Europe and External Affairs

The Scottish Diaspora and Diaspora Strategy: Insights and Lessons from Ireland
THE SCOTTISH DIASPORA AND DIASPORA STRATEGY:
INSIGHTS AND LESSONS FROM IRELAND

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The views expressed in this report are those of the researcher and do not necessarily represent those of the Scottish Government or Scottish Ministers.
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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1 Speaking at Trinity College Dublin on February 13th 2008, Scotland’s First Minister, Alex Salmond, called for Scottish policy makers to study and extract lessons from the remarkable growth of the Irish economy from 1993. The purpose of this report is to provide a comparative study of one area of public policy which hitherto has attracted much speculation but little serious analysis; that of diaspora and diaspora strategy.

1.2 In both Scotland and Ireland sustained attention is now being given to the potential benefits which might flow from renewing and refreshing relationships with overseas diasporic populations. This has manifested itself in a raft of diaspora related policy initiatives. In neither case, however, is a formal and systematic diaspora engagement yet in place. The objective of the report is to contribute to the development of such a strategy by identifying and reflecting upon Scotland’s approach to its diaspora relative to its Irish counterpart.

1.3 The report uses the term ‘strategy’ in a loose way to refer to firstly the securing of an overview of the range of actual and potential public, private, and voluntary ties between diasporic groups and Scotland, and secondly the development of a preferred orientation as to how these ties might best be developed. ‘Strategy’ in this context need not imply, and may not be best served by, a coherent and formalised top down, bureaucratically regulated, and managerialist, blueprint.

1.4 This project did not seek to evaluate any specific aspect of Scottish or Irish diaspora policy and we have undertaken no such task. Rather, we offer a series of observations which are informed by international comparisons, conversations with key actors from both the Scottish and Irish Governments, and an analysis of official documents and policy statements.

1.5 It is clear that a whole number of initiatives already underway will play an important role in Scotland’s diaspora engagement. Scotland has already made significant progress in connecting with its diaspora and has been cited by the World Bank as an exemplar of best practice in the area of business networks. Current initiatives include but are not limited to:

**Global Scot** – a business network connecting highly skilled Scots around the world.

**Global Friends of Scotland** – a social and community network linking overseas Scots.

**Homecoming 2009** – a flagship campaign seeking to encourage tourist visits and perhaps a longer term relationship between Scotland and its diaspora.

**Tartan Day and Scotland Week** – An official day set aside in the United States (and other countries) to celebrate the heritage and legacy of Scottish emigrants; Scotland Week is held alongside this to promote links with Scotland.
The central web portal Scotland.org – An official gateway to Scotland serving as a one stop shop for a variety of user groups.

Creative Scotland – an organisation that once established will be dedicated to promoting Scottish culture and arts both at home and abroad.

Fresh Talent Initiative and Talent Scotland – Agencies such as the Relocation Advisory Service established to promote skilled migration, including return migration, to Scotland.

AncestralScotland.com website and ScotlandsPeople Resources – The former a Visit Scotland tourist promotion web site, the latter a government backed partnership between the General Register Office for Scotland, the National Archives of Scotland and The Court of the Lord Lyon, including a website and the new Scotland’s People Centre in Edinburgh, which is a resource for ancestral visitors seeking genealogical research materials.

The Scottish Centre for Diaspora Studies at Edinburgh University – A new research centre serving as a focal point for research on the Scottish diaspora.

1.6 The intention of the report is to concentrate minds around five critical questions which if addressed could go some way to providing a clearer shape to Scotland’s approach to its diaspora.

1.7 Which populations constitute the Scottish diaspora and should be included as part of a targeted diaspora strategy?

For pragmatic and political reasons there is an urgent need to define and delineate the range of constituencies which might constitute the Scottish diaspora. There is merit in widening the definition of diaspora to include as many constituencies who might be prepared to play for ‘Team Scotland’ as possible. This widening might include expatriates irrespective of the grounds for their departure, later day descendants with a sense of heritage, mobile Scots and business travellers leading a transnational existence, and other nationalities both resident in Scotland and elsewhere with an affinity towards the country.

1.8 What government structures and programmes are best suited to the establishment of new relations with diasporic populations?

The Irish approach to its diaspora is relatively successful, particularly with respect to business, because it is light and flexible in structure, gives ownership and freedom to its members, and is developmental without being muscular. The state’s role is to nurture and incubate, not manage and over-determine. Scotland, in contrast, has pursued a strategy that is more muscular, state-centric and centrally managed. If it is true to say that the Scottish diaspora is less well articulated and organised, then there might be good reason for this. The Scottish Government might usefully reflect on the position and role of the state in managing diaspora initiatives, conduct research into already existing diaspora networks, and consider complimenting existing state run schemes by seeding, serving as midwife, and performing a husbandary role for wider social and economic networks amongst the Scottish diaspora. In addition, public
The administration of diaspora schemes should consider creating a specific set of measurable deliverables suitable to the task and timeframe at hand.

1.9 *How are diaspora organized and how does their underlying structure and logic predispose them to engage in different ways with the home nation?*

The Scottish diaspora is almost as expansive and large as the Irish diaspora and is a huge and relatively untapped resource for Scotland. Nevertheless, as a consequence of the historical formation of the diaspora, and in particular the voluntary nature of much of the emigration and speed of assimilation into the new communities, it is widely believed that it is not as well organized or culturally ready to be engaged. Fundamental to the building of a Scottish diaspora strategy must be a renewed interest in fortifying and stimulating Scottish-mindedness in the diaspora. It is clear that a critical mass of high profile culture building projects is now being constructed and these will surely make a significant contribution to the building of the diaspora.

1.10 *What social, economic, and demographic objectives ought to underpin the engagement with diasporic populations?*

Scotland has different social, cultural, and economic needs from Ireland and has a different set of rationales for engaging with its diaspora. In Ireland, the use of the income from the Celtic Tiger period to support vulnerable groups overseas, the building of business networks to lubricate the globalization of Irish firms and the localization of Trans National Companies (TNCs) in Ireland, and the preservation of an elevated sense of diasporic patriotism at a time of change are critical objectives. Return migration to meet population growth targets, the establishment of global economic networks to broker the globalization of Scottish firms and the localization of TNCs in Scotland, as well as the cultural nurturing of a comparatively weaker Scottish diaspora are all key and pressing priorities for Scotland.

1.11 *What concrete policies and interventions are current being introduced and what innovations merit closer scrutiny?*

Scottish policy makers should look in particular at the possibilities of reworking the following Irish schemes into a Scottish diaspora strategy.

- Irish Abroad Unit
- Emigrant Advice Network
- Enterprise Ireland’s approach to building business and social networks
- Emigrant News Online
- Ireland Funds
They should also consider building a larger version of Scottish Networks International and helping to nurture (though not own and run) ventures such as Scots in London network.

1.12 Ireland should in turn study and draw lessons from:

-Globalscot
-Scottish Network International
-Fresh Talent Initiative which includes the Relocation Advisory Service
-Scottish Centre for Diaspora Studies
-Scotland.org Web portal
-Homecoming Scotland 2009 campaign

1.13 Clearly, the current global economic downturn will have ramifications for diaspora policy, affecting remittance transfers, philanthropy, the extension of welfare entitlements, migration patterns, tourist flows, and the functioning of economic networks. Nevertheless there is an argument to be made that it is precisely in this context that diaspora groups have an even greater role to play in promoting national social, cultural, and economic development.

1.14 Scotland and Ireland have much to learn from each other with regards to how they conceive and develop their relationship with their respective diasporas. The Scottish diaspora represents a huge potential resource for Scotland, and Scotland offers the diaspora many benefits; the key is to develop a strong partnership between both which is mutually beneficial. Our view is that any strategy for Scotland should:

- seek to focus on the cultural as well as the economic;
- be light in touch and flexible where appropriate rather than heavily structured and over-determined;
- be formulated to work over the long term;
- have an open view of who constitutes the diaspora and the value of an affinity diaspora;
- recognize that the intangible benefits of a strategy will be as important as tangible ones;
- understand that the relationship with the diaspora has to be reciprocal for it to be sustainable.
2. **INTRODUCTION**

2.1 For some time, commentators from each of the main political parties in Scotland have deliberated over the lessons which might be learned from the remarkable growth of the Irish economy from 1993\(^1\). Attention has been given to areas of commonality and difference and debate has centered on the extent to which Irish economic policy might provide pointers for Scottish economy policy. Speaking at Trinity College Dublin on February 13\(^{th}\) 2008, Scotland’s First Minister, Alex Salmond, reasserted the significance of the Irish comparison and pointed to the continuing inspiration Ireland provides when envisioning Scotland’s future:

2.2 ‘As a nation, Scotland must look outwards and upwards. We must measure ourselves against those around us - and those who have the ambition to achieve. Scotland looks out to an Arc of Prosperity around us. Ireland, Iceland, Norway, Finland and Denmark. All small independent nations. All stable, secure and prosperous. Of all these nations, no example is more impressive and inspiring than Ireland. And none is more relevant to the decisions that Scotland faces today. So I have come to Dublin to set out our aspirations for Scotland’s future - how we will create a Celtic Lion economy to match the Celtic Tiger on this side of the Irish Sea….The rewards to a nation that is willing to face up to its position, set its ambition, and pursue it resolutely - these rewards could scarcely be greater. The story of Ireland - one of the greatest success stories of the last century, and of this century - is a testament to what the people of Scotland can achieve.’

2.3 Given that both countries have different demographic, cultural, constitutional, political, social, economic, and institutional histories, it is clear that what happened in Ireland is not transferable to Scotland, at least in any straightforward manner. Discussion around ‘best practice’ and ‘policy transfer’ needs to be undergirded by a careful analysis of the specificities of the Scottish and Irish economies, in areas such as demographic trends, labour market intervention, enterprise and innovation, foreign direct investment, infrastructure and utilities. The purpose of this report is to provide a comparative study of one area of public policy which hitherto has attracted much speculation but little serious analysis; that of diaspora and diaspora strategy.

2.4 In both Scotland and Ireland sustained attention is now being given to the potential benefits which might flow from renewing and refreshing relationships with overseas diasporic populations. This has manifested itself in a raft of diaspora related policy initiatives. In neither case, however, is a formal and systematic diaspora strategy yet in place. This perhaps is fortunate as our findings suggest that the imposition of an overarching, rigid and highly formalised diaspora strategy or framework may prove largely ineffective over the long term; 

\(^1\) see Alexander (2003), and Coyle, Alexander, and Ashcroft (2005) for a more systematic assessment of the possibilities
indeed one of our conclusions is to suggest that a lightness of touch will be a key element in fostering successful relationships between nations and their diaspora. Alan Gamlen\(^2\) refers to this approach as ‘tactics without strategy’. As such, there is scope for the Scottish Government to adopt a more strategic orientation towards the Scottish diaspora without this orientation being overly-determined. The objective of the report is to contribute to the development of such a strategic orientation by identifying and reflecting upon Scotland’s approach to its diaspora relative to its Irish counterpart\(^3\).

2.5 The intention of the report is to concentrate minds around five critical questions which if addressed could go some way to providing a clearer shape to Scotland’s approach to its diaspora. These questions are:

- **Which populations might fall under the diaspora label and as such be included as part of a targeted diaspora strategy?**
- **What government structures and programmes are best suited to the establishment of new relations with diasporic populations?**
- **How are diaspora organized and how does their underlying structure and logic predispose them to engage in different ways with the home nation?**
- **What social, economic, and demographic objectives ought to underpin the extensions of relations with diasporic populations?**
- **What concrete policies and interventions are currently being introduced and what innovations merit closer scrutiny?**

2.6 Our approach has been to chart current thinking and practice in Scotland in regard to each question whilst at the same time drawing parallels from the Irish experience and enquiring into the relevance of the Irish case for Scotland.

2.7 It is important to be clear from the outset that our aim is to stimulate thinking and debate about the ways in which Scotland might most productively mobilize and engage its diaspora in future. Our project did NOT seek to evaluate any specific aspect of Scottish or Irish diaspora policy and we have undertaken no such task. Rather, we offer a series of observations which are informed by international comparisons, conversations with key actors from both the Scottish and Irish Governments (Appendix 1), and an analysis of official documents and policy statements, but which are not empirically grounded through a rigorous root and branch evaluation of particular schemes. This report then is designed primarily as a thought piece or catalyst for further roundtable discussion and we conclude by proposing a series of points of debate which may prove fruitful in advancing and focusing policy formulation.

\(^2\) See Gamlen (2007)

\(^3\) This report follows on from the Scottish Enterprise workshop ‘Engaging Scotland’s Diaspora’ held in Glasgow in October 2007 and notes the excellent contribution of Eirich and McLaren (2007). It also follows from a report written by the authors on the Irish strategy – see Boyle and Kitchin (2007)
The report is structured around six main sections. In the first section the bases and terms of reference of the comparative approach are further clarified. Sections 2 to 6 then work systematically through each question in turn, vis-à-vis:

- the definition of diaspora and identification of specific diasporic populations for inclusion in any strategy;
- the approaches which are best suited to engaging diasporic populations (in this case the constitutional status of both governments and the administration and operationalisation of diaspora projects);
- the \textit{a priori} inclination of each diaspora to be engaged (the scale and geography of the Scottish and Irish diasporas and the strength of patriotism and cultural inclination to connect with the homeland);
- the social, economic and demographic imperatives which might motivate further intervention;
- and finally the detailed and concrete policy interventions which are being pursued in Ireland and Scotland, paying particular attention to the growing economic importance of diaspora knowledge networks.

The final section concludes by setting out the key points which might merit further consideration and debate if Scotland is to develop a more coherent vista on its relations with its diaspora.

Prior to departure, it would be remiss not to set the study into the context of the transformations which have occurred in the world economy in the past months and the movement of both the Scottish and Irish economies into recession. It is now estimated that the Irish economy will contract by approximately -4% in the next twelve months whilst the Scottish economy is projected to decline between -0.4 and -1.9\%\textsuperscript{4}. Clearly, the changing economic circumstances will have ramifications for diaspora policy, affecting as it will remittance transfers, philanthropy, the extension of welfare entitlements, migration patterns, tourist flows and the functioning of economic networks. But it is not all bad. Indeed, according to at least one influential commentator in Ireland, it may be that diaspora groups have an even greater role to play in promoting national economic development in the present climate\textsuperscript{5}. It is evident that further research into the specific consequences of the contemporary world economic recession for diaspora policy is required but such a task is beyond the remit of this particular report.

\textsuperscript{4} Goudie (2008) and ESRI (2008)
\textsuperscript{5} McWilliams (2007)
3. THE VALUE OF THE COMPARATIVE APPROACH

3.1 At his address at Trinity College in Dublin on February 13th 2008, Scotland’s First
Minister, Alex Salmond, sought to identify ten lessons – ‘the main inspirations’ –
that Scotland might draw from the remarkable growth of the Irish economy from
the early 1990s. These lessons referred to constitutional matters as well as
social, economic, and cultural strategies:

1. There are no limits to the success of a nation united by a common purpose
and a clarity of will and purpose.
2. Political independence in itself does not guarantee success: it is what you do
with that independence which matters.
3. While only Ireland has recent experience of independence, both countries
‘can agree’ that continued membership of the United Kingdom ‘guarantees
underperformance’.
4. Investment in human capital – the education, skills and potential of our people
– is the basic determinant of economic success.
5. The European Union is and will remain Scotland and Ireland’s most
significant economic relationship.
6. Prosperity depends on openness and the development of comparative
advantage.
7. An economic windfall must be used wisely; economic gains need to be
reinvested heavily in education and training, and strengthening the business
environment to attract mobile capital.
8. Economic growth creates its own challenges. Fast growth is not a panacea –
though vitally, it creates the potential for the whole of society to enjoy
prosperity.
9. Small, peaceful countries can exercise major global influence, not on the
bases of military power and alliances, but on values and ideals.
10. There is no blueprint for the transition to full independence. Constitutional
incrementalism is not always the best approach.

3.2 Whilst not making it into his ten critical lessons, First Minister Salmond then
progressed to a reflection upon the similarities which exist between the Scottish
and Irish diasporas:

‘The similarities between Scotland and Ireland are striking. Look abroad and it is
almost a mirror image. Because for the people of two small Atlantic nations, the
Scots and the Irish have left broad and unmistakable tracks across much of the
world. And not only are the Scots and Irish welcomed across the globe – the
affection and admiration runs deeper. So deep that tens of millions of citizens – in
the United States, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Australia and New Zealand
– are proud to trace back their ancestry to our two great nations. Across the world,
over 80 million people – more than one in every hundred – lays claim to being
Irish. And 45 million regard themselves as Scots. The size and impact of both the Scottish and Irish Diasporas is truly astonishing.’ (Alex Salmond, Trinity College Dublin, Feb 13th 2008)

3.3 This comparison is one which is frequently commented upon. As diaspora policy emerges as an important public policy matter, more focused dialogue between Scotland and Ireland on diaspora and diaspora strategy seems inevitable. But why might this specific comparison be valuable? Why might this particular area of public policy merit a place in the wider dialogue which is taking place between Scotland and Ireland’s past, current status, and future trajectories?

3.4 Diasporic populations have long played a significant role in the economic, political, social, and cultural life of their home nations. Historically, remittance receipts in particular have served a critical role in maintaining domestic economies which otherwise would have further stagnated. From the beginning of the Second World War however, governments from home countries have taken a more proactive stance and sought to engage diasporic groups to particular ends. Three subsequent waves of diaspora policy can be identified, each overlapping today:

- Firstly, from 1945 and guided by the United Nations, developing countries sought to send to universities in the west and then repatriate undergraduate and postgraduate students, in particular medical and engineering students. These returnees were called upon to put their learning to the service of the economic and social welfare of their countries.
- Secondly, from the late 1960s onwards peripheral economies within the developed world began to develop an interest in out migration, now conceived off as constituting a brain drain. Stemming out migration and fostering a return of diasporic talent (brain incubation or brain circulation) emerged as a key policy concern.
- Thirdly, from the 1990s onwards both peripheral and core regions within the developed world began to reconceive of the potential offered by diasporic groups from afar. The hope that significant return migration would occur was ill founded and in any event diasporic groups might be better engaged in situ. In the global economy of today, it has come to be appreciated that global networks and ties can be useful for enhancing national competitiveness.

3.5 Whilst comprising a wider set of objectives, the Scottish and Irish comparison needs to be set against this backdrop. The World Bank has emerged as a key advocate of third wave diaspora strategies and has sought to promote policy debate, learning, and transfer in the area of diaspora policy. In so doing it has developed a typology of ‘country potential’ based upon the state of readiness of the home nations (politically, culturally, infrastructurally, etc) to engage overseas populations and the fitness of purpose of diasporic groups (scale, degree of

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6 Larner (2006)
organisation, level of patriotism, etc) to be mobilised by their home nations (see Table 1). Whilst this framework is clearly oversimplified and provides only a crude categorisation of diaspora policy in particular countries, it is interesting to note that Scotland and Ireland are both ascribed the highest degree of country potential. At least according to the World Bank, a comparison of both country’s diaspora policies might be fruitful as each is well positioned to engage their respective diaspora and each has a relatively large, well organised, and committed diaspora.

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<th>Table 1 – Country potential for diaspora strategy</th>
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<td><strong>Unfavourable Country Conditions</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Sophisticated Diaspora Networks</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Emerging diaspora networks</strong></td>
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3.6 This comparison seems all the more appropriate given that both Ireland and Scotland are moving to redefine their relationships with their respective diaspora. From the turn of the century and stimulated in part by falling rates of fertility and fears of skills shortages in key sectors of the Scottish economy, the Scottish Executive began to think more formally about the relationships it might build with Scottish expatriate communities. In April 2008, following publication of its national economic strategy, the Scottish Government published its *International Framework* establishing the methodology through which it was to coordinate its international engagement and identifying the Scottish diaspora as a new ‘key priority’. The flagship event *Homecoming 2009*, inviting Scots to return to Scotland for a holiday or perhaps more permanently, has served to galvanise resolve to further harness the energies, knowledge, talents, and good will of the Scottish diaspora. According to the *International Framework* document:

‘Scotland's Diaspora population around the world and across other parts of the UK consists of large numbers of people with a good will towards Scotland, who have the potential to improve our reputation and drive economic growth by acting as ambassadors for Scotland. We continue to work with Global Scots and our Global Friends of Scotland to put in place mutually beneficial relationships and to understand how Scotland and the Diaspora can work together to develop mutually beneficial partnerships. The year of Homecoming in 2009 will be a real focus for

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7 Kutznetsov (2006)
energising and engaging our Diaspora, and we will ensure it has a lasting legacy in terms of better, more effective and higher impact communication with Scotland's Diaspora.’

Likewise as early as 1995, then Irish President Mary Robinson in an *Address to the Houses of the Oireachtas*, spoke about the importance of ‘Cherishing the Irish Diaspora’. In 2002 the *Task Force on Policy towards Emigration* set forth a bold new agenda for Ireland’s engagement with its diaspora. This agenda prioritised redirecting some of the riches of the Celtic Tiger to protect the welfare of vulnerable groups within the diaspora living in the United Kingdom and the United States. This policy notwithstanding, only five years later, in April 2007, Dermot Ahern TD, and then Minister for Foreign Affairs, announced that Ireland was to embark upon a major review of its diaspora policy. Set against the backdrop of fears that the Irish economic success was running its course, Ahern recognised the value of engaging the diaspora so as to nurture mutually beneficial relations:

‘The time is right to review our approach to our community across the globe and to develop a strategy for the years ahead. Maintaining and enhancing our links with our communities abroad has been a particular priority for the government. Just as the nature of our diaspora has never been fixed, our attitudes and our capacity to engage with the Irish abroad have changed with our nation’s fortunes. We need to regularly reshape our policies in this key area and this conference will launch this process.’

Both cited as exemplars of third wave diaspora strategies and both in the throes of much introspection over the future shape of their approaches to their diaspora, Scotland and Ireland have much to talk about, compare and contrast, and this report aims to contribute this dialogue
4. **DRAWING BORDERS: WHO BELONGS TO THE DIASPORA?**

4.1 A meaningful diaspora strategy depends upon a clear understanding of who belongs to the diaspora. This is in part a pragmatic matter: any strategy needs to ration limited resources through careful planning and targeting. It is also, however, of significant political concern. An emerging criticism levelled at diaspora strategies around the world – and seeds of this criticism have already being sown in the academic literature on Scotland and Ireland’s diaspora policies⁸ – is that they risk the racialisation of economic policy and national growth strategies, prioritising the Scots or the Irish as a global tribe and potentially overlooking the contribution of other migrant groups resident in Scotland and Ireland. If the concept of diaspora is too narrowly defined the boundaries drawn between those included and those excluded might prove to be problematic and unhelpful. As such, it becomes critical to identify which constituencies ought to be included in Scotland and Ireland’s diaspora strategies in order to ensure a wide and cosmopolitan approach.

4.2 In seeking to draw clearer boundaries some reflection on the wider application of the concept is required. Of Greek origin and commonly thought of as popularised by Jewish religious history, the notion of diaspora eventually worked its way into the social scientific literature in the 1950s, through firstly African Studies and then Armenian Studies. Taken to refer in principle to the scattering or scrambling of a particular population, in the past decade the concept has diffused widely throughout the social sciences and humanities and in so doing has lost much of its original meaning. It is possible to identify at least three definitions of diaspora, based respectively on the concepts of ‘forced migration’, ‘mass scattering’, and ‘connectivity’ respectively. Each frames diaspora differently, leading to the inclusion and exclusion of different population groups and as a consequence the cultivation of different ways of thinking about strategies towards diasporic populations. The three definitions are mapped out most clearly in the work of William Safran, Robin Cohen and Roza Tsagarousianou⁹.

4.3 William Safran’s definition of diaspora conceives of diaspora as only one particular form of mass migration, that involving forced exile and a fraught and lengthy period of resettlement and planting down of new roots in regions of destination. Diaspora consists of migrations where:

- Original communities have spread from the homeland to two or more countries.
- These communities are bound to their original geographical locations by a common vision, memory, or myth about their homeland.
- These communities harbour a belief that they will never be accepted by their hosts and therefore develop autonomous cultural and social needs.

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⁸ See for instance Zumkhawala-Cook (2005) and Lenten (2007)
• They believe that they or their descendants will return to the homeland should conditions prove favourable.
• They are strongly motivated to maintain support for their homeland and communal consciousness and solidarity enable them to continue to take an interest in homeland affairs.

4.4 Robin Cohen has moved to widen Safran’s definition. Cohen argued that diaspora should include those groups who scatter voluntarily as well as those who move as a result of aggression, persecution or extreme hardship, should only be applied to groups who have settled in a new destination for a relatively long time period, should take into account the positive aspects of migrants’ lives in regions of destination, should acknowledge that assimilation and integration into host cultures does occur and should permit an inclusion of second, third, and later generation descendants. Diaspora incorporated all kinds of mass population movement and Safran’s definition was overly restrictive. On this basis Cohen identified five types of diaspora:

• Victim diasporas (e.g., classic diasporas forced into exile such as the Jewish, African, Armenian diasporas)
• Labour diasporas (e.g., mass migration in search of work and economic opportunities such as the Indian and Turkish diasporas)
• Trade diasporas (e.g., migrations seeking to open trade routes and links such as the Chinese and Lebanese diasporas)
• Imperial diasporas (e.g., migration among those keen to serve and maintain empires such as the British and French diasporas)
• Cultural diaspora (e.g., those who move through a process of chain migration such as the Caribbean diaspora).

4.5 Whilst widening and loosening the types of migrations which might be included there remain limitations to Cohen’s definition. According to Tsagarousianou (2004), communications and transportation advances have made mobility so efficient today that migration is rarely permanent and there is a need to resist thinking of diaspora in terms of permanent settlement. Diasporas have always been more mobile than commonly assumed but today they are more transient than they have ever been in history. The consequence is that connectivity within and between the diaspora, both physical and virtual, has never been as dense or as extensive. Diasporas need to be conceived of as being fundamentally reworked by new forms of mobility and communication technologies. Diasporas operate on a transnational basis and the term best refers to ‘complex multidirectional flows of human beings, ideas, products – cultural and physical, and to forms of interaction, negotiation and exchange.’ The implication then is that not all expatriates are diaspora, the term being confined to those who are proactively engaged in transnational activity.

4.6 With a view to further clarity, in this report we endorse Cohen’s widening and loosening of the concept of diaspora and argue for an inclusive conceptualization
of diaspora as a central component of any diaspora strategy. Moreover we argue that it is important to take seriously and promote the concept of ‘affinity diaspora’. In addition, we propose that it is critical to take seriously forms of mobility which are more transitory and the use of the new forms of communication which are now available. A new generation of diaspora strategies are made possible by new communication and transport technologies. Nevertheless the report will not discard entirely the theme of forced migration and will note the importance of the exile motif in diaspora formation and in turn diaspora strategies. Diasporas which are underpinned by a communal belief in the importance of forced migration and estrangement from ready assimilation in settlement regions do provide a different set of resources for diaspora strategies and this distinction will prove important in the Scottish and Irish comparison.

4.7 In this report then the concept of diaspora will be taken to include:

- a collection of people who share a common national, civic or ethnic identity and who were either forced to leave or voluntarily left their settled territory and became residents in a new territory.
- descendants of these emigrants who remain interested in their heritage and who might be prepared to reengage with their ancestral home.
- migrants who move in a transient, circular and more nomadic way, leading a transnational existence which entails moving into and out of the homeland for short periods, including business travellers.

4.8 An affinity diaspora is a collection of people, usually former immigrants and tourists or business travellers, who have a different national or ethnic identity to a nation state but who feel some special affinity or affection for that nation state and who act on its behalf, whilst resident in the state, after they return home, or from a third country.

4.9 A diaspora strategy then will be taken to refer to an explicit policy initiative or series of policy initiatives enacted by a state, or its peoples, aimed at developing relationships between diaspora and affinity diaspora populations. A diaspora strategy needs not be over-determined and can be quite light in conception and application, and is best thought of as an overarching framework for providing a level of coherence to the range of concrete diaspora policies devised and implemented by a variety of public, private, and voluntary agencies.

4.10 To date neither Scotland nor Ireland has articulated a clear sense of who it considers its diaspora to consist of, although a debate in each country has begun and some useful pointers provided. Fortunately neither is lapsing into a narrow and restrictive use of the label by default. Indeed, each has a welcome commitment to broadening the concept to include all groups who live overseas and who have a special affinity with Scotland and Ireland. Therein each has witnessed the rise of a keen interest in better understanding the structure, scale,
form, geography, and causes of migration to and from them. It is correctly assumed that the wider the net is cast the richer the contributions harnessed will be. There is no sense that the turn to the diaspora represents a resort to a form of ethnic nationalism and indeed where diaspora policies are worked into debates on Scottish and Irish nationalism, they are most commonly framed as part of wider appeals to civic nationalisms. In both cases, there is clearly a desire for wider, looser, and more inclusive approaches. Nevertheless, our assessment is that in both Scotland and Ireland most programmes are designed with first generation and descendants of first generation Scottish and Irish migrants in mind. In both cases therefore, there would appear to be scope for, firstly, greater engagement with affinity diasporas and, secondly, a heightened understanding of how Scottish and Irish people move around the world and communicate with home in the twenty first century.

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10 Gilmartin and White (2008), National Institute of Economic and Social Affairs (2008)
5. **ENGAGING THE DIASPORA**

5.1 There are clear constitutional differences between Scotland and Ireland. Whilst it is obvious that stronger international branding creates a greater sense of global presence and contributes to nation building and diaspora building, it is clearly a matter of debate whether the differential constitutional status of Scotland helps or hinders its capacity to formulate a diaspora strategy. Unlike Scotland, Ireland is an independent state and in principal has legal sovereignty over the setting of taxes, the allocation of all state expenditure, the establishment of law, order, and defence, and the setting of international relations. Scotland in contrast has historically been a full member of the United Kingdom and subject to the British Parliamentary system. Since 1999, it has had its own parliament with full authority over most public services and a limited amount of power to vary tax levels. A number of key reserved powers however remain at the British level including the governance of both emigration (consular and embassy services) and immigration (immigration policy, rules and systems). In addition, whilst Scottish Development International and Scottish Enterprise have overseas offices, the Irish Development Agency and Enterprise Ireland would appear to have a more extensive international presence.

5.2 Beyond the powers invested in state institutions, the methodologies adopted by states when engaging with diasporic populations is also of critical importance. Scotland chooses to present itself as a Celtic Lion, in waiting to match and perhaps surpass the achievements of the Celtic Tiger. What does it mean to aspire to the status of a Tiger or Lion economy? Whilst for Scotland the Celtic Lion appellant might mean little more than an aspiration to achieve world class rates of economic growth, for Ireland the concept of Tigerhood is taken more seriously to imply a commitment to a certain kind of state and certain kind of approach to policy making. What are the defining features of Tiger states? Can anything be read into Ireland’s alignment with the label ‘Tiger’? If so, how do Tiger states implement diaspora policy and what might Scotland learn, if anything, from such a *modus operandi*?

5.3 Most commentators trace the label Tiger to the economies of the Pacific Asian region. This region has been witness to three waves of world class economic growth, with Japan pioneering the first wave, the four ‘dragon economies’ of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore taking up the mantle in the second, and finally, the three South East Asian ‘cubs’ of Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia rising to announce the third wave. Subsequently, the economic success enjoyed by Vietnam, Myanmar, and China has been taken to constitute a fourth wave. Beyond Pacific Asia lie a number of other contenders. Whilst Brazil, Mexico, and India have sought to claim Tigerhood for some time, more recently countries as diverse as Ireland and Israel, and even Chile, Mauritius, and Botswana have attracted the label.
5.4 What have these countries got in common? As the label ‘Tiger’ increasingly came to be associated with Ireland so too its growth strategy has come to be compared with its Pacific Asian counterparts. According to Sean O’Riain\(^\text{11}\) this comparison is useful as Irish economic growth was marshalled by a type of developmental state that derives from the same family of command capitalism practised in the dragon economies. In place of the highly centralised and interventionist roles played by state technocrats in Pacific Asia however, the Irish state has operated with a more flexible and decentralised command structure and has exercised a much lighter touch. O’Riain argues that whilst the Pacific Asian economies are characterised by a bureaucratic developmental state, Ireland has grown under the governance of a new type of flexible developmental state or developmental networked state.

5.5 The flexible developmental state concept recognizes five ways in which states might intervene to promote the development of business. These are:

- **Absent** – Beyond its legal obligations the state withdraws and allows the market to dictate business opportunities.
- **Custodian** – The state provides protection for business start ups, policing and regulating infant industries.
- **Midwife** – The state attracts private enterprises into new sectors.
- **Husbandry** – The state teaches, cultivates, nurtures, and prods entrepreneurial forces that have already been activated.
- **Demiurge** – The state has direct involvement in productive activities, often with the intention of denationalizing later.

5.6 According to O’Riain, as a flexible developmental state, the Irish state performs more midwifery or husbandry functions. It does so through the principal of ‘embedded autonomy’, networking within the business community and placing state interests into business networks whilst remaining outside of the business community and its imperatives. The Irish state is a light state in terms of the number of civil servants per capita and consequently has honed a talent for building capacity and working in partnership with the business community, trade unions, the voluntary sector, and civil society. Embedded autonomy has served as a useful strategy for getting things done without orchestrating or determining in an overly centralized fashion.

5.7 Whether Scotland can be classified as a developmental state and indeed whether it aspires to such a classification is beyond the scope of this report. What is relevant nevertheless, is the application of this approach to diaspora policy. When applied to diaspora policy this typology leads to at least five different ways of engaging diasporic groups:

- **Absent** – The state leaves the formation of links between the homeland and the diaspora to the market or to autonomous social, cultural and political movements.

\(^{11}\) O’Riain (2000; 2004)
Custodian – The state nurtures, protects, regulates, and polices new and emerging diasporic connections.

Midwife – The state identifies new sectors and locations it wishes to connect with and mobilizes and cultivates key individuals and communities to make these connections happen.

Husbandry – The state reenergizes and rebrands existing networks and plays a formative role in the shaping the trajectory of networks.

Demiurge – The state directly creates and runs diasporic initiatives and networks, perhaps with the intention of letting the market assume responsibility at a later date.

5.8 From our discussions with Scottish and Irish managers of various diaspora schemes, and our analysis of policy documents, it seems that there is a discernible difference in the ethos and practices underpinning the administration of the various diaspora programmes. Both countries clearly have initiatives which have been instituted by organisations outside the state, either from the homeland or from the diaspora. Whilst important exceptions exist, in the Scottish case, where the state does get involved it functions largely as the lead player and most significant manager, whilst in the Irish case the state primarily seeks a midwifery or husbandry role lightly incubating existing initiatives or seeding new initiatives. Irish diaspora policy is more light in touch and consistent with its status as a flexible developmental state; meanwhile Scottish diaspora policy is more muscular and has a greater degree of state involvement at all stages of the process.

5.9 All the schemes that Scottish Government agencies engage with, as far as we are aware, are funded and managed by those agencies. The Scottish schemes are underpinned strongly by new managerial structures and processes that emphasise accountability, transparency, productivity and value for money. The Scottish Government initiatives are accompanied by defined targets and associated metrics for measuring progress and success. A scheme is therefore defined as a success or failure depending on how much economic value it can be demonstrated to have leveraged over a specific (usually very short) period. There is clearly an important rationale for moving to new forms of public administration and placing greater demands on measuring value for money and ensuring transparency and accountability in the expenditure of public funds. Democratic systems require public confidence in the efficiency of state run organisations. Nevertheless, such managerialism can circumscribe how schemes are conceived, structured and run, and for all its benefits may potentially limit the development of schemes that would have a multitude of intangible benefits.

5.10 The Irish schemes are slowly transferring to this form of managerialism, especially with regards to accountability and transparency of spend\textsuperscript{12}, but there remains a greater recognition of the intangible benefits gained by fostering an

\textsuperscript{12} See for example the recent Goodbody Report (2007) on the work of the Irish Abroad Unit
engagement with the diaspora and an appreciation of the timeframe over which dividends will be returned. Rather than manage a small set of highly controlled schemes, the Irish strategy has been ‘to let a thousand flowers bloom’. To that end, Ireland supports existing organisations without seeking any control and encourages the development of new social networks run by the diaspora for the diaspora (using the diaspora’s own resources). This approach uses of the ideas of light incubation and does practice forms of ‘embedded autonomy’ wherein the Irish state leaves an organisation/network to run itself, providing some minimal resources when needed (basic funding, advice, speakers, etc), and only steps in when the organisation/network needs to be re-energised.

5.11 The idea is to foster the organic growth of networks with as light a government input as possible. This is partly to keep investment at a low level, but is mainly because it is believed that organic networks are more likely to succeed than those that are highly managed. For instance, and with specific respect to business networks, Enterprise Ireland invests selective but light resources (some of which are in-kind rather than financial) into over sixty Irish business networks around the world. This strategy is believed to enhance a sense of Irish-mindedness across a very large number of business people and produces all kinds of tangible and intangible benefits that trickle back to Ireland through inward business investment, high quality economic or political advice, tourism visits, and philanthropy. The metrics used to assess this strategy focus on the quality and strength of the network, feedback from clients, number of quotations and contracts, but there is no rigid and robust economic metric. For Ireland, the challenge will be to find appropriate ways of undertaking more value for money assessments without calibrating measures of success so that they undermine the schemes they are intended to assess.
6 THE CHARACTERISTICS OF EACH DIASPORA

6.1 The scale, geography, social structure, and character of diasporic populations play a significant role in shaping their capacity and inclination to connect with the homeland. Prior to the nineteenth century, Scotland had a long history of emigration to Europe, including to Ireland. Between 1821 and 1945, and in waves concentrated particularly in the 1850s, 1870s, early 1900s and the interwar period, over two million migrants left Scotland, more than half to the USA with Canada, Australia, and New Zealand being other important destinations. Following the Second World War and lasting up to the 1990s, Scotland was a country that suffered from brain drain, the 1960s in particular witnessing a net, negative annual migration balance of -40,000. England, and, in particular, the South East became an important destination. Throughout the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries Scotland has played host to Irish (particularly from the 1840s to the 1920s), Jewish and Lithuanian (1890s to 1910), Italian (interwar years), Polish (post war), as well as Pakistani, Indian and Bangladeshi (1960s) migrants. However, since 1990, Scotland has enjoyed a net migrant gain peaking following the accession of Eastern European states to the EU in 2004 at +25,000 (Figure 1). Moreover, in-migrants to Scotland are more likely to be more qualified and skilled than out-migrants, Scotland attracts more students than it exports, and retains the highest proportion of graduates than any region in the UK\(^\text{13}\).

\(^{13}\) Houston et al. (2008)
Figure 1 - Scotland: Key components of population change 1952 to present

Year

Natural Increase, thousands
Estimated Net Migration
Total Population

Source: pers. comm. w ith General Register Office for Scotland

Figure 2 - Ireland: Key components of population change 1952 to present

Year

Natural Increase, thousands
Estimated Net Migration
Total Population

Source: pers. comm. w ith Central Statistics Office, Dublin
6.2 Migration from Ireland to Europe dates to the missionary and mercenary migrations in the sixth to the fifteenth centuries. From the eighteenth century migration to the new world, principally the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, dominated. Between 1700 and 1920 the Irish population (whole island) fell from 8.2 million people to 4.2 million with an estimated three million people emigrating abroad. Included in this stream were the flight of the Scotch-Irish to North America between 1705 and 1776, the famine migrants in the 1840s, and the economic migrants of the period from the 1850s to the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922. In the twentieth century, Ireland has continued to suffer from net migration loss, peaking in the 1950s and 1980s with the United Kingdom emerging as the chief destination region. With the country’s economic fortunes reversing from 1993, however, Ireland too has witnessed a parallel reversal in its migration fortunes. Between 1991 and 2006 Ireland attracted a net gain of nearly 350,000 migrants, with over half of incoming migrants being returnees (Figure 2). Whilst the largest migrant group remains the British, migrants have come from every continent and broadened Ireland’s demographic base significantly. As with Scotland, Ireland has played host to post-accession Eastern European flows, particularly from Poland and Lithuania.

6.3 Table 2 shows key statistics pertinent to the Scottish and Irish diasporas and potential affinity diasporas. It is clear that in spite of their differences, some broad similarities exist between both countries. Both are small European countries; both have approximately one quarter of their existing population living overseas, principally in England; both participated in the great European migrations to the New World and have longer diasporic ties with the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand; from being an exporter of talent both have enjoyed net migrant gains since 1990, albeit Ireland at a greater scale; both have significant populations from the EU accession states; both attract a significant volume of overseas students, with Scotland being more of a magnet; and finally both are significant tourist locations.

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15 Delaney (2000)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Scotland</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Net Migration</strong></td>
<td>+20,400 (average annual since 2003)</td>
<td>+43,900 (average annual since 2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scale of Diaspora (native born, overseas)</strong></td>
<td>1,267,500</td>
<td>800,000 Irish born overseas. 3.1 million Irish Citizens (Passport holders) overseas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Geography of Diaspora</strong></td>
<td>800,000 in England, 467,500 non UK(^{16})</td>
<td>500,000 in UK, 156,000 in USA, 50,000 in Australia, 22,800 in Canada, 16,000 France, 16,000 Germany, 8,000 Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scale of Wider Diaspora (people claiming ancestry)</strong></td>
<td>28 million to 40 million(^{17})</td>
<td>70 to 80 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Geography of Wider Diaspora</strong></td>
<td>USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand</td>
<td>Today 44 million claim to be Irish American, 6 million people in Britain claim Irish ancestry, there are 3.8 million Irish Canadians and 1.9 million Irish Australians 500,000 people in Argentina have Irish ancestry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Foreign Born Residents</strong></td>
<td>168,142 Scotland residents were born outside of the UK (+34% since 1991; 3.3% compared to 7.5% for the whole of the UK, 2001 census)</td>
<td>419,733 (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Geography of Foreign Born Residents</strong></td>
<td>The largest group was from Germany, followed by Pakistan and the US (2001 census)</td>
<td>A large number of foreign-born residents in 2006 were from the United Kingdom (112,000) Eastern European accession countries (163,227), Asian countries (46,952) and African countries (35,326) (2006 census)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Overseas Students (UG and PG)</strong></td>
<td>58,095 overseas students (for academic year 2006/07). This figure does not include the 28,290 students from other parts of the UK</td>
<td>25,319 (for academic year 2005/06)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{16}\) Quoted in Eirich and McLaren (2007)  
\(^{17}\) Quoted in Eirich and McLaren (2007)
### Geography of Overseas Students

In 2006-2007, most non-Scottish students enrolled in a Scottish institution of further education were from England (2,350). Other important groups were from India (1,430) and from other European countries (Italy, Spain, Poland, France).

In 2005-2006, 15,196 overseas students or 57% of the total were from non-EU countries (including India, China, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea and Thailand).

| Tourist Visits (non Scottish/Irish) | 9.59 million 6.8 million UK, 2.79 overseas | 8.01 million, 4.01 million from the UK, 4 million from non UK/Ireland sources |

**All data from official government sources unless otherwise stated.**

6.4 Where both diasporas would appear to differ most is not in their scale or geography but in their cultural dispositions. Given the cultural characteristics of their respective diaspora, the extent to which Scottish or Irish born migrants and subsequent generations consider themselves to be Scottish or Irish differs. This view was prevalent among both Scottish and Irish interviewees and whilst largely anecdotal would seem to reveal an important truth. In general, Irish-mindedness – the strength of Irish identity and an allegiance or patriotism to Ireland – seems better developed than Scottish-mindedness. This is perhaps most clearly reflected in the number of active Irish diaspora organisations around the world, which number several thousand.

6.5 In the course of undertaking interviews for this project it became evident that there exists a strong belief in Scotland that the Scottish diaspora is less visible and less well organised than the Irish diaspora. There is a belief that migrating Scots were more quickly accepted by the host populations, adopted the identity of regions of destination more readily and assimilated within a single generation. Scots tended to choose to leave to seek a better life elsewhere, rather than migrating because there seemed little other viable option. As a result, Scottish identity and Scottish-mindedness very rapidly dissipated to become a ‘historical badge’ little worn or displayed except on particular occasions such as St Andrews Day or Tartan Day or Burns Night or during significant sporting occasions. Whilst sharing a Scottish ancestry clearly mattered, the concerns and tribulations of the domestic country proved to be immediately arresting and primary loyalties were more readily redirected from the old to the new homeland.

6.6 In contrast, a commonly held view is that the migrating Irish most often left due to economic necessity or for political reasons. Even when they moved for reasons of self advancement, homesickness, alienation, and an elevated interest in Irish nationalism persisted as a consequence of traditional Gaelic attitudes to migration, which led migrants to justify themselves not as voluntary, ambitious emigrants, but as involuntary, non-responsible ‘exiles’, compelled to leave home by forces beyond individual control. The Irish faced hostility in regions of

18 Miller (1985)
settlement as a consequence of their race (Celtic), class (poorest of the poor), nationality (Irish), and religion (Catholic). For a time, anti-Irish racism suppressed upward mobility and fuelled a sense of estrangement and cultural difference. With few resources, they often ended up living in the same poor neighbourhoods, forming Irish enclaves where Irish culture was kept alive. In addition, the poor state of Ireland and the political conflict in the North led to the maintenance of direct connections back to the homeland through remittances and political support, the latter of which also helped to keep alive Irish nationalism.

6.7 It is important to note, however, that while the Irish diaspora appears in general to be more coherently organized than the Scottish diaspora, it has varying intensities and forms in different locales given the size of the community and because patriotism, interest and commitment to Ireland vary across time and space. Even in locales where diaspora identities and activities are considered to be strong many people are little if at all involved in the diaspora groups or activities. It should also be noted that until relatively recently the Irish diaspora had largely self-organised itself through organic processes, along with help from the Catholic Church, and the Irish state has traditionally not sought to manage the diaspora in an overly-determined way. The move in recent years to actively engage and support the diaspora through the schemes detailed below is then a relatively new development driven by a concern amongst some Irish commentators that the strength of Irish identity overseas might be on the wane for a number of reasons: the numbers of Irish-born emigrating has dropped markedly reducing first generation stock that tend to be the most active; the political and economic rationale for maintaining ties to Ireland has dissipated given the peace process and Ireland’s economic miracle; and the ‘greying’ of the diaspora community leaders without significant numbers of readily identifiable replacements. That said, Irish-mindedness remains strong and the Irish Government recognises the value in investing in trying to maintain this strength.

6.8 One of the principal differences between Scotland and Ireland then is that Scotland might need to work harder if it is to engage its overseas communities as it cannot rely on the spontaneous self organisation of the diaspora. And yet Scottish-mindedness is essential to any diaspora programme as the Scottish diaspora will only do work for and alongside Scotland over the long-term if they harbour a deep sense of Scottishness and a pride and allegiance to Scotland. It is clear that a whole number of initiatives now underway will play an important role to this end. These include but are not limited to:

**Global Scot** – a business network connecting highly skilled Scots around the world.

**Global Friends of Scotland** – a social and community network linking overseas Scots

**Homecoming 2009** – a flagship campaign seeking to encourage tourist visits and perhaps a longer term relationship between Scotland and its diaspora.
Tartan Day and Scotland Week – An official day set aside in the United States (and other countries) to celebrate the heritage and legacy of Scottish emigrants; Scotland Week held alongside this to promote links with Scotland.

The central web portal Scotland.org – An official gateway to Scotland serving as a one stop shop for a variety of user groups.

Creative Scotland – an organisation that once established will be dedicated to promoting Scottish culture and arts both at home and abroad.

Fresh Talent Initiative and Talent Scotland – Agencies which includes the Relocation Advisory Service established to promote skilled migration, including return migration, to Scotland.

AncestralScotland.com website and ScotlandsPeople Resources – The former a VisitScotland tourist promotion web site, the latter a government backed partnership between the General Register Office for Scotland, the National Archives of Scotland and The Court of the Lord Lyon, including a website and the new Scotlands People Centre in Edinburgh, which is a resource for ancestral visitors seeking genealogical research materials.

The Scottish Centre for Diaspora Studies at Edinburgh University – A new research centre serving as a focal point for research on the Scottish diaspora.

6.9 Beyond their instrumental utility, each of these initiatives plays a symbolically important role in heightening awareness of Scotland and Scottishness within the diaspora. There would seem to be a movement underway with a reasonable degree of combined mass. Important initiatives are underway and already are enjoying success. Nevertheless, given the scale of the task at hand it would seem that a more significant ramping up of projects designed to nurture Scottish-mindedness might again be required. Culture and identity building is a long term and complex project and achievements are not easily preserved or sustained. It is here that the constitutional debate in Scotland, the strength of Scottish cultural identity overseas, and Scotland’s diaspora policy all once again intersect. The critical question would appear to be, can the Scottish diaspora be most successfully built up through programmes, activities, and outreach work undertaken with the existing constitutional arrangements or would an independent Scotland provide a stronger set of culture building tools and instruments?
7. **THE RATIONALE FOR ENGAGING THE DIASPORA**

7.1 Scotland and Ireland will require different diaspora strategies simply because the conditions which motivate them to engage their respective diaspora populations are different. Scotland’s turn to its diaspora stems from debates in the early 2000s about impending skill shortages. The growth of skill shortages through time in any economy can be said to derive from one of three sources: a growth of that economy relative to the working age population; a decline of the working age population relative to the economy; or a growing mismatch in the skills inherent in the labour market relative to the skills required by the economy. A relatively poorly performing economy at the periphery of Europe, Scotland’s skill shortages could not in truth be attributed to the success of its economy. Instead, attention was given first, and foremost to the impact of the absolute decline of the country’s working age population; and secondly the nation’s limited ability to serve as an incubator for members of what, following Richard Florida[^19] was referred to as the ‘creative class’.

7.2 In the early 2000s it was believed that the Scottish population was in decline and that Scotland occupied premier position in the European league table of shrinking populations. There was a fear that Scotland’s population could dip below 5 million. The contribution of Scotland’s demographic trends to emerging skill shortages derived from the problem of falling birth rates and an ageing population structure. Scotland feared that it could not meet replacement demand that would occur in the labour market (existing jobs that will need to be filled due to retirements)[^20]. Secondly, Scotland began to take an interest in Richard Florida’s ideas regarding the importance of the creative class to economic growth and saw a need to prospect for a larger share of creative members of society. Independently of the absolute shortage of skills that would derive from unmet replacement demand, the shortage of pools of creative talent in the economy was in itself a problem.

7.3 Increasingly the attractiveness of Scotland to immigrants and fortifying positive net migration was the diagnosis and The Fresh Talent Scotland Initiative and the Relocation Advisory Service were the principal products. Scotland was to proactively attract students, business people, other workers, entrepreneurs, and Scottish expatriates. Fostering return migration then, to deal with the country’s low birth rates, projected demographic shrinking, skill shortages, and absence of creative talent, emerged *de facto* as its primary relation to its diaspora. Expatriates already had a sense of connection to Scotland and could be more easily lured back by the magnets of good educational and career opportunities, a cosmopolitan and tolerant multi-cultural ethos, a vibrant night time economy and series of consumption opportunities, and by the desire to bring up families and care for parents in their old age.

[^19]: Florida (2002)
7.4 It has now become apparent that Scotland’s population is stable if not growing slightly, that fertility levels have risen, and that no significant skill shortages exist, albeit that the country suffers from relatively low levels of self-employment and entrepreneurial activity and could benefit from labour market expansion in these areas\textsuperscript{21}. Against this backdrop, a new set of rationales for engaging with the diaspora has developed, rationales which have been prompted in part by the publication of the Scottish Government’s new Economic Strategy in 2007 and its International Framework\textsuperscript{22}. Three aspects of this strategy have important consequences for the framing of diaspora strategy\textsuperscript{23}:

7.5 \textit{Demographic} – There remains a belief that population growth will be an important stimulus to the economic development of Scotland and as such that the promotion of population growth remains a key policy concern. Scotland has set itself the target of matching the average European EU (EU15) population growth over the period from 2007 to 2017. Beyond natural increase, it is estimated that to meet this target Scotland will require an annual net migration balance of +22,000. Encouraging return migration represents one way to work towards this target.

7.6 \textit{Economic} – In the period 1975 to 2005 the average annual GDP growth rate in Scotland was 1.8\%, lower than the UK average of 2.3\%, and significantly lower than the Irish rate of 5.2\%\textsuperscript{24}. As a consequence the Scottish Government has set itself the targets of raising Scotland’s GDP growth rate to the UK level by 2011, and matching the GDP growth rate of the small independent EU countries by 2017. In so far as diasporic populations can help Scottish businesses compete in the world market and help broker transnational capital investment into Scotland, the diaspora can help the Scottish economy to become ‘smarter’ and ‘wealthier’.

7.7 \textit{Cultural} – The Scottish National Party is currently in power in Scotland and the nation is in the throes of debate over the extent to which full independence or continued Union with the rest of the United Kingdom will best serve its interests into the future. It is presumed that a strong cultural identity and sense of national confidence will be important if Scotland is to match both the demographic and economic growth rates achieved by small independent European States. To conceive of Scotland as a globally networked population of 40 million people is arguably a more powerful way to think. It is clear that a strong cultural attachment to Scotland is a prerequisite for all other efforts to engage diasporic groups and as noted throughout this report there is a debate to be had as to whether such an attachment can be secured best as an independent nation or as a member of the United Kingdom.

\textsuperscript{21} Houston et al (2008)
\textsuperscript{22} Scottish Government (2007)
\textsuperscript{23} As specified in the Scottish Government International Framework (2008)
\textsuperscript{24} Scottish Government (2007)
7.8 Ireland is a country that has undergone enormous transformations since the start of the 1990s. Up to that point, Ireland was a poor nation on the periphery of Europe characterised by a weak economy and high emigration. During the 1980s, Ireland was in severe recession. Inflation and unemployment rates were high (unemployment was over 18% in 1985) and in 1987, Irish GDP was 63% of the EU average making it the second poorest country in the EU behind Portugal. Unsurprisingly, the dire economic situation led to widespread emigration. Between 1981 and 1985, net out-migration was on average 15,000 people each year, rising to 35,000 per year between 1986 and 1989. Crucially this emigration included large numbers of young, well-educated people seeking a better life overseas, with 70% of all emigrants under the age of twenty-five.

7.9 In contrast, from 1994 until the last couple of years Ireland has been the fastest growing and highest performing economy in Europe with year-on-year GDP growth often double or more its European neighbours, and wealth levels in terms of average income amongst the highest of any developed nation. In 2003, the OECD estimated that in terms of GDP per capita, based on Purchasing Power Parities (PPS), Ireland was ranked 4th in the world. Accompanying the economic boom was a growth in the labour force and a fall in unemployment. Between 1992 and 2004 the number of workers increased by 755,000 from 1.165m to 1.920m. Unemployment dropped from 15% in 1993 to stabilise around 4% by 2000. While many would argue that Ireland's economy is relatively robust, the situation is undoubtedly in a period of change with Ireland’s economy now in recession and unemployment growing rapidly to its highest level since 1997.

7.10 These dramatic changes to the economy led to equally dramatic adjustments to the demography of the country. Between 1996 and 2006 the population of the state grew by 16.8% to 4.23m. Births exceeded deaths by almost 140,000 between 1996 and 2002 leading to a strong natural increase in population. Emigration fell steadily during the 1990s, accompanied by a rapid growth of immigrants so that the country became a net-importer of people after 1996. Up to 2004 and the arrival of large numbers of migrants from accession-state countries, approximately half of all in-migrants were Irish-born returnees. According to the 2006 census there were 419,733 people living in Ireland who were born outside the state, including a large number of East Europeans (163,227), Asian (46,952) and Africans (35,326). The Central Statistics Office reported that immigrants represented 9.93% of total population (4,239,848) in 2006. This was almost certainly a large undercount given the number of active PPS numbers and in-migration has continued in the intervening time especially from the EU accession countries (particularly Poland and Lithuania). Given the

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25 Breathnach (1998)
26 NESC (1991)
27 ESRI (2005)
28 Walsh (2005)
present economic downturn there is anecdotal evidence that some of these immigrants are now leaving the country, but as yet the scale of that out-migration is unknown.

7.11 In 2002, as a reflection of the country’s new found wealth, Ireland’s Task Force on Policies towards Emigration, drawing on a full scale mapping of the Irish diaspora29, recommended extending certain welfare rights to overseas populations, especially vulnerable groups (the elderly, the sick, the poor and prisoners) who left Ireland in the 1950s and the 1980s to move to British cities. Cast as recompense for the failure of Irish domestic economic policy in the 1950s and the 1980s and in gratitude for the significant flows of remittance monies which these migrant groups repatriated, a raft of welfare and citizen advice schemes were introduced, including the appointment of overseas welfare officers in British cities. In the past five years, Ireland’s policy towards its diaspora has been motivated by a concern about what the country might give the diaspora back. Nevertheless there have recently emerged two additional rationales for reinvigorating connections with the diaspora.

7.12 Cultural – There is growing concern that the strength of diasporic attachment and affiliation to Ireland might be waning and that a certain level of disenchantment exists. As noted above, this can be read as one of the consequences of the peace process in Northern Ireland, the fact that the rise of the Celtic Tiger has undermined the logic of supporting the country and wider secular trends within society in regions of settlement. As a consequence priority is now being given, not least in the country’s Cultural Policy to the nurturing of the social and cultural life of the diaspora and its continued enthusiasm for matters Irish.

7.13 Economic – Ireland’s success has been down to its capacity to compete successfully in the global economy. The first and most widely recognised tactic has been built around attracting foreign investment and to a limited degree embedding it into the local economy – the global goes local. The second, and more surprising tactic given Irish economic history, is the emergence of a local network of indigenous firms that have become increasingly integrated into international business and technology flows and have been highly successful in international markets – the local goes global. There is growing recognition that diasporic networks have a role to play in increasing the density of the webs of connection which exist between domestic capital and transnational capital. As a consequence, Enterprise Ireland in particular is increasingly seeking ways of establishing diaspora business networks or diaspora knowledge networks in different locations, of different sizes, and in different sectors of the economy.

29 Walter et al. (2002)
8 CONCRETE DIASPORA POLICIES PURSUED BY EACH COUNTRY

8.1 Given constitutional, economic, demographic and managerial differences, variances in the nature of their respective diaspora and the level of their nation-mindedness, and differing social, economic, cultural and demographic trajectories it is perhaps no surprise that the Irish and Scottish existing diaspora policies and concrete projects of engagement are relatively dissimilar. These differences can be categorised in terms of support for overseas populations, business networks and ties, policies towards returnees, policies towards affinity diaspora, philanthropy, and the social and cultural building of the diaspora. Using these categories, Table 3 provides an overview of the main differences between both countries.

Table 3 – Summary of Scottish and Irish State supported diaspora policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUPPORT FOR OVERSEAS POPULATIONS</th>
<th>SCOTLAND</th>
<th>IRELAND</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UK Department of Foreign Affairs: Foreign &amp; Commonwealth Office</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs – Irish Abroad Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political representation abroad through network of British embassies and consulates around the world</td>
<td>Network of embassies and consulates around the world</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Participation in EU, UN, WHO, OECD and OECD</td>
<td>Participation in EU, UN, WHO, OECD and OECD</td>
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<td></td>
<td>British Council</td>
<td>Dion, the Irish Government’s advisory committee on Irish emigrant welfare in Britain</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Department of Education and Science – overseas child abuse victim redress</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Irish Council for Prisoners Overseas</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Emigrant Advice Network (Éan)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Department of Social and Family Affairs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| BUSINESS NETWORKS SUPPORTED BY THE SCOTTISH AND IRISH STATE (FOR INSTANCE BY SCOTTISH ENTERPRISE AND ENTERPRISE IRELAND) | Scottish Enterprise, Scottish Development International (SDI)  
Specialist Knowledge Networks: Specialist sectoral interests within global  
Professional Knowledge Networks: Scots in London/ScotsIn: the Scottish Business and People Network ([www.scotsin.com](http://www.scotsin.com))  
Transnational Business Networks: “British-other nationality” business associations, work of Scottish Council for Development and Industry (SCDI) and Scottish Development International (SDI)  
Global Knowledge Networks: Globalscot and The SaltireFoundation | Enterprise Ireland, Industrial Development Agency (IDA) Ireland  
Specialist Knowledge Networks: the Irish Technology Leadership Group, Biolink USA-Ireland, Techlink UK-Ireland  
Transnational Business Networks: “Irish-other nationality” business associations  
Global Knowledge Networks: Asia Pacific Ireland Business Forum, The Ireland Funds. |
|---|---|
| RETURNEES | Fresh Talent Initiative’s Relocation Advisory Service and TalentScotland  
The web portal [www.scotlandistheplace.com](http://www.scotlandistheplace.com)  
Homecoming Scotland 2009 campaign | FAS sponsored international recruitment fairs  
The Emigrant Advice Network (Éan)  
Safe Home  
Crosscare Migrant Project (Emigrant Advice)  
The Department of Environment, Heritage and Local Government - voluntary housing capital assistance scheme |
| AFFINITY DIASPORA | Scottish Networks International (SNI)  
Fresh Talent Initiative including Fresh Talent: Working in Scotland Scheme and the Relocation Advisory Service  
Scotland’s International Development work  
Other diasporas’ organisations in Scotland | IBEC: Irish Business and Employers Confederation and IBEC’s Export Orientation Programme (EOP)  
No equivalent  
Ireland’s International Development work  
Other diasporas’ organisations in Ireland |
8.2 Vulnerable groups
Since 1984 the Irish Government, through the Díon Committee, has provided grants to support the employment of professional workers in the UK to offer advice and practical assistance to disadvantaged members of the Irish community. Since 2003, the Díon Committee has been supplemented by the Irish Abroad Unit in the Department of Foreign Affairs. The Irish Abroad Unit runs the Emigrant Groups Programme under which grants are provided to voluntary organisations that support vulnerable Irish citizens abroad. In 2006 over 220 welfare officers in UK were supported along with a number of capital projects. Other grants support the social, sporting and heritage activities of Irish emigrants (e.g. GAA clubs, Kennedy Library Irish-American collection) and the Emigrants Advice Network (EAN). The Department of the Environment, Local Government and Heritage provides funding to voluntary housing bodies to make up to 25% of accommodation available to elderly returning emigrants who satisfy
eligibility criteria and are on the waiting list of the Safe Home Programme. The Department of Education and Science supports a number of schemes designed to investigate and redress past abuse of Irish children within state agencies who subsequently emigrated, supplies outreach services to such citizens, and until recently provided an educational grant scheme for former residents and their families. The Irish Commission for Prisoners Overseas supports Irish citizens incarcerated abroad. The Aisling Return to Ireland Project provides an annual supported holiday and aftercare for long-term, vulnerable Irish migrants to Britain. We are not aware of any such similar schemes operated by the Scottish government directly, although it maybe the case that some are operated by the UK government on behalf of all UK citizens.

8.3 Business Networks
Scotland and Ireland have both put significant resources in the past few years into building business relationships with their respective diaspora. As noted above, how they have gone about this is recognisably different. Indeed, it is here that differences in the methodologies used to engage the diaspora most depart. In the main, the Scottish approach focuses on fostering high quality relationships between specific individuals and businesses, whereas the Irish approach focuses on developing broad-based social networking and community building. Ireland then has a more plural strategy that aims to foster a number of business networks and to grow a wide base of contacts and expertise. At present, Enterprise Ireland (EI) supports, through in-kind or financial aid, over sixty Irish business networks around the world. Some of these were initially seeded by EI such as Techlink and Biolink and others were started by Irish business people abroad. In the main, networks are owned and run by their members and function as social networking sites, many of whom also organise regular face-to-face meetings. In Scotland, the focus to date has been upon building up one particularly critical network, Globalscot, a widely cited exemplar of an impressive network of global elites. This network, managed by Scottish Enterprise, does not function as a social network but rather as a broker, linking Scottish businesses and specific Globalscot members.

8.4 Business networks play a critical role in the emerging knowledge economy. Diaspora knowledge networks are overseas networks that mobilise the skills, expertise, contacts, knowledge, business acumen, and financial and political resources of diasporans as a collective resource to benefit the local and global diaspora as well as the homeland. It is useful distinguishing four kinds of diaspora knowledge network:

8.5 Specialist Knowledge Networks
These are networks which are sector specific (for instance biotechnology, ICT, law) and which generate dense and specific ties to the homeland to aid the expansion of respective sectors, for instance through providing knowledge,

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30 This classification is based on the on-going research work of Aine O’Neill on elite Irish business networks.
mentoring, expertise and finance (venture capital). In the Irish case examples include the Irish Technology Leadership Group in Silicon Valley (an elite network of Irish corporate leaders who support the Irish ICT sector through the soliciting of Irish business ideas in a Dragon’s Den format31), Biolink (a network of biotechnical professionals spread across the USA), and Techlink UK (a network of Irish scientists based in London looking to commercialise laboratory breakthroughs). Whilst there would appear to be no obvious example of such a network in the Scottish diaspora, GlobalScot does have a variety of sector interests and specialisms

8.6 Professional Knowledge Networks
These are regional and local networks of professional and highly skilled expatriates located in cosmopolitan cities. The focus is upon dual social and business networking and the exchange of contacts, skills, advice and ideas. The nearest Scottish example that we are aware of is the ‘Scots In’ network. This social networking site describes itself as a global Scottish business and people network. Originally based in London, it is now transforming itself into a global network and already has over 5,000 members. As well as online services the network has started to organise face to face events. In the Irish case examples include the Irish Network New York, the Irish Network San Francisco, and the Irish Professional Network of London, each with over 1,000 members.

8.7 Transnational Business Networks
These are networks whose primary purpose is the fostering of economic ties between the destination region and the homeland. Here the diaspora plays the role of a broker of relationships to a particular country. The network resources produced include knowledge of markets, cultural knowledge and access to transnational opportunities. In the Irish case examples include the Irish Hungarian Business Circle, the Norwegian Irish Business Association, and the Irish Business Club of Finland. Whilst Scotland has specific offices in Brussels and other world centres, it also would have access to such networks through British diasporic ties between regions of migration and Britain.

8.8 Global Knowledge Networks
Global knowledge networks are transnational networks linking global regions with the homeland, including trade missions, business forums, philanthropy, mentoring, advice and access to decision makes. In Scotland, the emphasis has been put on establishing an elite business network, GlobalScot as part of a Global Connections Strategy. GlobalScot targets high achieving members of the Scottish Diaspora (almost 50% of the 840 GlobalScot members operate at company Chairman, CEO or President level) who are specially selected and invited to join. In Ireland, examples would include the Asia Pacific Business forum which links 11 Irish business groups in Asia Pacific and the Gulf to

31 The Irish Technology Leadership Group explicitly recognises the Indian and Chinese knowledge transfers from Silicon Valley which as Saxeninan has shown have been of importance to the development of the ICT sector in India and China
facilitate an exchange of ideas and resources and to leverage reputation and connections. In addition, the Ireland Funds is a global philanthropic, but also business and social, network with 23 chapters spread across 10 countries, whilst the Irish Chamber of Commerce USA is a transnational economic network with 13 chapters across the USA.

8.9 Returnees
As noted, Scotland and Ireland both have sizable overseas populations. Both countries are seeking immigrants who have desirable skills and talents. Both have only made marginal efforts to encourage their respective diaspora to return to the home country to live permanently. Through the Scotland.org website, the Fresh Talent Scheme, the work of the Relocation Advisory Agency Scotland, and TalentScotland, Scotland has put in place an infrastructure through which those who want to relocate can secure information and advice. Whilst returnee Scots have been only one of five priority groups for the Fresh Talent Initiative, and whilst to date arguably greatest attention has been given to attracting overseas students, it remains the case that the apparatus is available to all overseas Scots. In addition, the organisation of the Homecoming Scotland 2009 event has resulted in a new prioritisation of the Scottish expatriate community. An important feature of Homecoming 2009 will be the capacity of agencies to translate holiday visits into longer term business, social, and cultural ties, and perhaps then to relocation.

8.10 In the Irish case, proactive programmes were perhaps not needed given that the strength of the Irish economy and the lure of well paid jobs was enough to entice people back. In general, Irish returnees were treated in the same fashion as other desirable skilled migrants. For example, from the mid-1990s, the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment and FAS (the state training agency) organised a series of overseas trade fairs aimed at attracting talent to Ireland. These fairs were mainly aimed at potential overseas immigrants, but also encouraged Irish diaspora to consider returning home. To aid those thinking of returning, the Department of Social and Family Affairs funded a number of organisations that provided advice to returnees. For example, Emigrant Advice provides information through its ‘Returning to Ireland’ service on the statutory services and entitlements available to those ‘coming home’. In addition, the Safe Home Programme was established to help vulnerable Irish abroad to return to live in Ireland and the Aisling Return to Ireland Project helps them visit on short-term holidays.

8.11 Affinity diaspora
Both Scotland and Ireland have attracted significant numbers of immigrants to live in their respective countries. As a result, there are significant sized diaspora of other nation states residing in Scotland and Ireland. These populations are clearly a target for other countries’ diaspora strategies, but they also represent a potential affinity diaspora for Scotland and Ireland. Scotland has sought to develop this relationship through the Fresh Talent Scotland programme and the
Scottish Networks International programme. Fresh Talent Scotland aims to attract skilled migrants to the higher education sector in Scotland and to encourage them to stay afterwards by offering favourable visa conditions that will enable them to work after their course has finished. Scottish Networks International seeks to partner postgraduate students with Scottish companies for work placements. By developing a relationship with the company it is hoped that if and when the student leaves Scotland they will help their partner company and other Scottish companies do business in their home country. In effect they will continue to play for 'Team Scotland' when they leave. Scottish Networks International is currently being restructured but its ethos is a valuable lesson for Ireland. In Ireland there has been little attempt to build an affinity diaspora although some Irish-Other Country business networks based in Ireland perform this function. For example, the Ireland Turkey Business Association (ITBA) builds links between Turkish businesspeople in Ireland and Irish businesses and also helps Irish businesses seeking to do business in Turkey. In this latter sense, the ITBA is playing for 'Team Ireland' overseas. Of course more generally, the international development work both states do in countries such as, among others, Malawi is part of the sowing of goodwill.

8.12 Philanthropy
There is a well developed network of philanthropic enterprises based in Scotland supporting Scottish society but the anecdotal evidence collected in the course of the research suggests that there is relatively little overseas Scottish philanthropy contributing to Scotland. In contrast, Ireland has a very poorly developed indigenous philanthropic set-up, but has successfully cultivated philanthropy in the diaspora. The Ireland Funds, International Fund for Ireland (IFI), and Atlantic Philanthropies (AP) are the prime examples. Over the past thirty years, the Ireland Funds have raised more than €300m to be spent on projects in Ireland, IFI more than €850m and AP more than €500m. It is hoped that with the newly generated wealth in Ireland (there are 33,000 cash millionaires in Ireland [not including the value of their main property]) that indigenous philanthropy will grow rapidly in the next 5 to 30 years. The Ireland Funds are currently going through a period of introspection as the Peace Process in Northern Ireland and the economic success enjoyed by the Republic of Ireland has largely removed some of the rationale for expenditure in Ireland. It is likely that the Ireland Funds will increasingly seek to position itself in terms of a number of global responsibilities and will channel donations to trouble spots and needy regions. It is unclear what Scotland’s strategy for developing overseas philanthropy will be given the recent winding up of the Scotland Funds (mirrored on the Ireland Funds) but there is clearly a potential, untapped reservoir of financial goodwill that needs to be explored.

8.13 Cultural and Social Building
Both countries have cultural policies which pay due cognisance to the value of the diaspora as a generator and audience for Scottish and Irish culture. In Scotland, as observed above, a raft of initiatives is now underway which will
contribute to building a heightened awareness of the country among its diaspora. Homecoming 2009, a year long tourist oriented ‘festival’ and hallmark event, will be the flagship campaign in the near future and the challenge will be to harness the attachments to the country which will be generated during the year so as to secure a lasting legacy. Scotland has perhaps more work to do to re-energise its diaspora which is commonly believed to be less engaged. In contrast, Ireland’s challenge is to ensure that the historical affiliation which the diaspora has had to the country is maintained in a changing set of circumstances. Ireland already has an important set of media connections to the diaspora, not least through the popular weekly e-mail bulletin of the Irish Emigrant online which is sent to over 30,000 addresses. In addition, there is an interesting debate continuing as to how RTE, through its service charter, might cater for the diaspora including the use of a free to air Satellite Channel in the UK.
9. **CONCLUSION: AN AGENDA FOR ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION**

9.1 Diaspora strategies are built around five key pillars: firstly, a clear understanding of who belongs to the diaspora and which groups are being targeted for attention; secondly, a conscious appreciation of how and using what means states might best engage their diasporic populations; thirdly, an awareness of the histories and geographies of diasporas which produce different levels of desire and different competencies to connect with the homeland; fourthly, the social, cultural, economic, and demographic rationales which ought to guide and give purpose to specific kinds of intervention; and lastly, the range of innovative and effective concrete policy interventions available. Any comparative analysis of Scotland and Ireland’s diaspora policies needs to take account of these five foundations. Whilst inevitably simplifying a more nuanced and complex reality, this report has attempted to identify the key similarities and differences which exist between Scotland and Ireland in each case.

9.2 In overall terms both Scotland and Ireland have no clear definition as to who might be part of their diaspora policies but do show a keen interest in widening the concept of diaspora and incorporating a range of overseas populations with an interest in playing for ‘Team Scotland’ and ‘Team Ireland’. Ireland’s approach to its diaspora thereafter takes the form of what might be referred to as a developmental state, lightly incubating initiatives which have emerged organically from an already existing diasporic community. While the Irish state has placed a priority upon the provision of welfare from Ireland to vulnerable diasporic groups and to the preservation of strong social and cultural ties to Ireland, it also increasingly aspires to harness the diaspora to stimulate the country’s faltering knowledge economy. In contrast, the Scottish Government remains embedded within the British state and has a more narrowly defined and structured approach to engaging the Scottish diaspora, which in turns is believed to be less organised and primed. To date the Scottish approach would appear to be motivated by a number of demographic and economic concerns which are assumed to be contributing to an under-performing economy. That said, reigniting the social and cultural attachment of the diaspora to Scotland is now being recognised as an emerging priority. Reflecting these conditions, both Scotland and Ireland undertake a range of concrete policy interventions, but place different emphases upon which interventions to adopt and how to implement them.

9.3 **Key questions for further reflection and debate**

This report has been written as an invitation to debate as to how Scotland might progress towards a diaspora strategy. We have noted that the term ‘strategy’ is best used loosely in this context, to refer to firstly the securing of an overview of the range of actual and potential public, private, and voluntary ties between diasporic groups and Scotland, and secondly to a preferred orientation as to how these ties might best be developed. It need not imply, and may not be best
served by, a coherent and formalised top down, bureaucratically regulated, and managerialist, blueprint. As such, our intention has not been to produce a set of firm recommendations. Nevertheless a number of key questions emerge and by way of conclusion it is worthwhile drawing attention to them.

9.4 Which populations constitute the Scottish diaspora and should be included as part of a targeted diaspora strategy?

For pragmatic and political reasons there is an urgent need to define and delineate the range of constituencies which might constitute the Scottish diaspora. There is merit in widening the definition of diaspora to include as many constituencies who might be prepared to play for 'Team Scotland' as possible. This widening might include expatriates irrespective of the grounds for their departure, later day descendants with a sense of heritage, mobile Scots and business travellers leading a transnational existence, and other nationalities both resident in Scotland and elsewhere with an affinity towards the country.

9.5 What government structures and programmes are best suited to the establishment of new relations with diasporic populations?

The Irish approach to diaspora is relatively successful, particularly with respect to business, because it is light and flexible in structure, gives ownership and freedom to its members, and is developmental without being muscular. The state’s role is to nurture and incubate, not manage and over-determine. The state has also recognized its role in supporting vulnerable Irish abroad and in fostering Irish-mindedness as prerequisite for creating a sustainable relationship with its diaspora. Scotland, in contrast, has pursued a strategy that is more muscular, state-centric and centrally managed. If it is true to say that the Scottish diaspora is less well articulated and organised, then there might be good reason for this. Moreover, the Scottish approach has clearly delivered a number of impressive schemes, in particular the much heralded GlobalScot network. This said, we believe that the Scottish Government might usefully reflect on the position and role of the state in managing diaspora initiatives, conduct research into already existing diaspora networks and consider complimenting existing state run schemes by seeding, serving as midwife and performing a husbandary role for wider social and economic networks amongst the Scottish diaspora. The metrics through which schemes are evaluated and judged to have succeeded or failed should also be considered. Public accountability, transparency, and auditability are crucial for the legitimacy of schemes but diaspora initiatives often require sustained and long term investment before they bear fruits and these fruits are often intangible and unquantifiable but undeniably beneficial. As such public administration of diaspora schemes should consider creating a specific set of measurable deliverables suitable to the task and timeframe at hand.

9.6 How are diaspora organized and how does their underlying structure and logic predispose them to engage in different ways with the home nation?
The Scottish diaspora is almost as expansive and large as the Irish diaspora and is a huge and relatively untapped resource for Scotland. Nevertheless, as a consequence of the historical formation of the diaspora, and in particular the voluntary nature of much of the emigration and speed of assimilation into the new communities, it is widely believed that it is not as well organized or culturally ready to be engaged. Fundamental to the building of a Scottish diaspora strategy must be a renewed interest in fortifying and stimulating Scottish patriotism and Scottish-mindedness in the diaspora. This must come before all other forms of engagement and is a prerequisite for success. The nature of these cultural foundations also needs reflection and certainly has to move beyond stereotypical tropes of clan, tartan, whiskey, bagpipes, Burns and golf to engage with the full diversity of the Scottish diaspora. It is clear that a critical mass of high profile culture building projects are now underway and these will surely make a significant contribution to the building of the diaspora. Nevertheless, a full and open debate is required as to the extent to which Scottish Independence will be required if Scotland is to expect its diaspora to be as lively and vibrant as Ireland or whether the diaspora can be enlivened within the existing constitutional arrangements.

9.7 **What social, economic, and demographic objectives ought to underpin the engagement with diasporic populations?**

Scotland has different social, cultural, and economic needs from Ireland and has a different set of rationales for engaging with its diaspora. Return migration to meet population growth targets, the establishment of global economic networks to broker the globalization of Scottish firms and the localization of TNCs in Scotland, as well as the cultural nurturing of the Scottish diaspora are all key and pressing priorities. In addition, many countries are viewing their diaspora as a primed resource waiting to be exploited for economic gain. We feel that this view will deliver short-term gains but will potentially fail over the long term. People will quickly tire of a relationship that is unidirectional and any scheme has to be structured in such a way that the diaspora gains as much out of the relationship as Scotland. From this perspective, the diaspora becomes a precious resource to be cared for and tended, valued and re-energised, so that Scotland grows in partnership with its diaspora.

9.8 **What concrete policies and interventions are current being introduced and what innovations merit closer scrutiny?**

Scottish policy makers should look in particular at the possibilities of reworking the following Irish schemes into a Scottish diaspora strategy.
Irish Abroad Unit
Emigrant Advice Network
Enterprise Ireland’s approach to building business and social networks
Emigrant News Online
Ireland Funds

9.9 And they should consider building a larger version of Scottish Networks International and help to nurture (though not own and run) ventures such as Scots in London network.

9.10 Ireland should in turn study and draw lessons from:
- Globalscot
- Scottish Network International
- Fresh Talent Initiative which includes Relocation Advisory Service
- Scottish Centre for Diaspora Studies
- Scotland.org Web portal
- Homecoming Scotland 2009 campaign
10 SUMMARY AND NEXT STEPS

10.1 Scotland and Ireland have much to learn from each other with regards to how they conceive and develop their relationship with their respective diasporas. This report has documented the various schemes and policies that operate in both countries and outlined the prospective ways that relationships with diaspora can be usefully forged. Our intention has been to provide an initial starting point for further reflection and dialogue by presenting an empirically-informed platform upon which a more widely conceived diaspora strategy for Scotland can be debated and built. Our view is that any strategy for Scotland should:

- seek to focus on the cultural as well as economic;
- be light in touch and flexible where appropriate rather than heavily structured and over-determined;
- be formulated to work over the long term;
- have an open view of who constitutes the diaspora and the value of an affinity diaspora;
- recognize that the intangible benefits of a strategy will be as important as tangible ones;
- understand that the relationship with the diaspora has to be reciprocal for it to be sustainable.

10.2 The Scottish diaspora represents a huge potential resource for Scotland and Scotland offers the diaspora many benefits, the key to both parties success is to grow that relationship in partnership with each other. In order to progress such a partnership we believe that further steps are required to map out what a re-envisioned Scottish diaspora strategy might look like. These steps are:

1. Research and formulation of potential schemes and ways forward. This report is part of that process, but further research is required including an in-depth study of best practice in countries other than Ireland.

2. Consultation with Scottish diaspora organizations and affinity Scots, Scottish Government units and agencies, and global agencies such as the World Bank and UNESCO who have aided a number of countries formulate their strategies.

3. The formulation of a draft, overarching diaspora strategy that sets out its basic principles, including full details on suggested schemes, their remit and operation.

4. An open debate on the proposed diaspora strategy as a mechanism to refine the path towards creating a fruitful partnership between Scotland, its diaspora and its affinity diaspora.
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Scotland

Government
UK's Department of Foreign Affairs/Foreign and Commonwealth Office: http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/

Scottish Enterprise: http://www.scottish-enterprise.com/

Highlands and Islands Enterprise: http://www.hie.co.uk/

Fresh Talent Initiative: http://www.scotlandistheplace.com/


Scottish Network International: http://www.scottishni.org/

Global Friends of Scotland: http://www.friendsofscotland.gov.uk/

Homecoming Scotland 2009: http://www.homecomingscotland.com/

Event Scotland: http://www.eventscotland.org/

Visit Scotland: http://www.visitscotland.com/

Scottish business and social networking

ScotsIn: http://www.scotsin.com/

US Scots: http://www.usscots.com/

Philanthropy

Scotland Funds: http://www.thescotlandfunds.org.uk/

American-Scottish Foundation: http://www.americanscottishfoundation.com

Ireland

Government

Department of Foreign Affairs: http://www.dfa.ie

Irish Abroad Unit: http://www.dfa.ie/home/index.aspx?id=291

Enterprise Ireland: http://www.enterprise-ireland.com/

Department of Social and Family Affairs: http://www.welfare.ie/
Department of Education and Science: http://www.education.ie/
Department of Environment, Heritage and Local Government: http://www.environ.ie/
Culture Ireland: http://www.cultureireland.gov.ie/
Tourism Ireland: http://www.tourismireland.com/

Voluntary-sector support for Irish overseas
Irish Council for Prisoners Overseas: http://www.catholicbishops.ie/prisoners-overseas
Crosscare Migrant Project: http://www.migrantproject.ie/

Irish returning home
Emigrant Advice Network: http://www.ean.ie/
Emigrant Advice: http://www.migrantproject.ie/publications.htm
Citizens Advice concerning returning to Ireland
IrishAbroad.com returning home advice
http://www.irishabroad.com/Irish-World/Expats/Moving-to-Ireland/
Safe Home Programme: http://www.safehomeireland.com/links.htm
Aisling Return To Ireland Project: http://www.aisling.org.uk/drupal/index.php

Irish business and social networking
Irish Technology Leadership Group – Silicon Valley: http://www.itlg.org/
Biolink USA-Ireland: http://www.biolinkusaireland.org/
Techlink UK-Ireland:
IBEC – Irish Business and Employers Confederation: http://www.ibec.ie
**News services for Irish Abroad**
The Irish Emigrant: http://www.emigrant.ie/

Irish Voice: http://www.irishvoice.com/

RTÉ: http://www.rte.ie/

**Immigration services**
The Irish Lobby for Immigration Reform (ILIR): http://www.irishlobbyusa.org/

Irish Immigration Centre: http://www.iicenter.org/index.html

**Philanthropy**
Ireland Funds: http://www.irfunds.org/

International Fund for Ireland: http://www.internationalfundforireland.com/

Atlantic Philanthropies: http://atlanticphilanthropies.org/
APPENDIX 1: PEOPLE INTERVIEWED AS PART OF THE RESEARCH

Scotland
Irene Johnstone, Director, Scottish Enterprise and International Networks
Ben Guthrie, British Council Coordinator, Scottish Networks International
Dick Mungin, Former Chief Executive Officer, Scotland funds
Ruth Steel, Global Friends of Scotland
Ian Kernohan, Scottish Government
Joanne Deponio, Homecoming Scotland, Event Scotland
Denise Hill, Director, Visit Scotland
Luke Cavanagh, Scottish Government, Analytical Services

Ireland
Kingley Aikens, Chairperson, Ireland Funds
Ray Bassett, Assistant Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs
Noreen Bowden, Director, Emigrant Advice Network
Jim Carroll, Irish Abroad Unit, Department of Foreign Affairs
Goan Cathal, Director-General, RTE
Liam Ferrie, Emigrant News
Conor Fahy, Regional Director, Southern Europe, Middle East and Africa, Enterprise Ireland
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