendered soft power irrelevant. Still, Steve Smith makes a strong contrary argument that “the events of September 11 support those who wish to widen and deepen the concept of security” (2006, 57). After all, it was not a state that declared war on the United States but, rather, a transnational network reflecting a very different conception of identity, of community, and, indeed, of security itself. What this tells us, of course, is that security is a conceptual battlefield with no agreed-on definition or parameters. That security as a concept is itself a contested discourse is hardly surprising given what is at stake in terms of how we define the problems and the responses to global security risks.

**HUMAN SECURITY**

We could argue that the simultaneous widening and deepening of security comes to a logical conclusion with the concept of human security now seen as a full-blown alternative to state security. The concept of human security is
inseparable from the optimistic Western view following the end of the Cold War, namely, that globalization would lead to democratization and that conflict over fundamentals would become a thing of the past (see Geopolitics entry in volume 1). In 1995, the Commission on Global Governance published its influential report *Our Common Neighbourhood*, arguing that “the concept of global security must be broadened from the traditional focus on the security of states, to include the security of people and the security of the planet” (338). At the same time, the concept of human security was coming to the fore in the work of the UNDP, which launched the human development index (HDI) focused on the welfare of individuals rather than the economy.

Economic development and military security now became intertwined in the dominant conceptual discourses (see Development entry in volume 1). The basic underlying principle seems straightforward enough: “Since the idea of human security is to improve the lives of people rather than improve the security of national borders and key issues cross these borders, coordinated action by the international community seems essential” (King and Murray 2001–2002, 607). Human security is a move in the realm of security that parallels the discursive shift in development theory toward sustainable development, and in international law to human rights as an overarching principle. It is a people-centered approach to security that seeks to create a situation where all will enjoy “freedom from fear and freedom from want.” It is assumed to be the raison d’être of the United Nations, and many national governments have adopted it as a progressive foreign policy slogan.

Recently, considerable effort has been put into developing and operationalizing the concept of human security (Alkire 2003). Nevertheless, the effort remains quite vulnerable to the charge that “human security is like ‘sustainable development’—everyone is for it, but few people have a clear idea of what it means” (Paris 2004, 250). From the perspective of the national security advisor, human security looks very much like a laundry list of desirable but utopian goals; a laudable ideal rather than a relevant policy category. It is also open to many, often conflicting interpretations. We might, for example, agree that to bring peace to a region we need to address the root causes of conflict, but then the remedies suggested might vary hugely. From a traditional state security perspective, the human security approach can only dilute the analytical power of security and presents such a vast array of different threats and complex ambitious solutions, that nothing gets done.

Beyond its vagueness, the concept of human security can also be interrogated in terms of its assumed unproblematic notion of human security itself. In 2003, the Commission of Human Security issued the landmark report *Human Security Now*. The report argued that when a state is neither willing nor able to ensure the human security of its citizens, “the principle of [international] non-interference yields to the international responsibility to protect” (Commission of Human Security 2003, ix). States or the state systems are still expected to ensure human security by intervening where “fragile, collapsed, fragmenting or generally chaotic state entities” (p. 8) do not protect human security. This approach enlists the concept of human security in a radical way to support the global governance agenda. As Mark Duffield and Nicholas Waddell put it, “Human
Security Now argues for a bio-politics of human population based upon global forms of coordination and centralisation . . . collectively having the ability and legitimacy to support the efforts of weak and ineffective states” (2006, 15). In other words, human security can be yet another form of human control.

From this perspective, the resilience of global populations can be improved through regulatory networks, including aid programs, to ensure biopolitical regulation. This critique of the concept of human security as a form of biopolitical regulation draws on the work of Michel Foucault. Biopolitics and biopower can be seen as the appropriate regulatory mechanism for the era of global governance. As Foucault put it, “Regulatory mechanisms must be established to establish an equilibrium, maintain an average, establish a sort of homeostasis . . . security mechanisms have to be installed around the random element inherent in a population of living beings, so as to optimise a state of life” (2003, 246). Human security is ultimately about the security of the modern state. It is a hugely ambitious project to establish through biopower a disciplinary power over the human-as-species. In this sense, it is complementary to, rather than a radical alternative to, traditional conceptions of state security.

PERMANENT SECURITY

The benign version of human security did ultimately come to pass, however, as the optimistic global security mood of the 1990s gave way to the post-2001 moves toward what we might call an enhanced permanent security state. The modern “state of emergency” emerges when a state declares that military methods are necessary to deal with disorder that cannot be dealt with by normal political means. The panoply of counterterrorism measures declared by the president of the United States of America after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon have been wide-ranging and designed to last. As Michael Dillon argues, “On September 11th, 2001, the United States found itself subject to the recoil of the violence of globalisation. Declaring war on the terror to which New York had been subjected, the Bush administration invoked a global state of emergency to wage indefinite war on an indefinite enemy. The outcome has been a radical suspension of the law to save the law” (2002, 77).

The logic of modern power is articulated most clearly by Giorgio Aganben (2005), who argues that the “state of exception,” which was once a provisional measure in the West, has now become a working paradigm for government.

Globalization and security set the parameters of events prior to and since 2001. One asymmetric attack by a relatively small organization is clearly not the cause of this transformation in world affairs. Nor can it explain how or why an emergency extrapolitical regime has now become the new normalcy. The traditional divide between war and peace has now disappeared as the world embarks on a long war (see Information Wars and New Wars entries in volume 1). President George W. Bush declared, “Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated” (cited in Gross 2006, 75). The global War on Terror declared in 2001 has since transmuted in White
House and Pentagon discourse into the “Long War.” The change in terminology reflects a growing recognition that one cannot declare war on a form of war. But there is still no recognition that this Long War cannot be won by military means. As John Arquilla puts it, “In terms of the Long War thus far, and in what is likely to come, ideas and beliefs have, in important ways, begun to trump traditional war-fighting” (2007, 384).

The Long War, like the Cold War before it, seeks a clearly identifiable enemy that fits conventional geopolitical and military thinking (see Münkler 2005 for an overview). It does not respond to the complex array of factors creating global insecurity but, in fact, adds to them. It is not even sustainable security in conventional terms: “The current U.S. security paradigm is essentially one of ‘control’—a matter of responding to current and potential threats primarily by the use of military force” (Rogers 2007, 136). This exposes the severe limitations in the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) that was meant to transform U.S. military strategy after the Cold War ended. The use of weapons, high technology, and information and communications technology would put an end to war as we know it (Hirst 2001). The American way of life was now joined by an American way of war. But the RMA was disrupted by the asymmetric attacks of 2001 and their global dissemination by global information and communications technology.

The RMA and the Long War are of dubious efficacy as security drivers even in their own terms because they rest on an outdated modernization theory perspective on development—on the notion of regime change, for example—and on a technological determinism that ignores the social, political, and cultural determinants of conflict. More specifically, by demonizing the likes of Al Qaeda, the dominant security discourses cannot comprehend its nature. A quite different approach would be to examine this type of organization in terms of social movement theory and as part of global civil society. Victor Asal and his colleagues make a coherent argument that such organizations as Al Qaeda can be viewed as “transnational advocacy networks,” a theoretical approach mainly applied to human rights movements (2007). After all, Al Qaeda has embraced a localized and networked form of organization, and like humanitarian networks, it is alert to the importance of symbolic political action. It also works on public opinion through an adept use of the new communications technology.

The notion of a Long War against Islam as a consequence of an underlying clash of civilizations is based on no clear historical understanding of the relationship between globalization and war (on which see Barkani 2006). That globalization meant peace and that war was now a thing of the past was an illusion of the 1990s and reflected the era’s “end of history” mood (Fukuyama 1992). It is not so much that globalization itself causes war but that we need an understanding of how “war is itself a form of interconnection, and a historically pervasive and significant one at that. War in this sense is a globalizing force, and it has been for a long time” (Barkani 2006, xii). We can then go on to explore how the West and Islam are interconnected and have a mutual constitution. The modernity and hybridity of a movement such as Al Qaeda precludes any simplistic model based on Islamic fundamentalism and shows how the Long War on Terror is a recipe only for the deepening and broadening of insecurity.
BEYOND SECURITY?

We argue that to understand and deal with the issue of (in)security in the era of globalization, we need to move beyond the security paradigms explored in this introduction. The various theoretical approaches to security—from realism through poststructuralism—are also constantly constructing the political meaning of (in)security. We have examined in particular the broadening and deepening of the security problematic and the highly ambiguous concept of human security, seen by some as liberal wishful thinking and by others as a Foucaultian control mechanism. What Booth advocates, from the perspective of the new critical security studies, is not just to turn all political problems into security issues (‘‘securitising politics’’) but to ‘‘turn every security issue into a question of political theory (what might be called politicising security)’’ (2005, 14). Security is too important to all of us to be left to the so-called securocrats or, for that matter, to the academic specialists in security studies.

Clearly, from a globalization perspective, security cannot be divorced from the global political economy. Security and insecurity issues do not arise in sterile apolitical environments or as part of some military strategist’s abstract scenario planning. To a large extent, the political economy of globalization dictates life chances, affecting whether we lead comfortable lives or suffer social exclusion (Munck 2005). As Roger Tooze argues, ‘‘It is the apparently increasingly arbitrary, random, sudden and unpredictable nature of the workings of the global economy that have heightened the sense that these matters concern our security’’ (2005, 143). We could go further to argue that the currently dominant neoliberal market-friendly globalization not only generates but even depends on insecurity. Competitiveness—which applies as much between people, communities, cities, nation-states, and regions as between enterprises—is explicitly creating insecurity and rejecting any notion of social protection or solidarity.

Neither can we approach security in a global context without clearly understanding the complexity and tensions in the real world. Certainly, globalization did not do away with what are mistakenly seen as premodern forms of conflict derived from racial, ethnic, tribal, or national identities. Paul James (2006) directs our attention to the complexities and contradictions that structure people’s lives and social relationships in the era of globalization. There is not an abstract contest between globalization (good) and tribalism (bad) as many proponents of globalization have argued. James develops instead a counterposition ‘‘that allows us to make decisions about political-ethical directions, on the basis of an understanding about the complexities of different forms of community and polity, rather than on the basis of ideologically-driven prejudice about the essential virtues of savage globalisation’’ (2006, 9).

One seemingly attractive response to global insecurity would be to foster the development of a global civil society (see Global Civil Society entry), which would counter the state and other forms of violence and insecurity. Such a society is defined as ‘‘the sphere of ideas, values, institutions, organisations, networks and individuals located between the family, the state, and the market and operating beyond the confines of national societies, politics and economies’’ (Anheier, Glasius, and Kaldor 2001, 17). This broad definition would embrace...
many forms of globalization—contesting movements throughout the world, including Al Qaeda. But the proponents of global civil society clearly do not wish to see global terrorism, or global crime, for that matter, included in their cosmopolitan sphere of civilized dialogue. Indeed, they have gone so far as supporting wars they deemed humanitarian, such wars, for example, as the bombing of Serbia by NATO forces in 1999.

Whether there can be such a thing as a humanitarian war goes to the heart of the relationship between globalization and security. For Mary Kaldor and others, the nature of the new wars—where criminalism and tribalism prevail—necessitates a cosmopolitan response that will likely include military force (2003). Likewise sympathetic to the view that outside agencies should intervene when a state cannot save its own citizens from violence, Iris Marion Young also argues that she finds it “disturbing that some international actors appear to assume that such commitments to human rights themselves legitimate some states making war on others” (2007, 100). The contradictions between the notion of humanitarian wars and the specter of human rights imperialism point us to the main limitation of global civil society theory, namely, that it fails to address and understand the nature of contemporary postmodern violence (Delanty 2001).

To effectively go beyond even critical security studies (see Fierke 2007 for an overview), we need to start with the so-called theory-practice nexus. We must accept that theory is “for some one and for some purpose,” as Robert Cox famously put it. An emancipatory theory would need to explore the sources of human insecurity over and above the challenges to state security. There is today a global anxiety, or what Bauman calls “liquid fear” (2006), that permeates all areas of our life, creating insecurity around many of the facets of globalization and not just the new global terror that the security literature concentrates on. There are regressive structures and processes in today’s global society that clearly create ever greater insecurity. These range from inequitable trade arrangements and unjust wars to polluting, sexist, and racist daily social practices. There are also progressive structures and processes striving to knit together the local communities and global networks in pursuit of a better life for all. Certainly a gap exists here, as Richard Wyn Jones argues, because “international relations specialists on the whole have been remarkably ineffective on the relationship between their work—theyir theories—and political practice . . . There have been no systematic considerations of how critical international theory can help generate, support or sustain emancipatory politics beyond the seminar room or conference hotel” (1999, xx). To once again marry a critical understanding of the world around us with the enduring human capacity to imagine and construct a better life would indeed be a task worth developing to ensure that the era of globalization does not become the era of insecurity it threatens to be.
in short, the new matrix for our era, the framework for what is and for what might be. The next section of this introductory chapter examines the contested and often contradictory meanings that globalization takes on as dominant paradigm for our time. This is followed by a summary of the main economic transformations globalization has generated in the world around us. How this new world order might be governed politically is the subject of the final section that sets the parameters for many of the contributions to this volume.

Globalization is currently the dominant paradigm or way of seeing the world around us, both for supporters of this phenomenon and for its detractors. It is a grand narrative as powerful, all-embracing, and visionary as any that may have preceded it, including those of classical capitalism, colonialism, or socialism. It is seen as an epoch-making moment in human history, a transition to a brave new world whether that is viewed positively or negatively. Recently, substantive and seriously researched books have been published arguing for “the truth about globalization” (Legrain 2004) or “in defence of globalization” (Bhagwati 2004) and on “why globalization works” (Wolf 2004). These works are as passionate and as important as those seeking to defend an earlier model of capitalism from the ideological challenge posed by the rise of the Soviet planned economy in the 1920s. So, what is the neoliberal case for a global market economy?

For the liberal globalizers, the essence of the phenomenon in question is the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor “so that, economically speaking, there are no foreigners” (Wolf 2004, 14). They believe, quite literally, in the “magic of the market,” a market they see as not only the source of material wealth but “also the basis of freedom and democracy” (Wolf 2004, 57). Liberal globalization is seen as something that encourages moral virtues. While it indeed “makes people richer,” it also, according to Martin Wolf, makes people “more concerned about environmental damage, pain and injustice” (2004, 57). Be that as it may, clearly the liberal globalizer worldview goes beyond simple economics and offers an alternative to all collectivist or social views of the world. Corporations are seen as virtuous as well as dynamic agents of progressive change. Globalization will, according to this view, lead to a decline of inequality and poverty worldwide as the market works its magic. While it might have some downsides—it is accepted that no market is perfect—overall there is simply no alternative. Freedom itself – variously defined or not at all—depends on the continued expansion of the global free market.

The case against globalization is equally passionate and categorical. Globalization, from this perspective, is seen as an economic process leading to the commodification of life itself. There is nothing that is not for sale, from health to education, from knowledge to our genes. Behind the rhetoric of free trade supposedly lies a sinister move toward introducing barriers around privatized technology, resources, and knowledge to keep them safe for capitalist exploitation. The result, as Naomi Klein puts it, is that “globalization is now on trial because on the other side of all these virtual fences are real people, shut out of schools, workplaces, their own farms, homes and communities” (2002, xxi). The “silent takeover” (Hertz 2001) by the transnational corporations (see Transnational Corporations entry in volume 1) is seen by others to be an imminent threat to the very possibility of Western democracy as we have known it
(see Democracy entry in volume 1). Corporations are taking over social functions previously carried out by the state, pressuring governments to follow their neoliberal global agenda, and leaving the political system devoid of any real choices.

It is probably impossible to adjudicate between the pro- and antiglobalization cases, especially when stated in such a polemical and absolutist manner. It might, anyway, be more productive to avoid such binary opposition and instead start from an assumption around the sheer complexity of the globalization processes. As John Urry puts it, “Global ordering is so immensely complicated that it cannot be ‘known’ through a simple concept or set of processes” (2003, 15). The global era cannot be reduced to a simple logic of the market, or of so-called network society or of empire. The complexity approach allows us to move beyond such counterpositions as those between structural determinism and pure chance or, put another way, between frozen stability and ever-changingness as dominant trends. Complexity refuses all static and reductionist readings of globalization that should, in preference, be seen as “neither unified nor . . . act- ing as a subject nor should it be conceived of in linear fashion” (Urry 2003, 40).

It is understandable that first-generation globalization studies should have conceived of this complex process as more powerful and unified than it actually was, but from now on an approach that foregrounds the complexity approach will be more productive whatever political choices we ultimately make.

Another common opposition in the vast literature on globalization now available is between those who stress the novelty of the situation and those who stress continuity with earlier periods of capitalism’s internationalization. Among the popularizers of the first position must be counted management consultant Kenichi Ohmae, who in a series of books with such titles as The Borderless World (1990) and The End of the Nation State (1995) articulated a vision of modernity’s nation-state era coming to an end as the liberating forces of the global market became dominant in the 1990s. The traditional order of national economies, industrial production, welfare states, and so on, would be swept away by the new wind of free market dynamism. Ohmae stresses the revolutionary break with the past and the short time span, say, of 25 years, in which these world revolutionary events took place.

Academic promoters of the globalist case are more nuanced; nevertheless, emphasis is laid very much on the novelty of the phenomenon described. Thus Anthony Giddens finds himself essentially agreeing with those for whom “the new communications technologies, the role of knowledge as a factor of production, and the new discoveries in the life sciences, signal a profound transition in human history” (2001, 4). The whole mood or tone of this discourse is revolutionary in that it conceptualizes globalization as a fundamental shift in the human trajectory that is now in full flow. There are, of course, optimistic and pessimistic renderings of the globalizing scenario, but the unifying strand is that the shifts involved in all areas of human life are irreversible and of global significance, whether we view them as benign or not.

Against the globalizers, who believe in globalization, and the antiglobalizers who believe it is real too, even if they do not like its effects, we can posit the sceptics, for whom the death of the traditional order is at best overstated. None are clearer or more evidence based than the arguments of Paul Hirst and
Grahame Thompson in their aptly titled *Globalization in Question* (1999), which challenges what they call the “necessary myth” that globalization represents a qualitatively new stage of capitalist development. For these authors, the globalization of production has been exaggerated, as have the forecasts of the death of the nation-state. While accepting that there is a growing international economy, they reject as fanciful the idea that multi- or transnational corporations are footloose and fancy-free. They even turn the tables on the decline-of-the-nation-state arguments by showing how in many ways the nation-state has gained in importance by managing or governing the processes of internationalization. While arguably marked by a tinge of nostalgia for a preglobalization era when so-called normal national politics prevailed, this approach is a healthy sceptical antidote to out-and-out globalizers.

Globalization today certainly shows many new traits, but one can also discern continuities with previous expansionary phases of capitalism. One way of putting it, albeit allegorically, is that “one-third of the globalization narrative is over-sold; one-third we do not understand; and one-third is radically new” (Drache 1999, 7). From a complexity theory standpoint, we might challenge this separation between being and becoming, but the drift of the argument is well taken. There is a big difference between globalization as mutually reinforcing and causally related transformations following a preestablished path, and a conception based on the notion of “contingently related tendencies” (Dicken, Peck, and Tickell 1997, 161). There are also extremely diverse economic, political, social, and cultural tendencies that vary widely across regions and time. There is simply no unified coherent and unilinear globalization strategy waiting to be applied comparable to the 1950s modernization theory, which for that era served as a widely accepted overarching paradigm for social change (see Development entry in volume 1). Now occurring around us all the time is a complex restructuring and recomposition of the world order, an order the concept of globalization might point toward in different ways and even partially explain, but the concept cannot serve as master framework to understand and explain it totally.

Having briefly analyzed what globalization is not, what can we say about what it is over and beyond the obvious complexity and uneven development of the phenomenon? Clearly, it is no one thing and has various interlinked economic, political, ideological, social, and cultural facets. But if there is one overarching theme, it is that of connectivity or interconnectedness. Following Ash Amin, we could argue that “the most distinctive aspect of contemporary globalization” is the “interconnectedness, multiplexity and hybridization of social life at every level” (1997, 129). This means we can no longer draw clear and firm boundaries between local and global spheres or between national and international spheres of social life. We cannot separate the “in here” of the city, community, or locality in which we live from the “out there” of global flows of money, capital, people, power, and dominance. Thus globalization should be seen not as an entity but, rather, as a set of complex interacting relationships. Our daily activities are all influenced by these complex and interrelated facets that are stretching our social relationships to an unprecedented degree.

Another useful image to understand globalization is that of time-space compression. Spatial barriers—for example, in trade or communications—have
fallen away to a considerable degree. Space does not even matter any more, according to some pundits. Time has also changed from being a reflection of natural processes to become instantaneous. The world has been shrinking for a long time, but this process has taken a qualitative leap forward in the last quarter of the twentieth century. We may not yet have achieved the distanceless world that Martin Heidegger once foretold, but as David Harvey puts it, we are now living through “processes that so revolutionize the objective qualities of space and time that we are forced to alter, sometimes in quite radical ways, how we represent the world to ourselves” (1989, 240). The elimination of spatial barriers and the compression of time will not, however, necessarily lead to a homogeneous spatial development. The changing spatiality of global capitalism is, if anything, more heterogeneous, differentiated, and fragmented (see two entries under Regionalism in volume 1).

Above all else, we must stress that globalization signifies a much greater interconnectedness of social fates. As David Held and Anthony McGrew put it, “Globalization weaves together, in highly complex and abstract systems, the fates of households, communities and peoples in distant regions of the globe” (2003, 129). Our own daily lives are becoming increasingly globalized in terms of their references points, our consumption patterns, and our mental maps. We imagine the world in a different way than our ancestors did at the last turn of the century. Today for many individuals and collective subjects, be they governments, companies, intellectuals, artists, or citizens, globalization is the “imagined horizon” (García Canclini 1999, 32). The repercussions, both positive and negative, of the 2004 New Year’s Eve East Asian tsunami demonstrated most clearly how real the weaving together of fates across the world now is. Whichever view is taken, clearly globalization has transformed the world around us and the way in which we understand it and seek to change it.

So in terms of competing paradigms, it might be premature to choose one particular rendition of globalization theory to guide us. Held and his colleagues usefully distinguish between the globalizers, the sceptics (who doubt there is much new in it), and the transformationalists. The latter stress the changes taking place and how an open-ended explanation of this arena may help us in getting to know the one-third of globalization that is as yet unknown. As against fixed ideal-type paradigms of a new global market, global democracy, or global civilization, Held and his colleagues prefer the “transformationalist accounts [that] emphasize globalization as a long-term historical process which is inscribed with contradictions and which is significantly shaped by conjunctural factors” (1999, 7). A good example of the latter are the events of September 11, 2001, in the United States and their sequel of unfolding conflicts across the world that effectively put an end to prevailing optimistic views of globalization as a new peaceful era of harmonious global development.

A transformationalist approach to globalization starts from the premise that the world is changing rapidly and in fundamental ways, even if the direction of change is not yet fully discernible. An underlying question is whether a new sense of globality means we should abandon methodological nationalism, that is, the nation-state as an obvious and self-sufficient frame of reference for understanding the changing worlds we live in. A closely associated issue is the
viability of methodological nationalism, that is, the forms of social enquiry that precede the rise of supraterritoriality (e.g., the Internet and global financial markets). While accepting that a new global optic is necessary to comprehend the changing worlds around us, we cannot accept that the nation-state does not matter or that territorial forms of consciousness might not have a continuing or even increasing relevance. The point is, simply, that we now live in the era of globalization, immersed in a rapidly changing world that clearly has an impact on all the facets and levels of our lives.

GLOBALIZATION AND SOCIETY

The social facets of globalization are myriad, from transnational migration (see entry on Migration) to the rise of the global city (see entry on City and the Self), from new forms of community to the flourishing of global crime (see entry on Crime). Clearly, the social has become more interconnected, less constrained by boundaries or limits. The social world is more interlinked; for many individuals, social relationships are less limited than they once were. Social identities are no longer space bound, and geographical distance sets few limits on social interaction. For Amin, we are witnessing a “greater hybridization and perforation of social, economic and political life” as a result of the increasing “interdependence and intermingling of global, distant and local logics” (1997, 133). There is no global without its myriad locals, a principle as important as the constraining of local development by globalization. But it is the heterogeneity, the hybridity, and the perforation of all hitherto self-contained domains that is crucial to an understanding of society in the era of globalization.

Social relations are today constructed as much in space as in particular places. The various discourses of globalization construct social subjectivities in a complex and contradictory fashion. We are no longer place bound, and our social links can be transnational and they can be virtual. Globalization opens up to social groups diverse forms of social organization from the local to the regional, the national to the transnational. There is an increased differentiation and fragmentation of social subjectivity and social consciousness formation. Globalization has brought to the fore “the issue of subjectivity, the positions, agencies and forms of consciousness in and through which identities, decisions, choices and interventions are produced and enacted” (Kayatekin and Ruccio, 1998, 76). What globalization cannot produce is a totalizing vision that explains all or even determines what happens in the social and cultural domains. It does, however, produce new horizons of possibilities for all social groupings, be they the new global elite or the subaltern classes.

The economic and political transformations associated with the development of globalization are having huge social impacts. This section examines, in very broad outline, some of the main impacts globalization has on people. The degree of equality or inequality (see entry on Inequality) within and among nation-states is today the main issue at stake when the future prospects of globalization are discussed. As Göran Therborn puts it, “To the extent that it is actually operating, globalization puts on the agenda equality and inequality for
the whole of humankind” (2000, 34). For the advocates of globalization, this is a process in which market mechanisms not only will create abundance for all but also will eventually even iron out socioeconomic inequalities. For its critics, globalization is simply the most dynamic machine ever created to foster ever-growing levels of inequality. So the great riches generated by financial speculation, for example, are necessarily matched by vast layers of people falling through the very thin safety nets of welfare provision (see entries on Welfare and Health). Whatever our own opinions, we should note the conclusion of the recent World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization: “It is thus widely accepted that the litmus test for the current process of globalization is whether it will significantly enhance the speeding up of development and the reduction of absolute poverty in the world” (2003, no. 172, 42).

According to the World Bank, the “24 developing countries that increased their integration into the world economy over two decades ending in the late 1990s achieved higher growth in incomes, longer life expectancy, and better schooling” (2002, 1). Those that did not “integrate” into the global economy—such as the ex-USSR and sub-Saharan Africa—have suffered accordingly, with poverty rising rapidly. While the World Bank does recognize that the type or form of integration is crucial to a beneficial social outcome, such other organizations as the IMF and the WTO put very few provisos on their optimistic message. Thus, more or less at random, we can take as representative the view of Global Envision, a pro-globalization pressure group, which “takes the global free market as the starting point for reducing world poverty” and declares, “Providing the poor with opportunities to improve their own lives is the catalyst for creating a more fair, hopeful, and stable future. We support economic development and responsible free markets as the most reliable and sustainable strategies for global poverty alleviation” (Global Envision Web site). This is not a view that allows for caveats or for the possibility that the road to globalization is not equally beneficial for all countries.

The optimistic view of globalization, however, can be countered with other data from official sources. The UNDP found that at the turn of the century the assets of the 200 richest people in the world were greater than the combined incomes of the poorest 40 percent of the world’s population (1999, 20). Another way of looking at global inequality is to note that the richest 5 percent of the world’s population receive 83 percent of the world’s income, whereas the world’s poorest 10 percent receive only 1.4 percent of the world’s total income (see entries on Inequality and on Social Exclusion). Such a staggering level of divergence between the winners and the losers in a process of economic development is surely unprecedented.

Another way of describing increasing global inequality is in terms of the Gini coefficient (a rather basic measure where 0 represents equality and 1 inequality). According to World Bank data, the Gini coefficient increased from .62 in 1988 to .66 in 1993. This may not sound like a dramatic increase, but it actually represents a faster increase in income inequality than that which occurred in the 1980s in the United States under the Reagan administration and the United Kingdom under the Thatcher regime, when neoliberalism was at its height.
The second major social effect, after inequality, generated by globalization is interconnectedness. Amin goes so far as to say that “perhaps the most distinctive aspect of contemporary globalization” is precisely the “interconnectedness, multiplexity and hybridization, of social life at every level” (1997, 129). From this perspective, territorial ideas of local, regional, national, and international levels are replaced by a relational theoretical framework. The world, in brief, is becoming much more interdependent in both a lateral sense, across space, and in a vertical sense, across levels of society and politics. We can no longer work with a notion that people live “in here” in their towns, villages, or cities while globalization happens “out there” in a separate “global” sphere. Rather, the global can only work through the local level or levels that make it up and make it effective. The multiple levels or scales of society are all linked through the various processes (economic, political, social, and cultural) of globalization.

Life in today’s big cities exemplifies the interconnectedness of local and global social relationships and the complex multiplicity of scales that citizens structure their lives around (see entry on City and the Self). There is no longer a clear-cut and simple sense of community bounded by the space of a neighborhood or district alone. In a study entitled Living the Global City, John Eade (1997) showed the diverse ways in which globalization had affected the residents who were of diverse social and ethnic backgrounds, had different lifestyles, and had distinctive perceptions and expectations. Rather than sharing as a community in a common local culture, the residents related to various global cultures with which they maintained a regular interaction. As Martin Albrow concludes, “People can reside in one place and have their meaningful social relations almost entirely outside it and across the globe” (1997, 53). The locality is still a site for meaningful social activities of all sorts, but it can no longer be divorced from the “out there” (but also “in here”) of globality. The concept of hybridity captures well the complexity of social relationships in the era of globalization. Identities are less likely to be fixed, authentic, and simple, as in the essentialist conception that once prevailed. Rather, identity becomes more fragmented and fluid in a relational dialogue with others.

We now see a multiplicity of identities based on nationality, age, gender (see entry on Gender), sexual orientation, race and ethnicity (see entry on Race and Ethnicity), type of work, place of residence, and so on. In short, our social relationships are hybrids, no longer pure, and our identities may also be conceived of in that same way. We may well refuse binary oppositions—colonizer or colonized, male or female, urban or rural—and instead take up liminal positions, that is to say, “betwixt and between” fixed poles. The notion of border crossing captures well the increased spatial mobility of our era but also the greater social fluidity that characterizes it. From a hybridity perspective we can no longer neatly categorize people, as in the heyday of modernism, and it thus complicates our analysis of society and its contradictions.

The world is thus both more unequal and more interconnected than it was 20 years ago, but there is also more movement. Globalization, if it represents anything at all, would be the greatly accelerated movement of goods, capital, and people since around 1980. Transportation has become cheaper and faster, oiling the wheels of trading. This has led some commentators to predict the
“death of distance” as such new forms of transportation as air freight and containerization facilitate international trade. The new information economy can practically avoid transportation costs altogether. We are moving from a world of structures and barriers to one based on networks and global flows. Whether it is information, money, goods, people, or hazards, we are now seeing global fluids that are escaping the lenses of traditional social science concepts that were based firmly on the parameters of the bounded nation-state.

The movement not only of goods but also of capital has increased significantly through globalization. Capital flows to the developing countries of the global South increased from less than $28 billion in the 1970s to around $306 billion in 1997 (World Bank 2002, 42). Of course, this flow of capital was unevenly distributed, with the larger countries of Latin America, China, India, Malaysia, and Thailand receiving the lion’s share. While the flow of FDI increased steadily throughout the 1990s, its impact on developing countries was still less than had been the case during the first wave of globalization. Thus, by the end of the 1990s, foreign capital represented 22 percent of total developing countries’ GDP (gross domestic product), nearly double the figure for the 1970s but still beneath the 32 percent reached in 1914 (Maddison 2001, 35). And FDI in the South is still only a quite small proportion of the global capital market, which is focused mainly in the global North.

The movement of people from one country to another has also increased significantly since 1980 (see entry on Migration). It is well to recall, though, that during the first wave of globalization (1870–1914), around 10 percent of the world’s population moved permanently. Today, it is estimated that around 120 million people (2 percent of the world’s population) live in a country other than the one in which they were born (World Bank 2002, 44). A major impetus behind the movement of people is clearly the difference in wages between the economic North and the South. But if the causes of migration are largely economic, its effects are social, political, and cultural. For some observers, international migration is positive insofar as it may undermine national chauvinism and promote cultural diversity. But we must also bear in mind the somber conclusion of Stephen Castles and Mark Miller: “Never before has international migration seemed so connected to conflict and disorder on a global scale” (1993, 260). Many more people are now on the move across the world, but it is also a period when migrants are subject to securitization as potential security threats. Naturally enough this increases the insecurity of the average economic migrant.

Finally, there is a widespread image of the social dimension of globalization that we need to correct, namely, a conception of the global as dynamic and fluid as contrasted to local, which is seen as static and tradition bound. From this powerful image Manuel Castells derives the notion that corporations and people live in different places and times: one exists in the space of flows and lives in the instant time of computerized networks, whereas the rest of us exist in the “space of places” and live by the clock time of everyday life (1996, 475). While this image certainly reflects a tendency in the social transformation unleashed by globalization, it may be too one-sided. For one, globalization is not something out there, a nebula hovering above the local. Rather, what we have been
describing as globalization is constructed, legitimated, and reproduced in local and national places. Space and place are not separate in this sense. What this means is that globalization is confronted daily everywhere. Individuals, social movements (see entry on Social Movements), organizations, and social networks all have agency and are not powerless in front of a supposed globalization juggernaut. For every door that globalization has closed for social transformation—for example in reducing the scope of the nation-state—it has opened others, not least in terms of the new global networked order’s vulnerability to disruption through system instability as well as social contestation.

GLOBALIZATION AND CULTURE

As to the cultural domain, it might well have been our starting point, such is the importance of what is called “global culture” in the making of globalization (see entry on Global Civil Society). As Held and his colleagues put it:

Few expressions of globalization are so visible, widespread and pervasive as the worldwide proliferation of internationally traded consumer brands, the global ascendancy of popular cultural icons and artefacts, and the simultaneous communication of events by satellite broadcasts to hundreds of millions of people at a time on all continents. (1999, 327)

The simultaneity and ubiquity of global cultural products and processes is, indeed, a major feature of the era. The commodification of culture along with every other facet of human life, including life itself, is a key driver of the free market expansion lying at the core of globalization. If globalization is made at the cultural level, it is also contested at the discursive level, where different understandings of and meanings of globalization clash (see entry on Counter-globalization Movements).

Early debates in this area focused around whether a global culture was indeed emerging and if it was, whether it would flatten national or indigenous cultures (see entry on Indigenous Peoples). It is now widely accepted that notwithstanding the rise of a global consumer culture and a global youth culture, cultural diversity and hybridization will prevail over any “Coca-Cola-ization” or “Americanization” of the world’s cultures. For Mike Featherstone, the era of postmodern globalization has “pointed to the problem of cultural complexity and the increasing salience of culture in social life through the greater production, mixing and syncretism of cultures which were formerly held separate and firmly attached to social relationships” (1995, 12). Global differences have been acculturated and “brought home” through increased travel and migration. New forms of cultural resistance are emerging, and there is even a return to the concept of cultural imperialism that had prevailed during the anticolonial revolution and the cultural revolt of the 1960s.

Living as we do in the Information Age as part of the knowledge society, it is clear to us that the cultural domain will play a key role in the making of globalization (see entry on Education). Indeed, some analysts argue that the cultural
dimension is critical in creating and understanding what globalization is. We cannot conceive of globalization without the Internet (see entry on Internet) and the whole information and communications technology (ICT) revolution that preceded it. There is also considerable evidence that consumerism, once supposedly strictly a Western phenomenon, is now a global one driving further economic internationalization to feed consumer demands. The global market for branded products—from clothes to computer games, from Coca-Cola to small arms—is continuously expanding the reach of the global market (see entry on Consumerism). Global connectivity, which is one of the main features of what we call globalization, is particularly marked in the cultural domain where our ideas are shaped. But are we moving toward a global culture, as some defenders and critics of globalization alike have been arguing?

There are two basic camps regarding whether a global culture is now emerging. On the one hand is the cultural homogenization camp, which argues that cultural flows today are overwhelmingly from the West outward. According to this argument, that outward flow inevitably leads to the cultural Westernization of the globe. As Tony Schirato and Jen Webb put it, “In this perspective, global culture means Western culture writ large. For those without the resources to resist this cultural neo-colonialism, the future is Western” (2003, 155). Following this logic, local cultures are doomed to disappear as the Western cultural juggernaut makes its way across the world. The power of the new global media (e.g., CNN) is seen as destroying local cultural particularities (see entry on Media, Public Diplomacy, and Security). Authentic local cultures are either subsumed by this process or, at best, are repackaged as exotic cultural locations for the discerning Western tourist. Global culture, from this perspective, is a somewhat artificial production of globalization.

An alternative view of how globalization affects culture is offered by the cultural hybridization approach. Basically, this view posits a two-way cultural interaction between the global and the local, rather than the one-way flow from the West to the rest of the world. A hybrid cultural form is thus likely to ensue—part global, modern, and imported, as well as part local, traditional, and indigenous. New communication technologies may, for example, spread the dominance of English as a lingua franca, but they may also reenergize ethnic communities across the globe, producing a denser communication and identification between its far-spread members. While old cultural forms may indeed be swept away, they may also reform as new cultural products and “go global” as, for example, in relation to the diverse forms of world music. Traditional crafts and culture may no longer be authentic in the sense of belonging in a self-contained world, but they have now become part of a global set of flows where currents mix and hybrid cultural forms emerge.

Clearly, this is not the place to adjudicate between these two perspectives even were it possible to do so. The scale and complexity of the issues under consideration are enough to deter us from simplistic answers. Culture is a key element in constituting the complex connectivity that drives globalization (see entry on Culture). One author, Malcolm Waters, goes so far as to argue that “the globalisation of human society is contingent on the extent to which cultural relations are effective relative to economic and political arrangements” (1995, 9).
That is, while economic and political exchanges may have become internationalized, only the symbolic exchanges of the cultural domain are truly globalized. Cultural products—say, TV programs or CNN news—are intrinsically globalizing because of the inherent mobility of these cultural forms. Culture in this sense is truly globalizing and stretches social relations across continents. But what about culture in the sense of the way we live our daily lives, the framework through which we make sense of our surroundings in this or that geographical locale?

One of the most interesting concepts to emerge from the global culture debates is that of glocalization. Originally coined to describe the way in which the Sony Corporation sought to give local meaning to a global product, this term has been developed to describe the complex global-local interactions now prevailing. It is not a question of pitting localism against globalism but of seeing the complex synergies that exist between them. Globalism and localism are not cultural polarities, but they are mutually interpenetrating principles. Roland Robertson derived the term “glocalization” from the Japanese dochakuria, which refers to “living on one’s own land” (1995, 28). So, for example, the whole ecology movement could be understood as a global movement seeking to make life better “on one’s own land.” Even the McDonald’s gastronomic experience, often billed as the harbinger of cultural homogenization—the McDonaldization thesis—is as much local as global. The company is keenly attentive to local dietary tastes when it markets its products in different cultural milieus. Thus, homogenization is always countered by the trend toward heterogenization.

Another critical debate to consider in relation to globalization and culture is centered around religion (see entry on Religion), fundamentalism (see entry on Fundamentalism), and the so-called clash of civilizations. It is often forgotten that the Roman Catholic Church was probably the world’s first truly global nongovernmental organization. The idea of the world as a single community, as Robertson writes, “has a very long history, having been expressed in such notions as worldwide earthly paradise and the Kingdom of God on earth” (1992, 81). Most religions have global aspirations and believe the world’s inhabitants have the potential to become a single community. In some ways, therefore, the world’s religions can be seen as precursors of globalization as we know it today. Many religions have underlying aims quite similar to strands of the environmental movement. The challenges posed by the complexity and turmoil generated by globalization are addressed through the call for a global community that is respectful of local traditions and cultures.

Manuel Castells has written of how “the age of information becomes the age of confusion, and thus the age of fundamental affirmation of traditional values and uncompromising rights” (2004, 100). The apparent crisis of the traditional family, the decline of traditional religions, as well as the rise of new ones, and the apparently inexorable rise of migration create the specter of uncertainty. A response to uncertainty and fluidity is to seek answers that promise certainty and stability. Thus the appeal of absolute values offered by many religions is the promise of global harmonization. In a global order characterized by increasing strife as well as uncertainty, that such cultural worldviews will gather considerable support is not surprising. In their relationship
to actually existing globalizations, some religions are fervent supporters, others make a plea for a more people-friendly approach, and yet others militantly oppose all it stands for.

As to fundamentalism, if defined as a search for fundamentals (see entry on Fundamentalism), it could be read as a reaction to globalization and a search for meaning in an increasingly anonymous and amoral world. The spread of the free market, of consumerism, and even of a global democratic model can be unsettling to many. Against such universalizing forces is pitted the sense people have of community, which opposes the homelessness many may feel in the global marketplace of consumer goods, the media, or the McDonaldization of society, for example, as people seek a home. The quest for fundamentals is a response to the disorientation and loss that any overthrowing of an old order may create. For Robertson, then, fundamentalism (which usually takes religious form, though not necessarily) is related to “the quest for community, for stable values and beliefs and so on, on the one hand and nostalgia on the other” (1992, 178). As a countertrend to the universalizing processes referred to here, such fundamentalism is perhaps an inevitable product of globalization; it might even be a function of it.

We are arguing that fundamentalism is an integral element of globalization, a functionally necessary counter to it while also challenging actually existing globalization. The search for lost community—only partly captured by the term “nostalgia”—is ever-present in periods of accelerated cultural transformation. Osama Bin Laden’s antiglobalism is but an extreme version of the widespread desire in Islamic communities to return to an era before Western involvement. Romantic visions of a golden age of Islam are generated to counter the perceived lack of morality in the West and the temptations of globalization. There are many other, far less dramatic or newsworthy forms of protectionism. Of course, as everyone knows, Bin Laden’s implementation of his ideology has been entirely dependent on globalization in terms of such information and communication technologies as the Internet and through increased means and, of course, access to the resources with which to wage asymmetrical warfare. Not all fundamentalist movements take such dramatic form, certainly, but it is important to see to what extent such movements are bound up with the very logic of globalization.

Samuel Huntingdon has popularized the notion that we are now entering a post–Cold War era that will be characterized by a clash of civilisations rather than of political ideologies. Already in 1993, when Huntingdon was director of the Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University, he was forecasting that “a crucial, indeed a central aspect of what global politics is likely to be in the coming years . . . will be the clash of civilisations” (22). This clash basically boiled down to the interaction between Western and non-Western civilizations read as cultural blocks. For Huntingdon, the pressures of globalization would create a cultural backlash and the emergence of fierce conflicts based on a country’s culture and civilization. From such a worldview, culture and, by extension, race and ethnicity are the determinants of the fault lines along which the categories of friend and enemy will be derived in the decades to come. Whereas the Cold War was fought over differing definitions of freedom and democracy, the
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new culture wars will be fought over who has cultural-racial superiority and whether this superiority can define the dominant civilization.

Certainly, considerable attention has recently been paid to the rise and fall of ancient civilizations and the lessons to be learned by Western (or American) civilization today. Huntingdon himself went on to call on the West to unite “to abandon the illusion of universality” and for Europe to join America in recognizing that “Western peoples have far more in common with each other than they have with Asian, Middle Eastern or African peoples” (1996, 43). The clash of civilizations predicted by Huntingdon (1996) has become a much more plausible scenario in the first decade of the twenty-first century. But does Huntington’s view actually account for the complexity of the global security we all face? Can we really speak of the West as if it were a homogenous block? The divisions in the West over the war in Iraq, for example, seem to point against such homogeneity. Can we really place Russia, China, and what has been called the Third World into one category deemed non-Western? The arguments presented in this introduction point against such a binary division of the world.

The immediate post–Cold War period saw support for the notion that we were moving toward the “end of history,” as Francis Fukuyama so famously said, with the Western liberal model the only viable path to development (see entry on Development in volume 1). In practice, as we know, there has been an increase in all forms of conflict, including frontal challenges to Fukuyama’s model from the East (China), from the South (in WTO negotiations), and from various forms of fundamentalism. North America and Western Europe have seen the rise of xenophobia and the tightening of migration regulations as the outside world is perceived as ever more threatening. To counterpose against such realities an idealistic conception of global civil society (see entry on Global Civil Society) or to expect the emergence of a new global cosmopolitanism to supersede conflict would be naive. We do need to pursue a more complex understanding of the current global situations, however, if democratic alternatives for sustainable global governance are to emerge.

CONCLUSION

The economic, political, social, and cultural transformations of the world around us have one common feature we could arguably name reflexivity. When referring to “reflexive modernization,” Ulrich Beck sets it in terms of a “subversive, unintended and unforeseen self-questioning of the bases of political life” (2000, 101), which is created by the perception of risk that now prevails after the age of innocence. Rather than living through the “end of history,” as Fukuyama optimistically predicted at the end of the Cold War, we are moving into a new era of global civilization where we all have a common destiny, albeit threatened by old and new forms of global risk, whether from famine to AIDS or from global terrorism to the perils of genetic engineering. The point is that the era of globalization is characterized by intense reflexivity as individuals and institutions reflect on transformation, risks, and how to construct a better future. This does not spell an era of consensus necessarily; but all bets are off, and the
rationality of modernity (see entry on Modernity) does not imprison our minds and lives as it once did.

Globalization cannot explain everything or even anything on its own. The emergent global risk society, to use Beck’s terminology, is neither unified, nor all-powerful, nor uncontested (even at the level of meanings). Urry quite correctly takes to task simplified and static conceptions neglected in statements that “‘globalization’ is $\chi$ or alternatively that ‘globalization’ does $\chi$” (2003, 40). In reality, nothing is linear about the development of globalization, as if it were some rerun of the teleological 1950s modernization theories based on an unproblematic expansion of a conception of modernity based on a stylized rendering of the U.S. experience. While globalization cannot, therefore, be treated as the subject of history, it can be conceived as a new matrix for global development. Thus globalization can be taken as a shorthand label for the complex economic, sociopolitical, and cultural parameters that set the terms of reference and establish a matrix for the development of human societies.

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