From Response to Responsibility: 
A Study of the Other and Language in the Ethical Structure of Responsibility in the Writings of Bonhoeffer and Levinas

by

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The problem of responsibility is a topic that has been extensively investigated from the pre-Socratic period until nowadays. The concept of responsibility is also a developing and dynamic concept that reflects our understanding of history, our interaction with other persons in a society, and our response to living situations. The questioning of the ethical significance of responsibility was paradoxically raised in the 1940s, after World War II. Since that time, not only has the problem of responsibility but also the significance of morality been radically questioned, especially within the fields of philosophy and theology.

This study aims at re-thinking and arguing for the ethical structure of responsibility, in light of Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s and Emmanuel Levinas’s thoughts. Chapter one presents the origin of the problem of responsibility, the development of different theories of responsibility, the historical background of Bonhoeffer and Levinas and the reason why we need to rethink this concept regarding these two thinker’s thoughts. Chapter two then presents Bonhoeffer’s question ‘what is man?’ by discussing his consideration on the issue of language in his ‘non-religious interpretation of Christianity’ and on the issue of Christ as the Other in his Christological articulations. Chapter three further analyses Heidegger as an essential link between Bonhoeffer’s and Levinas’s thoughts. Chapter four turns to the investigation of Levinas’s question ‘who is the other?’ as an answer for Bonhoeffer’s question, by discussing his consideration on the issue of language in the form of response and on the issue of the Other as an incarnate subject. Chapter five provides a systematic analysis of the ethical structure of responsibility with regard to ‘the Other’ and ‘language’ as two indispensable elements. In this chapter, too, we apply this structure to a discussion of some central issues in religion, pluralism and Western-Chinese communication.

Much attention has been paid to the phenomenological background of Levinas’s ethical elaboration of the concept of ‘the Other’ and the diachronical analysis of ‘the Saying’ and ‘the Said’. Much has also been written so as to interpret Bonhoeffer’s ethical consideration of his Christology as well as his statement of
‘non-religious interpretation of Christianity’ with regard to the role of ‘language’. Little, however, has been said about the inspired relationship between these three elements: ‘the Other’, ‘language’ and ‘ethical concern’, especially in relation to the concept of responsibility advanced by these two thinkers. This is the essential reason for writing this study, and we argue that these three elements constitute the ethical structure of responsibility. Along with our analyses of and discussions on the similarities, the differences and the relationships between Bonhoeffer’s thought and Levinas’s thought, these three elements will be further interpreted, discussed and constructed into a stable and comprehensive ethical-structure. Each element is an indispensable angle of an ethical triangle, which is fundamental and necessary for considering a responsible human relationship.

The concept of language in this study, therefore, is not treated as an instrument for communication, but will be shown to be the expression of the invisible order in the ethical relationship. The concept of ‘the Other’ is not treated as a stranger, an alien, or a reciprocal partner in social relationship, but will be shown to be the trace of the tension between the responsibility and the freedom of subjectivity. The concept of ‘responsibility’ is not treated as a legal or accountable term that is used in the court, commercial contracts and even social convention, but will be shown to be an appropriate disproportion or asymmetry of the moral consciousness between the unique subjectivity of the Other and the self.

In this study, we also deliberately discuss the intellectual influence of Karl Barth on Bonhoeffer and analyse the concept of ‘the Other’ with regard to the influences of Martin Buber’s ‘I-Thou’ relationship on Levinas. Furthermore, we also articulate the concept of ‘being’ and ‘language’ in Martin Heidegger’s Dasein analysis in order to stress the deficiency of ethical concern in Heidegger’s existential-hermeneutical approach, which is criticized both indirectly and directly by Bonhoeffer and Levinas. All of these examinations provide not only the substantial backgrounds for our discussion but also the essential connection of central issues in this study.

In sum, therefore, these three elements: ‘the Other’, ‘language’ and ‘responsibility, all link closely together as a circle of a systematic interpretation. The
distance lies between the self and the other, the ethical order embeds in the expression of the language, and the difficulty implied in the fulfilment of responsibility reveal the paradoxically existential situation of human relationship. Thus we conclude that: to be responsible is to take the responsibility for the responsibility of the Other; to speak responsibly is to hear and answer the language for the language of the Other.

Finally, I would like to thank Prof. Xian (Thomas) Zhang, Institute of Sino-Christian Studies (ISCS) and Tommy Murphy, for their recommendation, without which I would not have this chance to study in Ireland and thank the four years support that I received from the John & Pat Hume Scholarship, which enabled me to carry out my doctoral study and research at the National University of Ireland, Maynooth. I would also like to thank Prof. Thomas Kelly, without whose acceptance of my application I would not have started my study in Maynooth. I would also like to thank Dr Michael Dunne, for his guidance and encouragement to continue with and complete this thesis. I would also like to thank Prof. Stephen Williams, who continuously encourages me on the study of Bonhoeffer’s thoughts. I would like to thank Marian O’Donnell for her support with the ‘Tutor’s Scholarship’, as well as her inspiration on artistic reflection on the problem of the other and the approach of dialogue and understanding. With the help of the Department of Philosophy at NUI Maynooth, especially Ms Ann Gleeson’s generous help, I could balance the time between teaching, researching and writing. I would also like to thank all of those who helped me on my life and in my study during these four years. Last, in particular, I would thank my parents, for their patience and understanding throughout this time — they have been a great support to me from the beginning and to the completion of this project.
# Abbreviations

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<td><em>Act and Being</em></td>
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<td>Martin Heidegger</td>
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<td>CF</td>
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<td>OB</td>
<td>Emmanuel Levinas</td>
<td><em>Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence</em></td>
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<td>OEL</td>
<td>Martin Heidegger</td>
<td><em>On the Essence of Language</em></td>
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<td>OWL</td>
<td>Martin Heidegger</td>
<td><em>On the Way to Language</em></td>
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<td>PRL</td>
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<td>WGWM</td>
<td>Karl Barth</td>
<td><em>The Word of God and the Word of Man</em></td>
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INTRODUCTION

It is generally agreed that one of the most important and most disputed concepts in
the twentieth century is the concept of freedom, but in the writings of both Dietrich
Bonhoeffer (1906–1945) and Emmanuel Levinas (1906–1995) we find an argument
that reflection on what freedom is or may mean, without reflection on our
responsibility to the other, cannot lead to an ethical concept of responsibility. Both of
these thinkers, of course, are inspired by religious writers and religious thinkers and
by their own particular religious faith backgrounds, but Bonhoeffer’s concept of a
‘non-religious conception of religion’ and Levinas’s concept of responsibility for
‘the Other’ are concepts that are thought and defended philosophically by their
authors on their own bases.¹ Their accounts are also highly controversial because
they call into question any ethical theory of responsibility that is grounded
exclusively in possibilities characteristic of freedom of the individual self, however
limited that freedom is as a ‘being-for-death (sein-zum-Tode)’, as famously
recognized and most forcibly argued by Martin Heidegger in his unfinished essay,
Being and Time (1927).²

Not all philosophers have given attention to the concept of responsibility in
their thinking, but this can be true of any major concept in philosophy. Some
philosophers, however, have, and this study looks at in particular the emergence of
an ethical concept of responsibility in the writings Bonhoeffer and Levinas in the
twentieth century. Both Bonhoeffer and Levinas were born in the same year and they
shared the same historical-political background that led to the untimely death and
execution by the Nazis of Bonhoeffer and to the tragic death of several members of
Levinas’s immediate family and friends. Yet their reflections span more than the
times upon which they reflected, and that is why they are as important today as they
were during their respective life-times.

¹ See, Ebeling, Gerhard, Word and Faith, trans. by James W. Leitch (Philadelphia: Fortress Press,
1963) and Theodore De Boer, The Rationality of Transcendence: Studies in the Philosophy of
Emmanuel Levinas (Amsterdam: J. C. Gieben, 1997).
² Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York:
Harper & Row, 1962); Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1927, 1957); also published in separate
printing in Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, ed. by Edmund Husserl,
Vol. 8 (1927) 1–438. (Henceforth: abbreviated in notes as BT.)
This study is divided into five chapters. In chapter one we note that part of the problem with the concept of responsibility is that it can mean several things in several different contexts. This needs to be clarified first. So, the first chapter of our study outlines the etymological origin of the term and reviews early pre-Socratic and Aristotelian accounts of responsibility. Furthermore, chapter one also discusses some of the main features of contemporary theories of responsibility that are relevant to their evaluation. In light of all of these examinations, we will point out the necessity to re-think the concept of responsibility according to Bonhoeffer’s and Levinas’s thoughts.

Chapter two analyses Bonhoeffer’s thoughts which relate to responsibility by means of the analysis of two essential elements, namely, the other and language. Bonhoeffer was influenced by Karl Barth’s work on dialogue and on the relationship between the ‘I’ and ‘Thou’. The first section of this chapter, therefore, discusses Barth’s distinction between the ‘Wholly Other (Totaliter aliter)’ and Man, and his account of the relation between ‘the Word of God’ and ‘the word of Man’. By clarifying Barth’s thoughts of the relationship between the Wholly Other, his embedded Kenotic Christology, and his articulation of the human Kerygmatic response, we will shed light on Barth’s influence on Bonhoeffer’s thoughts concerning his concept of a ‘non-religious’ interpretation of religion and ethics. In the second section, I will discuss Bonhoeffer’s thoughts on the connection between

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3 The Oxford English Dictionary gives two definitions for ‘responsibility’ and six meanings for ‘responsible’. Responsibility is defined, firstly, as: the state or fact of being responsible, i.e., of the thing done or to be done; and, secondly, as: a charge, trust, or duty, for which one is responsible, i.e., a person for whom one is responsible. As for the meaning of responsible, it gives: (i) correspondent or answering to something; (ii) capable of being answered; (iii) answerable, accountable (to another for something), liable to be called to account; and, morally accountable for one’s actions; capable of rational conduct. (iv) answerable to a charge. (v) capable of fulfilling an obligation or trust, and of respectable appearance; (vi) involving responsibility or obligation, and an actor who undertakes to play any part which may be temporarily required. The Oxford English Dictionary, Being A Corrected Re-issue with an Introduction, Supplement, and Bibliography of a New English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Vol. VIII Poy-Ry, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), p. 542. Thus the term can span from meaning the cause of something happening, such as, for instance, a fire heating and thus cooking a dinner in a pot, to human purposeful agency, the cook cooks the dinner in the pot, to legal responsibility in a court of law, but not all legal obligations are moral obligations, and so, responsibility can also refer to the moral concept of responsibility (for whom is the food to be given, is it to be distributed to those in need, and/or is the food poisoned and the foil for an assassination attempt), and so forth. It is the ethical concept of responsibility with which our study is concerned.

4 See, Karl Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man, trans. by Douglas Horton (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957); Das Wort Gottes und die Theologie (1924). (Henceforth: abbreviated as WGWM.) Barth and Bonhoeffer’s work is also inspired by Martin Buber’s work, especially his I and Thou, trans. by Walter Kaufman (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clarke, 1970); Ich und Du (Berlin: Shocken, 1923).
Christ and man, and his development of a socio-theological oriented ethics. By delineating Bonhoeffer’s existential interpretation of Christology and his non-religious interpretation, we will formulate the structure of responsibility in terms of his Christological analyses. Bonhoeffer’s Christological analyses include the ‘I’ and ‘You’ relationship both in the church as a responsible community and in his deliberation on the role of language in his analyses of ethics.

Central to both Bonhoeffer and Levinas’s account of ethical thinking is their rejection of Heidegger’s influential account of the self as a being-in-the-world that is responsible primarily for that being’s own self in ‘the call of conscience (der Ruf des Gewissens)’ to ‘proper (eigentlich) selfhood’. In Chapter three, we will discuss both the indirect and the direct influence which Heidegger’s thought exercised on Bonhoeffer’s and Levinas’s thought in order to draw attention to the problem, which Levinas identifies, of the ‘indifference’ of Heidegger’s ethical thought, which was also criticized by Bonhoeffer. Though a separate treatment and detailed presentation of Heidegger’s philosophy will not be given, our discussion of Heidegger’s philosophy is both an essential and a pivotal link between Bonhoeffer and Levinas. We will examine Bonhoeffer’s and Levinas’s thoughts respectively which relate to Heidegger’s standpoint by means of the analysis of Heidegger’s reasoning on ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ and ethics, especially from the perspective of Heidegger’s Dasein analysis and his exploration of language. The discussion of Being and ethics in Heidegger’s ‘Being-question’ (Die Seinsfrage), however, is derived from an implicit egocentricity and his discussion of Dasein and language will lead to our analyses of the inter-connection between the Other, language, and ethical problems, which we will argue are three central elements of the structure of an ethical concept of responsibility.

5 See, BT, Division Two, Section Two: ‘Dasein's Attention of An Authentic Potentiality-for-being, and Resoluteness’, §§ 56–60, which are on the problem of conscience as the call of care. On the one hand, Bonhoeffer criticized the epistemological endeavour of an autonomous understanding of Dasein by philosophy understood as ontology in his Act and Being: Transcendental Philosophy and Ontology in Systematic Theology, trans. by Martin Rumscheidt (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996), p.33, pp.60–81. (Henceforth: abbreviated as AB). On the other hand, the style employed by Bonhoeffer in this habilitation thesis is, it seems similar to Heidegger’s. Cf. 1) Bonhoeffer’s thought of this-worldliness and Heidegger’s ‘being-in-the-world’, and 2) his reflections on Bultmann’s methods that were influenced essentially by Heidegger’s existential phenomenology.

6 See, Emmanuel Levinas, The Levinas Reader: Emmanuel Levinas, ed. by Seán Hand (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), p. 180. Levinas argues against Heidegger’s indifference in his statement: ‘My responsibility for the other is precisely the non-indifference of this difference — the proximity of the other.’ In Chapter IV, we discuss this point further.
In chapter four, we present Levinas’s ‘responsible response’ to the ‘Other’ as an answer to the question of Bonhoeffer’s non-religious interpretation and the extension to Bonhoeffer’s unfinished attempt at thinking the structure of responsible life. The first section will focus on the relationship between the Other and the exteriority as ‘face’. This section deals with the problem ‘how the Other becomes the Other’ by clarifying the concept of ‘separation’ in Levinas and the ethical significance of ‘face’ in the case of the ‘incarnate subject’. After we define the concept of ‘face’ in the ethical relationship, especially in Levinas’s notion of responsibility, the second section will concentrate on the relationship between face and language. This section argues that the ‘face’ is the beginning of language via a structural explanation of language by distinguishing it from causal and instrumental views of language. Based on this presupposition, we intend to explore the ethical significance of language within the diachronical context of time. This will lead our discussion to Levinas’s concepts of ‘the Saying’ and ‘the Said’ and how this pair of concepts is entailed by ‘proximity’ and ‘substitution’ in a responsible relationship. In the end, we will conclude that, though man’s response is finite, the responsible significance of this response is infinite. It is the response to the Other via language that manifests the significance of responsibility. Responsibility, in this new sense, provides a possible approach for explaining Bonhoeffer’s idea of non-religious interpretation of Christianity and his exploration about the structure of responsible life.

In chapter five, we will further analyze, systematically, the role of depth of the Other and language in the ethical structure of responsibility. Firstly, we will examine another possible approach to detect the ethical significance of responsibility

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7 Thus language, in our study, is not regarded as an instrument that can be picked up and put down by ourselves; rather, we belong, in a sense, to language far more than it belongs to us, and through this we can find the place and meaning of human being in a particular time and society. Therefore, how language speaks and hears in a dialogical way, especially in communication with the Other/other, in both a theological and a philosophical sense, is a central concern in this study. Moreover, we shall argue that the role of language in the Other/other and responsibility is dialectical: that is to say, to explore the nature of language is to point to the subjects who exist in this language, and language is an unavoidable and fundamental perspective to explore the relationship between these subjects in various forms of dialogues. Only by means of dialogue can we fix both the centre and the boundary between the speaker and hearer. This view of language guides our reflections on the structure of responsibility that is discussed in this study, and that is based on Bonhoeffer’s and Levinas’s relevant thoughts.

from Alfred Schutz’s (1899–1959) phenomenology of sociology. After we discuss the merit and demerit of Schutz’s approach, and identify ‘the Other’ and ‘language’ as indispensable elements in any ethical analyses of responsibility, we will apply this structure to explore two important problems. The first one is to analyze the concept of ‘religion’ in the ethical structure of responsibility; the second one is to analyze the concept of ‘responsibility’ in Western and Chinese perspective. As for the first aspect, to re-consider the nature of ‘religion’ in an era when God does not play the same role as before and human being’s response to this change corresponds to Bonhoeffer’s reflection on the relationship between religion and faith. It also serves to develop further what he means by a ‘non-religious interpretation of Christianity’ which is also significant for researching the location of the ethical significance of responsibility in the reconsideration of religion. As for the second aspect, the ethical significance of responsibility for the other is regarded as a fundamental and universal value that can be understood and communicated in any background. This is why it is important to compare western and eastern philosophic approaches to ‘the other’ and the concept of ‘responsibility’ and ‘language’. This will demonstrate that though the value is basically comprehended, the approaches or the forms of its manifestation can never be the same and will never be the same. Responsibility to the other (à l’autre) and in front of the other (devant l’autre) and for the other (pour l’autre) preserves the otherness of the Other (l’Autrui). Therefore, in the last section of this chapter, we will tentatively and briefly show the similarities and differences between the Western and Chinese perspectives on responsibility in order to detect the genuine approach to treat each other differently and responsibly.

9 Alfred Schutz: Austrian social scientist. He integrates sociological and phenomenological tradition to explore human relationship with a method of social phenomenology. His thought was influenced by Max Weber, Henri Bergson, William James, as well as Edmund Husserl. See, Ch. V, § 1.
CHAPTER I

THE CONCEPT OF RESPONSIBILITY AND ITS CENTRALITY IN ETHICS

Although the word ‘responsibility’ is a relatively new invention in the English language,\(^1\) the concept of responsibility has been discussed throughout the history of Western philosophy and down through the ages in various ways and in different contexts. For instance, it has been used in the context of the explanation of natural phenomena, or as an evaluation of a character’s blameable behaviour, or as a legal concept in the proceedings of a court of law. In the twentieth century, however, this concept takes on a particular ethical significance both in the philosophy of Levinas and in the religious thinking of Bonhoeffer. The emergence of this concept is the focus of this chapter. The chapter begins, first, with a brief consideration of the etymological origin of the word and then examines the development of some of the main theories of responsibility and meanings attributed to this concept in philosophy up to and including its emergence as a central ethical concept in the writings of Levinas and Bonhoeffer.

SECTION ONE
THE ETYMOLOGY OF THE TERM ‘RESPONSIBILITY’

‘Responsibility’, in English, is an extended noun, relating to ‘response’ and ‘respond’ (both from c. 1300). ‘Response’ is Middle English and derives from Old French respons or Latin responsum, a neuter past participle of respondere, meaning ‘something offered in return’. ‘Respond’ is late Middle English from Old French, from respondre ‘to answer’, which derives also from Latin respondere, from re- ‘again’ and spondere, ‘to pledge’. This meaning of responsibility can also be found in the German Verantwortung, which emphasizes the meaning of answering

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\(^1\) The *Oxford English Dictionary* notes that the formation of the words ‘responsible’ and ‘responsibility’ in the English language dates from c. 1558–9 and c. 1787, respectively.
‘Responsibility’, therefore, is a word that is quite new in origins and arrives in Western ethics rather late. It first appeared in German, then in English, and eventually in French in the seventeenth century. Regarding the philosophical use of this term, Albert Jonsen remarks,

The word has its philosophical debut in David Hume’s *Treatise of Human Nature* (1740): ‘actions may be blameable […] but the person not responsible for them.’ It is from the beginning used in political literature, as exemplified in Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist Papers (1787): ‘Responsibility in order to be reasonable must be limited to objects within the power of the responsible body.’

Here, responsibility points to the responsibility of the state and what is within the limits of the state to regulate (actions by the state, in this case, may be considered blameable as the state is responsible but the individual person may not be held blameable because that individual is not responsible for them). Thus, what we could regard as personal responsibility is not covered or features in this meaning of ‘socio-political responsibility’.

J. R. Lucas notes that the Homeric heroes had little use of this socio-political concept ‘responsibility’, focusing instead their moral vocabulary on merit and kudos. Bernard Williams, nevertheless, provides sources for us to trace the meaning of this word ‘responsibility’ back to some passages of early Greek texts. We can find various aspects about responsibility in Homeric epics, such as for instance, responsibility as accepting; responsibility and cause; the elements of

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3 It appeared in English in the late eighteenth century. See, *supra*, n. 1.
6 Bernard Williams, *Shame and Necessity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 53. As Williams further points out: ‘(W)hen Telemachus was to blame, one thing involved in this was that it might be his business to make up for it. But when Agamemnon says, unlike Telemachus, that he was not *aitios*, he does not mean that it is not his business to make up for it. On the contrary: “But since I was deluded and Zeus took my wits away from me, I am willing to make all good and give back gifts in abundance. However his actions came about, he must compensate Achilles. In that sense, he does accept responsibility. […] It is in virtue of what he did that he must pay.”’ *ibid.*, p. 187.
responsibility; the relationship and intention, moral responsibility, responsibility as self-ascripted, and skepticism about responsibility. A. W. H. Adkins makes the point that the Greeks lacked indeed a concept of responsibility because their ethics does not centre on the idea of duty; however, the Greek texts still supply a useful background for us to re-consider the meaning of the concept of responsibility.

7 Williams, pp. 56–58: ‘The first of these elements, cause, is primary: the other issues can arise only in relation to the fact that some agent is the cause of what has come about. Without this, there is no concept of responsibility at all’ (p. 56). Therefore, ‘the aim is that the response should be applied to a person whose action was the cause of the harm.’ (ibid.). In this manner, then, ‘(T)he link between cause and response was for the Greeks built into their language. The verb aitiaomai means “to blame” or “censure.”’ (p. 57) ‘The word aition is, from the Hippocratic writings on, a standard word for “cause”, and its relative aitia kept connections with both kinds of sense: it meant a complaint or an accusation, but already by the time of Herodotus’s book it can mean simply “cause” or “explanation.”’. ‘This primary link to the idea of a cause may help us to understand some Greek views of responsibility that we find more problematical’ (p. 58).
8 William, p. 55: ‘Just from these two Homeric incidents, then, we have four ideas: that in virtue of what he did, someone has brought about a bad state of affairs; that he did or did not intend that state of affairs; that he was or was not in a normal state of mind when he brought it about; and that it is his business, if anyone’s, to make up for it. We might label these four elements cause, intention, state, and response. These are the basic elements of any conception of responsibility.’
9 Williams, pp. 63–66: ‘Critics have suggested that the whole discussion in the Tetralogies rests on a primitive conception of responsibility, essentially connected with magical notions and basically different from our own conception. But while we would not demand a “whole person” response in such a case, it is not true that the conceptions of responsibility being deployed here are all that different from some of our own’ (p. 63). ‘The fundamental point is that insofar as we do deal differently with criminal responsibility under the law, this is because we have a different view, not of responsibility in general, but of the role of the state in ascribing responsibility, in demanding a response for certain acts and certain harms.’ [...] ‘We have conceptions of legal responsibility different from any such conception the Greek had, but that is because we have a different concept of law – not, basically, a different concept of responsibility’ (p.65).
10 William, pp. 56, 64–67, 95: ‘All conceptions of responsibility make some discriminations, as Telemachus did, between what is voluntary in this sense and what is not; at the same time, no conception of responsibility confines response entirely to the voluntary’ (p. 66). ‘Very importantly, they include some purpose of justice. But these purposes can be identified only by working back to what we require of the law and other agencies that ascribe responsibility, from more general considerations about the relations of the individual to social power.’ (ibid.).
11 Williams, pp. 68–71: ‘so far we have been concerned with responses that are demanded by some people, or by a legal system, of other people. But there is another aspect to responsibility, which comes out if we start on the question not from the response that the public or the state or the neighbours or the damaged parties demand of the agent, but from what the agent demands of himself.’ (p. 68).
12 William, pp. 56, 67: ‘If we push beyond a certain point questions of what outcome, exactly, was intended, whether a state of mind was normal or whether the agent could at a certain moment have controlled himself, we sink into the sands of an everyday, entirely justified, skepticism.’ (p. 67).
13 See, Adkins, Merit and Responsibility.
SECTION TWO
THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHERS ON RESPONSIBILITY

We can find relevant discussions about responsibility from pre-Socratic philosophers, other than from the Homeric epics. Ethical speculations have been carried out by the Sophists and by Democritus, although Aristotle holds that it was Socrates who was the first to really invent moral philosophy.14 Barnes notes that ‘responsible’ in Greek is αἰτιός (aitios), means,

to be anointed with the same oil and sometimes in saying of someone that he is responsible for a certain state of affairs, we mean to hand out blame: calling someone responsible is calling him guilty. ‘Aitia’, according to Liddell and Scott, means ‘responsibility, mostly in the bad sense, guilt, blame, or the imputation thereof, i.e., accusation’.15

‘Responsible’ in this context may indicate the imputation of agency and the causation. For this reason, ‘responsible’ has both a causal and an evaluative use. These two aspects can be considered respectively, but they can also be examined inter-connectedly. Gorgias’s Helen, for example, is a proper case for us to understand how he judges the causation and think about this evaluation,16 even though it is still a matter of controversy to decide whether the discussion of this case is an intellectual contribution to moral philosophy or just a rhetorical exercise. Gorgias classifies his argument into four sources of actions:17 If I X, then (1) either my X-ing was accidental in which case it falls under ‘divine necessity’; or (2) my X-ing was forced upon me; or (3) my X-ing was the result of thought, in which case I was ‘persuaded by argument’, my own or someone else’s; or, (4) finally, I X-ed impetuously, driven on by my feelings.

For Gorgias, these four aspects can be used to explain various situations that are relevant to actions of ‘responsibility’. The first two can be considered together because both of them relate to ‘chance’. This, indeed, is one of the most important

15 Ibid., p. 415. Cf. The term ‘Christ’ is the English term for the Greek Χριστός (Christós) meaning “the anointed”, which as a translation of the Hebrew מashiach (Mašiah), carries much of its original Jewish meaning of “Messiah”—“one [who is] anointed” or appointed by God with a unique and special purpose (mission) on Earth.
16 Barnes, pp. 415–416.
17 Ibid., p. 416.
aspects that might remove the agent’s responsibility in legal debate. The reason for this is that causal responsibility can include what happens by chance, even though moral responsibility might not. This, in turn, is related to an important concept in Aristotle’s theory of responsibility: force (*bia*). If I am forced to do something, then I am not responsible for doing this. This is an ambiguous argument because whether an action is forced or not will ultimately be connected to the problem of choosing to act (or refraining from choosing act which itself is a choice). To depend, nevertheless, on the imputation of this choice alone cannot indicate a fair judgment on whether I need to be also responsible or not. Yet it plays an important role regarding the evaluation of the responsibility. We will evaluate the fourth one, which is about the problem of emotion and leave the third one as Barnes does, presently, because the third one is the most interesting one. In the fourth case, people do X under emotions like fear, love, hatred and so on, and then will not be responsible for what they did. As Barnes argues, the third one, however, is the most interesting one because it is about ‘the *Logos*, the rhetorical sophist’s engine and delight’. In the case of Helen, *Logos* is comparable to force (*bia*), which can be treated as a persuasion. Gorgias means people are not responsible for their acts, if he or she was persuaded by the others to do X. Barnes concludes, then, that Gorgias fails to defend this argument from the other aspects – of chance, force and emotion – because if we treat logos as a cause, then we can find other causes to be responsible for the previous cause. This will be an endless circle of explanation.

From the above brief review of Gorgia’s case of Helen, we can see Gorgia’s rhetoric skills cannot defend his position. His argument, however, opens up the door for later philosophers to consider the problem of responsibility, focusing especially on the problem of determinism, force and freedom.

**SECTION THREE**

**ARISTOTLE’S ACCOUNT OF RESPONSIBILITY**

Lucas remarks that ‘Aristotle was the first to discuss responsibility, and much of our understanding derives from him.’ The first sentence of Aristotle's *Nicomachean*
Ethics concerns the nature of the human good or human happiness *eudaimonia*.\(^{20}\) For Aristotle, what characterizes a human being is that being’s capacity for ‘discourse’ (*logos*) or that being’s ability to exercise ‘reason’ (*zoon echon logos*). In this regard, human beings by comparison to other living beings (animals and plants), are to be identified with their *logos* and this is what makes human beings what they are for Aristotle. Human function, therefore, is the characteristic activity of that living being’s soul in accord with reason. And reason is the source of the virtue (ἂρετή; *Aretē*). Correspondingly, that which makes an action right is its being virtuous. Moreover, Aristotle also uses the word ‘reason’ in his account of the determination of the mean and the power of knowledge. Therefore, we can say, human good is achieved when the human function is performed well, and this human function is performed well by being performed in accord with virtue. From this it follows, for Aristotle, that *eudaimonia* is the activity of the soul in accord with virtue, which is partially constituted by virtuous acts themselves.

Goods, Aristotle thinks, can be classified into three groups: external goods, goods of the soul, and goods of the body. Only goods of the soul are the ones that are most strict and special.\(^{21}\) To look for human good and happiness, we have to consider human virtue. Human virtue, however, refers to the good of the soul, not to the good of the body because happiness is an activity of the soul.\(^{22}\) Furthermore, the soul also can be seen as bipartite, with a rational and a non-rational part. And ‘the rational part is the source of the intellectual virtues, the most important of which in connection with ethics is practical wisdom.’\(^{23}\) The rational part constitutes the virtue of thoughts including wisdom, comprehension and prudence. The non-rational part is concerned with nutrition and so on, which is shared in reason, but not part of human virtue.

After we examine the relation between good and virtue, it is necessary to examine the preconditions of virtue in a deeper sense. This is related to the

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\(^{20}\) ‘Every skill and every inquiry, and similarly every action and rational choice, is thought to aim at some good; and so the good has been aptly described as that at which everything aims.’ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, translated and edited by Roger Crisp (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 3.


\(^{22}\) Ibid., p. 20.

\(^{23}\) Ibid., p. xiv.
discussion of action, which is a tendency in contemporary ethics. Ancient writers, however, discuss ‘right’ action more in terms of a human being’s life as a whole because actions will lead one to develop the corresponding character. Right action is what the virtuous person would do in any circumstance. Thus the values that one subscribes to play a central role in the formation of one’s own character which, in turn, determines the way one behaves or acts in particular circumstances. All of this — the interconnectedness of the way values form character and formed-character determines conduct — is ‘ethos’ for Aristotle and the ancient Greeks. And Aristotle’s doctrine of virtue as the mean between two excesses works especially well when we have a morally neutral action or feeling at the right time to get the largest amount of well-being, but to avoid an extreme situation. It is in this context that Aristotle recognizes virtuous actions as praise-worthy and vicious actions as blame-worthy, when they are voluntary. This leads Aristotle to reflect on free will and the issue of reward and punishment in relation to actions undertaken.

In his examination of reward and punishment, Aristotle begins by distinguishing two conditions of actions, those that arise from ignorance (di’agnoian) and from force (bia), which generates his philosophical and legal accounts of responsibility. In this context, Aristotle further distinguishes the voluntary (ékouσion) act that the agent who knows the particulars from decision, or not, from decision (i.e. culpable ignorance), and the involuntary (ékouσion) act that the agent contributes nothing from ignorance or not from ignorance, as well a third category: the non-voluntary, which is related to whether it is regretted, or not. These further refinements bring forward the internal views and external views of humans. The internal view, for Aristotle, signifies what is ‘known to us’ and decides our daily lives and responses to each other as persons in practical actions. By contrast, the external view signifies what is ‘known without qualification’ and what is judged to be true through science and through the construction of a systematic ordering of perception of the world in theoretical observation. The former constructs Aristotle’s thoughts of responsibility, that is, his is ‘an account of the causal conditions in which an agent merits praise and blame for what he or she does.’ There are two tasks for

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24 Ibid., III.I, 1110a-b.
Aristotle’s theory of moral responsibility. The first is to ‘identify the features that properly subject an agent to these demands, expectations, and evaluations.’26 The second, is ‘to identify the circumstances in which a morally responsible agent is morally responsible for some particular action.’27 As Lucas remarks,

Responsibility is not just a physical concept subject to the standard physical constraints of locality and temporal antecedence, but is, rather, concerned with the significance of actions and their interpretation, where is perfectly possible for the meaning to be altered *ex post facto.*28

Therefore, Aristotle would allow or even encourage us to interpret and develop his theories of responsibility. The theory of responsibility can be interpreted along the lines of Aristotle’s theory of the ‘four causes’ because many Aristotle scholars regard that the thought of ‘four causes’ is a theory of explanation.29 As a theory of explanation, it would be useful to explain his own theory of responsibility in these terms; this will be especially relevant for us to comprehend the ‘substance’ of his account from this point of view rather than the more modern aspect of ‘cause-and-effect’ emphasized in some theories of responsibility. Again, this will be helpful for us to clarify the ways in which the theory of the ‘four causes’ still exercises an influence on other theories of responsibility.

In brief, the theory of the four basic explanations and causes can be listed as below, which Aristotle developed in the *Physics,* book I-II (αἰτία):

1. The essence (*to ti estin, to ti ēn einaî*) and the form (*hē morphē, to eidos*) of a thing;
2. The matter (*hulē*) of the thing;
3. The source of the change and especially of the generation of the thing (*to kinoun*); and
4. The end (*telos*) at which the change and especially the generation of the thing is directed.30

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26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., p. 4.
The main purpose of the theory of ‘four causes’ is to solve the problem of the essence of changing things, which was evoked by both Parmenides’ and Plato’s ideas about the same problem. Parmenides denies the reality of change and regards that only the changeless is real. Plato argues that there are separate forms for different changing things. Aristotle thinks both of these two views are unacceptable. He argues, instead, that the intelligible world of forms is visible in the changeable and sensible reality of substances that we encounter all around us. It is in this context, then, that Aristotle develops his own theory of the four explanations and causes in order to supply a clear account of the relationships of permanence and change in the changing things.

As for employing the theory of ‘four causes’ to elucidate the nature of moral responsibility, the first cause ‘formal cause’ and the second cause ‘material cause’ are static factors whereas the other two causes ‘efficient cause’ and ‘final cause’ are dynamic factors. The ‘formal cause’ pertains to what responsibility is in virtue of it being the very relationship it is; and the essence of relationship determines to what general kind the particular responsibility in various situations belongs. The ‘material cause’ concerns how actions change or transform and especially how these actions of responsibility can be generated or come to be. As Aristotle emphasizes, matter cannot exist on its own but is in potency and only in a material thing with certain form. Thus, this idea can be employed to explore the inner elements that constitute the nature of responsibility in the following chapters of this thesis. The ‘efficient cause’ is also sometimes referred to a ‘moving cause’. It addresses the question, what generates responsibility in the first place? Aristotle argues that ‘what generates a particular thing is an already generated thing that belongs to the same general kind’. A proposed answer would be that the intentions of the agent generate responsibility. The ‘final cause’ focuses on the result of such actions in the end-state (telos) or that towards which the actions of responsibility are directed, or, more simply put, the thing that it is produced for. It responds to two questions, then: ‘what is responsibility good for’ and ‘for whom is responsibility a good’?

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31 The explanation of the contents of the ‘four causes’ refers to Vasilis Politis’s idea in his Aristotle and the Metaphysics, pp.53–55.
32 Politis, p. 54.
Setting this approach aside, we will turn to contemporary theories of responsibility in the following section, since this is of importance to the discussion on responsibility in this study.

SECTION FOUR
A BRIEF REVIEW OF CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF RESPONSIBILITY

Responsibility covers a wide-ranging area of investigation, and so, it is not surprising that there have been many approaches to and studies of various aspects and dimensions of responsibility. Contemporary theories of responsibility, however, concentrate attention, generally speaking, on three main attributes of responsibility, namely: retrospective responsibility, prospective responsibility, and responsible agency. These three aspects of responsibility also include concerns that are relevant to our study; in particular, the two main questions that we are addressing in this study: (1) what is it to be responsible? and (2) what is a person responsible for?

Turning to the issue of retrospective responsibility, first, this aspect of responsibility concerns what we have done, or failed to do, and its result. This issue of retrospective responsibility occupies an important place in both moral and legal domains of enquiry. Prospective responsibility, on the other hand, concerns the foreseen effects of that what we will do, or avoid doing. In this sense, retrospective responsibility is partly determined by prospective responsibility and prospective responsibility is partly based on retrospective responsibility. In other words, retrospective responsibility is a kind of ascription of responsibility that focuses on the doing of the factual act and the consequences of this action, rather than on the possible results, or on probable intended outcomes of actions, or on the moral character of the agent. Prospective responsibility, therefore, is a kind of assumption of responsibility that concentrates on ‘whatever or whoever is holding someone responsible be willing to accept the transfer of responsibility to another’. Whatever

we have responsibility for is a matter of morality, of course, but this does not imply that the law is concerned with every dimension of morality. There are many things that the law is concerned with that do not have a moral dimension, such as, for instance, matters of practical planning (e.g., regulation of traffic with traffic lights at a crossroads in order to enable traffic flow more freely). There are also moral matters of personal judgement that are not the concern (or can be the concern) of the law (e.g., wishing one fellow human being well or ill). Morality, in other words, extends to what is outside the mind and to what is inside the mind and takes into consideration a much wider field of enquiry than matters pertaining to law. This is reason why, nevertheless, both retrospective and prospective responsibilities can be evaluated both in moral and in legal systems, even if what is the morally right thing to do is not (or cannot be) prescribed by law or the legally required thing is not the morally required thing. One, then, can be held, accountable or ‘responsible’ on the basis of retrospective and prospective responsibility from either a moral or a legal point of view separately.

To be a responsible agent, then, involves both retrospective and prospective responsibility. In this regard, a responsible person is one who assumes moral responsibility or legal liability for what he or she has done, or failed to do. Likewise, an irresponsible person is one who tries to evade responsibilities, or who does not take responsibility seriously (which is tantamount to evading responsibility). For example, people who are subject to the obligations of civil law or penal law but who compromise the other, when it is his or her own fault, or accept punishment when not one’s own fault, are still people who are responsible for their actions. In other word, a responsible agent, as one commentator puts it, is someone ‘who can answer (be responsible) for his or her actions and intentions before someone who questions the agent, even if that “someone” is the agent himself or herself’.  

35 Schweiker, p. 55.

Looked at in this way, we can see that, in the contemporary contextual use of the responsible agent, most modern thinkers approach responsibility with a causal or naturalistic explanation of human thought and action because his perspective
provides a firm response to juridical responsibility. As mentioned above, however, whatever we have responsibility for is a matter of morality, even if the law does not concern itself with such matters. To deliberate upon this ‘overflowing’ from a juridical use into the moral thinking of responsibility, it will be useful to integrate the approaches of William Schweiker’s and Gerald P. McKenny’s towards a classification of contemporary theories of responsibility because later, in the final section of this chapter, we will argue for the need to re-think responsibility in line with Bonhoeffer’s and Levinas’ thoughts precisely because these thinkers take both the ethical and the religious dimensions of responsibility into consideration in their reflections on responsibility.\(^{36}\)

Following Schweiker’s classification, the development of contemporary theories of responsibility can be divided into three types of theories: the agential theory, the social theory, and the dialogical theory of responsibility. The agential theory corresponds to the representative action, the social theory corresponds to the accountability/ imputability of the actions, and the dialogical theory corresponds to the answerability of the actions. As we shall see, theories focusing on causal responsibility play an essential role in the elaboration of moral theories, but in the twentieth century the idea of responsibility has been interpreted more in line with how to understand the existential situation of a human being. The question is not simply ‘what caused something to happen?’ but ‘who is responsible?’

If we take a person as a responsible agent, we must give an account of his or her individual conscience or social roles, the former focuses on the internal dimension and the latter concentrates on the external dimension. Both of these dimensions show that responsibility is an indication for the answer to the ‘who’ in the question of ‘who is responsible?’ In this context, responsibility is a description of

\(^{36}\) See, Schweiker’s *Responsibility and Christian Ethics* and McKenny’s, ‘Responsibility’, in Part III The Structure of the Christian Life, *The Oxford Handbook of Theological Ethics*, pp. 237–254. The reason why we chose Schweiker’s and McKenny’s perspectives to think about responsibility follows from the central topic of our thesis: to uncover the essential elements of the structure of responsibility and to provide an exploratory discussion about the relationship between morality and religion. For these reasons, this examination or review will neither exhaust all the theories related to responsibility, nor even deplete the theories mentioned in these two authors’ discussions. Moreover, even though the theme of these two authors’ writing is about Christian ethics, they both endeavour to present an integrated horizon of the struggle about the thoughts of responsibility in the history of human self-understanding from both a philosophical and theological perspective. Therefore, their investigation will provide a valuable foundation of understanding for the ongoing discussion.
a state of human relationship, rather than the pointing to and finding out the endless causes in a sequence of events. Responsibility itself is an event, in which an agent responsibly interacts with others. In this regard, the idea of responsibility concatenates the action and agent and embodies a metaphysical sense of self-understanding.

The issue of human self-understanding, however, brings up the complex problems of pluralism. Is it possible for people from different cultural background, educational background, and religious background to reach genuine human self-understanding and make moral judgments together? Is it possible to find a ‘neutral moral language’ as a platform that can translate different moral beliefs into a way that people can understand and communicate their values together? These two questions cover (i) the interpretative dimension about ‘what is going on?’, (ii) the practical dimension about ‘what are we to be and to do’, (iii) the essential dimension about ‘what does it mean to be an agent?’, (iv) the normative dimension of ‘what is the norm for how to live?’ and (v) the meta-ethical dimension about ‘how do we justify moral claims?’.

From these questions, therefore, the only one thing that we can clearly confirm is that the meaning of responsibility will not mean the same in each theory. There may be ‘a family resemblance’ among theories in their use of explaining the term ‘responsibility’; the most important thing, nevertheless, is to disclose the fundamental elements that determine the meaning of responsibility rather than to seek the common or similar understanding of responsibility. The ‘self’ of the person as a moral agent appears in the activity of responsibility. The word of ‘person’ comes from Latin persona, which was the mask that an actor wears in a play and thus the meaning of ‘persons’ originally refers, to ‘character in a drama, mask’. Therefore, the idea of responsibility is embedded in the modern debate on how to understand human existence.

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37 Cf., Schweiker, p. 231, n. 4.
38 Ibid., p. 32.
39 Ibid., p. 65.
Before we explore the contemporary theories of responsibility in detail, it will be useful to bring McKenny’s ‘formula’ – X is responsible to Y for Z – to explain theories of responsibility from the aspects of imputability, accountability and liability, which is from F. H. Bradley’s essay ‘The Vulgar Notion of Responsibility and its Connection with the Theories of Free Will and Determinism’ (1876). McKenny interprets that the part of ‘X is responsible’ corresponds to imputability; the part of ‘responsible to Y’ corresponds to accountability; the part of ‘responsible for Z’ corresponds to liability. In view of this, McKenny’s interpretation of Bradley’s classification is overlapped with Schweiker’s way of classification, even though the emphases and the methods they employed are not the same. We can integrate McKenny’s interpretation of Bradley’s classification into Schweiker’s approach, however, to examine contemporary theories of responsibility as a whole.

§1.4.1 Agential Theory – Accountability/Imputability

As outlined above, the agential theory elaborates the meaning of responsibility in terms of accountability. To be a moral agent is to be responsible primarily for oneself first, and then, perhaps, for others. The focus here is on the relationship between the agent and that agent’s act. The acting agent determines the rightness of acts of praise and blame. The agential theory, therefore, emphasizes the primacy of moral autonomy. In this case, responsibility is a matter that is ‘up to us’.

Aristotle represents the early theories of agential responsibility, but the Aristotelian theory of responsibility is a ‘weak’ theory because it centres on the relation between agent and act in determining the moral rightness of praising and blaming. An obvious characteristic of this weak theory is: ‘whether the action originates in the agent’s power to act or not [to] act’. The praise and blame is the condition for the agent’s power — in other words, the issue of the freedom of the agent is still at stake. With this premise, the utmost possibility to realize an agent’s freedom depends on the outside condition. Correspondingly, for Christian ethics, it

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41 Schweiker, p. 65.
42 Ibid., p. 75.
44 Schweiker, p. 68.
refers to the bondage of will. It brings forward the question in relation to ‘how human beings can be responsible for sin, if they are in bondage to sin’. ‘Sin’, however, is a religious term denoting some break in the relationship between the human being and God or some alienation of the human being from God. How exactly we treat each other and are responsible is connected to the way in which our relationship with God is maintained (or broken or reconciled) will be addressed in detail. It is suffice to note, at the moment, however, that contemporary theories ‘reverse the line of reasoning found in the traditional account’. The traditional reasoning of agential theory believes that praise and blame are only proper responses to voluntary actions and states of character. The voluntary actions means that the agent has the knowledge of what he or she has done, is doing or will do, but not in the state of ignorance. The discussion of the voluntariness gives rise to the debate of freedom. For Aristotle, the representative of the weak agential responsibility, praise and blame is the core of holding responsibility. For contemporary agential theories, however, freedom is the premise and (pre-)condition for the carrying out of a moral action, not praise and blame.

Kant’s theory about responsibility is representative of these modern theories. To be sure, Kant does not use the term responsibility in his ethics. In his theory of ethics, nevertheless, an agent should be directly responsible for what they caused to happen but not for the consequences of what they did. The question for Kant is not about whether the agent has the power to choose to do, or not because it is assumed that the agent is free to choose to do. The concept of will which the theories of Christian ethics have been wrestling with falls outside of Kant’s consideration. The reason is that, for Kant, the freedom that the agent owns is bound up with the will, which leads to the occurrence of all actions but prior to all the choices. Kant frees the will by emphasizing the autonomy of the will and by suspending the ‘is’ and replaces it with ‘ought’ that is based on the standard of rationality. The rational will must be regarded as autonomous and this frees the moral agent from external laws according to Kant’s third formulation of the categorical imperative – ‘the Idea of the

\[46\] Ibid.
\[47\] Schweiker, p. 85.
\[48\] Ibid., p. 79.
will of every rational being as a will that legislates universal law.’\(^{49}\) In this sense, Kant’s ethics is a strong agential theory of responsibility because the status of our moral role is that of universal lawgivers rather than universal law-followers. The moral agent, for Kant, has the self-legislating freedom to ‘act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.’\(^{50}\) From this point of view, the purpose of morality, for Kant, is not to promote the goodness itself in the world, but to promote the goodness of the moral agent’s will.

In contrast with Kant’s autonomy, Paul Tillich used the idea of ‘theonomy’ to develop a Christian version of an agential theory of responsibility, according to Schweiker.\(^{51}\) The similarity with Kant’s autonomy is found in the fact that Tillich concentrates on the actualization of the self, and the relationship between the moral law and the essential being of human. The process of growing from a disintegrated self to an integrated self is an ethical issue for Tillich and only ‘agape’ (love) can make this development come true. If Kant’s autonomous view of responsibility is absolute because of the categorical imperative, then Tillich’s ‘theonomous’ view of responsibility is also absolute, but because of the love of God. However, the agential theories of responsibility only pay attention to the role of the self and its inner development. What, then, is the role of the community in the development of the self? Which one is the priority, the self or the community? Are they complementary to each other simultaneously?

\(\S\)1.4.2 Social Theory – Representative Action

Compared with the focus on the self-initiative activity of agential theories of responsibility, social theory examines the importance of representative action in the moral life. This theory focuses on social roles, vocation, stations, and thus communal unity, as well as the practices, which constitute the identity, and roles of persons and communities.\(^{52}\) It is not only about the ‘ought to do’ action decided

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\(^{50}\) Ibid., 4:421.

\(^{51}\) Schweiker, p. 82.

\(^{52}\) Cf., Ibid., pp. 65, 86, 93.
upon by the agent and ‘what’ the self as an agent ‘is’ or ‘is to be’, but the stress is put on the kind of people we ‘ought to be’ in terms of social practices and discourse. The self is no longer the decider of the laws in the world, but is the organ of the social world. If we use McKenny’s ‘formula’ — X is responsible to Y for Z — to explain the social theory in this case, then it refers to the part of ‘responsible to Y’, which highlights the relational attribute of responsibility. It is, therefore, the community as a social entity, and not the individual, that plays the central role in the moral discussion.

In fact, such social theory can also be traced back to Aristotle, for the practice of praise and blame is an important matter for Aristotle’s theory of responsibility. In Book III of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle distinguishes the voluntary and the involuntary, which is the foundation of his reflections on the legitimacy of bestowing praise and blame on anyone’s action. For Aristotle it is other social members who decide what constitutes praise and blame, not the ‘self’; so, we can say that Aristotle begins with a social practice of praise and blame. Aristotle’s purpose, nevertheless, is not focused on how these social practices are to be carried out, but what the proper reasons for praise and blame are. From this point of view and for this kind of social theory, the social role of the self in a society is the key to penetrate to the structure of responsibility. It does not depend on the inner-self as an accountable self for it is related to an individual-collective integrity. The difference between agential theory and social theory, nonetheless, lies in the fact that in the former the focus is on free will and the ambiguous issue of self-consciousness and self-determination (because the identity of the self that is conscious and what it is that is determining that self is not immediately given or determined), whereas in the latter the concentration is on the efficacy of moral (social) responsibility itself. From this point of view, the essential claim of moral responsibility is that the ‘ought to do’ relies on the ‘ought to be’ in the social order. The assumption of this theory of responsibility, therefore, relies upon exterior elements like social laws, norms, and cultures, etc., rather than on interior elements like personality, conscience, or free will and so forth.

In the same way, we could also analyse Christian ethics regarding the social role of the self in responsibility. For Christians, ‘the crucial social practice of the
Church is telling the story of God’s action in Christ\textsuperscript{53} and to fulfill it in the daily life within the church. Compared to Tillich’s theonomous theory of responsibility that focuses on the essential being of human existence, the social theory relies on the remembrance and interpretations of God’s Word, the Scripture, as the framework for understanding life. In this circumstance, the Scripture is not guidance for Christian existence but a contextual constitution for everyday moral life in the church. Viewed in this light, to be responsible for a Christian, particularly for the reformed tradition, is to practice the scriptural vision of life towards each other in the Church, and not to depend on the rationality or freedom of will. As a result, the Christian ethics of responsibility, as well as the general social theory of responsibility, is a weak theory of responsibility.

The social theory of responsibility accentuates the agent’s identity in a society and draws attention to the appropriate roles of the self and the collectivity, in which and through which the social practice of blame and praise play an important role. By comparison with the agential theory, the social theory goes beyond the strict limitation of the nature of human subjectivity because the emphasis upon the self neglects the social function and the relational attribute of the concept of responsibility. There are, nonetheless, some problems which emerge regarding social theory, such as, for instance, ‘who will decide the standards of the social practice of blame and praise?’ , ‘Why should we comply with these standards or laws?’ , ‘How can we know the validity, the universality, and the justification of these standards?’ Is it a matter of the majority of opinion in establishing the validity of social customs? In matters of morality, however, we should not be impressed by unanimity for such unanimity does not guarantee or warrant, even, the correctness of the moral judgment. (Most people believed slavery to be right, burning witches to be right, or that certain human beings were superior to other human beings, e.g., racism, sexism, and so forth.) In order to find out the answer to these questions, therefore, we need dialogue and negotiation. The dialogical theory is conceived to explore the agentic-relational attribution of responsibility.

\section*{Dialogical Theory – Answerability}

\textsuperscript{53} Schweiker, p. 91.
Dialogical theory focuses attention on possible ways to solve the problems mentioned above and it seeks to provide an interpretation regarding the role of the other, the event of the encounter of the self, and the role of the other in the community, that is relevant to the understanding of responsibility. In terms of McKenny’s ‘formula’ (X is responsible to Y for Z), the dialogical theory corresponds to the part of ‘responsible for Z’, which stresses the domain of ‘conscience’. In this instance, the ‘self-disclosure of the other to us and how we respond to the other constitute us as persons.’ The preposition ‘for’ designates the connection with others, or, more precisely, the claim that the other places on me and so unfold as a call of the self into question. Compared with the agential theory that also concerns the problem of agent and action relation, the dialogical theory centres on the internal reaction to the external calls, and stresses the liability to the other. Compared with the social theory, which also concerns the social relationship — the relation between the agent and the community, the laws and norms that have been reached through praising and blaming — the focus of dialogical theory is on the event of multifarious self-other encounters.

The central thought of this ‘self-other’ encounter is that ‘the self needs a Thou in order to be’. In this respect, the dialogical theory of responsibility attempts to integrate the emphasis of the self with agential theory and the focus on the self-community relationship from social theory. Furthermore, it also proposes to penetrate to the phenomena of responsibility and detect the structure of responsibility. The dialogical model of responsibility, therefore, holds open the possibility of exploring an integrated horizon of the critical elements that constitute the essential and basic structure and nature of responsibility. In this respect, Martin Buber’s thought is a direct influence on the dialogical theory of responsibility.

For Buber, responsibility involves plurality for to be a responsible person is to confront one another (responsible persons) in a living mutual relation. According to Buber, there are three main types of relation that exist in this world. The first one is the relation of our life with nature, and in which the relation clings to the

54 Ibid., p. 65.
55 Ibid., p. 63.
56 See, Buber, I and Thou, p. xi.
57 Ibid., pp. 6, 101.
threshold of speech; the second is our life with men, in which the relation takes on
the form of speech; and the third is our life with intelligible forms, where the
relation, is a being without speech, yet begets it. These three kinds of relation give
an indication for an address and answer, from which is shown a primordial
relationship prior to forming, thinking, and acting. Responsibility entails these
types of relation, or in Buber’s words, ‘Love is responsibility of an I for a Thou.’

As noted above, the agential theory stresses the role of the self and the social
type emphasizes the role of praise and blame. For Buber, both of these theories
are unable to reveal the true structure of relation as ‘I-Thou’. As for the first theory,
the ‘I’ is at stake because, for Buber, the ‘I’ only becomes ‘I’ through the relation to
the ‘Thou’. The agential theory, however, lays stress only on autonomy. As for the
second theory, measure and comparison is the issue at stake whereas, for Buber,
relationship as concrete reality is immeasurable. These two theories are in the
domain of the primary word ‘I-It’, which ‘makes it appearance as individuality and
becomes conscious of itself as subject (of experiencing and using)’. The dialogical
theory, by distinction, is located in the presupposition of the primary situation of the
‘I-Thou’ relationship, which ‘makes it appearances as person and becomes conscious
of itself as subjectivity (without a dependent genitive)’. The a posteriori
organization makes the external order of the world, but each meeting of the I and
Thou composes the signs of the world-order itself. Thus Buber reasserts his views
in the end of his renowned work I and Thou, ‘the community that is built up out of
relation, and […] the collection of human units that do not know relation – modern
man’s palpable condition of lack of relation’. Buber’s insightful but mysterious
style of writing influenced many thinkers who endorse the ‘dialogical theory’, even
though their concerns or methods are not completely the same. His thoughts about
relation and the word also influenced Barth and Levinas, which we will discuss in
detail in the following chapters.

This brief review of Buber’s influence on dialogical theory, now leads us to
examine two basic forms of this theory. The first is Karl Barth’s ‘divine command

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38 Ibid., p. 15.
39 Ibid., p. 62.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid., p. 106.
ethics that continues some agential theories of responsibility, but concerns the encounter with the other’; and the second one is H. Richard Niebuhr’s ‘representative ethics that continues some social dimension of responsibility, but again, respect to the demand to respond to others.’

Buber is keen on the I-Thou relationship but does not explicitly indicate the connection between the ‘I-Thou relationship’ and responsibility. Both Emmanuel Levinas and Karl Barth follow Buber’s way of thinking, but are also concerned with the question ‘how is the event of encounter with the other understood within an ethics?’ Levinas’s answer is the ‘face of the other’, which penetrates the meaning of reality that struggles to free ‘the other’ from the view of the self. Barth’s answer is God as the Absolute Other, who reveals Himself and encounters the self as ‘Commander’. From Barth’s focal point on divine command ethics, we could say his theory is ‘a weak dialogical ethics of responsibility’ because it is about the divine meta-ethical elements of the source of morality that is outside the centre of the self. Barth ‘defines responsibility (Verantwortung) in terms of an obedient answer (Antwort) to the command of God.’ In other words, Barth’s theological ethics is the ‘answerability’ to an other who is external to oneself. The answerability is located in the form of the command of God that we hear and respond to in the ultimate goodness and Word of God. Therefore, in the sense of exploring the meaning of goodness, Barth’s theory is meta-ethical. In the sense that the Word of God is incarnate in Jesus, his theory is normative. In sum, Barth’s dialogical theory concerns the derivation of morality from God but not human action itself. The self is defined by the command of God who is Jesus Christ. In this case, revelation, as the incarnation of the Word of God in Jesus, rather than responsibility, is morally fundamental. How a self is responsible depends on how this self responds appropriately to the Other, that is to say, to God’s Word. We will return to this further, in the second chapter.

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62 Schweiker, p. 94.
63 Ibid., p. 95.
64 Ibid., p. 98, my emphasis.
66 Schweiker, p. 102.
Contrary to Barth’s theory, Niebhur regards responsiveness as the designating self-knowledge to be essential, and also the first task of ethics. Therefore, Niebhur develops three fundamental types of agent. The first is ‘man-the-maker’, which can be equated with agential theory because human beings in this sense have the capacity to determine their destiny by themselves. The second is man-the-citizen, which can be equated with social theory because human beings in this sense are organic parts of the community. The third is man-the-answerer, which signifies the dialogical theory, which emphasizes the role of the answerer who responds to action on humans/us. The question of ‘what we are’ is present in all of the actions we choose to do and the interpretation on these actions that affects the meaning of responsibility. Therefore, for Niebhur, responsibility is a first principle which constitutes selfhood and the moral agent.

These three types of agent can be sorted into three progressive elements with respect to the structure of responsibility. The first responsible action is a response to the action itself. Then the second one is the responsible action of the interpretation about that action. As regards Niebhur’s classification, the former deals with the external part of the structure of responsibility, which can be analysed using methods inspired by phenomenology which will be employed in this thesis. Correspondingly, the latter deals with the internal part of the structure of responsibility, which can be analysed with the methods inspired by hermeneutics, which also will also be used in this thesis.

So far, the concept of responsibility has been analysed both from the retrospective and prospective dimensions. We cannot, however, just stop at the theory of dialogical theory. To be responsible, one has to anticipate a response to our past, present, and future actions with regards to the Other, which constitute the structure of the concept of responsibility. The concern that is exhibited in the

67 ‘Man-the-maker’ in Latin is ‘Homo faber’. This concept is also articulated by Hannah Arendt and Max Scheler. Henri Bergson also referred to it in The Creative Evolution (1907), emphasizing the point that, ‘If we could rid ourselves of all pride, if, to define our species, we kept strictly to what the historic and the prehistoric periods show us to be the constant characteristic of man and of intelligence, we should say no Homo sapiens, but Homo faber. In short, intelligence, considered in what seems to be its original feature, is the faculty of manufacturing artificial objects, especially tools to make tools, and of indefinitely varying the manufacture.’


69 Schweiker, p. 100.
diachronical response in relation to the Other in a responsible relationship goes beyond the dialogical theory that counts only in the subject’s answerability in the synchronical and present dialogue with the other in a reciprocal relationship. Thus a deeper dimension to the structure of responsibility — one that takes into account the diachronical dimension of responsibility — needs to be addressed. In other words, the need to re-think the structure of responsibility, over time and in time, is necessary to the analysis of the contemporary concept of responsibility.

SECTION FIVE
A TURNING POINT: THE NEED TO RETHINK RESPONSIBILITY

Thus far, we have looked back to the etymology of the term of responsibility. We have also reviewed the pre-Socratic philosophers’ thoughts on responsibility and examined Aristotle’s first systematic reflections on responsibility. We also reflected upon contemporary theories of responsibility. From these reviews, we have mapped the practical and intellectual development of the concept of responsibility, taking into consideration the self as the evaluating subject, the self as a social role balanced in its relationship in the community, and dialogue as a type of connection between the self and the other. The concept of responsibility, however, is not static but dynamic. That is to say, the concept of responsibility is a dynamic word that challenges us to face it when it changes, but at the same time, it also urges us to grasp the fundamental elements that determine the nature of responsibility itself. The concept of responsibility also implies action and relationship, thus we need to investigate actions and relationships in any elucidation of the meaning of the concept of responsibility.

The concept of responsibility, however, is not without its critics in the history of thought. Nietzsche, for example, is a pioneer in the attempt to provide a critique of the responsible subject in his Genealogy of Morality. Nietzsche, of course, criticizes all moral values and holds that all the intrinsic worth of these values must
be, radically, called in question.\(^\text{70}\) The reason for Nietzsche’s suspicion is, ‘what if morality should turn out to be the danger of dangers?’\(^\text{71}\) Thus Nietzsche undertakes an examination of the long history of the origin or genesis of the concept of responsibility in this book and attempts to show that ‘how the responsible subject is not realized in a transcendental act of self-positing, but is rather the product of a long history of often violent social practices.’\(^\text{72}\) A major implication of this Nietzschean critique, therefore, is that when theories of responsibility have developed to this point, the question of both responsible action and the responsible agent is no longer stable.

In view of this situation, the consideration of the concept of responsibility should no longer be reflected upon in a horizontal dimension, that is to say, as pertaining to ‘a responsible subject’ or as that which exists between responsible subjects or in the connection with the responsible subject to the others only. It is inevitable that we have to reconsider the concept of responsibility in a vertical dimension by examining the basic elements that constitute the structure of responsibility, especially from the perspective of ‘the other’ as the starting point, and the role of ‘language’ as not only a tool to understand specific aspects of responsibility but also as a phenomenon to understand the nature of responsibility itself.

The development of Stanley Hauerwas’s thought is an example of this reversal.\(^\text{73}\) His early thought is still within the horizon of Kantian responsibility so that the role of otherness is estranged from the self on the one hand; narrative as a manifestation mode ‘replaces the act of will as what constitutes the subject’ on the other hand.\(^\text{74}\) In his recent work, however, Hauerwas holds that the subject should not exist prior to the ‘story’ that forms him or her. This is a profound reversal on the traditional views of responsibility. It is no longer the self that constitutes itself as moral subject before the influence of language works on it, it is rather the application of language employed by the self that constitutes the self as responsible.

Another significant shift, for McKenny, is ‘from the Kantian theme of responsibility as the constitution of a subject distinct from desires and inclinations to the


\(^{71}\) Nietzsche, p. 155.

\(^{72}\) McKenny’s, ‘Responsibility’, p. 244.


\(^{74}\) McKenny’s, ‘Responsibility’, p. 245.
Aristotelian theme of responsibility as a factor of social practices of praise and blame.\textsuperscript{75} In what follows below, however, this shift will be analysed as a dialectical development. In other words, these two ideas will be seen to collide with each other in a complicated way. This viewpoint has been elucidated in different versions, for example, by Kierkegaard in his \textit{Fear and Trembling}, by Levinas in his later works, by Karl Barth in his summons to responsibility issued by the Word of God, and also by Bonhoeffer in his consideration of ‘deputyship’ and its relationship to responsibility.

There is a common characteristic in these thinkers’ concerns: responsibility is not only formulated either by the self or by the community retroactively but also by ‘the other’ prospectively. In Schweiker’s estimation,

This act of understanding is how the imperative of responsibility becomes constitutive of a person’s or community’s identity. The idea of radical interpretation links the theory of value, the imperative of responsibility, and a theory of agency in an integrated ethics of responsibility.\textsuperscript{76}

In contrast with Schweiker’s integrated ethics of responsibility, this thesis intends to explore the structure of pre-moral elements in order to reveal the mask that has covered the ‘person’ for such a long time, not, however, by this person’s bodily existence nor by his social roles, but by the \textit{linguistic address and designation from the other}. We called this radical responsibility, and it is closely linked to Schweiker’s method of radical interpretation: ‘a way to articulate how moral identity is constituted and transformed through an act of understanding.’\textsuperscript{77} Indeed, this is a position taken regarding the epistemological principle in ethics. Emmanuel Levinas is the most important philosopher who has written on the internalization of responsibility. He can function as a counterpart and answerer to Dietrich Bonhoeffer who raises questions about the meaning of responsibility as representative action, as acting for others. In the next part, we will briefly introduce Bonhoeffer and Levinas’s historical background and explain the reason why we choose them as the central thinkers to be addressed in this study.

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{76} Schweiker, p. 152.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., p. 176.
SECTION SIX

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SHARED HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO BONHOEFFER AND LEVINAS’S REFLECTIONS ON RESPONSIBILITY

Both Bonhoeffer and Levinas’s thought share common concerns about the problem of ‘the other’ and of ‘otherness’. Otherness, from the point of view of ordinary life, refers to the quality or condition of being other, or different. From the perspectives of theology and philosophy, however, this concept contains a continuing and intriguing question that has been pursued for a long time, from Plato to Levinas, by many theologians and philosophers, relating specifically to the question: What is the position of human being in the world? At the end of Bonhoeffer’s lectures on the history of systematic theology in the twentieth century Bonhoeffer poses the question: ‘where do we stand?’78 As for Levinas, he remarks that ‘we are unable to hide from ourselves, what we discover is a self riveted to its being’79 and this serves to establish his position. These two thinkers gave their unique response to this question in different ways.

Dietrich Bonhoeffer was a German theologian, Lutheran pastor and martyr in the early 20th century. His brief but abundant life and precious theological ideas has had an enduring legacy that people, perhaps, may never take advantage of, but they will never lose this legacy, for, as the author of Bonhoeffer’s biography, and also his close friend, Eberhard Bethge, writes,

Perhaps it is the consistency and credibility of his admirable understanding of his culture and church traditions, and the way in which he accepted the shaking of these foundations, while he lived and conceived a new Christianity for the future.80

Born in the same year as Bonhoeffer (1906), in Kaunas, of Jewish family, Levinas influenced the French philosophical community by introducing the thought of Edmund Husserl. He is probably best known for his initial reflective philosophy of

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ethical thought with the aim of going beyond the ethically neutral tradition of ontology (promoted by Heidegger). Levinas, however, did more than just re-direct phenomenological inquiry to ethical concerns he rethought the sources of ethics and its relationship to theology, and therein inspired various comparative topics and monographs on his thinking in discussions on postmodernity.

Bonhoeffer gave his reply to the ethical problems through his works: *Act and Being* (1930), *Christ the Center* (or *Christology*, 1933), and *Ethics* (began from 1940), as well as his action as a martyr. Levinas gave his reply to the ethical problems through his works, *Time and the Other* (1947), *Existence and Existents* (1947), *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority* (1961), *Humanism and the Other* (1972), *Entre Nous: Essays on Thinking-of-the-Other* (1979), *Ethics and Infinity: Conversations With Philippe Nemo*, (1982), and many more studies, as well as in his experiences from the persecution of Jews by the Nazis.

Why, nevertheless, should we compare Levinas and Bonhoeffer’s work on responsibility? Is it just because they were born in the same year and faced the same historical era? Yes, this historical reality is important to both thinkers but it is not the only reason.

Levinas was an unconventional phenomenologist who subverted the traditional Husserlian conception of phenomenology as a rigorous scientific way of investigating the intentionality of consciousness, that is to say, the nature of consciousness and *its* objectivities, by pointing to ‘the other’ as source of meaning. In this, Levinas is one of the most influential thinkers on Jacques Derrida and his project of deconstruction. Bonhoeffer, as a devotional Christian theologian, criticises the traditional concept of religion and re-evaluates the situation of Christianity in the twentieth century. In this, Bonhoeffer is one of the most significant thinkers who inspired the existential hermeneutic on Christianity and Christological interpretation of the suffering God.81 Moreover, at the end of both of their reflections, both focus on and appeal to ethics in order to highlight their

81 We could find the ‘weak theology’ as a contemporary counterpart or a development for Bonhoeffer’s thinking because both these two ways of thinking concern the problem of faith in a changing era and of man’s changing understanding of the role of God in this context.
viewpoints on responsibility. Therefore, their perspectives are full of interlacing possibilities for offering answers to our re-understanding of ethics and the centrality of the concept of responsibility to that re-evaluation.

While both Levinas and Bonhoeffer share the same historical situation and have their own respective different religious backgrounds, both of them see the nature of ultimate reality as a strength that can daily renew life from ‘otherness’ and both of them endeavour to express this through speaking about transcendence in a dialogical sense. In this regard, both of these thinkers provide us with both useful and specific hermeneutic resources to re-examine the concept of responsibility in our contemporary situation.
CHAPTER II

THE INTER-CONNECTEDNESS BETWEEN
BOUNDARY, POSSIBILITY, LIMITATION AND ETHICAL
RESPONSIBILITY IN MAN

Barth and Bonhoeffer both relate their reflections on responsibility to an analysis of the other and language. Indeed, Barth’s early thinking on these issues had a significant influence on Bonhoeffer’s later ideas. This chapter, therefore, begins by outlining Barth’s distinction between the Wholly Other (Totaliter aliter) and Man, with particular reference to his reflections on the relationship between the Word of God and the word of Man. These twin elements are essential to his conception of what ‘man’ is and Barth’s thoughts of the relationship between man and the Wholly Other, his embedded Kenotic Christology, and his articulation of the human Kerygmatic response shed light on Bonhoeffer’s elaboration of a ‘non-religious’ interpretation of religious consciousness and of the ethical-religious dimension of human existence. In the second section, I will discuss Bonhoeffer’s account of the connection between Christ and man, and his reflections on a socio-theological oriented ethics. By delineating Bonhoeffer’s existential interpretation of Christology and his non-religious interpretation of Christianity, we will begin to see the appearance of a formulation of the structure of responsibility in terms of his Christological analyses, and one that has profound implications for answering the question ‘what is man?’ Bonhoeffer’s Christological analyses include the ‘I and You’ relationship in the church as a responsible community as well as deliberations on the role of language in his analyses of ethics. Thus the work of Buber will also need to be considered in this chapter. In conclusion, the inter-connectedness of

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1 It is on this basis that Bonhoeffer offers a radical critique of Heidegger’s analysis of conscience in Being and Time and the priority that Heidegger, and many others, gives to the ‘(authentic) self’ in determining the concepts of ‘self’, ‘other’, and ‘responsibility’. Though there is evidence that Bonhoeffer’s considerations of ‘act’ and ‘being’ in his early habilitation thesis Act and Being and his lecture Christ the Center/Christology were influenced by Heidegger’s distinction and conception of ‘Being (Sein) and being (Seiende)’, and the latter’s method of existential interpretation, Bonhoeffer’s thinking disagrees fundamentally, nonetheless, with Heidegger’s viewpoint on ethics. See, Peter Frick’s comparative discussion of Heidegger’s and Bonhoeffer’s thoughts, “In the Sphere of the Familiar:” Heidegger and Bonhoeffer’, in his, Bonhoeffer's Intellectual Formation: Theology and Philosophy in His Thought (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), pp. 301–326.
boundary, possibility, limitation and responsibility in that limitation in man will be highlighted as what indicates the dimension of ethical responsibility characteristic of Bonhoeffer’s conception of man.

SECTION ONE
BARTH’S DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE WHOLLY OTHER AND MAN,
THE WORD OF GOD AND THE WORD OF MAN

For Barth and Bonhoeffer, to know man, both myself and the other, is to know the Wholly Other as Christ. In this section, we will deal with Barth’s distinction between the Wholly Other and man, and the human kerygmatic response to this distinction.

In his early theology, Karl Barth (1886–1968) was the student of teachers who advocated German Protestant Liberalism, such as, for instance, Wilhelm Herrman (1846–1922). At this stage, Barth begins to change his mode of thinking from monologue to dialogue. During the time of the First World War, however, he turns to the German and Swiss Religious Socialist movement and is influenced by Franz Overbeck (1837–1905), Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855) and others. Then, Barth develops his own thoughts and method of dialectic and expression. After that, Barth thinks that German scholars overestimate man’s subjective capacity to know God. The theology of Schleiermacher represents this trend, to which Barth was openly opposed. The first milestone for Barth is his commentary The Epistle to the Romans (Der Römerbrief) [First edition written in 1919, second edition, 1922]. In this book, Barth reacts against German Protestant Liberalism, and the study can be regarded as his first major work to attempt to explain the absolute distinction between God and man dialectically. From this publication onwards, we can see his elaboration of the static dialectic and dynamic dialectic, which relates to Barth’s discussion of the analogia entis and analogia fidei. In this period, Barth is also in a movement known as ‘Dialectical Theology’ (Dialektische Theologie), whose members include Rudolf Bultmann (1884–1976), Eduard Thurneysen (1888–1974),

Emil Brunner (1889–1966), and Friedrich Gogarten (1887–1968). After Barth writes the Barmen Declaration (or The Theological Declaration of Barmen 1934 – Barmer Erklärung) and organizes the Confessing Church (Bekennende Kirche), he returns to Switzerland because of his open opposition to Hitler. After that, Barth concentrates on writing the thirteen-volume Church Dogmatics (Kirchliche Dogmatik), until his death in 1968. In this *magnum opus*, Barth expounds on comprehensive theological themes. For our purpose here, we will only pay attention to the topics of Word of God and Barth’s analogy of the I-Thou encounter and God-man relation.

§ 2.1.1 Wholly Other and Kenotic Christology

The first term that we will explore is the ‘Wholly Other’ (Totaliter aliter). Barth speaks extensively of the Wholly Other in a 1920 lecture on ‘Biblical questions, Insights, and Vistas’.

Later, he continues to explore this characterization of God as the ‘Wholly Other’ more comprehensively in the second edition of *The Epistle to the Romans*. The ‘Wholly Other’ is that which ‘locates God beyond everything man is capable of knowing’. Barth holds that God is the transcendental ground as ‘origin’ for human knowledge, which devotes Himself to man in Christ. Therefore, the purpose of the writing of his theology is not to keep or to break the theological or academic tradition, but to repeatedly renew the beginning or the origin of the witness to the triangular relationship between the Wholly Other, Christ, and man. To investigate the ‘origin’ of this relationship means to trace the path back over the history of the development of this origin. Because it is ‘nothing new, but the oldest; not particular, but the most universal; not historical, but the presupposition of all history’. Therefore, Barth also ‘repeated and endorsed the chief characteristics of the theology he had been taught: “religious individualism” and “historical relativism”’. For Barth, the relationship between faith and history seems paradoxical because ‘faith cannot be traced to a historical foundation’, but at the same time, man has to learn from history, live in history, and even create history. This, however, raises the

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4 Ibid., p. 2.
6 Ibid., p. 29.
following critical questions: How can man know both the nature of history and the place of man in the history? What are the role of God and the role of faith in history? Can God reveal Himself in history, and if so, how?

Barth would say that this is ‘a movement from Christ outside us to Christ inside us’. The mediation between the triangular relationship is the ‘Christological self-mediation of the Word’. From this point of view, it is the first time that Barth asserts his theological criticism of religion in the lecture about ‘Religion and Socialism’. To focus on the role of Word in faith is to take off the garment of religion and to present the origin of faith. This new perspective on faith and of faith would dispel the dichotomy between the historical explanation of revelation in God and the revelation of God in history. We can also say that here the triangular relationships between the Wholly Other, Christ, and man is also reflected in a parallel triangular relationship between God, revelation, and history. The self-revelation of God’s Word in Jesus Christ will be a concrete event that breaks through the boundary between God and history.

As mentioned above, the Wholly Other is discussed by Barth in his The Epistle to the Romans. What, however, is its relation to the Kantian-Ritschl-Herrmann moral presupposition in their definitions of religion? I will argue that Barth intends to replace this question regarding my encounter with God with my concrete encounter with my neighbour. Barth’s concern is not only about theoretical moral principles but also with the practical encounter, the event of Jesus Christ as revelation in our daily life.

In Barth’s collected lectures Word of God and Word of Man, he explicitly states the meaning of the ‘Wholly Other’,

the Wholly Other [is] the infinite aggregate of all merely relative others. He is not the form of religious history but is the Lord of our life, the eternal Lord of the world. He it is of whom the Bible speaks.  

7 Ibid.  
8 Ibid., p. 28.  
10 WGWM, p. 74.
The other, which we try to represent by parables in our thought, speech and action, the other, for whose actual appearing we yearn, being tired of mere parables, is not simply some other thing, but is the wholly other kingdom which is God’s.11

Steven G. Smith, in his doctoral study The Argument to the Other, summarises this in four points.12 Firstly, God is wholly other than the human; Secondly, God is other than the temporal or historical.13 Thirdly, God is wholly other than all human experience or possible objects thereof. Lastly, God is wholly other than any possible concept we might have of Him. I agree with Smith that this absolute Wholly Other will ‘involve us in serious difficulties, since concepts are our only means of thought’,14 but the most difficult problem is still the same: the inner tension between God and man. Barth emphasizes this tension and accepts the unavoidable existence of this tension. Therefore, his intention is not to solve this original tension but to shift this tension to another perspective, kenosis.

The term ‘kenosis’ in Barth’s thought ‘does not indicate any alteration in his divinity, but it does indicate that He truly took on humanity’.15 In other words, the interpretation of the kenosis of God will also provide possibilities to solve the questions that we ask above about the paradoxical relationship of I and Thou between revelation and history. To discuss this relationship, we have to explore the influence of Martin Buber’s ‘I-Thou relation’ on Barth’s thought, something which will also be related to Bonhoeffer’s and Levinas’s discussion, as we shall see later.

§ 2.1.2 Martin Buber’s Influence of the ‘I-Thou’ Relation on Barth’s Thought

Martin Buber (1878–1965) was an Austrian-born Jewish philosopher who presents a philosophy of dialogue that centres on a fundamental distinction between the I-Thou relationship and I-It relationship. Many Christian thinkers and theologians have adopted the I-Thou schema, but recast it in the context of their own arguments and

11 WGWM, p. 320.
12 Smith, pp. 41–42.
13 Faith occurs in the “Moment”, outside physical time, in which all faith partakes of a simultaneity that is impossible with the historical order.
14 Smith, pp. 41–42.
line of thought, and sometimes in ways incompatible with Buber’s own thought.\textsuperscript{16} This is something that Barth also does. As one commentator remarks, ‘Karl Barth in varying degrees equates I-It with man’s sinful nature, and I-Thou with the grace and divine love which are only present in their purity in Christ.’\textsuperscript{17} What Barth emphasizes here, however, is a limitation of man’s sinful nature that obstructs entry into the I-Thou relationship. Owing to Barth’s emphasis on the gap between man’s fallen nature and God’s divine love, he makes the distance between the I and the Thou greater than Buber does. This is a point that Bonhoeffer later sought to address and settle, but did not resolve it. We will argue that Levinas can provide a solution here, and will discuss this from Levinas’s perspective in chapter four. The problem, nevertheless, is one that Barth bequeaths to his followers, including Bonhoeffer, and thus it needs to be understood first.

Barth develops a kind of representation of Protestant Christianity that accentuates both the separation between God and man and the role of revelation as a suspension of all separateness. Buber, as an influential figure of Judaism, stresses how the mysterious inner particular faith of the individual is nonetheless universal. Both of them, however, have difficulties in finding a resolution. Barth attempts to draw revelation down to the encounter between man and man, but at the same time seeks to maintain the untouchable and inexplicable attribute of revelation. This, nonetheless, would lead to an unsolvable conflict since it will be impossible for a man to verify the revelation when the absolute gap between God and man has been set up. Buber likewise has a similar problem regarding man’s relationship to each other, for, as Friedman notes,

\begin{quote}
the conflict [arises] between two men through the fact that each of them is as he is. It is the tragedy of the contradiction, which arises from the fact that men cannot and do not respond to the address that comes to them from that which is over against them.\textsuperscript{18}
\end{quote}

In contrast to Barth’s insistence on keeping the distance between God and Man thoroughly unbridgeable, Buber keeps trying to solve this problem by his promotion

\begin{footnotes}
\item[17] Ibid., p. 272.
\item[18] Ibid., p. 282.
\end{footnotes}
of genuine dialogue as a means by which each man would let the other man and God also into the world in everyday life through the infinite sphere of responsibility. This is a responsibility before the infinite,\(^\text{19}\) and which restricts the danger of excessive power that would lead to radical violence in the real I-Thou relationship.

Barth’s concerns centre on the wholeness of the relationship between God and man and its analogy to the relationship between man and man, while Buber’s concerns focus directly on the wholeness of the relationship between man and man. The differences come from their starting point. Barth’s starting point is vertically and internally bidirectional from one pole to the other. By comparison, Buber’s starting point is horizontally and externally a mono-directional reciprocity between two poles. For Buber, his main concern to view the other as an end in himself is to eliminate the subject-object mode in moral considerations. He resolves this tension through the method of discourse that leads to a real responding to the other. The genuine human encounter dwells in this responsible dialogue and through dialogical responsibility.\(^\text{20}\) For Barth, genuine human encounter takes place between two poles and is based on two aspects.\(^\text{21}\) Firstly, the real I is a subject that we cannot fully comprehend. Secondly, in a real encounter, each person would break through the barriers to comprehend a Thou who is like himself. For Barth, this possibility of the I-Thou relationship indicates an ‘analogy’ between God and man and leads to the possibility of a ‘Revelation of the Word of God’ to ‘the word of man’, which is a central concept in Barth’s discussion on all topics including responsibility.\(^\text{22}\) For this reason, we will discuss the relationship between divine revelation and the human based on the aforementioned analyses.

§ 2.1.3 Divine Revelation and Human Response

Revelation, from Old French is revelacion, from Latin is revelationem (nom. revelatio), which derives from revelatus (uncover), generally means ‘disclosure of facts’. In Barth’s thought, as well as that of Bonhoeffer, revelation has a ‘most

\(^{19}\) See, Friedman, p. 43.
\(^{20}\) We will discuss this further in chapter four as relating to Levinas’ thought on response and responsibility.
\(^{21}\) See, Balthasar, p. 76.
\(^{22}\) Ibid.
specific’ Christological identity. Revelation is a recounting that is both internal and external to the self, and which provides the possibility of dealing with Barth’s God-man problem. In this sense, revelation as the foundation of Barth’s theory already implicates a dialectical significance for his articulation of human speech and God’s Word.

The early Barth deals with the problem of revelation with a pietistic, Romantic attitude of the notion of imago Dei, but the later Barth understands the imago Dei as the subjective possibility for the reception of revelation. Barth treats of revelation in the second edition of The Epistle to Romans and in the first volume of his Church Dogmatics extensively. His discussion includes the relationships between Bible, the Word of God, and Christian faith, and even the possibility and the impossibility of revelation, as well as the relation between the Word of God and history. For Barth, however, our ‘‘memory of God’’ is one of absence, not [of] ontological participation because our memory is the ‘memory of that lost relationship with God’. Barth’s imago Dei, nonetheless, can be better understood with the characteristic of analogy, therefore, it is ‘not like the Platonic recollection and Augustinian memory, but more akin to Kierkegaard’s dread or Heidegger’s Sorge (which, of course, it pre-dates)’. In other words, revelation happens as an event that is a recognition of the problem of temporality, which separates us from eternity yet connects the present and eternity through the power (vis, as Augustine held) of memory. At the same time, it also awakes the present according to the eternity. According to Barth, revelation is not continuous but is ‘recalled again and again within what is representational and human’ in a historically conditioned moment. Barth locates the Christological role in the Old and New Testaments as ‘the time of the revelation’. The Old Testament is the ‘time of the anticipation’, in which Christ was revealed in anticipation, and the New Testament is the ‘time of
remembrance”, in which the same Christ is the subject of the narrative'.  

For Barth, this invisible process from anticipation to remembrance has to be dialectical because revelation as personal encounter lies in the speech act and in the words used by people. Smith explains this by noting that,

Barth frequently calls attention to the discontinuity between what God offers man and what man is even capable of conceiving, but also to a realized identity between God’s work and the human world. He speaks of a new immediacy between God and man restoring their original relationship, of a new ‘organism’ effectively functioning in human history, and of God’s Kingdom as the actual fulfilling content of the ideal empty forms of man’s morality.  

Smith’s interpretation provides the perspective that reveals the relationship between God’s revelation and man’s morality as based on the Otherness. ‘God’s “Otherness” means His revelation.’  

We can put Smith’s brief but dense statement in this way: God reveals Himself as the Other to man, and when God’s revelation is to be received by man, God is no longer as an Other for man. This is a dialectical relationship that can be regarded as a foundation for Barth’s theological ethics because it includes the dimension of space and time in history. The dialectical relationship is treated as an analogy between God’s being and human being as well as between human beings, which is ‘a hermeneutical declaration of principle’ or ‘a hermeneutic of simultaneity’. This simultaneity lies in Barth’s hermeneutical circle regarding the relation between that which is understood as being from the self and that which is to be understood for the Other.  

This hermeneutical circle, however, is not without some major epistemological problems. How does the self know that the other knows something, especially God? How does the self know that the other’s language about something truly speaks of something, which also can be applied to the case of God? Barth has not answered these questions directly but points out a way and insists on it till the end: revelation, which is ‘pure act, pure decision, pure creation, pure sovereignty and

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31 Ibid., p.44.
33 Ibid., p. 36, my emphasis.
34 Jüngel, p. 71.
35 See, Ibid., p. 77.
freedom’. All of these aspects represent the righteousness of God because for Barth, ‘every man – lifts up from the depths of his nature the cry for righteousness, the righteousness of God’. However, to indicate does not mean to provide the answers for the questions of man, such as: How did the history of God in the Bible happen? How did that one historical event happen and follow from another? Is there any natural cause of these things? Why did the people in the Bible speak those words and how did the authors of the Bible record these words? How can we understand these words now, etc.?

Therefore, these questions, as examples, point to the tension arising from the distance between the nature of God and the knowledge of God which has been formulated by man in history. This tension, as we mentioned previously, is the foundation for human ethics because it relates to ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ which are embodied in every detail of daily ethical behaviour. This ‘Yes’ and ‘No’, in Barth’s words, would set up a duality or a dualism in the human person. ‘We admit our knowledge of God only as an antithesis to another knowledge. Knowledge of God as an antithesis to other knowledge.’ The human response as ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ will not be determined once and for all, but is re-compared and re-evaluated with the knowledge that is formulated in man’s own history and in the interpretation of God’s revelation.

The necessity to rethink ethical problems, for Barth, is that man is conscious of the transcendental origin of the ethical problem and not only the answer to the ethical question in actual life. Thus the difficulties of speaking about God turn into the problem of ‘our obligation and our inability and by that every recognition give God the glory’ because Barth stresses:

Man as man cries for God. He cries not for a truth, but for truth; not for something good but for the good; not for answers but for the answer – the one that is identical with its own question. Man himself is the real question, and if the answer is to be found in the question, he must find an answer in himself; he must be the answer.

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36 Balthasa, p. 66.
37 WGWM, p. 11.
38 Ibid., p. 55.
39 Ibid., p. 186.
40 Ibid., p. 190.
Thus, the question must be the answer, but as questioners, humans just cannot give the answer. Man needs revelation to travel through this barrier according to Barth.

Balthasar, interestingly, deduces three stages of God’s personal self-revelation from Barth in order to show Barth’s approach when dealing with the problem of boundary.\textsuperscript{41} Firstly, God discloses himself from a hidden situation. In this situation, man just can hear and accept this revelation from the Word of God, ‘which is its objective order (fides quae) and its source of understanding (fides qua) in the subjective order.’ This is a good example of how dialectics functions as a theological methodology. Understanding lies in the dialectics between ‘Yes’ and ‘No’. Secondly, dialectics in the background of revelation serves as a signifier to signify the understanding of the revelation. Thirdly, dialectics will keep the purity of revelation in order to guard against any distortion by human thought.

Thus far, we can see that Barth emphasizes the role of revelation in the relationship between God and man; its importance for the relationship between man and man; and also to clarify the function of dialectics as a theological method in the foregoing arguments. Barth, however, presents a theological negation of the values of society, even though he does discuss the man-man relationship because of his emphasis on revelation. Barth has not provided enough explicit discussion on the role of revelation in society, which is what Bonhoeffer aims to explore in his early thought where he holds that the revelation of God should be made concrete in the community. This is fundamental to the dialogicalism. We will examine this in a later section on Bonhoeffer.

§ 2.1.4 ‘God is dead’ and Barth’s Kenotic Christology as Precursor of the ‘Non-Religious Interpretation of Christianity’

As discussed above about the rethinking of ethical problems, ‘the priority of the answer over the question becomes the indispensable hermeneutic of Barth’s subsequent theological work’.\textsuperscript{42} There are two aspects of hermeneutics here. The first

\textsuperscript{41} See, Balthasar, p. 61.
\textsuperscript{42} Jüngel, p. 34. The questions referred to, in particular, are: ‘The Christian’s Place in Society,’ p. 274; ‘The Need and Promise of Christian Preaching,’ p. 116; ‘The Word of God and the Task of the Ministry,’ pp. 208 and 211, from WGWM.
is the method of hermeneutic that Barth applies to analyse the God-man relationship. The second is that aspect of the method of hermeneutics as applied to understanding to the dialectical style of Barth’s thought itself. When someone asks the question as to whether God is righteous, or not, the tower of Babel falls into pieces. It is a fatal question that reveals the changing understanding of the role of God. ‘It is clear that such a god is not God’. This god is just an idol produced by man, and ‘God is dead’ (as Nietzsche would put it). Barth’s hermeneutics is the exegetics of the Bible with the questions that we asked previously, but these answers return to the questioner. This seems to be a vicious circle, or a cul de sac. Barth does not stop here, however, but changes the perspective:

The Bible tells not how we should talk with God but what he says to us; not how we find the way to him, but how he has sought and found the way to us; not the right relation in which we must place ourselves to him, but the covenant which he has made with all who are Abraham’s spiritual children and which he has sealed once and for all in Jesus Christ. It is this which is within the Bible. The word of God is in the Bible.

Barth’s emphasis, in other words, changes from the question of ‘who is God’ into ‘how does He as the Other reveals himself’, and finally turns towards the Bible, the Word of God as an historical document of God’s revelation. The answers exist in our questioning attitude towards it. This history is a concept of ‘primal history’, which Barth appropriated from Overbeck but used in a way Overbeck had never intended, it signifies an ‘impossible possibility’, ‘a “Moment” which has no before or after’, reminiscent of Plato’s eixaiphnēs (that which is between motion and rest and thus not in the time sequence).

Barth clarifies that this special moment is not necessarily related to religious emotion. He also emphasizes that ‘religion and thought concerning God have never meant the same thing’. From this point, to some extent, we may know why Bonhoeffer would say Barth is the first one to think over the ‘non-religious interpretation of Christianity’. For Barth, the content is as of importance as is the

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43 WGWM, p. 22.
44 Ibid.: ‘[…] this is a burning question that becomes evident that we are looking for a righteousness without God and against God – and that our quest is hopeless. It is clear that such a god is not God. He is not even righteous. […] It is high time for us to confess freely and gladly: this god, to whom we have built the tower of Babel, is not God. He is an idol. He is dead.’
45 WGWM, p. 43.
46 Jüngel, p. 35.
47 WGWM, p. 54.
form of that religion when we consider ‘true’ religion. Just as the internal power of a
movement is as important to the functioning of motion, so, too, everyday life is as
important to the unfolding of the consecrated life. In other words, ‘religion forgets
that she has a right to exist only when she continually does away with herself’.48
‘True’ religion, in this regard, exists in this world, but it is also ‘a competitive power
over against this world’, not against the ‘godless world’ but against the ‘religious
world’ when religion becomes conscious of religion psychologically and
historically.49

Following from this, Barth emphasizes the origin of ‘true’ religion in our
daily life, and if we compare this point with Bonhoeffer’s theory, we can see that the
latter focuses on the structure of the role of ‘true’ religion in the life of community.
Barth wants to ‘cast doubt over life’s possibilities […] where on the human side we
have the question arising, is it true?’50 He later provides a dialectical ‘answer’: ‘one
simply cannot ask or hear the “question” without hearing the answer’.51 If we
understand Barth’s statement as ‘the question is the answer’, then it means the
questions are asked by men and the answers to these questions only can be ‘learned’
by man who is continually questioned by God, who appeared as the Word of God,
even when man does not realize it. This is the origin of ‘true’ religion for Barth: to
question the Other and at the same time to be questioned by the Word of God. The
purpose that Barth keeps seeking, the origin, then, is also closely related to our
previous discussion of Barth’s hermeneutics. This is the dialectical hermeneutics of
Barth, purposefully configured in order to avoid the danger of ‘fake’ religion and to
understand the meaning of ‘the Word of God’. In Barth’s words, this is to ‘recollect
what we had forgotten and continually forget: God’s revelation and our own faith’,52
even when, perhaps, we have failed to do so. For Barth, when we forget God’s
revelation, this means the traditional meaning of God has left us, and gone. The
response of man to the revelation of God only can be achieved in the way of Kenotic
Christology. In Bonhoeffer’s words, it is the way of a ‘non-religious interpretation of
Christianity’.

48 Ibid., p. 67.
49 See WGWM, p. 70.
50 WGWM, p. 116.
51 Ibid., p. 120.
52 Ibid., p. 294.
Bonhoeffer, then, thinks that Barth is the first one to raise the problem of the ‘non-religious interpretation of Christianity’. In this section, we have concentrated on Barth’s thought on God as the Other and its relation to human response to the Word of God. In the following section, we turn our attention to the specific instances of human response, in terms of Barth’s theory of analogy, language and ethics.

§ 2.1.5 The Human Kerygmatic Response

Barth advocates that to know God means to know His hiddenness. What we ‘know’, therefore, is primarily a kind of absence. For Barth, however, this absence is a preparation for us to ‘re-conceive Jesus of Nazareth as the Logos’. This raises other questions: ‘does history not provide other figures whose lives express an ethical excellence? Why is Jesus in particular the Christ?’ Nearly all Christian thinkers devote their life to answering these questions. Barth is also no exception. He believes the answer should consist in the theology of the Word as Christ, which is to understand the revelation of God with and beyond the philosophy of language.

In what follows, therefore, we will consider what Barth consider to be the relationship between the divine Other and language as the Word of God, seeking to clarify, firstly, the similarity and difference between, *Analogia fidei, Analogia entis, and Analogia Relationis*. This distinction is the basis of Barth’s dialectical hermeneutics and his theory of theological language. Then we will explore the modes for the nature of language, especially concerning the relationship between human response and ethical significance. Finally, we will examine the connection between theology of the Word and revelational ethics.

§ 2.1.6 Dialectic and Analogy: Analogia Relationis, Analogia Fidei, Analogia Entis

For Barth, as methodology, a doctrine of general revelation is a doctrine of analogical correspondence, and vice versa. And the analogical thought of Barth is closely related to the development of dialectical theology at that time. The term

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33 Ward, p. 6.
34 Ibid., p.6.
35 Ibid., pp. 6, and ff.
36 See Ward, p.21: ‘a doctrine of analogical correspondence is a doctrine of general revelation.’
‘dialectical theology’ represented the movement as promoted by Barth, Brunner, Bultmann, Gogarten, and others, and the style of their language was genuinely dialectical. Barth’s dialectical thought is not reflected in dialectical language as a writing style, or as a theological method, but it is to be found in his emphasis on the *dialogical* framework that constitutes the relation of self both to and with the other. Why he insists on doing this, is because,

the dialect is a condition of Christian existence, a condition of distance-in-relationship to God. Dialogue takes place within this condition or relation, and dogmatic thinking is the critical exegesis of this ‘dialectical dialogue’ [...]. Dialectical theology was Barth’s way of avoiding the immediacy and directness of dialogicalism. Dogmatics became the exegesis of the dialectical relation, the dialogue between the transcendent other and the immanent self.\(^{57}\)

Compared to the dialectical theologians, Barth insists on a theological foundation for *speech* about God, rather than on a replacement of this basis with other concepts. Barth wants to reveal God as God Himself by way of analogy because analogy can help towards an understanding of what is manifested in revelation whilst also preserving the original matter as itself, and at the same time keeping the analogical meaning as itself. In this way, Barth manages to apply his universal hermeneutic to fill the gap, whilst, at the same time, maintaining the wholeness of God as the Wholly Other.

In terms of the analogical approach of interpretation, liberal theologians, such as Bultmann, think that to interpret biblical texts is the same as interpreting all secular texts.\(^{58}\) Barth, however, insists that all secular texts should be explained in the same way as biblical text.\(^{59}\) Barth, in other words, changes both the direction and the primary analogate of analogy in the interpretation of secular and biblical texts, and in doing so, changes the problem of historical understanding.

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\(^{57}\) See Ward, 96.

\(^{58}\) There are three elements of this historical method as pointed out by Troeltsch: (1) the basic principle of criticism, that all judgments are only probable; (2) the analogy between historical events and our own experience, as well as the analogy between historical events themselves; and (3) the principle of correlation, according to which all phenomena are interconnected and every event in history has its antecedents and consequences. See, Jüngel, p. 79.

\(^{59}\) Ibid.
We can thus understand why, for Barth, dialectics is not an end in itself, but only a means or a method to arrive at the ‘real thing’.\textsuperscript{60} Barth’s thoughts on the analogy of being (analogia entis) is influenced by Przywara’s work on the analogy of being, but Barth’s central theological and linguistic concerns are about the notion of the analogy of faith (analogia fidei).\textsuperscript{61} The term analogia is used by Barth in its Latin form. The term, however, derives from the Greek, it means a ‘proportion’ or ‘ratio’ in the philosophical sense. It is combined with the root ‘ana-’, which means ‘upon, according to’, and the other part ‘-logos’, which means ‘ratio’, but also ‘word, speech, reckoning’.\textsuperscript{62} In other words, analogy is a form of argument for the nature of what is.\textsuperscript{63} By this token, Barth’s purpose is neither to find a new form of expression nor to incorporate revelation into a philosophical system of interpretation, but to find out the nature of the ‘happening’ of faith in the Word of God, which is expressed by the word dialectic (dia-lektikê).\textsuperscript{64}

[The word ‘dialectic’] refers to a process of setting one word against another (\textit{dia}, apart, over against) in order to point out a direction or find a way through this unavoidable \textit{vis-à-vis} (\textit{dia}, through). If we stress the first stage of the process, we come up with a more static and dualistic dialectic (e.g., Kierkegaard); if we stress the second stage of the process, we come up with a more dynamic and tripolar dialectic (e.g., Hegel).\textsuperscript{65}

The first stage shows that a static and dualistic dialectic lays the emphasis on the separation of the subject-object relationship, and the second stage signifies that the dynamic and tripolar dialectic stressing the identification of the subject-object relationship. The relationship between the first and the second stages are dialectical itself, which also represents the development of the tradition of Western philosophy. Man’s curiosity begins from the nature of the things outside himself. At this stage, however, man has not become aware of the distinction between the self and the object until he locates the nature of the object in his system of knowledge. Under these circumstances, man’s knowledge of the object never equates with the nature of object itself. Hence, knowledge of the object just covers some parts or aspects of the

\textsuperscript{60} Balthasar, p. 29.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{62} It is also a mathematical term used in a wider sense by Plato.
\textsuperscript{63} Ward, p. 97.
\textsuperscript{64} Balthasar, pp. 47 and 58.
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., p. 59.
object. The remaining parts that are unattainable by our knowledge need an analogical interpretation in order to fill the gap between our knowledge of the object and the nature of the object. In Barth’s discussion of the dialectic of the Word of God, the analogical interpretation becomes the necessary condition in order to ascend higher on the scale of knowledge, from the being of the object in man’s mind, so as to become a real subject itself. In other words, the process of the ‘leap’, from the projection of the object in man’s mind to the real knowledge of the subject itself, and the method that is applied to understand this ‘leap’ are important for Barth, as it was for Kierkegaard.

As we have mentioned above, Barth’s focus is on the concrete Word of God, which becomes incarnate in Jesus Christ. The dialectic proposed by him is not ‘simply the God-human divide, but more the way that divide manifests itself within discourses discoursing about that divide.’ What we need to consider regarding Barth’s thought and its relation to the topic of our thesis is the relationship between ‘the immediacy of revelation and the mediation of language’.

Following this line of thought, therefore, to discover the right analogy will enable one to have a right understanding of revelation through using a proper kind of language. The problem of the gap between subject and object, therefore, now becomes, in turn the problem of the analogy between the ‘received language’ and the ‘original language’. Barth, nevertheless, does not suddenly replace dialectics with analogy because analogy is not Barth’s end but the means to understanding the Word of God. For this reason, it is the ‘happening’ of the language, as action, which ‘makes man’s decision in faith similar to God’s’. In this sense, analogy draws

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66 In this case, the dialectic can be regarded as a pre-period of phenomenology.
67 See, Balthasar, p. 60.
68 Nevertheless, the former turns to the analogical and dialogical perspective and the latter turns to the individual perspective to deal with the same problem.
69 Ward, p. 89.
70 Ibid., p. 89.
71 See, Ward, p. 100. This point can be compared with the ‘noesis-noema’ relationship of phenomenology that was elaborated by Husserl.
72 See, Balthasar, p. 93.
73 Balthasar, p. 93. Concerning this point, we will compare Barth’s priority of the role of ‘action’ and Bonhoeffer’s balance of act and being in the next section of this chapter. We also will have more discussion about the ‘saying’ of language in Levinas’s thought in Chapter IV.
together two extremes, one is the man or this-world and the other is God or the other-world, into a middle way.

It thus follows that ‘in terms of Barth’s theology of language, *analogia fidei* precedes *analogia entis*, precedes onto-theology, and yet simultaneously constitutes it. *Analogia fidei* is the condition for *analogia entis*. In other words, it is the *analogia fidei* which constitutes the realm of the middle way of the ‘in-between’, rather than the *analogia entis*. The reason for this is precisely because the notion of being advocated by *analogia entis* is limited to expression in a single pole of those two extremes. In this instance, ‘the analogy of being’ cannot be applied and the concept of ‘being’ would be treated as a finite concept in a theological sense. Theological analogy, however, needs to make clear what is the process of ‘acceptance-response’ as regards the ‘question-answer’ mode on the problem of ‘God-man’.

When Barth set the ‘God-man’ relationship into an analogical mode, his intention was to draw the ‘understanding’ of the wholly Other down to the ‘encounter’ of a real Thou as a Word to respond to as the real significance in revelation. In other words, ‘(T)he ego is ego in its interaction with another thou in this world; and this is what is presupposed in the fact that it finds life in an encounter with God’. In this way, Barth avoids the danger of the ‘objectification’ of revelation, which has been changed into a revelation where God reveals Himself in words of the historical event. We may compare Barth’s *analogia fidei* with Levinas’s ‘analogy of appresentation’, however, Barth’s focus has always been on the Christological interpretation of revelation because ‘Christ is the condition for language’. Next, we will explore how Christ conditions language and the detailed modes of the nature/essence of language in Barth’s sense.

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74 Ward, p. 102, original n. 32.
75 Balthasar, p. 187.
76 Ward, p. 154.
77 Ibid., p. 154.
§ 2.1.7  *Modes of the Essence of Language*

When we consider Barth’s thought on language in the context of German philosophy of language, we cannot avoid the similar problems that have been reflected on by the philosophers of dialogism and Heidegger because all of them are concerned with the clarification of the transcendental conditions of language. Barth’s considerations, however, are unique since he concentrates on the role of language as a mediation of a revelation that is conditioned by Christ. He also intends to establish understanding of revelation as an objective knowledge, rather than as an inner experience. Thus, we could hold that, for Barth, language is the essential bridge between God and human being.

As one commentator points out, therefore, for Barth, God’s language is a ‘direct and immediate transferral of meaning from object to word, the proper adequation of signifier and signified’, but, as Ward continues and also notes, ‘(H)uman language, on the other hand, is caught up in the transcendental subjectivity of perception and conception.’ To connect God’s Word and human language, we have to consider the divine attribute and the social attribute as well as theological epistemology and human knowledge at the same time.

Two aspects, therefore, need to be considered. The first is the origin of God’s Word and the origin of man’s word. The second is the relationship between God’s Word and man’s word, as well as the relationship between each man’s word. For Barth, the origin of God’s Word is from God, and man can only understand God’s Word by Christ as *Logos*. Revelation, as we mentioned before, is like a memory in that it enables us to look back in history and bring it back to the present and also for the future. In this sense, revelation gives rise to interpretation in the form of language. In other words, ‘we read this language by faith, through faith, to faith; we read the language as analogous by revelation, through revealedness to the revealer’.

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78 For more on this, see, Ward, p. 102.
79 This is what Bonhoeffer criticizes in his *Letters and Papers from Prison* as ‘positive orthodoxy’.
80 As in Schleiermacher and Herrmann.
81 Ward, p. 28.
82 Ibid., p. 15.
In this sense, Barth’s argument is not that God is just the Wholly Other and has nothing to do with man because when we speak of God as the Wholly Other we will already find ourselves in the light of revelation;\(^8^3\) that is to say, the distance between God and man has been overcome by language.\(^8^4\) There is a contradiction that exists in this distance, however, for we must but cannot speak God.\(^8^5\) The dialectical role of revelation is to remove this contradiction by this kind of statement – ‘to speak of God can only mean to let God speak’.\(^8^6\) It now follows for Barth that analogical interpretation can be understood and applied under three aspects: Firstly, as the analogy between the triune God; Secondly, as the analogy between the revelation of God and the biblical language of faith which interprets it; and thirdly, as the expressive power of revelation and that of the dogmatic assertions.\(^8^7\)

Again, the very identification of analogical interpretations in these three aspects is to clarify the task of theology for Barth, which is, namely, to awaken faith rather than to make man’s knowledge about God reliable.\(^8^8\) To this extent, man’s ‘thought means recollecting the meaning of what we say and do’ that corresponds to the revelation of God.\(^8^9\) In other words, to speak of God means to speak God’s word in the realm of revelation and faith. In these words, God becomes man. The Word of God becomes the foundation of the ethical language. In Barth’s words, ‘(T)he Gospel is not a truth among other truth. Rather, it sets a question mark against all truths.’\(^9^0\) The Gospel as the Word of God questions human life and seeks to make itself known to men. Therefore, ‘true’ faith for Barth is decided by whether man can perceive the questions that are being asked by God and give his own answers, or not.\(^9^1\) That is to say, the Word of God is not only a speaking \([\text{Rede}]\) but a speaking to \([\text{An-Rede}]\).\(^9^2\)

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\(^8^3\) Smith, p. 46.
\(^8^4\) To recognise that God, as Wholly Other, is ‘ineffable’ is to say that much, as Augustine notes.
\(^8^5\) Ibid., p. 122, but see previous note.
\(^8^6\) Ibid., p. 123.
\(^8^7\) Jüngel, p. 43.
\(^8^8\) That is, to bring about the awareness of faith in language.
\(^8^9\) WGWM, p. 133.
\(^9^0\) Barth, *The Epistle to Romans*, p. 35.
\(^9^1\) Ibid., p. 58.
\(^9^2\) Smith, p. 134.
The characteristic of Word is ‘to be spoken by I to Thou, reason to reason’.\textsuperscript{93} Man’s speaking of the Word of God is to thus speak of man’s becoming aware of it.\textsuperscript{94}

Language, then, is a potentiality that would only be actualized by revelation. And this actualization cannot be accomplished by the means of communication and semiotics. In the process of communication, words are used to express interlocutor A’s meaning and to understand interlocutor B’s meaning, and vice versa; but not to directly construct the reality of the object of the communication. In the semiotic understanding, the speaking of the reality of the object has been determined by the interpretation of this object. For Barth, both of these two ways are not enough to understand the Word of God, \textit{or even human words}. Revelation, as the incarnation of Christ, is a particular historical event that manifests the Word and, at the same time, conditions man’s understanding of the Word.\textsuperscript{95} Analogical interpretation happens in the tension between this manifestation and condition in an existential, or in a more comprehensive ethical sense.

\section*{2.1.8 Theology of the Word and Revelational Ethics}

The relationship between the Word of God as well as human words and the ethical problem is inseparable in Barth’s thought. In Barth’s First Edition of \textit{The Epistle of Romans}, he already views ‘God’s revelation as the answer to the moral question presented by the humanly knowable’ in the way of an ‘ideal and unfulfillable moral law’.\textsuperscript{96} That is to say, our understanding of the meaning of God and our response to what God does and communicates as revelation, will directly shape human actions. This shaping implies three moments in the subjective response to revelation: the first is ‘reflection’ (\textit{Nach-denken}), my perception and recollection of the message offered in words heard or read; the second is, ‘Co-thinking’ (\textit{Mit-denken}), in which I accompany what is said to me with my own thoughts; and the third is, ‘Self-thinking’ (\textit{Selbst-denken}), in which the Word becomes my word.\textsuperscript{97} These three moments describe a movement from God’s revelation to human’s understanding. At this

\noindent\textsuperscript{93} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{95} Ward, p. 31.  
\textsuperscript{96} Smith, p. 25.  
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., p. 135.
point, the connection between God and man and the moral implication of this connection in Barth’s mind is not a formal categorical imperative but a pre-descriptive transfer from divine Word to concrete moral words. This is a fundamental operation of the Trinity and a transformation from the *kenosis* of Christ to an ethics of kenosis.  

*Kenosis* (κένωσις, kénōsis) is a Greek word for ‘emptying out’, which is usually used as a theological term that recalls the fact that Jesus emptied himself, therein showing how the believer should be transformed into the ‘likeness of Christ’. In Barth’s case, *kenosis* is not the original reason for the revelation but it is the revelation itself. This means, the *kenosis* of Christ brings the revelation of Christ into the relationship between the self and others. When the self can empty itself in order to accept others as themselves, the primary ethical and existential relationship of human being has been established. At this point, ‘Barth’s economy of living on to God is structurally close to Levinas’s phenomenological account of substitution, of living-for-the-other.’

As we will see in chapter four, with regard to Levinas, ‘time’ also plays a foundational role in the analysis of language and of the Other when we explore the pre-condition of the *ethical* structure of responsibility. Barth also pays attention to the role of time and distinguishes ‘time’ into two types, the ‘unqualified time’ and ‘qualified time’. Revelation, as an ‘event’, reveals that the meaning of God’s Word happens in a ‘qualified time’, in the ‘now’ and in the recollection of this ‘now’, which is ‘a string of successive moments bearing unborn potential and the eternal “Now” of revelation which can actualize the potential of such moments’. The analogy between the ‘now’ and the recollection of this ‘now’ constitutes the foundation of the analogy of faith. In other words, the *kenosis* of Jesus is the incarnation of God in the form of God’s Word, which reveals time as the creation of the triune God.

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98 Ward, p. 158.
99 Ibid., p. 139.
100 Ibid., p. 167.
101 Ibid.
From the above analysis, the emphasis of what God is in Himself shifts into the question of what God is for men.\textsuperscript{102} In Barth’s words,

\begin{quote}
We must let conscience speak, for it tells of the righteousness of God in such a way that that righteousness becomes a certainty. Conscience, as everybody knows, may be reduced almost to silence or crushed into oblivion; it may be led astray to the point of folly and wrongdoing; but it remains forever the place, the only place between heaven and earth, in which God’s righteousness is manifest.\textsuperscript{103} [...] We hear the alarm and rush out sleepily before we have found out what is really the matter and what must first be done if anything else is to be done.\textsuperscript{104} [...] However] This is difficult for us to hear.\textsuperscript{105}
\end{quote}

Only when man hears the Word and words, will the inner meaning and law of our conduct be awakened, and then man will discover that he himself is responsible. The difficulty for Barth, then, lies not only in the seeking of the revelation but also in the acceptance and the proof of the revelation. That is to say, to seek is an autonomous action that begins from the self, while to accept is a heteronomous action that originates from the other. In this case, the certainty of things will no longer be determined by myself and regarded as truth, but by the others and be concerned about the good. This, then, both shows up and highlights the foundational relationship between the Word and ethical issues in the perspective of revelation.

Why, nonetheless, is Barth so insistent on the point that the relation between language and revelation is necessary with respect to the priority of the other, rather than of the self? Barth’s reasons are that, without the focus on the priority of the other, it would not be possible to identify the original and transcendental nature of ‘good’. ‘The problem of the good calls into question all actual and possible forms of human conduct, all temporal happenings in the history both of the individual and of society.’\textsuperscript{106} Barth’s key word in this statement is ‘happening’, which contains the elements of language, time, and the priority of the other, which concerns us in our study. A typical question about ethical issues is ‘what we ought to do’. This question is asked by ourselves but, at the same time, we have to give the answer from

\textsuperscript{102} See, Jüngel, p. 37.
\textsuperscript{103} WGWM, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., p. 14.
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., p. 23.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., p. 138.
ourselves, from every yesterday until every tomorrow, from what we have said before to what we are saying now, from the centre of the self to the position of the other. In other words, it is not up to ‘us’ to go in search of the answer to the ethical problem but, on the contrary, it is the ethical problem that takes us on and that we cannot escape from different situations which are related to the existence of others. ‘We are faced not with a problem but with the problem’. When we consider the ethical problem seriously, then, we will become aware that we are living through questions that will cause new questions. There is no standard answer to these questions, but, for Barth, a responsibility that exists a priori in the problem of ethics would provide us with a balance between the wrestling/struggling of questions and answers about the good.

Barth understands clearly the tension between freedom and nature, that morality and happiness lie in the structure between questions and answers which derive from people themselves. He does not continue along the way of Kantian ethics which culminates on the postulate of God but, instead, asks another question ‘How can any idealistic ethic be developed except as a criticism of all ethics’? From this we can see even though Barth is concerned with the ‘universally applicable law of humanity’, he pays most attention to the ‘moral objective’ in the ‘subject of society’ as a goal of history. This implicates responsibility as a balanced pivot in our conduct here and now because a moral objective only exists in the moment when morality and history meet.

Meeting, of course, is a ‘happening’ that is inherent in any social movement, including the movement of Christianity, but Barth emphasizes ‘a movement from a third dimension’, namely,

[a movement] which transcends and yet penetrates all these movements and gives them their inner meaning and motive; a movement which has neither its origin nor its aim in space, in time, or in the contingency of

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107 Ibid., p. 140–141.
108 See, WGWM, p. 155.
109 WGWM, p. 156.
110 Ibid., p. 157.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid., p. 161.
113 Ibid., p. 282.
things, and yet is not a movement apart from others: I mean the movement of God in history or, otherwise expressed, the movement of God in consciousness, the movement whose power and import are revealed in the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead.  

In other words, ‘God in consciousness is actually God in history’. Accordingly, we can divide Barth’s ethical thoughts into three types which have a significant influence on Bonhoeffer’s thought about situational ethics. Firstly, we can see the anthropological and existential orientation in Barth’s *The Epistle of Romans* from his concern regarding the God-man relationship and man’s response to God’s revelation, which determines man’s ethical decision; secondly, we can see the ‘theological actualism’ in Barth’s works from the development of Barth’s thought on the Word-event, which emphasizes his concern about the ‘happenings’ in this-world, and not only in the other-world; thirdly, the keynote of Barth’s position on ethics is still Christological because, for Barth, Christianity ‘is not a system of ethics and has no special ethics of its own. The Christian can only ponder the same questions that every man must ponder.’ This is true also precisely because ‘the Christian problem is the problem of existence’.

Concerning the relationship between language and ethics in the sense of Word of God, there are two related aspects that would help us to make a further distinction. The first is Luther’s law-gospel mode; the second is Barth’s gospel-law mode. The differing order in the priority of the law and gospel influences, in turn, the different things that Luther and Barth address. Even though the gospel for Luther makes us move away from ourselves and outside of ourselves, Luther emphasizes the priority of law in human conscience. This, for Barth, would cause difficulties for the role of gospel in the form of the Word. Correspondingly, Barth emphasizes the priority of gospel and appeals to the concretization of the Word of God as revelation, Bible, and proclamation. Barth states that the ‘gospel is the Word of God addressed to humankind in the grace of God; and the law is the Word of God

114 Ibid., p. 282.
115 Ibid., p. 288.
116 See, Balthasar, p. 86.
117 See, Balthasar, p. 89, also Barth’s Ph: 123.
118 Smith, p. 158.
119 See, Jüngel, p. 108.
120 Ibid., and p. 123.
which lays claim to human kind for the grace of God’. This distinction is the basis for Barth’s consideration of theological ethics.

Barth’s theological ethics can be regarded as a revelational ethics. Revelation as the Word of God connects ‘the gospel to human being and the law to human activity’. Luther thinks that when we can be away from ourselves and outside ourselves, then the Word would be heard both receptively and passively. Barth’s anthropological concern, however, situates the human being as an image of God’s being. What the human being, therefore, can do is only to receive the Word of God. In making this point, Barth sets up the tension between anthropology and Christology that stresses the uniqueness of God. There is a question about man’s receptivity/ passivity and freedom which emerges when man lives and exists before God. Barth’s solution is to concretize ‘the obedience to the divine Other in service of the Other person’. In this way, then, the question of the truth of the divine Other has been transformed into the responsibility for the Other.

As stated previously, Barth provides a perspective and analyses regarding the relation between revelation and the moral problem of our existence. He articulates this perspective from the point of view of the wholly other, the relationship between God’s Word and man’s response, the problem of time, etc. From Bonhoeffer’s point of view, however, even though Barth is the first to put forward the notion of a ‘non-religious interpretation of Christianity’, inspiring Bonhoeffer’s own thoughts on this matter, Barth’s absolute separation of Christology and anthropology makes it difficult for him to find the solution to the problem that he himself correctly identifies, the interrelatedness of the Word of God and the word of man. For this reason, in the next section of this chapter, we will continue to discuss the necessary pre-condition of responsibility from Bonhoeffer’s perspective.

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121 Ibid., p. 117.
122 Ibid., p. 122.
123 In next section of this chapter, we will discuss Barth’s counterpart – Bonhoeffer’s emphasis on the uniqueness of man in a Christological sense.
124 See, Smith, p. 10.
In the previous section, we have discussed Barth’s distinction between the Wholly Other (*Totaliter aliter*) and man, and the human kerygmatic response to this distinction. This discussion provides a preparation for us to think about the limitation and possibility of man and the question of ‘what is a man’ from the perspective of revelational ethics. Although Bonhoeffer praised Barth as the ‘epoch-making theologian’, and as one who recognized the need to expound a ‘non-religious’ theology, Bonhoeffer was not satisfied completely with Barth’s attempt to ‘render unto human the things which are human’s, and unto God the things that are God’s.’ In Bonhoeffer’s estimation, this position leaves revelation as the Word of God as something that is accepted passively by man when it is the happening of revelation, as Bonhoeffer argues, that reveals the ethical choice for human. The difference between Barth and Bonhoeffer, then, lies not in relation to the facts, but in relation to their respective methods and perspectives or concerns. Both of them intend to explore a new way of manifesting faith towards God. Barth’s concern is with the eternity of the otherworld and God; Bonhoeffer’s focus is on the temporality of the human situation and relationships. As Andreas Pangritz argues, ‘Bonhoeffer’s intention was not to overcome Barth’s theology but to develop some aspects within Barth’s approach in a way, which had not yet been carried out by Barth himself.’

In Bonhoeffer’s early thinking, he believes that God makes human beings free in order to be responsible for our choice, and to create our own ethical life through the incarnation of God in the world. This is why he addresses extensively, in this thought, questions regarding the situations that man lives in, the relationships that man establish, and the approaches that man use to understand his ‘self’ and ‘the others’. By taking all these elements into account, Bonhoeffer, therefore, re-directs Barth’s question about God in the other world to the question of Jesus Christ in the

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126 Ibid., p. 129.
127 Frick, p. 245.
world, who hides and empties himself but also reveals himself at the same time when the world has come-of-age and no longer needs him.

For these reasons, we will explore Bonhoeffer’s two key topics: (1) Christ and the social interpretation of Christology and (2) the non-religious interpretation of Christianity as socio-theologically oriented ethics. Christology is the cornerstone for interpreting Bonhoeffer’s thought precisely because the idea of non-religious interpretation of Christianity is a manifestation of Bonhoeffer’s Christological thought. The social interpretation of Christology prepares a pre-linguistic foundation for a further understanding of human relationships. This is an essential precondition towards understanding the essence of ‘non-religious interpretation of Christianity’, which is put forward by Bonhoeffer, but which was not fully elaborated by him. Thus, it is necessary to clarify Bonhoeffer’s Christological thought and his idea of the non-religious interpretation of Christianity before we are able to come up with an analysis of the structure of responsibility according to Bonhoeffer from these presuppositions that underpin his ideas.

Bonhoeffer’s life was short, his works were not completed, his thought is inspiring but need to be further interpreted. The questions that he left for us, and the space that these questions encourage us to explore, are precisely his valuable legacy. In this section, nevertheless, we will focus on his four main works: Ethics, Sanctorum Communio, Act and Being, and Letters and Papers from Prison.

*Ethics* is the work that was written by Bonhoeffer from 1940–1943. It is his most mature work and is considered to be his major contribution to theology. One of the chapters is entitled ‘The structure of responsible life’ (*Die Struktur des verantwortlichen Lebens*).\(^{129}\) In this chapter, Bonhoeffer emphasizes the tension between the bond that connects man and God and man’s freedom. Responsibility comes from this tension and is essentially a relation of man to man. He also explains that responsibility is ‘fundamentally a matter of deputyship,’\(^{130}\) and ‘respect

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\(^{130}\) Ibid., p. 224.
Deputyship, for Bonhoeffer, is open to two abuses: man treats himself as absolute or treats the other as absolute. Both of these two points of view, however, exaggerate the power of man and neglect the reality of man’s living situation in this world. Bonhoeffer’s discussion about deputyship, in fact, can be traced back to his ideas on ‘What is man?’ in his early thinking. He stated that there are two possibilities when answering question of ‘what is man?’ One is that ‘man seeks to understand himself from his achievements or from his limitations’; the other is that ‘the I sees itself as something which is transcendent to itself.’ The first possibility implies a potential danger to the power of man, especially when conscience is regarded as an absolute responsibility towards the other. To avoid this danger, it is necessary to ask what constitutes a man’s unity with himself in the tension between obedience to God and freedom of choice. The call of conscience brings man into a judgment on good and evil from man’s own understanding. Bonhoeffer objects to this view as a ‘[Socratic] philosophizing’ way because it lets man question himself without being able to provide a thorough solution to this question. Bonhoeffer expounds upon his arguments about this problem in his early two academic works, _Sanctorum Communio_ and _Act and Being (Akt und Sein)_.

Regarding his dissertation _Sanctorum Communio_, Bonhoeffer considered this work as theological research rather than a sociological study. This is why he gave it a sub-title: ‘A Theological Study of the Sociology of the Church’. This book, in many respects, can be read as ‘Bonhoeffer’s attempt at completing Barth’s “theology of revelation” with respect to sociality’. He synthesized all the viewpoints from Max Weber, Ernst Troeltsch, Karl Barth, and Bonhoeffer’s supervisor, Reinhold Seeburg, in order to comprehend and integrate the idea of Church as a responsible community. The principal argument of this work is that human being is a social and responsible existence, which is based on an inter-connection of ‘I-You’. Community, as a theological concept, has been destroyed owing to the existence of

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131 Ibid., p.224.
133 Ibid., p. 50.
134 Ibid., p. 51.
135 Frick, p. 247. In this dissertation, Bonhoeffer intends to emphasize that his understanding of the ‘other’ is not the same as Barth’s.
The sin of humanity is embodied in the individual. Paradoxically, there is only one sin that is from Adam. The Church, of course, is the place where Christ incarnated, but Bonhoeffer is aware that there is a dialectical tension between the ‘religious community’ on earth and the ‘Kingdom of God’. This early work, to some extent, anticipates his concern with social theology and his transcendental viewpoints of ethics. We also can detect some hints of his later Christology in this work.

As for *Act and Being*, the main task of this work is to deal with the relationship between the objectivity of God as the being of revelation as well as arriving at an adequate conception of cognition as a mental act which knows the objectivity of revelation. From this relationship, the being of revelation can be grasped from reflection on the being of the human being. On the one hand, Bonhoeffer analyses transcendental philosophy, idealism, and ontological philosophy (of Heidegger) respectively, in order to demonstrate the limitations of reason in the discussion of faith. On the other hand, he uses an antithesis between “act” and “being” to analyse faith and revelation in the mode of “act and being” from the discrimination of ‘direct consciousness’ (*actus directus*) and the ‘consciousness of reflection’ (*actus reflexus*). From the distinction between these two aspects, Bonhoeffer further clarifies how the analyses of the mode of “act and being” could be used to deal with the problem of the knowledge of the “I” and (Heidegger’s) *Dasein* in respect of revelation about the self and community. In the last part of this work, Bonhoeffer puts forward the notion of “Being in Adam” as an old form of humanity and “Being in Christ” as a new future, as in the case of a child.

The above brief summary shows Bonhoeffer’s main concerns and the train of his thought in his early academic stage. He focused much of his reflection on the search for a new perspective on theological methodology. This was in preparation for his attempt to justify faith when it is confronted by the challenge of reason. He attempts to provide both sociological and ethical evidence for what is supposed to be true faith, and how this faith plays an essential role in personal being in the form of

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136 Bonhoeffer adopted this terminology from Franz Delitzsch, *A System of Biblical Psychology* (1855) and related it back to the distinction made by early Protestantism between *fides directa* (direct faith) and *fides reflexa* (reflexive faith), but not as understood psychologically but theologically. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Act and Being*, p. 28, original n. 17.
being-in-relationship. In this work, Bonhoeffer also points out that the early Barth held that revelation is a form of behaviour of pure acceptance and neglects God’s Freedom and Man’s responsibility. Bonhoeffer considered that the freedom of God lies in Christ and the Word of God, and one that can be received in the responsible community as Church. This implies that Bonhoeffer has revised Barth’s views on revelation, yet he still maintains the independence of God’s freedom from human being, something that he, in turn, inherited from Luther’s view that God is the God for us.

*Letters and Papers from Prison* is Bonhoeffer’s last work. He wrote it in Tegel. This is also the most influential work of Bonhoeffer. It reflects upon the role and the function of Christianity in the modern world and its central theme is about secularization, this-worldliness and the nature of the autonomy of human being. The ‘Coming age of this world’ and the ‘non-religious Christianity’ are the two major themes discussed in this work, in the form of letters. ‘Religion’ against the backdrop of secularization is a phenomenon of history but is not an inner ability that is given by God. Bonhoeffer also put forward another related topic – the ‘non-religious interpretation of Biblical concepts’, which is constant throughout his thought: in the context of the modern world, how is one to understand the existence of God, and how is one to understand Christ’s existence, existence for the Other/others.

Based on the interpretation of Bonhoeffer’s thought from these four works, we will attempt to answer Bonhoeffer question: ‘what is man’ and aim to continue and develop his unfinished notion of the ‘non-religious interpretation of Christianity’.

This movement is a development from ‘Christ the centre’ to ‘Christological universalism’ and Christological sociality. For Henrich Ott, to confront before God reveals the situation of man’s existence. Man’s response to God’s revelation manifests the structure of the human relationship between the “I” and the I-Other.

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137 This claim relates to Heidegger’s ideas about history and his viewpoints on religious phenomena.
138 Ott, p. 47.
139 Ibid., p. 50.
relations. For Bonhoeffer, this introduces the problem of interpretation of
personhood in the dialogue between self and God in a theological sense, from which
the response to reality is revealed. The reason is that ‘the weak Christ’ as “the one
for others” shapes and forms the strong and autonomous ego of modern people into a
Christian life as “existing for others.”

Bonhoeffer considers personhood within a
contextual or historical-contextual perspective because this points to the personal and
social matrix. Bonhoeffer, in other words, intends to use his arguments on
personhood to work out a solution to Barth’s unsolved tension between the
Christological and the anthropological interpretations of the relationship between
God and man. The concept of personhood, which involves both individual and
social aspects, also involves a boundary or limitation (Greime) in the mutual
interaction of communal life. From this line of thought, Bonhoeffer points out that
‘the personal-communal presence of Christ in revelation and the concomitant socio-
ethical interpretation of transcendence’ will bring forward a new humanity. This
is a humanity which can be explored through the sociality of the other, the ethics of
difference in the backdrop of historicity, and the role of language in the boundary
between the I and other.

Within this context, we can argue that the ‘non-religious interpretation of
Christianity’ is a ‘reformation’ of theological language by reflecting both on the
nature of faith and by criticizing the form of religion and its relation to faith. This
reflection is not only from the inside (Christians and churches) but also from outside
of Christianity. This aim is to pursue the true understanding of Christianity, for
Christians, in a situation of coming-of-age. At the same time, however, it also
means to seek for a new linguistic perspective in order to have a new understanding
for the people who are outside of Christianity. Bonhoeffer is conscious of the
importance of the problems arising from how language is organized in relation to the
expression of the true faith for people from different backgrounds and situations.

141 Cf. the difference between Barth’s Calvinist background and Bonhoeffer’s Lutheran background
on this topic.
142 Green, p. 101.
143 Bonhoeffer’s way that is used to solve the tension between Christology and anthropology.
144 Bonhoeffer proposes an idea of ‘non-religious interpretation of Biblical concepts’ in order to
demonstrate how to reform theological language into a new language to carry out the communication
about true faith.

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This indicates a first issue concerning what the role of language would be in the formulation of a religion and that leads to the uniqueness of that religion. This is also closely related to the second issue, namely, that when people express their faith (which is not necessary religious faith) through their specific approaches in organizing language, how do they relate their own existential situation to these approaches and let other people understand their faith? This, in turn, leads to a third issue, which is central to our study, namely, determining how Bonhoeffer endeavours to ‘think’ and ‘do’ theology in this world, in communities, in historical decisions, and in ethical relationships in the context of how language can embody people’s responsibility when they face each other.\textsuperscript{145} We will investigate these three main issues, following a discussion on Bonhoeffer’s Christology and ‘non-religious interpretation of Christianity.

2.2.1 \textit{Christ and the Social Interpretation of Christology}

Bonhoeffer scrutinizes the God-man relationship under two aspects: the sociality of Christ and humanity and the problem of transcendence. Bonhoeffer uses the term ‘person’ and its relation to God in a new way. Person entails Christ’s presence \textit{pro me}, for me. This ‘\textit{pro me}’ structure refreshes the traditional discussion regarding the God-man relationship and introduces ethical responsibility into the I-You encounter in order to re-interpret Revelation. All of these demonstrate that the relationship between Christology and anthropology is no longer as strained as it was in Barth’s discussion. Based on this transformation of the concept of person and the structure of relationship within Bonhoeffer’s existential interpretation of Christology, the non-religious interpretation of Christianity could be further developed.

\textit{§ 2.2.2 Image of God, Obedience to God and Freedom from God}

First, in order to discuss these three relationships with God, there is a preparatory step towards understanding Bonhoeffer’s Christological thought. Bonhoeffer’s interpretation of Christ renews traditional thinking on these three relationships. Moreover, Bonhoeffer’s treatment of the ‘person’ is not a way towards interpersonal ‘personalism’, even though Bonhoeffer’s personhood is a fundamental notion that

\textsuperscript{145} Green, p. 28.
provides meaning for man’s existence and his value. The reason is that Bonhoeffer intends to leave space for Christ-as-the-Other in his interpretation, while sharing the main point of personalism that a person’s nature is social being. His idea of ‘person’, nevertheless, is also not the one associated with traditional theology, and which lays the emphasis on Christ as one person with two natures, divine and human. The reason for this is that Bonhoeffer intends to analyse what role Christ plays in a community, and not just to focus attention on the attributes of Christ. Therefore, we could say that Bonhoeffer’s considerations begin from some similar concerns in personalism but it does not end up with personalism. For Bonhoeffer, the meaning of communio not only includes that people share similar values in a society to promote a mode of being in which people can fulfil themselves but also entails the characteristics of Sanctorum, in which God’s transcendence is not a remote other, as was Barth’s propose, but a real and present other who encounters me. Revelation, in this regard, is not an entity but an event that implies an encountering relationship, the timing of this encountering in history, and the methods that used to interpret this encounter.

Understanding ‘revelation’ in this way also has significant implications, in Bonhoeffer’s thinking, for the understanding of the position of human in three situations: when man is regarded as the image of God, when man shows his obedience to God, and when man attains freedom from God.

The image of God for Bonhoeffer is called the analogia relationis. Bonhoeffer does not follow the traditional meaning of the ‘image of God’, namely, that human beings are created in God's image and, therefore, have an inherent value independent of their utility or function. Instead, he follows Barth’s argument regarding the relational Imago Dei. As noted in the previous section, in his analyses of the analogia relationis Barth stresses man’s obedience to God and the freedom of God. Bonhoeffer agrees with Barth that God is free, but he disagrees with Barth’s formal understanding of God’s freedom in revelation as a restraint on man’s freedom and responsibility.\(^{146}\) Man is another important figure in revelation; and this is precisely why Bonhoeffer does not think that man can only show his obedience to

\(^{146}\) See, Green, p. 86.
God passively. In other words, the freedom of man is an indispensable counterpart to the freedom of God because ‘freedom is freedom for’.\footnote{Clifford Green, ‘Human Sociality and Christian Community’, in, The Cambridge Companion to Dietrich Bonhoeffer, ed. by John W. De Gruch (Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 113–133 (p. 129).} God shows his freedom \textit{via} his revelation to man, and man shows his freedom \textit{via} his response towards God. From Bonhoeffer’s point of view, freedom, in the language of the Bible, is not something that people have for themselves, then, rather it is something that they have for others.\footnote{Dietrich Bonhoeffer, \textit{Creation and Fall} (Canterbury: SCM Press, 1959), p. 37 ff. (Henceforth abbreviated as CF.)} To be free is ‘being-free-for-the-other’. Obedience, viewed in this light, is a responsible freedom that demands liberation from egocentric wilfulness.\footnote{Green, p. 152, p.163, p. 167.}

In this regard, Bonhoeffer, in fact, addresses an important issue on ‘power’. His discussion on power does not only refer to the power of God, or to the power of man, but, most significantly, the power that man uses to know and interpret his relationship to God as the almighty Other. This is also the reason why Bonhoeffer attacks nearly all of the methods of philosophy because philosophy limits methods only in human reason, especially in Kantian philosophy. When man abuses his power in interpreting the encountering with the other, \textit{this self-interpretation} leads to \textit{a self-dominating power} over the other. Herein, the ‘created sociality is violated’.\footnote{Ibid., p. 111.} This violation is a process of objectification of the other people and of God under the lordship of self-power. Bonhoeffer reminds us that one of the dangers in this process is precisely human conscience. Bonhoeffer, in \textit{No Rusty Swords}, notes,

\begin{quote}
He [human being] is anxious at this lordship over a dead world, and in his anxiety he breaks the fearful silence of his solitude and snatches himself away from himself, confronts himself, in order to fill the place of the missing other, and accuses himself. That is conscience.\footnote{Green, p. 152, p.163, p. 167.}
\end{quote}

The problem, therefore, lies in the point that conscience ‘fills the place of the missing other’.

Conscience, then, in the view of Bonhoeffer’s theological thought regarding human responsibility and human relationship plays an important role in

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\footnote{NRS, p. 66.}
\end{flushright}
understanding the difference and the relation between the image of God, obedience to God, and freedom from God. In Bonhoeffer’s *Creation and Fall*, he points out that sin originates from man’s violent use of conscience because man imitates God in judging other people with his conscience.\footnote{CF, p. 81.} In Bonhoeffer’s *The Cost of Discipleship*, he holds that obedience leads to liberation, which is not a self-willed conscience but an other-willing freedom. In Bonhoeffer’s *Ethics*, the ‘for me’ structure guarantees the true freedom to let the ‘extra [outside] me’ encounter me through the event of revelation via Christ, which is a counterpart of responsibility.\footnote{Cf. Frick, p. 185 The author explains Bonhoeffer’s articulation between freedom and responsibility: Bonhoeffer argues that freedom underlies all concrete ethical behaviour and hence ‘the action of the responsible person is most profoundly in accord with reality.\footnote{This danger is particular present in Heidegger’s famous analysis of conscience in *Being and Time*, which stresses the call (*der Ruf*) of conscience as coming from the self and to that self and thus as something that centres on that being’s expressed concern for the proper (*eigentlich*) being of that self.}}

In sum, the problem of conscience obscures the boundary or barriers of the I and the other, which is the key to understand Bonhoeffer’s Christology. Bonhoeffer’s new interpretation of Christ in terms of personhood would eliminate the danger of the power of human’s conscience.\footnote{Cf. Frick, p. 185 The author explains Bonhoeffer’s articulation between freedom and responsibility: Bonhoeffer argues that freedom underlies all concrete ethical behaviour and hence ‘the action of the responsible person is most profoundly in accord with reality.\footnote{This danger is particular present in Heidegger’s famous analysis of conscience in *Being and Time*, which stresses the call (*der Ruf*) of conscience as coming from the self and to that self and thus as something that centres on that being’s expressed concern for the proper (*eigentlich*) being of that self.}} This significant insight also directly gives rise to Bonhoeffer’s later thoughts regarding the non-religious interpretation of Christianity because his aim is to clarify the role of Christ in the absence of God in the coming-of-age.

After describing the backdrop of Bonhoeffer’s Christology, we will then investigate what is the role of the I-form and You-form of Person in the interpretation of Christology? What is the significance of this relationship in exploring Bonhoeffer’s social interpretation of revelation? Why is revelation an important concept for understanding Bonhoeffer’s thought regarding responsibility?

\section*{§ 2.2.3 I-Form and You-Form in the Interpretation of Christology}

The I-You relationship will remind many of Martin Buber, whose book, *I and Thou*, which was published in 1923, four years before Bonhoeffer finished his doctoral dissertation *Sanctorum Communio*, and before his habilitation thesis *Act and Being*, where Bonhoeffer puts forward his social and theological understanding of the I-Form and You-Form.
Buber distinguishes existential relationships into two: I-It and I-Thou relationships. For Buber, the I-It relationship is ‘experience in its relation to I’. The I sets up a barrier between subject and object, therefore, ‘the primary word I-It, [is] the word of separation.’ In the I-Thou relationship, ‘the inborn Thou is realized in the lived relations with that which meets it, [...] through the Thou a man becomes I.’ In other words, for Buber, the I-It relationship refers to a situation of objectification that separate subject and object and the I-Thou relationship refers to a situation of mutual encountering that establishes a primary inter-subjectivity.

Bonhoeffer formulates his own theological and anthropological viewpoints on the I-You relationship explicitly in *Sanctorum Communio* but it is not the same as Buber’s idea of I-Thou relationship. Bonhoeffer calls attention to the point that, the individual exists only in relation to an ‘other’: individual [therefore] does not mean solitary. On the contrary, for the individual to exist, ‘others’ must necessarily be there.

Bonhoeffer defines the other person as a boundary to the self, but not a boundary made by the self as in the ‘I-It’ relationship of Buber. When the self encounters this boundary, he is obliged to respond to this other. Without this response, the self and the other would exist in isolation. This response, therefore, is exactly what constitutes a ‘personal-ethical model of transcendence’ in Bonhoeffer’s theology.

It is clear that Buber intends to highlight the danger of treating the other and God as an object or a thing as in the I-It relationship, and wishes to establish a

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155 Buber, *I and Thou*, p. 22 The I which stepped forth declares itself to be the bearer, and the world round about to be the object, of the perception. Of course, this happens in a ‘primitive’ form and not in the form of a ‘theory of knowledge.’
156 Ibid., p. 23.
158 Wayne Whitson Floyd, Jr. *Theology and The Dialectics of Otherness: On Reading Bonhoeffer and Adorno* (University Press of America, 1988), p. 118 [...] there is no indication that Bonhoeffer was familiar with Buber’s *I and Thou*. [...] Bonhoeffer was evidently quite typical in working out his position in relative independence of these others, at least in the early stages of his development of a version of the I-You model itself.
160 Ibid.
161 Ibid., p. 116.
mutual understanding between each other as in the I-Thou relationship. Correspondingly, Bonhoeffer intends to reveal the reality of our individual and social identities in the place of our difference. In other words, the I-Thou relationship in Buber is reciprocal, but for Bonhoeffer, the I-You relationship is You-oriented because this You has the attribute of the human other and the divine Other as Christ: the I, in other words, is to be located by the You. Besides, Bonhoeffer tries to make it clear throughout his works, especially in his early works, that his I-You relation is beyond the epistemological subject-object relation. Therefore, ‘encounter’ is a kernel point to understand in relation to Bonhoeffer’s thinking on responsibility, as ‘for Bonhoeffer, human beings truly encounter each other only in the ethical sphere of claim and responsibility.’ 162 This is because ‘in the encounter with the other his or her claim is a barrier for me which forces me to decide if I want to answer this claim or not.’ 163 Bonhoeffer, therefore, remarks,

It is a Christian insight that the person as conscious being is created [...] in the situation of responsibility, passionate ethical struggle, confrontation by an overwhelming claim; thus the real person grows out of the concrete situation. [Thus, the true encounter between two human beings takes place when...] the other ... places me before an ethical decision. [...] The person exists always and only in ethical responsibility. 164

Based on this, Bonhoeffer distinguishes three basic structures of human types: ‘Einzelperson’ (the I), the ‘community of persons’ (the I-You relations), and the ‘collective person’ in order to develop his thoughts on responsibility. 165 With this distinction, Bonhoeffer turns away from ‘the subject-object relationship and towards a more communitarian understanding of “person” within the framework of the church-community, the Gemeinde.’ 166 At the same time, he keeps his thought in a Christological direction to argue that Christ exists as this church-community. 167 When the individual person exists responsibly for others, then ‘collective person’ comes into being. For Bonhoeffer, ‘collective person’ is the form of ideal

162 Frick, p. 123.
163 Ibid.
165 See, ibid., p. 124. These three structures corresponds to ‘plurality of spirit’, ‘community of spirit’, and ‘unity of spirit’. Here Bonhoeffer adapts Hegel’s ‘objective spirit’ to explain his thought as ‘collective person’, but they are not identical.
166 Frick, p. 97.
167 Ibid.
personhood. It is, then, the claim from the ontologically relational other and my response to that other which implicates new social relations, in Bonhoeffer’s thought.

Bonhoeffer illustrates four ways of basic social relationship in *Sanctorum Communio* and associated problems as a preparation towards proposing his thinking on new social relations. 168 First, is the ancient Greek Platonic-Aristotelian approach, wherein,

human beings only become persons insofar as they participate in the species reason [...] according to Plato’s *Timaeus*, only the rational part of the soul, [...] is immortal. Thus, essential being lies beyond individual-personal being. [...] the collective form, as more nearly approaching the genus, is therefore ranked higher than the individual person. 169

In Platonic-Aristotelian thought, person, who is regarded as a rational form of human being, can be organized into a collective form. From this point of view, person as a genus concept is higher than the concept of individual being. The form as universal genus eclipses, however, the particular.170 In this case, the personhood of the person is an impersonal universal, which Bonhoeffer disagrees.

Second is the Stoic approach. Here, as Bonhoeffer remarks,

The Stoic school was the first in the history of philosophy to formulate, [...] the concept of the ethical person. The human being becomes a person by subordination to a higher imperative. [...] The ethical, rational being of persons is their nature, and at the same time it negates the person as an individual.171

Compared to Platonic-Aristotelian doctrine that emphasizes the universal form of the ‘I’, the Stoic one takes the ‘I’ as self-sufficient because this ‘I’ reaches the fullness of reason. Thus, I as a moral person who share similar reason would be thought as ‘a relation of like to like’. The core of the ‘personhood’ moves from the ‘ideal form of person’ to the ‘ideal relation of social philosophy in common.’

169 SC, p. 36.
170 See, TDO, p.119.
171 SC, p. 37.
Third is the Epicurean approach. This approach asserts that,

human social formation (*Vergesellschaftung*) only serves to heighten the pleasure of each individual. Social formations thus have a purely utilitarian basis, arising only from an agreement and so are inconceivable as natural community. [...] One person is fundamentally alien to the other.\textsuperscript{172}

Compared to the previous two approaches, the Epicurean breaks down the characteristic of totality of ‘ideal form’ into an ‘I-Alien’ relation. In this case, however, both the I and the other have self-serving utilitarian concerns, which Bonhoeffer would not agree with.

Fourth is the Cartesian approach. This approach generates a different way of viewing the ‘self’, for, as Bonhoeffer notes,

Descartes’s transformation of the metaphysical question into an epistemological one casts the concept of person into a different light from previous theories. This was realized in essence by Kant’s development of the epistemological concept of person: the knowing I becomes the starting point of all philosophy.\textsuperscript{173}

For Bonhoeffer, this Cartesian approach is thought of as the starting point to criticize all philosophy because of its danger of an overuse of human self-power.

After examining these four social relationships, Bonhoeffer explores the notion that it is not the subject-object paradigm but the tradition of idealist epistemology that separates the wholeness of knowing and being. This separation helps to totalize the other into the ‘I’. Bonhoeffer’s new proposal is to avoid this totality of the subjects, and instead to reach the reality of the other – let the other as other be. This is a ‘dialectical emphasis on otherness in ontology which mirrors the sociality of the epistemological paradigm’s concern with the status of objectivity.’\textsuperscript{174} If we use Theunissen’s words, this is ‘a kind of “decentering” of the I,’ the ‘perceptivity of the world dominated by the subject for the basis upon which the I

\textsuperscript{172} Ibid., p.39.
\textsuperscript{173} SC, p. 40.
\textsuperscript{174} TDO, p. 104.
first arises in the meeting with the Thou. […] The encounter with the Other-as-Thou refutes the idealist premise of ‘the I as the midpoint of the world.’

Thus far, we have elucidated the distinction between Buber and Bonhoeffer’s I-Thou and I-You relationship; we have examined the role of I and You in four basic social relationships and Bonhoeffer’s criticisms of them; we have also explored Bonhoeffer’s analyses of his criticism of the traditional viewpoint on the I-You relationship. There are, however, still many problems left for us to solve in the following sections in this chapter: What exactly is the encounter between I and You? What role does the boundary between the I and You play in the interpretation of the concept of ‘person’? How would this encounter make man a responsible individual?

In brief, Bonhoeffer’s concept of ‘person’ is relational, corporate, and collective. Man is to be man only in the encounter. For Bonhoeffer, personal encounter is ethically present in the light of Revelation. For Henrich Ott, revelation includes Bonhoeffer’s understanding of history together with the collective understanding of man. The reason for this lies in that, on the one hand, the history of revelation for man is the history of man’s understanding of revelation; on the other hand, man’s understanding of revelation is a collective history regarding man’s understanding of himself. The presence of Christ represents the collective personhood in community. Only in this collective personhood can we interpret the reality of revelation; only from the other can we discover my genuine existence when the boundary between I and You stands face to face with me; only in the historical continuity of revelation can we have a guarantee that our understanding on the boundary is genuine. Therefore, in next section, we will discuss Bonhoeffer’s concepts of ‘pen-ultimate’ and ‘ultimate’, after which we will explore the role of history as a valued-related time in revelation.


176 Cf. Plato’s Symposium: speech of Aristophanes the pursuit of wholeness of one’s two parts…

177 See, Reality and Faith, p. 206.
As discussed previously, the dialectical being between I and You brings to mind the dialogical philosophy of Martin Buber. We also pointed out, however, that Bonhoeffer’s unique understanding of personhood arises from his post-metaphysical doctrine of revelation, which develops his thought in a different direction from Buber. Revelation is of importance to Bonhoeffer not only because it indicates a certain tension between Christology and anthropology in Barth’s thought and this influenced the formation of Bonhoeffer’s ideas on Christological society but also because,

revelation names that situation of openness, where reality is always and only to be understood ‘in reference to’ (in Bezug auf) the thinking subject, whose process of thought is ontologically ‘suspended’ (Aufgehobensein) in being that it has not created.

The key words of ‘in reference to’ and ‘suspension’ imply that revelation is an indirect and contingent process that is dependent upon and thus that has to take in account the thinking subject who lives historically in time and in this world. In his Ethics, Bonhoeffer discusses this relationship of pen-ultimate and ultimate in connection with his reflection on the intimate connection between revelation, history (as time), reality, word of God, and man’s ethical decision in this world.

Bonhoeffer defines ‘pen-ultimate’ as follows: ‘it is everything that precedes the ultimate, everything that precedes the justification of the sinner by grace alone, everything which is to be regarded as leading up to the last thing when the last thing has been found.’ Bonhoeffer does not provide a definition of the ‘ultimate’, because ultimate and pen-ultimate are mutually exclusive contraries, and yet, though mutually exclusive concepts, the meaning of these concepts are, at the same time, mutually inter-dependent. They are different but they are inter-dependent because ‘a thing becomes pen-ultimate only through the ultimate’ and ‘it is the ultimate which determines the penultimate.’ Moreover, ‘it is the freedom of the ultimate that validates the pen-ultimate.’ In other words, the pen-ultimate prepares the way

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178 Bonhoeffer’s Intellectual Formation, p. 103, my emphasis.
179 Ethics, p. 133.
180 Ibid., p. 133.
181 Ibid., p. 134.
for the ultimate; and the ultimate, correlativey, confers the value or necessity of the pen-ultimate. Bonhoeffer, therefore, stresses the point in particular that to prepare the way is to prepare for the word: ‘this is the purpose of everything that has been said about the things before the last.’

There are two important things here, for Bonhoeffer, which play important roles in the discussion of the pen-ultimate in relation to being man (Menschsein) and being good. In the context of Ethics, this means that humanity and goodness are embodied in Christ as the word of God, and this word is the final word in the sense of time. Therefore, the time that God creates, and awaits and prepares for man with ethical significance to respond, will become one of the key topics in Bonhoeffer’s later thought.

However, in his early thought, Bonhoeffer already shows his concern regarding the relation between time and revelation. He points out that the concept of present is defined from without rather than from within. In Bonhoeffer’s interpretation, future can be embodied as Christ, who will project beyond the past and come to the present from the word of Scripture. This is the answer for the question about the nature of revelation: ‘how a discovery of the eternal in the temporal is possible.’ Moreover, Bonhoeffer also introduces the relation between revelation and word.

We too may say that the Word of God and the word of man are joined in Holy Scripture; but they are joined in such a way that God himself says where his Word is, and he says it through the word of man. The word of man does not cease to be a temporal, past word by becoming the Word of God; it is the Word of God precisely as such a historical temporal word.

Here, Bonhoeffer states that the Word of God and word of man can be fitted into the paradigm of the word of the ultimate and the word of the pen-ultimate. However, it is not enough to distinguish between them as between eternal word and temporal word because revelation happens both in the temporal and eternal word. The translation of the Word of God with word of man needs both freedom and responsibility. This is an important issue which allows us to reflect on the relation

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182 Ibid., p. 135.
183 NRS, p. 311.
184 Ibid., p. 313.
185 Ibid., p. 314.
between the traditionally established moral norm and the present changing moral perceptions. Certainly, Bonhoeffer ponders this issue against a backdrop of Christian ethics, but the reason that he has to rethink it is because he finds that a non-religious influence has been influencing Christian ethics; on the other hand, it will be significant to show, how the non-religious influence changes Christian ethics and how the “words” of Christian ethics have been changed in history.¹⁸⁶

Once we have analysed the role of ‘time’ and ‘word’ in the mode of pen-ultimate and ultimate, we need to explore the relationship between this mode and revelation as an encounter between the word of man and the Word of God in a specific historical situation. This encounter is to be conceived as a ‘value-related moment’¹⁸⁷ by means of which we can understand the pre-linguistic moral experience of the You because this encounter is not just a casual meeting, but the event of meeting the ‘ethical barrier’.¹⁸⁸ When the I is addressed by the You, the barrier or boundary is being passed through by the I who is enacted and renewed by the You. This is a purely moral transcendence that emphasizes the response towards the Other. This Other demands the I in a historical happening to be responsible as a person who has a social personhood. In other words, ‘this process is something like “ethics of revelation”, which is in contrast to the conservative Lutheran concept of “orders of creation” (Schöpfungsordnungen).’¹⁸⁹ This ‘orders of creation’ refers to the relationship between the natural world and human’s ethical responsibility in the explanation of the creation of this world. For Bonhoeffer, the preparing word in the pen-ultimate time is the ‘orders of preservation’ towards Christ. This ‘orders of preservation’ refers to humans as moral or responsible creatures who preserve and integrate all existents in this world. Then, the pen-ultimate time is the time of ethical responsibility towards the ultimate time of divine eternity. For Bonhoeffer, the reality of revelation lies in this process but not in a static eternal and timeless situation.

¹⁸⁶ We will discuss this further in Chapter V.
¹⁸⁷ TDO, p. 127.
¹⁸⁹ Frick, p. 258.
We interpret this point in the following way: if we define God as a divine Other, then there is a history that shows this divine Other’s revelation to man, which is recorded as the Words of Bible; however, at the same time, there is another history that is the history of man’s interpretation and response to the record of this divine Other’s revealing. Therefore, the response to this divine Other is a history of God and also a history of man. When we analyse Bonhoeffer’s non-religious interpretation of Christianity we need to take both of these two histories into consideration. The ethical significance of the ‘Reality’ of revelation in this context means that ‘it is not a new “you ought” but “you are”,’ 190 “not in the ideas, but in the historical facts; not in imperatives, but in indicatives; not in generality, but in oneness”. 191 To put this idea in another way, it is not the ethical language that regulates what we are saying, but we are the ones who were recorded as ethical language that is to be said in history. In other words, ethical language would be manifested or embodied by the subjectivity that is both creating history and created by history.

In the first part of this section, we have examined the inner relationship between the image of God, obedience to God, and freedom from God according to Bonhoeffer’s thoughts on freedom and responsibility; we also have distinguished between the thoughts on the I-You relationship between Buber and Bonhoeffer and clarified Bonhoeffer’s unique consideration of the boundary which is related to his thoughts on revelation; finally, we have investigated the element of history as time, in the formulation of language, and their relations to revelation as a social and historical encounter. All of these prepare for the next part of this section which deals with Bonhoeffer’s later thought, the non-religious interpretation of Christianity, and which leads to an interpretation of socio-theological-oriented ethics on this topic.

§ 2.2.5  Non-religious Interpretation of Christianity as Social Theologically-Oriented Ethics

In a letter of 5th May 1944, Bonhoeffer explains in more detail what he meant by the topic of ‘religionlessness’ and the implications of this position for him, remarking,

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190 NRS, p. 362.
191 Ibid., p. 363.
A few more words about ‘religiouslessness.’ I expect you remember Bultmann’s essay on the demythologizing of the New Testament? My view of it today would be, not that he went ‘too far,’ as most people thought, but that he didn’t go far enough. It’s not only the ‘mythological’ concepts, such as miracle, ascension, and so on (which are not in principle separable from the concept of God, faith, etc.) but ‘religious’ concepts generally, which are problematic. You can’t, as Bultmann supposes, separate God and miracle, but you must be able to interpret and proclaim both in a ‘non-religious’ sense. Bultmann’s approach is fundamentally still a liberal one (i.e., abridging the gospel), whereas I am trying to think theologically.¹⁹²

One month later, on 8 June 1944, Bonhoeffer discusses this topic again in relation to Barth, Tillich, and Bultmann. About his own emphasis on the critical point ‘not to make religion a precondition of faith’, he remarks ‘only in this way [of a religionless religion], I think, will liberal theology be overcome […] the world’s coming of age is no longer an occasion for polemics and apologetics, but is now really better understood than it understands itself, namely on the basis of the gospel and in light of Jesus Christ.’¹⁹³

If Bonhoeffer’s early theory begins from a theology of sociality, his later thought, which faced a unique historical situation at that time, and his fundamental desire is to ‘articulate a theology of life’ continues to reinforce the social interpretation about the community.¹⁹⁴ The task of the second part of this section, therefore, is to explore the social significance of the ‘non-religious interpretation’ based on the previous discussion of the Christological reflection on the relationship between God and man, and on I and You in revelation.

§ 2.2.6 Humanity in Adam and Broken Community

Bonhoeffer first considered the idea of ‘Humanity in Adam’ and ‘Broken Community’ in Act and Being. This idea leads the way to Bonhoeffer’s later thoughts on the world, which, as he puts it, is in the situation of ‘coming-of-age’. Bonhoeffer diagnoses that humanity ‘in Adam’ means a fallen humanity because of

¹⁹³ Ibid. p. 121.
¹⁹⁴ Frick, p. 234.
four reasons. The first is the power of the knowing and interpreting ‘I’. The second is that the attitude of this ‘I’ is one of domination. The third is that this ‘I’ is isolated. And the last is that this ‘I’ accuses himself in conscience. From all of these reasons, Bonhoeffer draws the conclusion that the fallen Adam is essentially ‘being-for-itself’, which is ‘extremely egocentric.’

We have already analysed the I-You relationship, the role of personhood in this relation, and its significance in the development of an other-oriented social relationship in a previous part of this section. Now, we will reflect upon Bonhoeffer’s thoughts on social forms as community and society, from which basis we will move on to clarify the socio-theoretical foundation for his non-religious interpretation of Christianity.

Bonhoeffer develops a typology of social forms. One is ‘community’ (Gemeinschaft) and the other is ‘society’ (Gesellschaft), both of which he appropriated and modified from the well-known distinction of Ferdinand Tonnies. Community constitutes a ‘structure of meaning’, which is oriented towards its self-preservation of personhood of each person in this community. Society constitutes a ‘structure of purpose’, which is oriented towards the pragmatic intention of each person. From this distinction, ‘only a community has a personality in the way Bonhoeffer means it’. Having established the collective characteristic of this personality, Bonhoeffer proceeds to carry out his social interpretation regarding ‘individual sinful act and collective sin of all humanity.’ This interpretation

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195 Green, p. 92.
197 SC, p.86 ff. [n. 45]. First published in 1886, Tonnies’ very influential Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft had reached his sixth edition by 1926. Bonhoeffer, as usual, changed the concepts which he took over; this is why he says, though this is omitted in the Gregor Smith translation, that he uses Gemeinschaft ‘in a special sense’. For Tonnies, a Gemeinschaft was a social group which had ‘grown’ organically, while a Gesellschaft was one that had been ‘made’ artificially; a certain romantic nostalgia may be detected in this distinction. Bonhoeffer also sees a confusion between a historical and a systematic phenomenological method in Tonnies’ definitions. Consistent with his preference for the latter method, Bonhoeffer defines them according to the nature of their constitutive acts of will (‘will to meaning,’ ‘will to rational purpose’) and their structure (‘structure of meaning’, ‘structure of purpose’), not according to their origin. Furthermore, he places both types in the ‘primal state,’ thereby dismissing the possibility of viewing a Gesellschaft merely as a sinful Gemeinschaft. (SC, p.117f), quote taken from Bonhoeffer: A Theology of Sociality, p. 37.
198 Green, p. 38; also, Bonhoeffer, p. 65.
199 Green, p. 38.
200 Bonhoeffer, p. 65.
201 Ibid.
relates to another paradigm from Bonhoeffer: the personification of Adam and Christ as two fundamental styles of human relationship and social forms.\textsuperscript{202}

The key point of these classifications is the role of ‘personification’ in Bonhoeffer’s thoughts and method. Bonhoeffer does not purely identify Christ and Church but emphasizes their dialectical relationship.\textsuperscript{203} Church, for Bonhoeffer, is the life of the community of the new humanity with the ‘personification’ of Christ when man encounters each other in a responsible personhood. Certainly, Bonhoeffer’s discussion at the time did not concern itself with how this ‘personification’ can be applied to people who are outside of the institution of the Church. His incomplete reflections on the non-religious interpretation, the social interpretation of revelation, and his discussion of the response to reality provide resources, nonetheless, for us to think further about.

\textsuperscript{202} Green, p. 44.
\textsuperscript{203} Ibid., p. 60.
\textsuperscript{204} Ibid., p. 51.
\textsuperscript{205} This corresponds to Bonhoeffer’s consistent reflection on the relationship between anthropology and Christology.

§ 2.2.7 Being-in-relationship: the Social Significance of Revelation and Correspondence to Reality

As we discussed earlier (in § 2.2.1.2 and § 2.2.1.3), revelation for Bonhoeffer is only understandable in relation to sociality. Again, his interpretation of original sin is also in terms of a social conceptuality. Man lives and shares the structure of meaning with each other in the same community. However, there is a question that is related to this understanding which needs to be answered: How can Bonhoeffer’s theology solve the conflict between an individual’s responsibility in individual sinful acts and the collective sin of all humanity in this structure of meaning?

According to the ‘pro-me’ structure and the collective personhood, ‘the act of the individual person and the collective person is one and the same.’\textsuperscript{204} In a meaning-oriented community, the collective person is not the sum of the individual persons. Only when the individual person encounters the barrier or boundary [\textit{Grenze, Schrank}] and responds responsibly to the other via this boundary does true humanity come into being and is shared by both sides of this boundary.\textsuperscript{205}
Therefore, the individual’s responsibility is closely linked to both the individual’s sinful action and collective sin of all of humanity in Bonhoeffer’s thought. For him, the transcendence of the ethical relationship depends on how both the individual’s sin and the collective sin of all humanity in the broken community can be solved by the socio-ethical revelation in terms of Christ’s presence in man as Word in the primal community. As seen in the previous discussion, conscience as a man’s power of will constitutes ‘limits’ for others, but at the same time, when each man encounters other man’s will, they participate in a process of pursuing the reality of their relationship.

In Bonhoeffer’s case, revelation is not only present in a personal encounter, but also in the history of the continuous understanding of this encounter. The latter leads to problems: What is the role of remembrance between the meaning of the original encounter and the living present situation? What is the difference between individual remembrance and the remembrance of the collective person in a community? What is the significance of responsibility in interpreting the difference between individual remembrance and the remembrance of the collective person which is recorded in the Bible and interpreted by man? Answers to all these problems can be located in the paradigm of the pen-ultimate and ultimate of word/language, which is also related to Bonhoeffer’s reflections on the non-religious interpretation of Christianity. The world is coming of age, the role of religion in this world is changing, and the understanding and interpretation of religion is also changing. In this context, Bonhoeffer puts forward his notion of ‘religionless Christianity’ or ‘non-religious interpretation of Christianity’. If the form of religion is no longer the same as before, then what should Christians do with their Christian faith when their remembrance encounters the remembrance of non-Christians in history? Bonhoeffer’s endeavour is to find out a way to revive the ‘looking to’ Christ, and at the same time to reform the relationship between Christology and anthropology in a new tension: between the dominating power of the ego and the mature strength of self in the root of ‘religion’.206 Thus, we will next discuss Bonhoeffer’s interpretation of non-religious Christianity.

206 See, Green, p. 171.
§ 2.2.8 Non-Religious Interpretation of Christianity

Before we discuss the term ‘non-religious’, we need to know what Bonhoeffer means by the term ‘religious’. According to Clifford J. Green, Bonhoeffer diagnoses “religion” as something rooted in human weakness and a dependency upon the power of God under eight headings. Bonhoeffer also criticises Schleiermacher’s views on religion and church from five headings. Bonhoeffer tries to clarify the distinction between religion and Christianity because, as Ebeling notes, ‘religion has always been a garment of Christianity.’ His criticisms regarding Barth’s revelational positivism and Schleiermacher’s social attribute of religion are from different perspectives; however, Bonhoeffer’s point is that he tries to avoid the abuse of man’s self-consciousness as conscience, which would fall into the danger that religion is only anthropology.

For Bonhoeffer, to be ‘religionless’ is to find out the a priori religious, which is a ‘historically conditioned and transient form of self-expression.’ Accordingly, ‘Non-religious interpretation’, as Ebeling points out, ‘is for Bonhoeffer nothing other than Christological interpretation.’ In other words, it concerns the question of

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207 Green, p. 16, also see Green, 263 1) religion is episodic. (‘God’ as stop-gap, deus ex machina, and working-hypothesis) 2) Religion’s peripheral or parochial character; 3) Religion is subjective and inward. 4) religion’s individualism 5) Otherworldliness. [...] Religious otherworldliness looks for the off-stage refuge of the deus ex machina; 6) Intellectual dishonesty. To invoke God as a working-hypothesis when a limit is reached in human knowledge is simply dishonest. 7) Religion is humiliating. This is seen in common forms of apologetics and proselytism; 8) Religion is self-centered. It does not transform and reorient human existence into a free and responsible ‘existence-for-others.’

208 Frick, p. 127, 1) Schleiermacher is concerned with individual (self-consciousness) more than community; 2) Schleiermacher’s concept of church is ‘utilitarian.’ 3) Bonhoeffer makes the criticism that Schleiermacher ‘thought he could deduce the concept of the church from the general concept of religion.’ 4) Bonhoeffer makes the criticism that: “Schleiermacher’s concept of unity is not theological, but psychological, and therefore profoundly mistaken. It is based on an identification of ‘religious community’ and ‘church’.” 5) Bonhoeffer’s fifth criticism is that Schleiermacher makes the methodological mistake of viewing the church only from the outside.

209 Ebeling, p. 136.

210 Bonhoeffer criticizes the tension between Christology and anthropology in Barth’s thinking as a ‘revelational positivism’. Bonhoeffer’s critique on Barth’s revelational positivism is a controversial issue, we leave it open to discuss and will not discuss it in this thesis.

211 It refers specially to Schleiermacher’s concept of the feeling of absolute dependence, even though it develops from the ‘absolutely general nature of humanity.’ Another point of criticism from Bonhoeffer is that it is possible to discuss truth on consciousness only, because for Schleiermacher, everything can be true in consciousness.

212 LPP, p. 92.

213 Ebeling, p. 107.
‘Who Christ really is, for us today’ in relation to language. Bonhoeffer comes to realize that,

our church is ‘incapable of bringing the word of reconciliation and redemption to mankind and the world at large.’\(^{214}\) [and he finally stated] : ‘The church must get out of its stagnation. We must move out again into the open air of intellectual discussion with the world.’\(^{215}\)

Eberling, however, detects that Bonhoeffer’s view of the coming changes in this connexion is ‘simply not concerned at all with the problem of form, but with the problem of language’, and that,

It will be a new language, perhaps completely unreligious, but liberating and redeeming like the language of Jesus, so that men are horrified by it and yet overwhelmed by its power. It will be the language of a new righteousness and truth, a language which proclaims the peace of God with men and the advent of his kingdom.\(^{216}\)

In Bonhoeffer’s early thought, he was already aware of the immaturity of Protestant theological language and Barth also faced this problem when he looked for a philosophical terminology for his theology, especially from Kant and the Neo-Kantians.\(^{217}\) However, Bonhoeffer points out the danger of systems in philosophizing, as something decided by the thinking ego. He analyses Kant’s and Hegel’s ways of dealing with the relationship between thinking and transcendence. In Bonhoeffer’s words, Kant holds that ‘thinking is not an act which ever involves transcendence, but refers to it.’\(^{218}\) Kant sets the limit between man’s reason and transcendence in order to renew this limit. Hegel, nevertheless, holds that the purpose of setting up these limits is to overcome them. For Bonhoeffer, neither Kant nor Hegel could provide an exhaustive solution to the relationship between reason and transcendence because they use reason to limit reason, or use thinking to limit thinking, which is a circle of egocentricity or a circle of philosophy.\(^{219}\) Bonhoeffer’s purpose is to know the reality, which is revealed from revelation as encountering the boundary between I and You. For Bonhoeffer, man is in limitation, which is

\(^{214}\) Ibid., p. 121.
\(^{215}\) Ibid. pp. 121–122.
\(^{216}\) Ibid., p. 122.
\(^{217}\) NRS, p. 367, p. 368.
\(^{218}\) Ibid., p. 369.
\(^{219}\) Ibid., p. 370.
identical with Kant’s purpose. The difference lies in this that, for Kant, thinking can only refer to the Other/other by reflection [reflexus] because of the limits of reason; however, for Bonhoeffer, revelation is the direct action [actus directus] that identifies man’s thinking as act and man’s existence as being. Based on the identity of act and being, Bonhoeffer can then put forward a non-egocentric way to interpret religion.

Ebeling thinks that Bonhoeffer’s non-religious interpretation is a concrete interpretation of faith, and faith is regarded as a prerequisite of the hearing of the Word.\textsuperscript{220} The hearing of the Word concerns both believers and non-believers who confront faith. From this, we may define the problem and its origin as below.\textsuperscript{221} Firstly, the non-religious interpretation raises a problem of language, that is, not only to change the old concepts or words into new forms but also to deliver the essence of faith with and within a new linguistic form. Secondly, the non-religious interpretation also implies the I-You relationship in a community that shares a collective personhood in history because the interpretation would be variously determined by the confrontation of man’s own existence with other people, who may not be religious any more. Thirdly, this interpretation grants a measure of freedom and responsibility as regards what types of old presuppositions that should be kept, or discarded in the process of this interpretation.

As noted above, nevertheless, this is not a linguistic problem only, but a problem about how language bears the significance of faith. Bonhoeffer thinks that Barth and Bultmann are the pioneers in exploring this problem. Barth does not go far enough, in Bonhoeffer’s estimation, because his strategy of adopting philosophical terms is not effective. As for Bultmann, he also does not go far enough in the sense that he still ‘keeps thinking in “religious” categories’\textsuperscript{222}, and yet he goes too far in reducing the content of religious faith down to only an existential significance remain (a position later developed by Heidegger into an entirely

\textsuperscript{220} See, Ebeling, p. 126. Namely, in the sense that the proclaimed Word is aimed solely at faith, and that the profound difference thereby becomes apparent between faith and religion.
\textsuperscript{221} The classification of this problem adopts Henrich Ott’s method but I develop and reform some of his ideas. See, Ott, p. 100.
\textsuperscript{222} Ott, p. 115.
aetheistic-existentialism in *Being and Time*). Bonhoeffer, therefore, is clearly conscious of these problems and he retains his early social thought in his later reflection on the ‘non-religious’. For him, the non-religious interpretation is necessary in order to reveal the meaning of word as an event in community. Word is *extra-me* but at the same time *pro-me*. Christ as the logos of word and living address exists between persons. The encounter of I and You in this stage is the encounter of the address between persons in community and in history. This is the original meaning of communication and of genuine dialogue.

Genuine dialogue does not only concern the existence of a person in an epistemological sense but also the structure of person in a relational sense. The language that the non-religious interpretation intends to use bears the significance of ethical relations. A person who uses this kind of language constitutes ethical significance in every word. Words, therefore, are not constituted by man, rather they constitute man. In other words, personality has a verbal nature from which a word has an ontological sense. When people encounter the other, face to face, the boundary is uncovered by the words that each use in a responsive attitude.

This responsive attitude leads to the central issue, ‘responsibility’, in the discussion of a non-religious interpretation. Responsibility, in the first instance, is ‘the basic answering (*Verantwortung*) of a person to life itself, the fundamental response of one’s own life to life as constituted in and by relationships.’ To use Bonhoeffer’s terms: responsibility is ‘the total and realistic response of man to the claim of God *and* of our neighbour.’ This response contains both obligation and freedom. Obligation is thus embodied from vicarious or representative action and its correspondence with reality *via* language. Freedom is embodied from the personal accountability of life and thus the free wager of concrete decision. These two aspects help man to ‘observe and recognize *in his own existence* collective responsibility and collective guilt.’ As Ott comments, responsibility is not identical to a pure ‘ought’. And the responsibility of the collective person is also not

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223 We will discuss Bultmann’s problem with Heidegger’s further in Chapter III.
224 ATS, p. 213.
226 Ibid., my emphasis.
227 See Green, p. 313.
228 Ott, p. 208, my emphasis.
identical to a pure ‘collective ought’. Action, according to an ‘ought’, is based on the understanding of one’s existence as linguisticality. Responsible action, however, stems from an understanding of reality through language but not from the understanding of language only.

For Bonhoeffer, it is in and through the Word, that is, both the Word of God and word in general, as revelation via encounters, that unites God and man. If we explore the difference between ‘word’ in Greek and ‘word’ in Hebrew as examples, we can further clarify the meaning of ‘understanding reality through language.’ Logos in Greek means ‘word,’ ‘account,’ or ‘reason’. It derives from the verb legō (λέγω): to count, tell, say, and speak in a coherent way. In Christian thought, it is identified with the Word of God. On the other hand, word as the unity of language in Hebrew is davár [דָּבָר], which also means a thing’s manifestation. From these two examples, we can detect a common point: words are happening words that serve human self-understanding of man in the flow of time. Man’s responsibility is manifested in his existence as a response to the people whom he encounters in his life. In this sense, language is not static but dynamic. Language reveals man’s past, manifests his present, and also constitutes his future. The unique attribute of language lies in the fact that language presents invisible and promising things which awaken faith within man. Man’s conscience is questioned in the process of speaking and hearing words from the Other. Man, in this sense, does not ‘have’ a conscience, rather he is conscience when he gives a response responsibly to the Other. By this process, the mind of man has been formed according to, but is not decided by, the mind of the Other (for Bonhoeffer, it is the mind of Christ). This is not leading people to be a religious man, but leading to ‘the man.’

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229 There are two layers of meaning for the concept of ‘linguisticality’. The first one is a human being’s linguistically communicative capacity. The second one is the linguistic state of human existence.
230 Ebeling, p. 417.
231 See, NRS, p. 15.
§ 2.2.9 Some Preliminary Conclusions: Man, Limitation and Possibility, and the Boundary Between the Condition of Possibilities and the Connection of Limitations which Implicate Responsibility

When Bonhoeffer raises the question of ‘what is man’ in his early work, he seeks a theological basis for ethics. Ethics, then, for him, is a way from man to God, but Christianity speaks from God to man. The ethical discussion in Christianity, therefore, is not about what is right and wrong, or good and evil, but ‘only between one evil and another’ in history. Thus, for Bonhoeffer, responsible action would be determined by its identity with the true reality. This is why, for Bonhoeffer, the ‘I’ who carries out responsible acts awakes only in the conscience of being called. And in Bonhoeffer’s case, this calling is face to face with God as the Other. It is a boundary situation, in other words, where man stands before God and with God, but lives without God.

It thus follows for Bonhoeffer that responsibility, in this context, does not provide a standard of moral norm on what man ‘ought’ to do. It is not concerned with the judgment of conscience on what man ‘can’ do. Responsibility, rather, focuses on the personhood of who I ‘am’, who you ‘are’, and who we ‘are’. This idea of responsibility emphasizes the priority of difference in opposition to any philosophy of totality as a systematic ontology. This also reveals individual and social relationships concerning their respective identity of being and thinking. Thus Bonhoeffer endeavours to avoid the priority of either being or of thinking, but intends to prove the dialectical inter-wovenness between being and thinking. An idealist epistemology, after all, can only raise and does raise the question of the limitation of man’s reason, and traditional ontology can only and does only help to prove this limitation, but Bonhoeffer’s Christian universalism put this boundary as its centre.

In sum, Barth’s distinctions between God as Wholly Other and man, and the Word of God and the word of man set the scene intellectually and raise essential questions that both allow and engender Bonhoeffer to raise his own questions regarding religion, faith, reality, person, and the role of language. All of these...

\[232\] Ibid., p. 39.
\[233\] Ott, p. 28.
discussions serve to clarify the question ‘what is man’. From the analyses of this chapter, we can conclude that to understand ‘what is man’ does not come from man’s possibility but from his reality. Man’s possibility is founded in man’s own limitations and achievements; man’s reality, however, is determined through man’s response to the Other when they encounter each other. In this regard, Bonhoeffer’s position not only inherits but also criticizes Barth’s thought, and raises again the question of ‘what is man’ for us. Bonhoeffer also draws attention to and considers both Heidegger’s historical way of addressing the question of the meaning of being and time and Scheler’s continuous but static approach to this topic. Bonhoeffer holds that Heidegger’s way is better than Scheler’s, but Bonhoeffer argues that Heidegger fails in his discussion regarding death and totality because Heidegger’s interpretation is a self-understanding that is founded in a self-enclosing hermeneutic circle. In the next chapter, therefore, we will discuss Bonhoeffer’s conceptual criticism and Levinas’s ethical criticism of Heidegger’s position, both of which will help to clarify further the inter-relatedness of the concepts of the other, language, and ethical responsibility (and which we will elaborate further in chapter five in relation to Levinas’s thinking).
CHAPTER III

BONHOEFFER’S AND LEVINAS’S CRITIQUE OF HEIDEGGER’S ANALYSIS OF BEING, LANGUAGE, RESPONSIBILITY AND DASEIN

Martin Heidegger’s (1889–1976) work *Being and Time* (1927) is considered to be one of the most important philosophical works of the twentieth century. Moreover, his thought has strongly influenced not only philosophy but also theology and the humanities. Heidegger’s support for National Socialism and the Nazi Party in the 1930s, however, reveal real flaws inherent in his thought, and it brought criticism from several of his students, including Hannah Arendt, Emmanuel Levinas, and Karl Löwith, and many others.\(^1\) Faced with the same historical background as Heidegger, Bonhoeffer and Levinas were concerned with similar ethical problems, but they argued against Heidegger’s position on what constitutes ‘authentic existence’ (in the strong Kierkegaardian existentialist’s sense of concretely lived existence). Because of the major influence that Heidegger’s philosophy was exercising on others, both Bonhoeffer and Levinas thought it incumbent upon them to express themselves on Heidegger’s thought and the controversial issues that he brought forward. In this regard, the discussion of Heidegger is an essential link between Bonhoeffer and Levinas as it forms an important philosophical background to both the significance and the exigency of the emergence of an ethical concept of responsibility in the twentieth century.

This chapter examines Bonhoeffer’s and Levinas’s thoughts which relate to Heidegger’s standpoint and in particular to his analysis of *Dasein* and his exploration of language in addressing ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ (*die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein*). We shall see that Heidegger’s discussion of the meaning of Being and his conception of (existentialist) ethics is founded upon an implicit

egocentricity which prevents him from being able to address the ethical inter-
connection between the Other, language, and ethical problems.

In order to illustrate the significance of Heidegger’s egocentric thought on his
articulation of Being, we will begin, briefly, by outlining three stages in Heidegger’s
thought (in section one). This will clarify the main points which influenced
Bonhoeffer and Levinas, but which they also radically criticized. In the second
section, I will compare the centrality of the question of meaning of Being in
Heidegger and the centrality of the meaning of Christ in Bonhoeffer. By formulating
this comparison between Heidegger’s Dasein analysis and Bonhoeffer’s rethinking
of the Logos and Christology, we will show the fundamental difference between
Heidegger’s and Bonhoeffer’s thought on ethics. In addition to this, we will discuss
Bonhoeffer’s critique of Rudolf Bultmann’s dependence on Heidegger’s early
philosophy. It is well known that Bultmann applies Heidegger’s existential thoughts
to his de-mythological interpretation of Christian exegesis. Bonhoeffer considers that
this brings forth new perspectives on interpreting Christian thought, but he also
shows that this project of demythologization of Christian faith produces the problem
of regarding the individual person as ‘the possibility of being’, deviating from the
essence and value of Biblical perspective and information of man before God and the
relation between man and man before God. We will conclude this section, therefore,
by analysing Heidegger’s disinterested logos and Bonhoeffer’s Christological and
ethical anti-logos.

In the third and final section of this chapter, we will turn to and examine
Levinas’s response to Heidegger’s concept of the ‘ontological difference’ (Being is
not a being). Firstly, we will compare Heidegger’s concept of Being and Levinas’s
notion of the Other. Moreover, we also will explore Heidegger’s stress on
temporality and Levinas’s thinking on time, especially on diachrony. By delineating
these central concepts, we can explore Levinas’s critique of Heidegger’s ethical
deficiency. Secondly, we will investigate Levinas’s response to Heidegger’s concept
of language. In order to elucidate this point, we need to review briefly the
development of his reflections on language from the early stage to his later stage. In
view of above-mentioned background, we will point out the differences regarding the
role of language in Heidegger and Levinas. Levinas puts much value on Heidegger’s
Being and Time and his early thought; however, the reflection of language in Heidegger's later thought is similar to Levinas’s deliberation on language, although the concerns behind their discussions are not completely the same. We will discuss, therefore, Levinas’s response to Heidegger’s early linguistic thought on the other hand and explore the similarities and differences between them on the other. Lastly, we will conclude this section by comparing Heidegger and Levinas’s thought on ‘face and language’ in order to illustrate the importance of ethical significance of ‘face-to-face’ overlooked by Heidegger.

SECTION ONE
THREE STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF HEIDEGGER’S RELIGIOUS AND ANTI-RELIGIOUS THOUGHT

The development of Heidegger’s thought is complicated and outside the limits of this study to address. We will focus, however, on those significant religious themes in this development that are relevant to their understanding and evaluation.2 Heidegger himself, after all, in his later thought, admitted that ‘without this theological background, he would never come onto the path of thinking [about die Seinsfrage].’3 The first stage in the development that Heidegger recounts, is his conversion from Catholicism to Protestantism (1917–1919).4 In this period of his early teaching career at the University in Freiburg (1917–1924), Heidegger lays the foundation for his writing of Being and Time.5 Though Heidegger had been versed in medieval

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3 Martin Heidegger, On the Way to Language, trans. by Peter D. Hertz (New York: Harper & Row, 1982), p. 10. (Henceforth abbreviated as OWL). In 1957, the older Heidegger also recalls his younger days at University, remarking: ‘What the exciting years between 1910 and 1914 meant for me cannot be adequately expressed; I can only indicate it by a selective enumeration: the second, significantly enlarged edition of Nietzsche’s The Will to Power, the works of Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky in translation, the awakening interest in Hegel and Schelling, Rilke’s works and Trakl’s poems, Dilthey’s Collected Writings.’ M. Heidegger, ‘A Recollection (1957)’, in Heidegger: The Man and Thinker, ed. by Thomas Sheehan (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, Inc, 1981), pp. 21–22 (p. 22). See, also, below, n. 7.
5 For an extensive and meticulous examination of the many sources (e.g., from theology, existentialism, hermeneutics, Husserlian phenomenology, Dilthey’s historicism, Augustinian philosophical anthropology and many more) that influenced the composition of Heidegger’s Being
philosophy and medieval mysticism, and completed his doctoral and habilitation studies on Duns Scotus, from the outset of his teaching career Heidegger had moved away from and rejected the ‘catholic eye’ that is characteristic of ‘natural theology’, and accepted the ‘protestant ear’ that is characteristic of hermeneutic-biblical scholars interested in exploring the significance of the meaning of the life, death and resurrection (what the protestant theologians called ‘facticity’) of Jesus Christ for our human self-understanding. The second stage in Heidegger’s thinking is a turn from Protestantism to a heroic and atheistic-Nietzschean voluntarism (1928–1929). This year also marks the return of Heidegger to Freiburg University, to succeed Husserl who had retired and bequeathed the chair of philosophy to him. Before this, Heidegger taught at Marburg University (1924–1928), where he made the acquaintance of Rudolf Bulmann among others. In his return to Freiburg in 1928, and in the years to follow, Heidegger was engaged in activities supporting National Socialism into the early 1930s. The third period in Heidegger’s thought, however, begins from about 1936, when he moves away from his early voluntarism and existentialist’s concerns, and towards a more mytho-poetic meditation on Being and thinking.

In his first turn from Catholicism to Protestantism, Heidegger’s philosophical interest moves from a strict Husserlian phenomenology to a hermeneutical phenomenology. This is mainly influenced by Wilhelm Dilthey’s concept of history and the history of ideas, and also by Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics, which

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6 In this ‘Curriculum Vitae 1915’, Heidegger specifically draws attention to a philosophical turn of events that occurred for him between 1913 and 1915, after he completed his doctoral thesis in 1913 on *The Doctrine of Judgement in Psychologism*, under the direction of the neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert. See his, ‘Curriculum Vitae 1915’, in Martin Heidegger, *Becoming Heidegger*, ed. by Theodore Kisiel and Thomas Sheehan (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007), pp. 7–8. In that doctoral study, Heidegger tells us that his interest initially lay in logical and mathematical problems, bequeathed to him by others such as Rickert, Frege, Russell, and Lotze, and that ‘I [Heidegger] took my bearings both from modern logic and from basic Aristotelian-Scholastic premises’ (p. 8.). In all of this, Heidegger furthermore remarks, ‘the *Logical Investigations* of Edmund Husserl was decisive for the course of my scientific development. At the same time, the earlier work by the same author, *The Philosophy of Arithmetic* [1889], placed mathematics in a whole new light for me’ (p. 7). By the time Heidegger completed his habilitation thesis on *The Doctrine of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus* in 1915, however, all of this had radically changed because, as he says himself, ‘(A)s a result of my study of Fichte and Hegel, my intense engagement with Rickert’s *The Limits of Concept Formation in the Natural Sciences*, the investigations of Dilthey, and not least of all the lecture courses and seminar exercises of Privy Councillor Finke, my aversion to history, which had been nurtured in me by my predilection for mathematics, was thoroughly destroyed’ (p. 8).
Heidegger read extensively, (as well as Husserl’s texts in phenomenology), during his early student days and teaching-career in philosophy. Based on these sources, Heidegger developed his thoughts on the history of the disclosure of Being and the kairological moment [Augenblick] of truth in Being and Time. The main purpose of Being and Time is to locate the existence of human being into a factual structure and to provide an ontological and neutral interpretation of the life of human being. This leads to Heidegger’s distinction between ‘existential’ and the ‘existentiell’, or ‘the ontological’ and the ‘ontic’. However, Heidegger’s emphasis on historicity lies in his intention to discover an essence [Wesen] of history, which is ahistorical and essential. Therefore, the essence of the universal a priori human-life structure replaces the core Christian belief structure. In this sense, Heidegger’s concern regarding the question of ‘What is Man?’ lies in the unspoken words of what man should be when God no longer functions in society as before. This leads to the second turn of Heidegger’s thought from Protestantism to voluntarism. In this turning point, Heidegger’s considerations are actually quite similar to those of Bonhoeffer’s, however, they went in different directions. Bonhoeffer continues his way in the pursuit of the ethico-religious God, and Heidegger, in his third stage, continues from voluntarism to a mytho-poetic meditation on Being, to pursue a cosmo-poetic god.

If, as Heidegger says in his later work On the Way to Language, origin (der Ursprung) always comes to meet us from the future (die Zukunft), then we need to excavate more hints from his early work to clarify the ultimate concern in his theory, in particular his early work Phenomenology of Religious Life. This work presents the text of Heidegger’s important lectures on religion from 1920 to 1921. Heidegger provides a sense of what phenomenology would come to mean in the mature

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8 Thus there is a certain forgetfulness, on Heidegger’s part, of real history which is always of the significance of a particular event and that does not lend itself to the same dimensions of analysis characteristic of mathematical-eidetic insight. See, Philip W. Rosemann, ‘Heidegger’s Transcendental History’, Journal of History of Philosophy, 40, no. 4 (2002), 501–523.

9 OWL, p. 10.
expression of his thought in this work. Following Dilthey, Heidegger points out that ‘philosophy arises from factual life experience’ and that this experience designates two aspects: one is the experiencing activity and the other is that which is experienced through this activity.\textsuperscript{10} From this distinction, we can see that Heidegger (unlike Dilthey) methodologically separates the experiencing activity itself and the understanding of this experiencing activity.\textsuperscript{11} This indicates that Heidegger’s elaboration of the distinction between Being and beings has fermented during this period because being (\textit{Seiende}) refers to the subject who experiences and ‘Being’ (\textit{Sein}) refers to the questioning of the meaning of what is experienced by beings. However, Heidegger does not think that Being and beings should be completely separated because ‘the experiencing self and what is experienced are not torn apart like things that expresses what is essential in factual life experience.’\textsuperscript{12} Heidegger’s distinction between Being and beings, then, replaces the Neo-Kantian distinction between objectification and subjectification because, for Heidegger, the approach that the object is to be drawn into the subject is no longer possible (i.e. is ahistorical) as both object and subject should be integrated into the context of the world in history. From this point onwards, Heidegger develops his philosophizing self-understanding together with a phenomenologically historical method. History is in a process of becoming and human being is a becoming being in history. Human being bears his or her life but also fulfils his or her life in history. In other words, human being is the product of history but history is also the product of human being. Thus, from the outset, Heidegger is critical of Husserl’s ahistoricality in the reduction of the natural attitude to the transcendental-phenomenological attitude of pure consciousness (and its objectivities).\textsuperscript{13} Following Dilthey’s cue, instead, Heidegger insists that it is only in history and through history that the meaning of life experiences and human self-understanding unfolds.


\textsuperscript{11} For Dilthey all experiences (\textit{Erlebnisse}) contain within themselves some (implicit) meaning, and so, the more one tries to understand (\textit{verstehen}) and articulate that understanding (\textit{ausdrucken}) the more one engages with that implicit meaning. Thus Dilthey is famous for his emphasis and stress on the hermeneutic and triadic unity of \textit{Erlebnis-Verstehen-Ausdruck} (Experience-Understanding-Expression).

\textsuperscript{12} PRL, p. 7.

From this analysis of history, Heidegger moves on to ‘the attitudinal character of the relation to history because each “attitude” has the character of a “relation”’.  It is not the perception, but the attitude that is prior to this perception of determining the order of man’s self-understanding. Heidegger adopts Husserl’s differentiation between two concepts: Generalization (Generalisierung) and Formalization (Verallgemeinerung). Generalization deals with the problem of ‘what’ and formalization deals with the ‘how’ (wie). We can say that, for Heidegger, generalization is the ordering of the activities of beings and formalization is the essence of this ordering. Following from this distinction, what Heidegger’s phenomenology attempts to explore is the essence of the totality of activities for the purposes of finding out the ‘Logos of the phenomena’. In this sense, generalization and formalization are just two different stages in one process to search for the essence of the relation between human being and this world.

Next, Heidegger applies this method to analyse the phenomenology of Christian religiosity. In this regard, Heidegger further distinguishes object-historical understanding and phenomenological understanding. The former focuses on the relations that the observer is not involved in, and the later brings in the observer’s attitude. Christian religiosity, as well as other different types of religious, however, contains both of these two understandings because, for Heidegger, Christian religiosity exists transcendentally in the factical life experience of believers on the one hand and, on the other hand, the believers receive Christian information through language (e.g. Word of God) and ‘empathizing’ with a situation, which is treated as a phenomenological term. According to Heidegger, the situation of the Christian believer lies in the two important stages of experience and history. The believer experiences their having-become and they also have a knowledge of their having-become. In other words, their having-become is their ‘to be (sein)’ now. It is this very experience of ‘having-become’ that provides a

14 PRL, p. 32.
15 Ibid., pp. 39–41.
16 Ibid., p. 43.
17 See, ibid., p. 55.
18 Ibid., pp. 57–58.
19 See Heidegger’s explanation on three object-historical complexes, in PRL, p. 59.
20 See, ibid., p. 65.
21 Ibid., p. 66.
perspective for that individual human being to have a knowledge of the relation between his own self-world and a transcendental world. For Heidegger, however, to have this relational sense does not mean that the Christian can integrate the self-world and transcendental world. This brings difficulties to any Christian worldview, similar to the contradiction between the ‘to be’ (of the meaning of Being [Sein]) and beings (Seiende). Dasein is the solution that Heidegger proposed in his early stage, for only this being can question the meaning of Being in relation to that being’s own being (als Seiendes), but he had not completely elucidated this concept and, in his later thought, he turns back to the meditation on the meaning of Being from a linguistic perspective.

In general, Heidegger’s early thought originates from his concern about the understanding and interpretation of the interaction of human being and the world around that individual human being. Therefore, his analysis of Dasein as an awareness of the coherence of Being-in-the-world becomes a new perspective for theologians, such as, for instance, Rudolf Bultmann, Heinrich Ott and others to develop their theological thoughts. In many respects, the reflection of Bonhoeffer on Bultmann’s existential way of Christian exegesis brings forth Bonhoeffer’s non-religious interpretation of Christianity. And Ott’s rethinking of Bonhoeffer’s Christological interpretation expands and corrects Bultmann’s approach. All of these show that it is necessary for us to clarify the main issues which concern Heidegger and Bonhoeffer. Based on this, we can point out their divergences and from these divergences we will explore the main points which Bonhoeffer emphasizes but does not yet complete, and which is developed through Levinas’s arguments criticizing Heidegger’s thought.

SECTION TWO
HEIDEGGER AS A KEY DIALOGUE PARTNER OF BONHOEFFER

Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Martin Heidegger led remarkably different lives. In 1927, Bonhoeffer completed his doctoral dissertation Sanctorum Communio, when

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Heidegger published his *Being and Time*. Because of a certain similarity between their ideas and concepts in Bonhoeffer and Heidegger, Charles Marsh thinks that Bonhoeffer ‘may have read *Being and Time* (or previously published sections of the book) while he wrote the doctoral thesis, although there is no evidence of that in the text’.\(^{23}\) When Bonhoeffer finished his habilitation thesis, *Act and Being*, in 1929, we can see his reflective and critical arguments on *Being and Time* in his early work, especially on the problem of revelation primarily through being.\(^{24}\) Bonhoeffer had Heidegger’s thought in mind after his inaugural lecture, even though there was no direct comment on Heidegger’s philosophy in Bonhoeffer’s later works. However, compared with the obvious impact of *Being and Time* on *Act and Being*, Stephen Plant points out that Bonhoeffer’s essential formative lecture series on Christology was methodologically influenced by Heidegger’s phenomenological theology.\(^{25}\) Thus, in this section, we will examine whether and how Heidegger is a partner in dialogue with Bonhoeffer.

§ 3.2.1 *The Meaning of Being (Sinn von Sein) and from Being to Dasein*

First of all, we will discuss Heidegger’s definition of Being and his formal structure of the question of the meaning of Being. As for the definition, Being is the most universal concept, which is not that of a class or genus.\(^{26}\) The concept of Being in medieval ontology is also designated as ‘transcendens’. In this sense, Being is indefinable and cannot be conceived as an entity (*als Seiendes*), therefore, its meaning is self-evident.\(^{27}\) This self-evidence of the meaning of Being, however, requires investigation, and so, far from cancelling any questioning of its meaning, it (re-) invites it. Thus, as regards the question of Being, Heidegger begins from the activity of asking as a seeking about the meaning of Being because Being constitutes what is asked about (*Sein Gefragtes*).\(^{28}\) This asking mode of Being is *Dasein*. The essential constitution (*Wesensverfassung/Verfassung*) of *Dasein* raises the problem of history (*Geschichte*), because the historical element is prior to knowledge, which is distinguished by Heidegger as ontological (*ontologisch*) and ontic (*ontisch*)

\(^{23}\) Ibid.  
\(^{24}\) See, Frick, p. 314.  
\(^{25}\) Ibid., pp. 322–323.  
\(^{26}\) BT, p. 22.  
\(^{27}\) Ibid., p. 23.  
\(^{28}\) Ibid., p. 24.
inquiry. Following Kierkegaard’s stress that one can only argue from one’s own, actual individual existence (and not to existence), ‘Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence.’ Following this line of thought, Heidegger further states that the understanding of one’s existence is ‘existentiell’, and the context of such structures is called ‘existentiality’. All of these constitute the fundamental ontology that locates Dasein’s understanding of Being (Seinsverständis) within this world (innerhalb der Welt) in its ordinary everydayness. This everydayness implicates timeliness (Zeitlichkeit) as temporality (Temporalität). To understand Being is to find the meaning of Dasein’s Being in history, and that, for Heidegger, means in time (or, more precisely speaking, in temporality). We can conclude that the definition of Being and the formal structure about the question of Being reveal a historical form of life and that the individual human being can investigate an irresistible power of becoming of his life in this world. Questioning the meaning of Being itself, then, is an achievement of the individual human being from within that being’s own factual life situation.

Having examined Heidegger’s definition of Being and Dasein, we now move on to the discussion about Being and responsibility according to Heidegger’s arguments. In Being and Time, Heidegger does not analyse responsibility explicitly. Heidegger, however, does discuss several times the ‘voice of conscience’ (Stimme des Gewissens). The call (Ruf) that is hidden in the voice is a mode of ‘disclosure’. John D. Caputo supposes that ‘Being leaves us with a deep, unsettling, indefinite “sense of responsibility” because conscience is the call that calls Dasein back to itself.’ We agree with this point in the sense that the
existential analytic cannot help to carry out the responsible significance from the call of conscience. This is the origin of the ethical deficiency in Heidegger because the authentic Dasein ‘never has a “good” conscience.’ The attribute of the authentic Dasein is ‘mineness’ (Jemeinigkeit), by means of which Heidegger intends to avoid the accusation of egoism. Indeed, it is precisely because Dasein is ‘mine’ that I can either own or dis-own the call of its self to itself in conscience. Mineness, in other words, is a condition for both authenticity and inauthenticity but not a moral criterion of ‘good’ human action or decision; neither can it stipulate what it is, or to whom one is responsible. From this perspective, we can both see and suppose that Heidegger’s thoughts on the call of conscience and the mineness of Dasein implicates an ontological responsibility, but it is not an ethical responsibility. This ontological responsibility calls for responsible response from the essence of the meaning of Being only and exclusively to each ‘my-own-self’. The conscience of Dasein answers to the essence of the Being of responsibility. In this sense, individual Dasein’s conscience is both closely related to and also determined by collective Dasein’s conscience in a society. The voice of the individual dissolves into the voice of the collective, allowing das Man to both take up and take over the responsibility of Dasein, when they confront a call in a specific historical background. It is difficult, however, to define ‘who is people’ and ‘what is a people’s response’ in this situation. In Being and Time, Heidegger’s notion of facticity cannot solve this problem but this problem leads to another problem: totalitarianism precisely because the direction of the response from the being of beings towards the meaning of Being itself is not a response that is constituted from one person to another by hearing and answering, but from a general principle to a greater power: the essence of Being.

This brief analysis of Heidegger’s thought on Being and Dasein is suffice to point out the danger or the problem that Heidegger’s theory leads to, and to which Bonhoeffer’s alternative standpoint that runs from Logos to the Anti-Logos of Christology is a critical response.

37 Caputo, p. 76.
38 BT, p. 68. ‘Dasein has in each case mineness [Jemeinigkeit], one must always use a personal pronoun when one addresses it: “I am”, “you are”.’
Bonhoeffer’s series of lectures on Christology were given in 1933. His later writings, nonetheless, are a development of his early thought, especially from his consideration of ethics. Even though the main arguments and writing style in the early and later stages are not the same, their starting point and ultimate concern never change as we noted in Chapter one. As we also mentioned, at the beginning of this chapter, Bonhoeffer’s Christological thought is methodologically influenced by Heidegger’s re-direction of Husserlian strict, ahistorical phenomenological approach towards a more hermeneutic and theologically faith-based existential-phenomenological method of analysis, even if Heidegger himself does not think through the significance of such religious faith itself. Moreover, the examination of Logos and Christology lies at the core of Bonhoeffer’s thought. Therefore, we will first discuss Bonhoeffer’s Christological thought in relation to his ethical concern before we move on to his criticism of Bultmann’s dependence on Heidegger.

Bonhoeffer’s focus of attention in Christology is how man understands himself. In another early work No Rusty Sword, Bonhoeffer thinks that man cannot understand himself from himself but only from the other, Christ, and in the community because ‘from the Word, which the community hears and without which the community does not exist.’ From this point of view, Bonhoeffer stresses the role of the Word as the incarnate Christ in a human being’s understanding of the Word and its relationship to the formation of morality. Originally, the Word exists outside of people. This is why is can only be addressed to people, but it is addressed to people in a form of law from which one chooses to act, rather than morality. That is to say, only when the Word has been incarnated and understood by people from within, and when man becomes what he is with this understanding of this Word from without and the incarnation of Christ from within, can morality (as ethical responsibility) come into being. In this sense, the difference between Heidegger and Bonhoeffer is not as clearly evident as it may seem. Heidegger’s focus, however, is on ‘mineness’, while Bonhoeffer’s core is Christ as other. Heidegger, therefore, explores the relation between Dasein and the world, with mineness as the prerequisite, while Bonhoeffer, by distinction, emphasizes man’s likeness to Christ.

39 NRS, p. 68.
and thus, as Kierkegaard would put it, identifies the necessity and the problem of becoming a Christian. This is why, for Bonhoeffer (but not for Heidegger), when man is concerned with the relation of Christ to the newly matured world, a central question will appear.\textsuperscript{40} This is an ultimate question for Bonhoeffer: ‘where does God now take refuge.’\textsuperscript{41} As we discussed in chapter two, Barth is the first one to realize this problem and attempts to solve it via his analyses of the distinction between the word of man and the Word of God and between religion and Christ. For Bonhoeffer, Barth does not succeed in developing a new way of theological interpretation, even though Barth has pointed out the problem. At the same time, Bultmann advocated a new approach, which is similar to Bonhoeffer’s idea of non-religious interpretation. We will discuss Bultmann’s existential approach of interpreting Christian thought and Biblical words after we examine Bonhoeffer’s development of Christological thought.

Bonhoeffer’s Christological thought is composed of three aspects: Word, Sacrament, and Church. These three aspects are interwoven, but the strongest part, which is also the part most related to our study, is his discussion of the meaning of the Word. Bonhoeffer’s question on Christ leads to an examination of the self because Christ interprets man’s being.\textsuperscript{42} The interpretation of Christ is the science of the Word of God and Bonhoeffer calls it Logology.\textsuperscript{43} Here Bonhoeffer introduces and embraces the tension between man’s logos and God’s Logos as Barth does. However, Christ in Bonhoeffer represents God’s Logos as an Anti-Logos of man’s because this Logos is not an idea but an incarnate Word.\textsuperscript{44} Compared to his Sanctorum Communio and Act and Being, Bonhoeffer maintains his consideration of the relationship between persons in a community but deepens and emphasizes the ethical perspective of it. He brings forward a ‘who’ question and a ‘pro me’ structure from his Christological thought.

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., p. 22.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., p. 28.
\textsuperscript{44} See, Bonhoeffer, Christology, pp. 28–30. This can be compared with Heidegger’s famous phrase: ‘Language is the house of being, which is propriated by being and pervaded by being.’ See, OWL, p. 5, 21–23, 63.
For Bonhoeffer, ‘the question ‘Who?’ is the question of transcendence while the question ‘How?’ is the question of immanence.’\textsuperscript{45} The transcendental question ‘Who?’ is raised in the encounter of strangeness and otherness. It is the question for ‘the very existence of the enquirer himself.’\textsuperscript{46} Man will find his limit of Logos when he encounters the boundary with the alien-ness. This boundary delineates the limitation of man’s existence, but, at the same time, it opens up the possibility towards the other’s existence transcendentally. Thus, the question of existence is the same as the question of transcendence for Bonhoeffer. We have discussed this in chapter two, where we already referred to the importance of ‘person’ in Bonhoeffer’s discussion of I-Thou. In his \textit{Christology}, the ‘Who?’ question emphasizes the incarnate characteristic of the personal structure of Logos. For Bonhoeffer, the death of God is equal to the death of the Logos of God because ‘the Logos of God incarnate must be crucified by man’s Logos’.\textsuperscript{47} The crucified and risen one as Christ is the first statement of Christology and Christ who presents himself in the church as a person is the second.\textsuperscript{48} Bonhoeffer then distinguishes between personality and person: personality is an apersonal concept because personality represents ‘power’ and ‘value’ while person goes beyond these.\textsuperscript{49} The person is to be understood in the \textit{pro me} structure of the God-man Jesus Christ.\textsuperscript{50} For Bonhoeffer, this ‘\textit{pro me}’ means that Christ’s relation to me in an ontological sense can only be conceived in the community. The ‘\textit{pro me}’ structure emphasizes the priority of the other, but this other refers to the I. In other words, the ‘\textit{pro me}’ structure provides an opposite point of view on the problem of ‘otherness’: I am the other for the otherness. I am addressed from the other as this other’s otherness. This address leads to the act of answering and it is answerable because I am questioned from the other. My answer shows my existence and the relation of my existence to the world. This is the inner meaning that we interpret from Bonhoeffer’s ‘who?’ question: the I becomes a stranger for the other and the Word that I am addressed renews me. Thus, the communication between the words of man creates the form of the community; similarly, the communication between the Word of God and the words of man creates the form of the religious community.

\textsuperscript{45} Bonhoeffer, \textit{Christology}, p. 30.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., p. 31.
\textsuperscript{47}Ibid., p. 40.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., p. 43.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., p.47.
This interpretation of Bonhoeffer’s train of thought shows the ethical significance of word and its relation to person, including the I and the other.

For Bonhoeffer, then, Christ is the Other who ‘stands in my place where I should stand but cannot.’\(^{51}\) As we discussed in chapter two, the boundary is the place that I cannot stand but have to encounter and understand. This understanding determines the existence of human being. Heidegger also seeks for this understanding but he leaves no room for Christ, or, in other words, there is no room for the Otherness but only for the mineness, even though he provides a creative viewpoint on the relation between this mineness and the world. The world of coming-of-age for Bonhoeffer has similar features to Heidegger’s thought on the mineness-world relation: if the role of God as the ultimate Other has been changed by this world, then in what way we will know this God and how he addresses us? Bultmann has similar concerns to Bonhoeffer. Bultmann, however, adopts Heidegger’s existential approach to interpret Christianity, which Bonhoeffer criticizes.

§ 3.2.3  Bonhoeffer’s Critique of Bultmann’s Dependence on Heidegger’s Philosophy

Rudolf Bultmann (1884–1976) was a German Lutheran theologian, and one who is generally regarded as the most conspicuous example of Liberal Theology in the twentieth century.\(^{52}\) Bultmann believes that what concerns faith not only lies in history (Historie) but the continuing significance of the past in the present (Geschichte).\(^{53}\) Based on this presupposition, Bultmann proposed his project of demythologization (Entmythologisierung). This means to use existential language to translate or interpret mythological language. Bonhoeffer thinks that Bultmann can go further and should go further and more thoroughly, for,

> It is not only the mythological conceptions, such as the miracles, the ascension and the like (which are not in principle separable from the conception of God, faith and so on) that are problematic, but the ‘religious’ conceptions themselves. You cannot, as Bultmann imagines,

\(^{51}\) Ibid., p. 61.  
\(^{53}\) Ibid., p. 29. The distinction of Historie and Geschichte was from Martin Kahler’s book The So-called Historical Jesus and the Historic Biblical Christ in 1892.
separate God and miracles, but you do have to be able to interpret and proclaim both of them in a ‘non-religious’ sense. Bultmann’s approach is really at bottom the liberal one (i.e. abridging the Gospel), whereas I seek to think theologically.54

Bonhoeffer’s analysis is incomplete and far from finished, therefore, he leaves many possibilities for us to interpret and to develop what he has not finished. Bonhoeffer both uses Bultmann’s thoughts to argue for Barth’s interpretation of the love commandment and debates with Bultmann’s theology about the question of the relation between philosophy and theology on revelation.55 Thus, we will examine Bultmann’s existential de-mythological approach in Bonhoeffer’s direction but also attempt to clarify and develop Bonhoeffer’s non-religious interpretation on understanding and language based on this examination.

§ 3.2.4 Bultmann’s Existential De-mythological Interpretation

If we return to Bultmann’s early thought, we will find that his concerns are quite similar to Bonhoeffer’s, namely, God as ‘Wholly Other’ and the limits of human powers.56 Bultmann is aware of the importance of existential consciousness in understanding God and the Christian faith at this period, before he was influenced by Heidegger’s thought. Bultmann begins from the most fundamental concept of human existence ‘experience’ to explore both my existence and the other’s existence. He emphasizes the uniqueness of the other in his early thought, because, for him, the other ‘gives us a part of himself that opens up to us a view into his depths.’57 With this understanding as presupposition, Bultmann first introduces this existentialist point of view in his theology in 1925 from two essays ‘The Meaning of Speaking of God’ and ‘Existential Interpretation of Scripture’.

In his later thought, Bultmann shifts his focus from a primitive reflection on human experience to a hermeneutic and linguistic interpretation on the relationship between God and man. He distinguishes between two modes of speaking: speaking

54 LPP, Letter on May 5th 1944, p. 125.
57 Bultmann, Rudolf Bultmann, p. 51.
of God and speaking about God. 58 For Bultmann, to speak about God is to speak an object that is alien from man himself; on the contrary, to speak of God is to speak of man himself. 59 This consideration, which shares with Bonhoeffer’s concern, shows that the self-understanding of man’s speaking of his existence has to be rethought along with the change of world-view (Weltanschauung). Both Bultmann and Bonhoeffer detect the paradoxical existence of man in a coming-of-age world: man is becoming independent from God and he has to take on a world-view that is constituted by himself. This means that man’s existence is no longer a part of this world-view but the designer of this world-view. On the one hand, he has to take responsibility for his own concrete existence as a subject; but, on the other hand, his existence in this world is subjected to the other’s existence. This will lead to the difficulty as to how man can truly speak to or respond to the other’s existence.

When Bultmann argued the problem of a theological exegesis of the New Testament in 1925, he brought in the dimension of history, as Heidegger did, to try to solve this difficulty. He asks, ‘What is the content of what is said, and to what kind of reality does it lead?’ and ‘what does it mean for me and how am I to understand it on its objective ground?’ The first question leads to the problem of history and the second one leads to the problem of hermeneutics. For Bultmann, history is regarded as the boundary for our existence because,

we stand in history and are a part of it, [then] every word we utter about history is necessarily a word about ourselves; that is, it discloses how we interpret our own existence. 61

In other words, our interpretation opens up the possibilities of our existence when we encounter history in a living relationship with the Other. 62 On the other hand, in order to transcend this boundary, Bultmann relates God’s Word and man’s word in order to deal with this problem: the encounter of God’s word lies in the communication of man’s words, therefore, it is necessary to change theological terms of the past into the existential concepts of the present. In this way, we will come to

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58 Ibid., p. 80.
59 Ibid.
60 Bultmann, Rudolf Bultmann, p. 132.
61 Ibid., p. 133.
62 However, Bultmann’s effort of subjective interpreting the relation with the other is exactly Bonhoeffer’s criticism of ‘man’s existential possibility’, as we have discussed in chapter two.
an objective understanding for all exegetical biblical information. This paves the way for Bultmann’s later hermeneutic thoughts in 1950.

We find that Dilthey’s question shares Bultmann’s life-long hermeneutic concern: ‘how can one individual come to an objective, generally valid understanding of another individual’s expression of life as given through the senses?’ Bultmann applied Heidegger’s hermeneutical way to emphasize the role of questioner in asking, which reveals one’s true existential situation. To find out an objective ground for understanding, Bultmann’s approach can be traced back to Heidegger’s fore-structure of understanding. This indicates that the meaning lies prior to man’s question, but it needs to be revealed by this questioner according to his hermeneutic perspective. Thus, it is impossible for the starting-point to be neutral, which leads to a hermeneutic circle. As the first one to explore this hermeneutic circle, Schleiermacher shows the significance of the historical and psychological background of the reader who interprets a text. Compared to Schleiermacher’s inner psychological approach, Heidegger develops this concept by relating this psychological subject to his situation. In other words, Heidegger locates this subject in his everyday existence to explicitly find out that he is in the inescapable relationship between his self-reference or a priori prejudice of his understanding and the others’ in this world.

Bultmann employs Heidegger’s notion with his own term of ‘pre-understanding’ (Vorverständnis) to point out the problem and emphasizes the role of presupposition in interpretation. Thus, this presupposition is regarded as another boundary for understanding our existence. Bultmann’s solution is,

The point, then, is not to eliminate the pre-understanding but to risk it, to raise it to the level of consciousness, and to test it critically in understanding the text.

This solution is determined by the questioner who understands and interprets the historical phenomena. Bultmann, therefore, supposes that because we have to

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64 Brown, p. 23.
accept this pre-understanding, the ‘most subjective’ interpretation is the ‘most objective’. If we examine this point from a Christian theological perspective, then the understanding and interpretation of God’s revelation would depend on whether this man truly questions his human existence.

To sum up this part, both Heidegger and Bultmann emphasize what the meaning is for the subject, but no longer meaning from the text and context together with the author’s intention as traditional hermeneutics does. Heidegger’s approach provides a new dimension for Bultmann to explore the structure of factual Christian existence. Bonhoeffer regards Bultmann’s starting point as valuable but he also believes that he is moving in a wrong direction.

§ 3.2.5 Bonhoeffer’s Critique of Bultmann’s Dependence on Heidegger’s Philosophy Re-Visited

As we discussed above, Bultmann’s intention is to find a universal, objective, and existential basis for Christian existence and Heidegger’s existential and hermeneutic approaches provide support for that task. Correspondingly, Bonhoeffer’s non-religious interpretation of Christianity also intends to discover a universal understanding of human existence from a Christian perspective. The difference between Bultmann and Bonhoeffer is that the former overestimates the role of self-understanding along with Heidegger’s Dasein analysis; the latter insists that the role of self-understanding always depends on God’s word from the outside, as revelation.

Bonhoeffer discussed Bultmann’s existential approach with his own ‘religiouslessness’ problem in mind in two letters contained in Letters and Papers from Prison. One is in a letter on 5th May 1944 and in another letter on 8th June 1944. These two passages raise the following question: did Bultmann’s de-methologization influence Bonhoeffer’s ‘religionless Christianity’, or are these two points of view parallel. From the ongoing analyses, we tend to agree that

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66 Ibid., p. 152.
67 See, Frick, p. 228.
68 LPP, p. 95. See, also, our discussion of these letters in Chapter Two, Section Two.
Bonhoeffer was inspired by Bultmann’s attempt to find a new way to re-interpret Biblical words that can be understood by people in a world of coming-of-age. However, the hermeneutical and existential approach that Bultmann adopts would deviate from nature and would narrow the scope of the kerygma of Christianity because of its liberal ‘reductionism’. As Frick remarks in his paper ‘Rudolf Bultmann, Paul Tillich and Dietrich Bonhoeffer’ (including what we have discussed regarding the problem of ‘possibility’ in Bonhoeffer in chapter two),

Bonhoeffer rejects what he understands to be Bultmann’s position, namely, that a person has the ontological-existential possibility to arrive at a proper understanding of self-based on a (Heideggerian) analysis of self and (almost) apart from revelation. Decisive for this complex discourse are the concepts of ‘possibility’ or ‘potentiality’ and ‘revelation.’

Revelation not only plays an essential role in Bonhoeffer’s theological thought but also in his ethical thought. The significance of encounter and exteriority constitute the nature of revelation and man’s ethical existence via the true response to this revelation. It is difficult, however, to find this significance in an ontological-existential interpretation of possibility.

Being in Christ call for a certain kind of continuity. Heidegger’s Dasein calls for continuity, too, but it is a continuity of perpetual cries in which decisions are called for, a continuity of ‘always-being-already-in-guilt’, which means – in Bonhoeffer’s devastating judgment – that “Heidegger’s concept of existence is of no use for the elucidation of being in faith”.

Bonhoeffer’s critique of Bultmann’s dependence on Heidegger, therefore, refers not to its methodological sense, but to the divergence of the theological and ethical concern of the self-understanding.

nicht in der Lage, dem Menschen ein theologisch angemessenes Selbstverständnis zu ermöglichen.’ See also note 32: one of the first scholars to articulate the parallel between Bultmann and Bonhoeffer was Gerhard Ebeling, in Word and Faith (Wort und Glaube, Tübingen third edition, 1967, p. 90-160), Cf., Green, A Theology of Sociality, p. 269-282.

70 Frick, p. 235.
71 Ibid., p. 320, also Act and Bing, DBWE 2, p. 98 (DBW 2, p. 91–99).
As for the ethical concern of Heidegger, we can trace it back to the influential debate between Heidegger and Ernest Cassirer in Davos in 1929. Cassirer points out that Heidegger’s ‘fundamental ontology’ lacks standards.\(^\text{72}\) Heidegger faces the problem that ethics has perhaps completely disappeared in his thought, or, to put it in another way, Heidegger doubts whether ethics is possible at all.\(^\text{73}\) This is a fundamental question for Heidegger because it questions a human beings mode of existence and our relationship to others, a question also shared by Bonhoeffer and Levinas. In other words, all of them have similar concern and all of them deal with the relation between language and being, but the question is whether and how these would lead to genuine ethical considerations.

Heidegger’s starting point is whether understanding and interpretation is in accordance with its existential meaning, which is also Dasein’s own potentiality-for-Being.\(^\text{74}\) This potentiality will be revealed by the assertion [\textit{Das Ausgesagte}] as a primary and authentic ‘locus’ of truth because assertion is the most familiar type of discourse or the first step of discourse. This is also an important concept for Heidegger to connect the issues between language and the relation of beings because the primary signification of assertion is pointing out [\textit{Aufzeigen}], communication [\textit{Mitteilung}], and speaking forth [\textit{Heraussage}] to the other being to ‘share with’ [\textit{teilt…mit}] what we see in common.\(^\text{75}\) This paves the way for his distinction between apophantical ‘as’ and existential-hermeneutical ‘as’ of the assertion.\(^\text{76}\) The former shows the structure of the assertion, which can be found in the latter one which is embodied as a structure of interpretation.\(^\text{77}\) Both of these two structures also depend on the disclosure of the \textit{Dasein: Dasein’s} understanding. For Heidegger, this is the logic of the Logos (\textit{λόγος}), which rooted in the existential analytic of

\(^\text{74}\) BT, p. 193.
\(^\text{75}\) Ibid., p. 196-199.
\(^\text{77}\) BT, p. 58, 201, 266.
This logic of Dasein analytic, however, has been interpreted in a way that is ethically inadequate, even though Heidegger himself is conscious of this problem. Heidegger is aware of this aspect of his later thought in his work *On the Way to Language*. He emphasizes that he does not search for something about language, but a different relation to language. Even though he detects this problem, he admits that our relation to language is vague, obscure, almost speechless. In the later part of this work, he again discusses our relation to language, which should become memorable in the form of ‘Saying’, and human beings are located within this Saying.

Our exploration of the crux of this problem in Heidegger is not only to point out the indifference towards ethical considerations in his thought but also to uncover the most fundamental and central perspectives in order to discuss the possibility of ethical considerations. When we talk about ethical issues, like responsibility, what are we truly talking about? If we just talk about something that ‘shows itself to be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself’ in a phenomenological and metaphysical way, how will this truth have something to do with me? Heidegger distinguishes the authentic self (my-own-self) and the inauthentic self (‘the One’ or ‘the They’ (*Das Man*), or the-They-self (my-unowned-self) when they carry out the logic of Logos, but what would the result be when ‘the-They’ faces my authentic self and vice versa? From these questions, we can see that what Heidegger neglects is the ‘who’ question, while he provides a profound understanding of the ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions. Compared with Heidegger’s pursuit of the ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions of Being via asking the Being of language and showing the neutrality of the language of beings, Bonhoeffer takes up the ‘who’ question to pursue the anti-Logos via asking the meaning of Christ who reveals the ‘pro me’ structure in the form of language. A non-religious interpretation of Christianity is an attempt by Bonhoeffer to carry out this ‘pro me’ structure of language but he never completes it.

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78 Ibid., p. 203.
79 OWL, p. 58.
80 Ibid.
81 OWL, p. 107.
82 Cf., BT, p. 58.
Thus far, we have briefly reviewed the development of Heidegger’s thought as a preparation for our discussion; we have also specifically clarified Heidegger’s argument from Being to *Dasein*, which is a counterpart to Bonhoeffer’s critical thought from *Logos* to anti-*Logos*; we then have discussed Bonhoeffer’s critique of Bultmann’s dependence on Heidegger after we analysed Bultmann’s existential de-mythological approach. Finally, we have concluded this part by comparing Heidegger’s and Bonhoeffer’s different concerns on language in order to indicate the formulation of the problems and the relationship between these problems in these related thinkers. Bonhoeffer’s ideas were not completed, but he pointed out the *pro me* structure and reflection on language, which was made clear by comparison with Heidegger’s thought. Thus, based on the foregoing discussion, we will argue that Levinas’s thought could be regarded as a strong supplement and development for Bonhoeffer’s thought. Before we turn to the part on how Levinas develops and completes Bonhoeffer’s thought, it is necessary to examine why Heidegger is also an important dialogue partner of Levinas. By doing this, we will make the intellectual connection clear as well as the similarities and differences of ethical concern by means of a discussion of the role of the Other and the role of language between Bonhoeffer, Heidegger, and Levinas.

**SECTION THREE**

**HEIDEGGER AS A KEY DIALOGUE PARTNER OF LEVINAS**

Compared to the analyses of the relationship between Heidegger and Bonhoeffer, there have been much more discussion and investigations into the intellectual relations between Heidegger and Levinas. This should make it easier for us to find out the crucial points of contact between these two thinkers but it also makes it difficult to clarify their complicated connections. In order to elucidate the essential elements of responsibility, the Other, and language from the real connections between their thought, we are going to explore their intellectual relations in terms of their analyses on ‘Being’ and the Other, temporality and diachrony, and their views on language.
Before the publication of *Totality and Infinity* in 1961, Levinas was always regarded as a follower and translator of Husserl and Heidegger. After this publication, Levinas’s arguments attacking the ethical background of Heidegger’s ontology were widely noted. Based on this critique, Jacques Derrida thought that Levinas ‘misunderstands and misrepresents Heidegger’s philosophy’ and he ‘concludes by suggesting that Levinas’s discourse is not really philosophy at all.’ There are two bodies of opinion on the differences and convergences between the thought of Heidegger and Levinas. Both of these considerations reveal the complexity of discussing the true relations between Heidegger’s thought and Levinas’s and it is regarded as one of the most difficult topics in the field of post-phenomenology. In Levinas’s own words, he appraises Heidegger’s *Being and Time* as one of the greatest works in the history of philosophy. This makes it more complicated to identify in which respects Levinas agrees with and disagrees with Heidegger. We agree with Manning’s evaluation that ‘(I)ndebted to Heidegger as Levinas is, he is no

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86 Steven Gans, ‘Ethics or Ontology: Levinas and Heidegger’, *Philosophy Today*, 16, no. 2 (Summer 1972): 117-21; Luk Bouckaert, ‘Ontology and Ethics’, *International Philosophical Quarterly* 10 (1970): 402-19; C.D. Keyes, ‘An Evaluation of Levinas’ Critique of Heidegger,’ *Research in Phenomenology*, 2 (1972): 121-42. Bernasconi and Critchley also observe this in their introduction to *The Levinas Reader* when they say that ‘the initial reception of Levinas’s work has been to a great extent determined by *Totality and Infinity*’ (p. xxi)
Levinas argues against Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology as first philosophy, but at the same time develops his own phenomenological ethics as first philosophy based on his critique of Heidegger in a dialectical way. Compared to Heidegger’s insistence on exploring the knowledge of Being, Levinas proclaims the priority of the Other which we are responsible for in the inter-subjective relations. If we say that Heidegger’s concern is about what man can experience, understand, and interpret from the mineness the Being, then Levinas’s concern is about what man cannot constitute via the actions mentioned above from the Otherness of the Other.

§ 3.3.2 Levinas’s Response to Heidegger’s Ontological Difference

In Levinas’s later work *God, Death and Time*, which consists of transcripts from his lectures delivered in 1975–76, he pointed out six fundamental motifs in Heidegger’s thought. These six motifs focus on different aspects of Heidegger’s famous ontological difference. The first and the second motifs are about the concept of being and the distinction between Being and beings; the third motif is about Heidegger’s well-known but obscure slogan ‘language is the house of being’ and which locates the site of this difference; the fourth points out the forgetting of this difference in Western thought and the thinking of being becomes the knowledge of God as theo-logy; and the fifth indicates that this movement of onto-theo-logy will lead to the will to power and the springing up of technology which also results in the death of God. The last aspect pointed out by Levinas is that Heidegger ceases to use the term ontology but replaces it with ‘the thinking of being’.

Together with his examination of these six aspects, Levinas further advocates that Heidegger’s emphasis of the forgetting of the ontological difference posits man’s thinking in the limit of being, which implies that one cannot think beyond being. However, another emphasis of Heidegger is in the task of being: ‘to-be’. Then the emphasis on the limit of being imposes restrictions on the emphasis on the

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90 Manning, p. 6.
91 See, Manning, p. 7.
93 GDT, p. 126.
‘becoming’ of being. Nevertheless, the difficulty of solving the problem of the understanding of one’s own being and the subjective understanding of the other’s is exactly the starting point for Levinas to put forward his own thought. Next, we will analyse Levinas’s response to Heidegger’s terms of being and time with his central terms of the Other and diachrony. Robert Manning’s book *Interpreting Otherwise than Heidegger* provides a clear and precise discussion about this topic. Based on Manning’s discussion, we will develop our arguments on how Levinas’s discussion about Heidegger’s ontological difference leads to Levinas’s articulation of responsibility in the relation to the other and to language.

§ 3.3.3  *Being and the Other*

As we have already discussed the concept of Being from Heidegger in the section on Bonhoeffer in this chapter, we will now discuss Levinas’s response to the relation between Being and the Other directly. In Levinas’s later thought, he changes Heidegger’s motif of Being-Other into Same-Other because the interpretation of the meaning of Being in the manner of Heidegger’s *Being and Time* will give rise to the self-projection of the Other into one’s own interpretation of potentialities. This is a process of assimilation of the Other into the Same. According to Levinas, ethical significance cannot be found in sameness because ethical questions will not be raised when everything is the same. Or to put it another way, the ethical significance can only be found when the Other is treated as Other for questions are to be raised from differences.

But this later reflection on Heidegger’s deliberation of Being can be traced back as early as 1947, when Levinas states that he attempts to ‘use phenomenological methods to overcome phenomenology’. Compared to his later expression ‘same-other’, Levinas is concerned with ‘the other side of being’ [*au-delà de l’être*], which is similar to Plato’s idea of the Good. This concern becomes the title of Levinas’s later important work ‘Otherwise Than Being’ [*Autrement qu’être*]. What Levinas wants to draw attention to in the above discussions is the neutrality of Being from Heidegger’s thought. Thus, we can say that Levinas’s thinking begins with the *il y a* (there is), which corresponds to a neutral situation that exists before

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94 De Boer, p. 83.
Being comes to be *Dasein* in Heidegger. *Il y a* in Levinas specifically refers to ‘a neutral, continuing existence without existents (and so never capitalized).’ From this point, we can conclude that the difference between Being and *il y a* lies in the different attitudinal which is a keynote of the basic state of being in Heidegger and Levinas. Heidegger starts his analyses from the premise that human being is in an inauthentic ‘fallenness’ and needs to affirm its mineness in the world, while Levinas begins his analyses from the presupposition that fallenness is the basic but not the prior state of human being and the human being needs to affirm its existence from the Other. Thus, the ‘*il y a*’ is the first target to be surmounted for Levinas in order to move on to his ethical deliberation of the otherness of the Other.

A question, here, arises. If being is manifold, as Levinas argues, and not as One or as the Same or as Mineness, as Heidegger contends, then ‘how can Otherness on the other side of being be thought?’ In order to answer this question, Heidegger’s approach to an understanding that is based on my own *Dasein* is no longer effective because the Other has its own unique quality of otherness that lies beyond one’s own comprehension. Thus, on the one hand, what really matters, for Levinas, is not the forgetting of the ontological difference as Heidegger insists, but the forgetting of the dignity of ‘the other person’ (*l’autre homme*); on the other hand, the meaning of Being, in Heidegger’s view, is to appear or to become manifest(ed) by man in order for it to unfold its truth in the course of history, but the meaning of the otherness of the Other, for Levinas, is to discover the intrinsic justice and righteousness in the being-between because justice is prior to existence. In other words:

Levinas is more concerned with justice than with the authenticity of existence, which is existing vis-à-vis existence as a whole; such care for the whole is typical of the ethics of a philosophy of totality.

Thus, Levinas’s critique of Heidegger’s concept of Being is embodied in his criticism of totalitarianism in Western philosophy under three aspects: truth,

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96 De Boer, p. 127.
97 See, Martin Heidegger, *Die Technik und die Kehre*, 38; Holzwege, 343, and De Boer’s comment on this, p. 113.
98 De Boer, p. 6.
exteriority and totality.\textsuperscript{99} No matter what aspect Levinas wants to examine, however, the essential key concept that he uses to criticize is the Other.

For Heidegger, beings meet and co-inhabit the other as being-within-the-world \textit{(innerweltlich Seiendes)} in a similar and parallel way. From this precondition, the understanding and the knowledge of the Other can be accessed from my self-understanding because of the similarity of the Being of everyone in this world. In the meantime, when my self-understanding is revealed from the solitude \textit{(Vereinzelung)} of authentic existence then the self can be confirmed. However, questions will be raised from this corollary: how and to what extent can this self-understanding can be really ‘shared’ by a co-state-of-mind \textit{(Mitbefindlichkeit)}\textsuperscript{100} and reach the co-understanding in Heidegger’s words if my self-understanding can only be revealed from the solitude? If this shared co-understanding is ‘already’ based on the understanding of Being, what is the significance of seeking another being-in-the-world who is similar to myself? These questions lead to our examination of the concept of ‘we’ in both Heidegger’s and Levinas’s thought.

‘We’ is an important but controversial concept. In Robert Bernasconi’s words,

\begin{quote}
The identity of the “we” has been the subject of some controversy. For Heidegger the standpoint of the ‘we,’ the observers who simply observe the correlation of knowing and object as it takes place within natural consciousness, is attained only in absolute knowing.\textsuperscript{101}
\end{quote}

The complexity of the concept of ‘we’ lies in the overall consideration from experience, words, and subjectivity. In other words, the analysis of ‘we’ entails the paradigm of the being-knowing analysis. As Heidegger states, ‘Experience is the movement of the dialogue between natural and absolute knowing.’\textsuperscript{102} From this statement we can clarify the concept of ‘we’ from Heidegger under three aspects. The first aspect refers to the natural knowing of one’s being by using one’s natural

\textsuperscript{99} See, De Boer, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{100} BT, p. 205.
consciousness. The second aspect refers to the absolute knowing of the relationship between one’s being and the other’s being (i.e. one’s subjectivity) in the movement of the dialogue by using words to detect what I lack in this dialogue. The third stage refers to how the I can be fulfilled from the knowing of the other in this movement. If our interpretation of Heidegger’s statement is correct, then we will argue that the concept of the ‘absence’ points out both a similar standpoint as well as a different direction in Heidegger and Levinas. The similarity lies in both of them admitting the absence of the experience of the other when we extend the knowing of the being of myself to the being of the other. However, Heidegger takes this absence for granted, and affirms the subjectivity of Dasein by reducing the absence of the difference between the self and the other into sameness. By contrast, Levinas takes this absence in the experience as the starting point of his ethical thought because this absence of the experience of the Other calls on the self to establish a responsible relation that is in accordance with but not necessary restrained by the presence. Dasein is in a situation of throwness, which means that the ‘sein’ (being) cannot determine ‘Da’ (there) in this situation. Levinas would agree that the ethical I also cannot choose my primordial condition as an ethical creature. Nevertheless, the sein (being) is made to be Da (there) in the situation of fallenness and throwness, while the ethical I is made to be himself with the other person. From this analysis, we can conclude that the initial consideration of the ‘we’ from Heidegger and Levinas are quite similar but their different presuppositions and concerns lead to different directions of their development of paradigm of ‘being-knowing’. In other words, Levinas’s challenge to Heidegger’s articulation of being is not to find out the authentic realness of being but the ethical being towards the good.

After we clarify the similarities and differences with respect to their initial concerns regarding Being and the Other, we can argue that the difference between Heidegger’s Being and Levinas’s ‘the Other’ would lead to different linguistic poses. These linguistic poses, on the one hand, show Heidegger’s intention of using language to ‘connects ontological inquiry to historical existence’ in order to fill up the gap between Being and beings; on the other hand, further are contrasted with

103 OB, p. 110, 192.
104 See, Festschrift Roger Buggraeve, p. 51.
Levinas’s argument of ‘good beyond being’ is an inevitable development based on his critique of this ontological difference. The reason why Levinas can point out this blind alley of Heidegger’s ontological difference lies in his insight that ‘the question of the meaning of being involves the way to escape from being’ and language is the most possible approach for man to question his being but at the same time to keep track of the uniqueness of his existence. In the second section of this part, we will discuss the role of language in Heidegger and Levinas’ thought based on our previous discussion regarding ontological difference.

§ 3.3.4 Temporality (Synchrony) and Diachrony

Time is a basic question in Heidegger’s Being and Time as well as in his later thought on the reality of history and the thinking of Being. In other words, time is an important reference frame for Dasein. Heidegger discusses time in ontic mode and in the ontological mode of temporality. In the first, time is in a serial temporal manner while in the latter, time is a primordial one which is ‘outside-of-itself in and for itself’. This ‘outside-of-itself’ is a characteristic that is derived from Heidegger’s ontological difference because this ‘outside’ indicates the distance between Being and beings. For Heidegger, death is the end of Dasein because it reveals the authenticicty of Dasein: Being-for-death (Sein-zum-Tode). Here, as paradoxical as it may sound, the mineness of Dasein is to be determined but, at the same time, to be eliminated by death. Death, for Heidegger, is like a terminal point of Dasein which defines our facticity as an ‘a priori past’ but which also reminds man to recollect the forgotten and original structure of time in the form of past, present and futurity.

By contrast, for Levinas, to transcendentally understand death is to understand the Other or the non-self. If death as a terminal point confirms the mineness of Dasein for Heidegger, then death as a starting point confirms the otherness of the Other for Levinas. Both Heidegger’s and Levinas’s arguments reveal to the subject a future that exceeds the present but whereas Heidegger leads

106 Manning, p. 57.
107 BT, p. 377.
108 See, De Boer, pp. 122–123.
this future back to the self Levinas extends this future outwardly to the plural Other. This is exactly Levinas’s purpose: ‘to transcend Being: to move beyond or to the other side of Being and Time’\textsuperscript{109}, and to move from finitude of Being to its infinity of Goodness:

It is not the finitude of Being that constitutes the essence of time, as Heidegger thinks, but its infinity. […] the aim […] is to show that time is not the achievement of an isolated and lone subject, but that it is the subject’s very relationship with the other.\textsuperscript{110}

Thus, for both Heidegger and Levinas, time constitutes history by returning to the I after experiencing being of the other and forming one’s history. Compared to Derrida’s argument, however, ‘in a closed totality and in actual infinity there is no history; history occurs as the difference between the totality and infinity’,\textsuperscript{111} Levinas critically holds that the problem of history in Heidegger’s thought does not rest with the difference between totality and infinity but lie in his totalizing of the infinity into an essence (\textit{Wesen}). The characteristic of this essence in terms of time is \textit{synchrony} of \textit{Dasein} and other beings. And this synchrony in terms of language is the act of assertion of \textit{Dasein} to the other beings in this world. The understanding of the other being would be achieved by the hearing and answering of each one’s assertion \textit{in the presence} of each other.

By comparison, for Levinas, time in the form of history is diachrony, rather than synchrony. And this synchrony in terms of language is the act of the Saying and the Said of the Other towards one’s self. The understanding of the Other would be achieved by the hearing and answering of each one’s ‘precondition for the unsaying of what has first been said.’\textsuperscript{112} This linguistic diachrony closely relates to the ethical diachrony because,

the priority of responsibility relative to freedom signifies the goodness of Good [\textit{la bonté du Bien}]: the Good must elect me before I may choose it. The good must elect me first. […] This is the strong sense of what we are calling diachrony. It is an irreducible difference that does not enter into

\textsuperscript{109} De Boer, p. 125.
\textsuperscript{110} Levinas, \textit{Ethics and Infinity}, p. 57.
\textsuperscript{112} De Boer, p. 72.
the unity of a theme; an untraversable difference between the Good and me; a difference without simultaneity of unmatched terms.\footnote{GDT, p. 177.}

In other words, this time in diachrony indicates both the distance towards infinity and the openness towards infinity. This indication contains Levinas’s critique of Sameness in Heidegger’s sense because Heidegger interprets time only in terms of the self-centred sameness of each individual \textit{Dasein} and not in terms of social and ethical relations. Thus his phenomenological ontology cannot really be open towards the infinity of one’s past and future, but only the utilitarian present in synchrony.\footnote{See, Manning, p. 85.} If we interpret this in the theoretical framework of Levinas’s thought on ethics and language, then Heidegger’s analysis of synchrony and language just emphasizes the reduction of the ethical and plural \textit{Saying} into the temporal and contemporary \textit{Said}. But what does the temporality and contemporary of ‘the Said’ mean in Heidegger’s thought?

In order to address this question, we need to include the question of language in Heidegger’s history of Being. Robert Bernasconi has provided a substantial and comprehensive discussion of this topic. In the lecture 1962 lecture entitled ‘Time and Being’, Heidegger stated that ‘the sequence of epochs in the destiny of Being is not accidental, nor can it be calculated as necessary’.\footnote{Martin Heidegger, \textit{On Time and Being}, trans. by Joan Stambaugh (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), p. 9.} As for Being, Heidegger is interested in the essence of the destiny of Being rather than the reason that lies behind this destiny in history. This is why, even though Heidegger discusses time as temporality in \textit{Being and Time}, a genuine understanding of the history of Being is lacking. Bernasconi points out three aspects of the reason why Heidegger intends to ignore it.\footnote{Bernasconi, p. 11.} First, Heidegger holds that if there is a unity in the thinking of the history of philosophy, then its end would not be visible until the development finishes in the end. The sequence of different historical words for Being, however, is undetermined. Therefore, this thinking of remembrance is impossible. Second, the sequence of understanding these historical words is free. It is very difficult, therefore, to find out the most decisive elements in a series of reasons. Third, the understanding of history needs remembrance, which is a different way of thinking.
These three aspects lead to Heidegger’s distinction between the question of *aletheia* (understood as the ‘unconcealedness of what is’) and the question of truth.¹¹⁷ Truth, for Heidegger, is ‘correspondence, grounded in correctness, between proposition and thing’,¹¹⁸ while the essence of truth is the history of man’s essence.¹¹⁹ Thus, the question of truth is the question of the correspondence and the correctness in the history of man, and every truth has its time.¹²⁰ The question of *aletheia*, however, is to search for ‘the trace’ (*Spur*) that lies behind and gives rise to the history of human essence as unhiddenness and the essence of truth will not change in time.¹²¹ This can explain why we previously mentioned that Heidegger’s thought talks about history while being still essentially a-historical. As Bernasconi shows, the history of Being begins with the forgetfulness of Being and the oblivion of Being can appear as concealed in language.¹²² In sum, the history of Being and history of beings are counter-aspects of the same history because the searching of the Being in the form of language (as trace) in history as the pursuit of the essence of truth constitutes the history of human essence as an existing and understanding being.¹²³

From the ongoing analyses, we can see that language plays an important role in relating these two aspects of truth in the sense of history. *Dasein* can only understand its history in terms of language in the form of the Said in the history of being. Therefore, these previous analyses also answer the question regarding the meaning of the temporality or contemporaneity of the Said. With this in mind, Heidegger also discusses the ‘historical return’ because ‘in the end it is historical return which brings us into what is actually happening today’ when he discusses the essence of truth.¹²⁴ And this history is always ‘a matter of the unique task posed by

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¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 24.
¹²⁰ Ibid., p. 25.
¹²² Bernasconi, *The Question of Language in Heidegger’s History of Being*, p. 25.
¹²³ Even though the notion of trace was lacking in his early formulation, the thought of trace still runs through Heidegger’s thought.
fate in a determinate practical situation, not of free-floating discussion.125 From what Heidegger says, we can further confirm Heidegger’s priority to the search for the essence of truth and the role of language as the voice of Being in this searching. Therefore, to explore the essence of truth is to explore the history of human essence, which is also to explore the essence of language as the voice of Being. We can conclude, therefore, that Heidegger’s emphasis of the essence of truth repeats itself in the synchrony of language.

In Levinas’s view, the diachrony of personhood in the I and the Other also repeats itself in the diachrony of language.126 The diachrony in Levinas’s phenomenological concern is to show that ‘time is something more than merely the structure of being.’127 Levinas’s diachrony of language is embodied in his distinction between the Saying and the Said. This distinction was Heidegger’s before being Levinas’s.128 Heidegger and Levinas, therefore, share this distinction, as Levinas also considers not only ‘what words teach us, but in what they hide from us;’129 however, the way they use it is not the same. Levinas’s concern is that the emphasis on the essence of language would lead to a closed language and speech would have lost its speech in the sense of ontological totalitarianism.130 We will analyse this difference in detail in next section on the discussion of language between Heidegger and Levinas.

§ 3.3.5  Levinas’s Response to Heidegger’s Thought on Language

The role of language in Levinas’s thought is as important as it is in Heidegger’s. However, Levinas questions the role of language in the Western tradition in order to point out the problem of language, especially with regard to Heidegger’s position:

In the Western tradition, linguistic expression has importance for meaning as meaning: there is no meaning if there is no language. And this meaning qua meaning is a manifestation of being. ([…] and Heidegger preserves this position) […] But if it is correct that meaning is only shown in

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125 Ibid., p. 66.
126 See, Ward, p. 111.
127 Manning, p. 86.
128 Ward, p. 112.
130 DF, p. 207.
language, must we likewise argue that logical exposition does not contain a manner of speaking [*pour-ainsi-dire*]? Must we not ask ourselves whether the logical exposition of meaning does not call for an unsaying [*dédire*]? [...] Must we not ask whether speaking shows a gap between meaning and that which is manifested of it, between meaning and what, in manifesting itself, *takes on the ways of being*?  

With regard to Levinas’s questions on the relationship between meaning and different ways of being, we will discuss three aspects in this section on language. In the first aspect, we will briefly review Heidegger’s deliberations on language, both from his early and his later thought. After we outline the main arguments on language from Heidegger, in the second aspect we will discuss how Levinas responds to Heidegger’s concept of language specifically in relation to Levinas’s ethical concern. In the last aspect, we will explore the discussion of ‘face and language’ in both Heidegger and Levinas, especially the similarity and difference between Heidegger’s later thought and Levinas’s ethical arguments. From the discussion of these three aspects, we intend to firstly clarify the extent to which Heidegger’s thought on language influences Levinas’s; secondly we will argue that Levinas’s ethical priority determines the difference regarding his articulation of language from Heidegger; and thirdly we will develop the ethical significance of language as related to Levinas’s discussion of ‘face’ with respect to the critique of Heidegger’s neutral attitude towards language.

§ 3.3.6  *Language in the Early and Later Heidegger*

Language plays an essential role throughout Heidegger’s thought because ‘there are no paths to [the meaning of] being (*Sein*) except those which are grounded in language [...]’  

Heidegger’s view of language, therefore, is in the sense of a transcendental ontology in that it attempts, as White emphasizes, to find out ‘how language can be’.  

In other words, Heidegger attempts to find out the essence of language in order to reveal the essence of Being because language shows how human beings locate themselves as being in the world. Compared to the idea that

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131 GDT, p. 128.  
133 Ibid., p. 6.
language is an instrument that we can use, Heidegger in his later thought points out that ‘language is the house of Being, the home in which man dwells.’

The origin of this famous but intricate slogan can be traced back to Heidegger’s *Being and Time* when he discusses language in the form of discourse. For Heidegger, language as discourse or talk (*Rede*) is the existential-ontological foundation in the existential constitution of *Dasein’s* disclosedness. Language, for Heidegger, is the totality of words in an ontological sense rather than in a semantic and ethical sense in the form of speaking and listening. Not only can we trace the theme of language back to *Being and Time*, but we can also find this theme in Heidegger’s early work *On the Essence of Language*. Heidegger thinks that the ‘human being’ has ‘language’ and the ‘word’ has the ‘human being’ because language can make something manifest. In other words, Heidegger, in these lectures on language, aims to reveal the origin of language in order to find out the ground for beings. From this work we can find both similarities and differences on language between Heidegger and Levinas.

According to Heidegger’s examination based on Herder’s analyses, ‘word’ can be divided into inner word and outer word. The inner word refers to what lies before inside and the outside word refers to what lies before outside. For Heidegger, the inner word is the reflective awareness or ‘mark formation’, which is the ‘tightly held view of the difference.’ The outside word is the sound or ‘the becoming’ of this inner word. The inner word is ‘the nomination-by-naming of something to something’, which is at the center of the consideration of language and exists prior to the ‘sounding-towards’ outer word. Heidegger also stresses the role of sensibility to connect across from inner word to outer word:

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135 See, BT, p. 203, and also original n. 3.
137 OEL, pp. 3–4.
138 Ibid., p. 6.
139 Ibid., pp. 17, 78.
140 Ibid., p. 95.
141 Ibid., p. 157.
Sensibility provides the ground for the formation of marks insofar as the senses are *modes of representation* of the soul. The sensibility provides the ground for the outer word insofar as the senses are *modes of feeling* of the soul.  

The reflective awareness of the inner word will become outer when it is speaking out or announcing, which is a process to reveal the existential significance of human being in the form of language. For Heidegger, this will let a human being have a chance to look at himself both from reason as an inner form and from language as an outer form. Sensibility connects these two forms. The idea that sensibility is the foundation of the unity of the inner and outer words can be found in Levinas’s two important works where he discusses the relationship between sensibility, enjoyment and existence in *Totality and Infinity* and when he further discusses the relationship between sensibility, proximity and expression in the way of ‘the saying’ and ‘the said’ in his *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*. We will discuss Levinas’s discussions about word, expression, and language shortly but it is of importance to return to Heidegger, and to his later work *On the Way to Language*, where Heidegger continues to intensively explore the possibility that ‘language is the house of the dialogue’ even though the approach and the emphasis of his discussion has changed from ‘language as a way to disclose Being’ into ‘language as the foundation of thinking of Being’. In other words, Heidegger’s focus is no longer on ‘what we discuss’ but ‘in the way in which we tried to do so’.  

In this period, Heidegger affirms the impossibility of ‘a dialogue from house to house’ and admits the problem of his ‘too far and too early’ articulations on language in *Being and Time*. Hermeneutics, in this period for Heidegger, is not the art or function of understanding and interpretation but the nature of interpretation on hermeneutic grounds, which differentiates it from that of Dilthey and Schleiermacher. Thus, in this sense, Heidegger continues his priority on the inner word in the analyses of the structure of language in the mode of sound and script, significance and sense, but in a mystical change. He even doubts whether the phrase ‘house of Being’ can sufficiently convey the meaning of the nature of language. Therefore, Heidegger

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142 OEL, p. 156.
143 OWL, p. 4, my emphasis.
144 Ibid., p. 5.
145 See, OWL, p. 19.
turns to the exploration of the pre-linguistic element, which bears the message and determines hermeneutics. This indicates that language plays a prior role to the interpretation of the subject-object relation and the ontological difference. The reason is that language makes man a message-bearer of the message. In this perspective, language walks through the boundary of the subject-object relation and the ontological difference. Heidegger further clarifies the concepts of ‘saying’ and ‘said’, and his position is quite close to Levinas’s. Saying, for Heidegger, means both ‘saying as what is said in it and what is to be said.’ From this we can see that Heidegger turns from the ‘what question’ to the ‘how question’ by locating the ‘saying’ as ‘showing’ in the first place rather than ‘the said’, like the inner word in his early thoughts. Heidegger attempts to depart from the hermeneutic circle, as he maintained in his early work, but his mystical and poetical interpretation ‘language or speech, speaks’ (Die Sprache spricht) is still not clear and sufficient enough to explain the authentic dialogue of language.

We argue that Heidegger tries to avoid the elements that might misrepresent the structure of language in the thinking of being, but at the same time he proposes that in order to find out this structure of language, it is necessary to discover our relation to language. This is Heidegger’s definition of meta-language, which is also an experience that we undergo with language when this experience brings us face to face. For Heidegger, this experience of the individual which they encounter face to face is a process of bringing a thing into being by language. Heidegger himself names this change from his early thoughts on language to later as ‘the being of language becomes the language of being.’ Correspondingly, the stress on this question in his early period turns to the focus on listening, and to ‘the promise of what is to be put in question.’ In other words, when we speak, the meta-structure of language already restricts or pre-constructs and pre-figures what we are going to say. What we are saying is to manifest this meta-structure and what we have said will change this structure for the next time, when we speak again. This meta-structure corresponds to our thinking experience, to the relation of word to thing. Thus,

146 OWL, p. 47.
147 See, OWL, p. 59.
149 Ibid., p. 72.
150 Ibid., p. 71.
Heidegger’s intention is to detect the equivalence between our thinking and language. That is to say, for Heidegger, when we use language as an instrument we are speaking merely about language, while we need to let language show its own structure from which it also reveals the genuine relation of human and things. We could summarize Heidegger’s development of language with William J. Richardson’s classification: in the first stage, Heidegger tends to use the method of phenomenology to clarify our speaking about language while in the second stage, he focuses on the process of the thinking of being in order to detect our speaking in language.151

From this foregoing analysis, the characteristic of essence both Being and Language in Heidegger’s thought is anonymous because a human being is just a resonance by being addressing, actualizing and revealing in this presupposition.152 Therefore, even though Heidegger attempts to move away from the hermeneutical circle with his examination of language in either the inner-outer word or said-saying mode, his investigation is still in a regressus ad infinitum. Although Heidegger changes his attention from ‘what it signifies’ to ‘the signifier’ from his early to his later thought, the path of the dialogue in which two people speak is still on the way to the ‘clearing’ (die Lichtung): language discloses.153 As Charles Taylor concludes, in his article ‘Heidegger on Language’, there is a long philosophical history on this Dasein-related clearing.154 In the process of the clearing, a conversational common space will be set up. Hegel stands for the first aspect: expression brings something to manifestation and reveals reality as the self, which is embodied as self-expression in a cosmic spirit or process. The representative of the second aspect is the Humboldtian one: language does not bring something to light, but brings it about, which is a more radical subjectivism by creating the symbol as a medium in which some hidden reality can be manifested. Compared to the first aspect, the second one not only focuses on its self-expression, but also its self-completion. According to Taylor, Derrida stands for a third aspect because he turns from self expression and completion to the question of the ‘who’ of expression. If we use Taylor’s analyses as

151 See Ward, p. 114.
152 See, De Boer, p. 126.
154 Dreyfus, p. 446.
a reference point, then Heidegger’s deliberations cover the first two aspects, but not the third one. It is exactly with regard to the third aspect that Levinas criticizes Heidegger’s early thought the most, even though in his later stage Heidegger is already conscious of this aspect. Heidegger shows the humble side of the human being’s use of language in a form of silence, from which the human being will not ‘cover the sources of the clearing in darkness.’

In this section, we have briefly reviewed and intensively analysed Heidegger’s exploration of language and its ontological characteristics. With this discussion, we make it clear that Heidegger’s analysis is not wrong, but it also will not provide what is right or good. It just ‘manifests’ what humans are by the means of the clearing of what language itself expresses. This is a process of retrieval. However, the ‘who’ question will push this process to go beyond itself: it is not only about the responding in the clearing of Being but responding to the plurality of historico-linguistic standpoints. Thus, in next section, we will discuss Levinas’s response to Heidegger’s concept of language in terms of his ethical priority rather than ontological priority.

§ 3.3.7 Levinas’s Response to Heidegger’s Thought on Language (Heidegger, Buber, Levinas)

We cannot discuss Levinas’s thought on language without mentioning an influence from two thinkers. One is Heidegger, who we have been examining alongside our study, another one is Buber who influences Levinas both on the themes of ‘the Other’ and of dialogue. As Ward points out, however,

Levinas’s project, unlike Buber’s, does engage with the phenomenological; but Levinas’s project, unlike Heidegger’s, appeals to monotheism’s God. It is this theological appeal that determines the ethical emphasis in his work upon social responsibility and intersubjectivity.

Ward’s words directly point out the characteristics of Levinas’s approaches in his examination of language: a phenomenological perspective and an ethical emphasis in the linguistic sense. These two aspects, nonetheless, are dependent on each other in

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155 Ibid., p. 448.
156 See, Caputo, p. 96.
157 Ward, p. 140.
order to examine the role of language in ethical interpersonal relationships. The approach of phenomenology provides the horizon for ethics to investigate the pre-linguistic elements that are fundamental to the constitution of ethical relation while the priority of ethical requirement provides the motivation for phenomenology to explore the genuine significance of language in the relationship of mineness and otherness. With these two aspects in mind, Levinas’s consideration of language must be transcendental rather than immanent because it concerns when the cogito speaks towards the other and also to the collective. This proceeds towards beyond the thinking of being because it aims to ‘a description of a relationship between the ‘logos de l’infini’ and the finite.'

Levinas’s response to Heidegger’s thought on language is derived from his critique of Heidegger’s knowing things in their ontological totality. The reason is that:

Heideggerian ontology subordinates the relation with the other to the relation with the Neuter, Being, and it thus continues to exalt the will to power, whose legitimacy the Other (Autrui) alone can unsettle, troubling good conscience.

Levinas holds that this ontological tradition begins from Plato and develops in two directions, Husserl is one and the other is Nietzsche. Heidegger’s early work, which Levinas mainly focuses on, is a synthesis but also a new development of these two directions at that period according to Levinas. As previously analysed, Levinas uses the key terms that Heidegger uses in order to criticize Heidegger’s thought from its inner side: to argue the otherness from the deficiency of sameness.

Thus, we will now further examine the similarity and difference of the argument on language and its ethical significance from Heidegger, Buber and Levinas. Ward already provides a detailed discussion of this theme; we, therefore, will summarize his analyses first, and then develop our own discussion concerning

158 See, ibid., p. 103.
159 Adriaan Theodoor Peperzak, Emmanuel Levinas, To the Other: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas (Purdue: Purdue University Press, 2005), p. 103.
160 See, Ward, p. 121.
the theme of the Other, language, and ethical significance between Heidegger and Levinas.

According to Ward, Buber’s, as well as Barth’s, emphasis on dialogue-with-difference influenced Levinas. And Ward holds that both Heidegger and Buber would agree that ‘there is otherness because there is dialogue.’\(^\text{162}\) We will argue, however, that Levinas would consider conversely that there is dialogue because there is otherness. As for the analysis about genuine dialogue, Buber and Heidegger share similar viewpoints. Firstly, ‘genuine dialogue is an ontological sphere which is constituted by the authenticity of being’;\(^\text{163}\) Second, in genuine dialogue and in ‘its basic order […] nothing can be determined, the course is of the spirit, and some discover what they have to say only when they catch the call of the spirit.’\(^\text{164}\) On the other side of same coin, their differences are evident. The first lies in the fact that Buber still belongs to the Greek ontological tradition while Heidegger intends to push beyond it.\(^\text{165}\) Even though both Heidegger and Buber start their thoughts from facticity (\textit{Faktizität}), Heidegger’s concern is to retrieve the forgetting of ontological difference; Buber’s concern is to prove the fundamental I-Thou relation in a social, anthropological and philosophical sense.\(^\text{166}\) From this we can conclude, according to Ward, that for ‘both of them dialogue is the location for the ontological, but what each understands by the nature of the ontological differs radically’.\(^\text{167}\) It is precisely these fundamentally different concerns which affect their viewpoints on ethical consideration and its relation to dialogue.

Buber stresses the significance of the ‘between’ in a spoken dialogue because it indicates a site between the I and Thou.\(^\text{168}\) The space of this site is open for the ‘understanding between human beings and for the ontological unity of the human and the divine Thou.’\(^\text{169}\) Thus, Buber, like the other dialogical philosophers, stresses the movement of the spirit from the divine Thou to the human Thou, rather than

\(^{162}\) Ward, p. 128, my emphasis.
\(^{164}\) Buber, \textit{The Knowledge of Man}, p. 87, also Ward, p. 128.
\(^{165}\) Ward, p. 128.
\(^{166}\) Ibid., p. 128.
\(^{167}\) Ibid., p. 129.
\(^{168}\) See, Buber, \textit{The Knowledge of Man}, p. 112, also Ward, p. 129.
\(^{169}\) Ward, p. 131.
concentrating on the unity between two dimensions of the ontological difference in Heidegger, even though both of them intend to move beyond intentionality. Their attention to language is an essential approach in the form of speaking and hearing to receive and respond between the human Thou and divine Thou as well as the beings and Being.  

In Ward’s opinion, the obvious distinction between them is the fact that Heidegger works on ‘the end of metaphysics’ while Buber works as a philosophical anthropologist.

This distinction shows their different purposes when they analyze language. Buber holds that language in the I-Thou relationship is both transcendental and spiritual, and which has an evolutionary characteristic to develop itself in the personal-social construction. Heidegger thinks that language in the beings-Being relationship is both backtracked and metaphysical, and which has a recalling characteristic to recall itself in the Dasein-world construction. Buber’s purpose is to improve a genuine and an effective way of dialogue in the I-Thou relationship. Buber’s way of dialogue exists reciprocally between the I and the Thou which is similar to Barth’s articulation on word of man and Word of God because when the Thou addresses the I, it is like a revelation from the Thou to reveal a monologue towards the I in the dialogue. Heidegger’s way of dialogue does exist between the beings who live in this world, but it also indwells between Being and the human individual’s understanding of its own being and that is a form of monologue.

Buber’s dialogue, therefore, spirals up in the understanding between the I and the Thou in a subjective but bilateral way. However, there is a danger that lies behind this spiral because there is no reliable guarantee for the direction of this spiral and dialogical development. Levinas criticizes this point from Buber from two aspects in Totality and Infinity:

One may, however, ask if the thou-saying [tutoiement] does not place the other in a reciprocal relation, and if this reciprocity is primordial. On the other hand, the I-Thou relation in Buber retains a formal character: it can unite man to things as much as man to man. The I-Thou formalism does

170 Cf. Heidegger’s Mitte and Buber’s Zwischen.
171 Ward, p. 134.
172 Heidegger’s treatment of the ‘call of conscience’ in Being and Time bears this out, for, there Heidegger argues that this call is a call from Dasein back to its self.
not determine any concrete structure. The I-Thou is an event (Geschehen), a shock, a comprehension, but does not enable us to account for (except as an aberration, a fall, or a sickness) a life other than friendship: economy, the search for happiness, the representational relation with things. They remain, in a sort of disdainful spiritualism, unexplored and unexplained.\footnote{TI, pp. 68–69.}

Levinas immediately states that he is not seeking to correct Buber’s thought on these points but that he would like to provide different perspectives on these similar points with respect to the idea of the Infinite. In Levinas’s other work Otherwise than Being, he further points out his developed thought on ‘illeity’ (from Latin, ille, ‘he’) with the comparison to Buber’s concept of ‘Thou’, though Levinas comments that ‘Buber has never brought out in a positive way the spiritual element in which the I-Thou relationship is produced.’\footnote{OB, p. 13.} From this train of thought, Buber’s philosophy of dialogue would be lack of the idea of the Infinite but still stick to totality because for Buber, ‘the truth of the word in its highest form […] is indivisible unity.’\footnote{Buber, The Knowledge of Man, p. 120, also Ward, p. 135.} In other words, Buber’s philosophy of dialogue brings Being and beings into one, if we use Heidegger’s paradigm of ontological difference as a mode to analyze it. Then when the dialogue happens in the I and the Thou, the element of time or history will be excluded because the I and the Thou are ‘an organic one’ at the time when they proceed in dialogue. Time or history is an external element rather than internal element because the I-Thou relation is one and will not be changed according to time but only will change because of their relationship itself. This is also because Buber’s ‘dialogicalism’ accommodates the other to the same.\footnote{Ward, p. 137.} Thus the critical question arises as to whether the dialogue in I-Thou relationship is dialogue, or the dialogue is just an inter-change of two monologues from the I and the Thou? According to this, Ward holds that Buber’s method is not dialogical and cannot overcome the intentionality of the ‘I’ with this method.\footnote{Ibid.} By contrast, Heidegger’s deliberations on language in the mode of ‘saying’ also shares this problem because saying cannot be apart from the self-understanding in a dialogue according to his analyses of temporality and its relation to ontological difference as we already discussed. Heidegger’s later thought on language continues this train of thought from

\footnote{\textsuperscript{174} Buber, The Knowledge of Man, p. 120, also Ward, p. 135.\textsuperscript{175} Buber, The Knowledge of Man, p. 120, also Ward, p. 135.\textsuperscript{176} Ward, p. 137.\textsuperscript{177} Ibid.}
his analysis of poetry as a witness (das Gedicht bezeugt es), even though it is no longer as a manifestation (bezeigt es) as in his Being and Time. The feature of witness still emphasizes the synchrony aspect of language. Heidegger, therefore, has not solved this problem thoroughly.

There is, however, an important concept that runs through Heidegger’s thought, and which should have more attention paid to it in any analysis of the relation between language, the Other and responsibility. This concept is ‘oblivion’ or ‘forgetting’, or to put it more precisely: the elements that constitute memory. Only when we know something that has been forgotten do we start to search through our memory. Thus, when Heidegger discusses forgetting, he is at the same time exploring memory because in this pair of concepts, one cannot exist without the other. Moreover, the reason why Heidegger takes language so seriously lies also in his discussion of the oblivion of Being because language is a key point in order to search the traces of the meaning of Being that are left for beings. Thus, it is not a psychological approach at all in Heidegger, but an interpretation of memory in a metaphysical and hermeneutical sense. If we can say of Heidegger’s early thought that dialogue, in the nature of language, happens between two beings about language, in his later thought, we can say that different relations to language in the process of thinking of being play a major role in his thought. Memory connects the dialectic of the said and the saying. Levinas understands and develops his thoughts of language from this, while Buber’s presupposition of the same and integral characteristic of I-Thou relationship restricts his thought from this perspective. As Wards argues, this is because ‘he is caught between the methodological precedence of his “I” discourse and the ontological precedence he wishes to accord the Thou.’ Buber’s thoughts on dialogue cannot go too far compared with Heidegger’s because of this unavoidable conflict. Heidegger’s phenomenological and hermeneutical approaches make it substantial that the trace of the dialectical relationship of the saying and the said would be fundamental for his analyses of language. Both of the unsolved

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178 Ibid., p. 136.
179 Augustine notes in Book X of his Confessions that ‘forgetting’ is a power (vis) of memory.
180 Again, this is somewhat reminiscent of Augustine’s remarks that he held in his memory not the mere images of what his mind (mens) stored but the reality of those images (Book X). His example is of the existence of the dog barking that is held, after the barking has stopped, in the memory of the hearer.
181 Ward, p. 139.
problem from Buber and eloquent analyses from Heidegger provide, however, a necessary backdrop for Levinas to develop his own thoughts on the relation between language, the other and ethics. Levinas identifies that the problem is of the sameness of the I-Thou relation in order to give a genuine place for the Other and continues Heidegger’s tracks to find out the ‘discourse prior to discourse’ in order to detect the genuine significance of language in our ethical relationship. Thus, in next section, we will briefly discuss Levinas’s concept of face and its relation to language with Heidegger’s later discussion of language within the context of ‘face-to-face’. A detailed discussion of Levinas’s ethical significance of ‘face-to-face’ in the analyses of language will be explored in the following chapter.

§ 3.3.8 ‘Face and Language’ in Heidegger and Levinas (Ethical Significance of ‘Face-to-Face’)

We are not going to compare the concept of face-to-face and its relation to language between Heidegger and Levinas in this section because, though both of them use this concept to point out the pre-structure of language, their presuppositions and purposes are not the same. It is still meaningful to look at their examples, nonetheless, because from their different perspectives we can detect why the same concept and similar starting points will lead to different concerns and directions. Then, we will argue for our own perspective by analysing the role of language in an ethical ‘face-to-face’ relationship as based on this discussion.

When Heidegger discusses ‘face to face’ in his work *On the Way to Language*, this concept is explained as the ‘neighbourhood’. This neighbourhood refers to the face-to-face that exists between poetry and thinking, that is to say, between two modes of saying, as well as when human experience is face to face with language. Heidegger argues that it is not only important to detect our relation to language, but it also necessary to find out how language keeps this relation as relation. In other words, language in Heidegger would reveal the inner structure and situation of human being by undergoing an experience with language.

With this in mind, Heidegger differentiates between ‘the being of language’ and ‘the language of being’. Heidegger explains the former as ‘language is the

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182 See, OWL, p. 82.
subject whose being is to be determined’,\textsuperscript{183} while the latter is as ‘we shall comprehend what language as soon as we enter into [it and when it] opens up before us.’\textsuperscript{184} The being of language and the language of being should be two stages in one process. The being of language is the being that exists prior to ‘the speaking’ but entails ‘the speaking’. The language of being refers to the language that man is ‘speaking’, which represents all of the characteristics of this man as being. Heidegger separates this process into two stages, but the ethical significance of language exists precisely between these two stages. Thus Heidegger’s investigation of language has approached or implied the ethical significance in his thought, but he never points it out and always wants to keep it in an absolute neutrality, though he also thinks that responsibility is a good thing and important.\textsuperscript{185} Based on this, Heidegger’s emphasis on face-to-face, either in the sense of the encounter between human being or in the sense of the neighbourhood of poetry and thinking as modes of saying, points out our existent situation of waiting for the encounter and the future. In this way, for Heidegger, language, memory, and thought can be shown and made to appear integrally related, and,

\begin{quote}
[Heidegger’s three lectures have tried]: to make us face a possibility of undergoing an experience with language, such that our relation to language would in future become memorable, worthy of thought. […] Its [Language’s] character belongs to the very character of the movement of the face-to-face encounter of the world’s four regions [earth, sky, god, man]. […] Language is, as world-moving Saying, the relation of all relation.\textsuperscript{186}
\end{quote}

The point that is criticized by Levinas and others, however, is that even though Heidegger places an emphasis on the relation of saying and the nearness of the face-to-face encounter, there is still no ethical concern in his thought. Language is a genetic web that expresses thoughts. Thus language as intellect, in Heidegger, is a totality of speaking: the being of language is in its totality of a ‘Saying’.\textsuperscript{187} In this way, in order to explain the unity of the being of language, Heidegger draws on Humboldt’s theory on language and worldview with regards to ‘the diversity of the

\textsuperscript{183} Ibid., p. 94.
\textsuperscript{184} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{185} Ibid., p. 102.
\textsuperscript{186} OWL, p. 107.
\textsuperscript{187} Ibid., p. 122.
structure of human language’ and ‘its influence on the spiritual development of mankind’ as we have discussed in above section.

From our previous discussion, Heidegger concludes his theory of language as:

The encountering saying of mortals is answering. Every spoken word is already an answer: counter-saying, coming to the encounter, listening Saying. [...] This way-making puts language (the essence of language) as language (Saying) into language (into the sounded world).

Heidegger understands that his theory of language could give an impression of or lead to a selfish solipsism. Thus he concedes that language is a monologue, even though it appears as a dialogue because the property of owning and appropriating language brings about this problem owing to Heidegger’s separation of thinking and Being.

This problem is irresolvable in Heidegger even though he points out that the approach of relating language, memory, and thought will show what is absent in the oblivion of Being turns out to be present in the unsaid, said, and the saying. What Heidegger left for us is the way to detect the trace of this oblivion rather than to construct what has been forgotten, in other words, it is ‘the experience of the history of thinking is the experience of a lack’. Thus, for Heidegger, the encountering of face-to-face is essential in his later thought in the sense of witnessing a transformation of language as an experience of language. However, from our forgoing analysis, Heidegger is not interested in moral judgments from his early thought in Being and Time to his later thought On the Way to Language. By distinguishing everyday language and philosophical language, Heidegger points out its relation to the distinction between inauthentic and authentic existence. And a person who is in an inauthentic existence cannot make a value judgment. This distinction influenced Rudolf Bultmann’s theology, and other Christian thinkers too, and it is something which is criticized by Bonhoeffer. Even though there is a term

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188 Ibid., pp. 117–119.  
189 Ibid., pp. 129–130.  
190 Ibid., p. 131.  
191 Bernasconi, p. 85.
‘care’ (*Sorge*) that Heidegger uses in his thought to describe the *Dasein’s* mode of being-in-the-world, it is a word used to describe the facticity of the existence of *Dasein*, which is value-neutral as well. Thus we could conclude this part by saying that Heidegger in his later thought reveals the relationship between face-to-face and language, however, this relation is still neutral and not in an ethical mode. This neutral being-with in Heidegger from his early to later thought is still the basis of Levinas’s thought because it is the starting point for him to criticize that very ethical neutrality.

Levinas’s emphasis on the priority and exteriority of the Other’s relation to language is, therefore, an ethical orientation that would clarify Heidegger’s mystical significance of language. It would also point to the inherent ‘metaphysical’, in Levinas’s sense, priority of the *ethical* face to face encounter as preceding ‘ontology’, in Heidegger’s sense, for, in Caputo’s words,

> The ethical is there from the start and does not require either ontological preparation (the Heidegger of *Being and Time*) or a deontological foundation (value theory, criticized by Heidegger). The ethical does not wait and does not need to have a space prepared for it.192

By criticizing, therefore, the priority of Being, knowledge, and the subject’s understanding of Being that Heidegger stresses, both Bonhoeffer (who develops the priority of Christ, the necessity of non-religious interpretation of Christianity, and the significance of responsible life) and Levinas (who develops the priority of the Other, the necessity to explore the link of language and the subject’s responsibility to, before and in front of the other) calls radically into question Heidegger’s concept of understanding and the understanding of the other’s being derived from his attitude of neutrality.

This problem, then, lies in the analysis of the relationship between ethics and language via the Other. When we consider language within the context of an ethical relationship, for instance, like responsible relationship, language is no longer an instrument for a human being to understand each other. Rather, it is a method that draws a human being face to face and reveals not only the present relationship of the

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192 Caputo, p. 197.
interlocutors but also their past and future relationship in history. Because the Other is not only a phenomenal face in a positive sense and an appearance of the Dasein in a negative sense, yet it is always more than that: ‘the Other commands from on high in a way that is beyond Being as phenomenality.’ 193 Thus, on the one hand, language is both the nature and mediator to connect the Other and the commandments in the form of responsibility; on the other hand, language and responsibility cannot be manifested completely only by themselves because they interpenetrate and inter-identify each other.

Responsibility only can be accomplished in the consideration of the other by the means of language within the context of both Bonhoeffer’s and Levinas’s thought. It is evident that their similar theological concern is the backdrop of their ethical concern. However, ‘Faith is of a different order from Being, for Heidegger’, 194 and ‘Heidegger’s ontology places itself “beyond good and evil”.’ 195 For both Bonhoeffer and Levinas, the critique from theology and goodness towards ontology and neutrality is ineluctable. It is the theological and ethical concerns which differentiate Heidegger’s thought from Bonhoeffer’s and Levinas’s. Bonhoeffer intends to develop a universalist and Christological language to seek the genuine faith in a coming-of-age era while Levinas intends to develop a personalist and ethical language to seek the genuine co-existence with the Other.

Indeed, ‘the world is not a thing that I understand by thinking about it because the world is not something separate from myself at all.’ 196 Heidegger’s problem is essentially derived from his ontological difference, even though in his very thought of being-with-others in this world he was aware of the limitation of Dasein. The separation of beings and Being leads him to epistemologically or methodologically ponder about this world but metaphysically outside from this world. Therefore, for both Bonhoeffer and Levinas, the philosophical questions cannot only focus on the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ question, but also the ‘who’ question, though Heidegger cannot provide a satisfactory answer he helps to sharpen the question.

193 See, Caputo, p. 199.
194 Ward, p. 125.
195 De Boer, p. 29.
196 Frick, p. 307.
Responsibility as an ethical concept would easily drop into a relativistic gap because of the various definitions of responsible behaviour. However, from both Bonhoeffer’s and Levinas’s direct and indirect investigation and critique of Heidegger’s thought, we not only confirm the priority of ethical concern rather than the ontological concern of human being, but also are convinced of the necessity of another kind of responsibility: to take responsibility for whom we are responding to. Though Heidegger also calls for the responsibility about the true vocation of Dasein in his speech to the German university, and also emphasizes the role of language via listening and calling, this responsibility is responsible to the essence of Being, a power that outmatches the integrity of all human being, rather than to the dignity of every human. Bonhoeffer is aware of this problem in his Christological thought but unfortunately he has no chance to complete his idea. Levinas detects this problem and endeavours to clarify this responsibility by stressing the claim that the call of the other has on me, that is, the call of conscience that emanates from the other.

For Levinas, “responsibility-before-freedom” does refer to an authentic awareness of being made responsible. This awareness does not fill in Heidegger’s gap of the ontological difference but opens up a horizon of responsible experience along with the other and before the other and in front of the other. A horizon to detect the presence through an absence because “the relationship with the Other (L’Autrui) is the absence of the other (l’autre).” Thus, this paradigm of presence-absence links Bonhoeffer’s and Levinas’s ethical and theological concerns together. Bonhoeffer’s concern is that when the world becomes mature and when God no longer plays the traditional role as before, what, then, is the position and faith of a human being? Levinas would agree with Bonhoeffer’s idea in his later life as a theology of responsibility and independence: before God and with God, we live a responsible life without God. This is also the resonance of Barth’s thought of kenosis but Levinas draws Barth’s consideration on God’s incarnation down to the concern about human being as well as the freedom and responsibility of creature rather than the absolute Other, God. Therefore, in the following chapter, we will concentrate on Levinas’s elaboration of response via the contrast between finity and infinity in order to illustrate our theme of responsibility, Otherness, and language.

197 De Boer, p. 79.
198 See, Ward, p. 140.
CHAPTER IV

THE ETHICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MANIFESTATION OF THE OTHER IN LANGUAGE

In the previous chapter, we noted that both Bonhoeffer and Levinas faced the same historical realities that called upon them to ponder similar concerns, especially regarding the ‘other’ and the issue of man’s responsibility to the ‘other’. In that chapter, we also noted that, though undertaken separately, it was of crucial importance that both of these thinkers provide arguments that refute Heidegger’s narrow focus on the responsibility that one has for one’s own self and his position in philosophy centring on the ‘mineness’ of Being to the exclusion of the ‘other’ for whom one is also answerable. Bonhoeffer never finished his critique, but in this chapter, we shall see that Levinas continues Bonhoeffer’s critique by raising again Bonhoeffer’s question ‘What is man?’, but from another approach, from the point of view of ‘Who is the Other?’ What is significant about Levinas’s approach is that he defends the view that the manifestation of the other occurs in language.

This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section focuses on Levinas’s reflections on the relationship between the Other and the exteriority of the ‘face’. This section addresses the problem of ‘how the Other becomes the Other’ by examining the concept of ‘separation’ in Levinas’s thought, whilst also relating the ethical significance of ‘face’ to his reflections on the ‘incarnate subject’. The second section concentrates on the relationship between ‘face’ and language. For Levinas, the ‘face’ is the beginning of language. Thus it will be of importance to distinguish Levinas’s account of language from both Heidegger’s view that ‘language is the house of Being’ and causal and instrumental views of language. Like words, the encounter of the face is experienced in and through time. Thus, in this section, we intend also to explore the ethical significance of language within the context of diachronical time. This will lead our discussion to Levinas’s concepts of ‘the Saying’ and ‘the Said’ and how this pair of concepts is entailed by proximity and substitution in a responsible relationship. We will conclude that although man’s response is finite, the responsible significance of this response is infinite. It is the
response to the Other via language that manifests the significance of responsibility.
Responsibility in this new sense provides a possible approach and basis for explaining Bonhoeffer’s idea of non-religious interpretation of Christianity and his exploration about the structure of responsible life.

**SECTION ONE**

**THE OTHER AND THE FACE**

In chapter three, we have specifically discussed Levinas’s evaluation of Heidegger’s ontological difference’ and the priority of the individual human being (in *Dasein*) in raising anew the question of the meaning of Being. In his critique, Levinas holds that Heidegger fails to recognize the original plurality of human beings (in *Dasein*) but only recognizes the manifestation of one’s own existential possibilities as a being for one’s own death (in *Dasein*). Levinas, nevertheless, admits that Heidegger pushes Husserl’s transcendental method of enquiry and rigorous phenomenology forward to the real life-world rather than only in an ideal world, but not far enough. We shall see, therefore, that Levinas’s critique is not only about whether there is ethical concern in Husserl and Heidegger’s discussion, but also is about the ethical requirement in the phenomenological approach itself. In other words, the question turns to how the phenomenological approach can be effective in the life-world (of an ethically responsible human being) and not only in the ideal world of meaning (repeated and repeatable in and through eidetic-seeing).

§ 4.1.1 *From Phenomenological Ontology to Ethics*

Levinas’s analysis begins from Husserl’s transcendental reduction. Husserl’s transcendental reduction is closely related to the notion of intentionality, which is borrowed from Brentano. Intentionality indicates the structure of consciousness, that is to say, intentional consciousness, for Husserl, means that consciousness is always a consciousness of something. Thus the transcendental reduction as the essence of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology shows the central role of consciousness in his understanding and analysis of intentionality. In this presupposition, the meaning of things is derived from or constituted by
consciousness. In other words, the transcendental reduction and constitutive meaning are two sides of the one coin in Husserl’s phenomenological approach. The former ‘reduces’ the natural attitude from our everyday life in the world into an intersubjective relationship between transcendental egos; the latter ‘constitutes’ the meaning via this reduction in consciousness and projects this consciousness back to the everyday life world. From this, Husserl’s eidetic reduction has been established. For Levinas, the eidetic reduction not only reveals the way we experience our everyday life in the world but also distinguishes our experiences themselves from our understanding of our experience. Thus, the eidetic analysis can look at what we do and what we are by this distinction, from which we can see the ethical implication in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. This is also the reason why Levinas still keeps phenomenology as his major approach to explore ethics as first philosophy.

Nevertheless, from Levinas’s early work *Existence and Existent*, he criticizes the role of consciousness in this phenomenological approach. The problem of consciousness lies in the depersonalization involved in the process of reduction when the subject intends to objectivize the other subjects and things in this process (as both things and other fellow human beings are taken, initially, as objects given to one’s own actual outer perceptual-sense experience). For Levinas, consciousness is not the only origin of knowing one’s everyday life in this world but it is the obligation to act before the other because ‘consciousness always arrives after the fact of the obligation’.

In *Time and the Other*, Levinas deals with the transcendence of the Other within a diachronical relationship rather than in the synchronical one such as Heidegger articulates it in *Being and Time*. This approach not only refers to the understanding of one’s experience of time, but also opens up a new perspective towards the time that is experienced both by myself and the Other diachronically. This means that the experience of time in a subject’s duration is just one aspect of the understanding of time; in order to approach the Other in a mutual relationship, we need to count in the Other’s experience of time and how these two aspects of time interweave when they encounter. From this, we will see that intentionality in the traditional Husserlian thematization way is not able to completely analyse the very relationship of the subject with the other because this

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two-dimensional time cannot be reduced and then constituted in the same way by the consciousness of two subjects. Therefore, Levinas’s unique way of discussing time breaks through the characteristic of sameness in the analysis of consciousness, which is an important presupposition for us to fully appreciate his articulation of ethics and religion in the consideration of language and the Other.

In *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas further breaks with consciousness analysis by emphasizing the sensuous elements of sensibility, like pain, suffering, pleasure, enjoyment, etc., in order to illustrate the importance of inhabitation or ‘being at home’ (*chez moi*) and cohabitation. This cohabitation is an invisible attribute of relationship that is achieved via ‘separation’ that exists between genuine subjectivities but which is connected by language at the same time. Only thus can we understand the role of alterity in an ethical relationship in dichronical time and through dialogue. The very approach to and basic question ‘What is it?’ indicates already an answer that is constituted by intentional consciousness in an objective thinking system. This way of thinking, according to Levinas, occupies Western philosophy and culminates in the philosophy of Hegel. In *Otherwise than Being*, Levinas stresses that the ‘what’ question comes after the who question because ‘the “what?” is already wholly enveloped with being, has eyes only for being, and already sinks into being.’ Thus in order to answer the ‘what?’ question, we need to be sure of ‘who’ raises this question in the first place. Heidegger attempts to solve this problem by understanding beings qua beings and let beings independently be. It is only in the ‘understanding of Being’ (*Seinsverständnis*) that is deposited in *Dasein* that any questioning of the meaning of Being can be sought.

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3 See, EI, p. 75.

4 *OB*, p. 23.

5 ‘Entities are, quite independently of the experience by which they are disclosed, the acquaintance in which they are discovered, and the grasping in which their nature is ascertained. But Being “is” only in the understanding of those entities to whose Being something like an understanding of Being belongs. Hence Being can be something unconceptualized, but it never completely fails to be understood.’ *Being and Time*, p. 228:183: ‘Seiendes ist unabhängig von Erfahrung, Kenntnis und Erfassen, wodurch es erschlossen, entdeckt und bestimmt wird. Sein aber “ist” nur im Verstehen des Seienden, zu dessen Sein so etwas wie Seinsverständnis gehört. Sein kann daher unbegriffen sein, aber es ist nie völlig unverstanden.’ According to Heidegger, then, because ‘[The meaning of] Being can be something unconceptualised (*unbegriffen*), but it is never completely incomprehensible (*es ist nie völlig unverstanden*), then we can set aside and not return to the very existence of things that are
In this manner, Heidegger excludes traditional (realist) metaphysical speculation from his conception of a phenomenological ontology (or ‘fundamental ontology’) that finds its roots, not in the consciousness of the human being (transcendently reduced \textit{a la} Husserl) but, nonetheless, in the actual awareness of an individual’s being a being-in-the-world. And since \textit{Miteinandersein} (being-with-the-other-person) is acknowledged by Heidegger as a feature of one’s own being-in-the-world, then Heidegger believes that his start-point evades any Cartesian or solipsistic isolatable consciousness. As we have discussed in chapter three, Heidegger has deliberately discussed the ontological relation of \textit{Miteinandersein} (being-with-the-other-person) via his examination of understanding.

Heidegger’s concept of understanding is both a turning point and starting point for Levinas. It turns from the traditional understanding of language and goes beyond the features of subjectivity in the background of phenomenological ontology. Levinas intends to explore the being’s relation with the other which cannot be reduced to understanding because ‘in understanding this being, I simultaneously tell him my understanding. […] my understanding of a being as such is already the expression I offer him or her of that understanding.’\textsuperscript{6} When I talk to someone, even about that being’s understanding of something, I recognise that my understanding is not reducible to that’s being’s understanding of their own existence. The other’s \textit{existence} is more than either my understanding or their own self-understanding revealed in dialogue. In other words, for Levinas, my relationship with the Other cannot be only explained by ontological understanding in the approach of ‘as’ in Heidegger’s thinking because this ‘as’ reveals the meaning of the object but not the object itself.\textsuperscript{7} Consciousness, in this process, bears this meaning and confers it to corresponding understanding. This is exactly what Levinas criticizes as a totalistic understanding of the ‘what’ question and such a totalistic conception of understanding cannot be applied to any analysis of the meaning of our shared human

\textit{outside of my understanding of their being, and that includes the being of my own fellow man. The exteriority of the existence of ‘the other’, then, is recognised by Heidegger, and central to his own position, but he does not address or think the other in his philosophy. This becomes the critical task of Levinas’s advancement of phenomenology (as ‘metaphysics’, in Levainas’s sense of that term), but it is one that radically calls into question the priority of ‘ontology’ in Heidegger’s definition of phenomenology as first philosophy.}\textsuperscript{6} EN, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{7} Emmanuel Levinas, \textit{Collected Philosophical Papers}, trans. by Alphonso Lingis (Dodrecht: Kluwer, 1993), p. 110. (Henceforth abbreviated as CPP.)
existence without serious determinant to the understanding the existence of others. This is why the very existence of others, or ‘metaphysics’ (in Levinas’s sense, of ‘ethics’) precedes any ‘ontology’ (understanding of being).

Levinas puts forward the ‘who’ question at the beginning of Otherwise than Being:

on all sides the privilege of the question ‘what?’’, or the ontological nature of the problem is affirmed […] if one starts with the notion of the truth, can one place the welcoming of the manifestation of being outside of the being that manifest itself? Can he that looks place himself outside of the Absolute, and the look withdraw from the event of being, by hollowing out the fold of inwardness, in which knowledge is deposited, accumulates and its formulated? […] That is in fact our problem: what does ‘who?’ mean? [because] truth can consist only in the exposition of being to itself, in self-consciousness.  

From this, we can argue that Heidegger illustrates the relationship of ontological difference but Levinas explores the ethical separation from the manifestation of beings by criticizing the totalistic characteristic of the relationship between Being and beings, which defines the distinction between the interiority and exteriority of a subjectivity as well as the finitude and infinitude in a responsible relationship. Thus we can understand why Levinas must think through Heidegger’s identifiction of ‘mineness’ and ‘Being’ to the Other as exemplified in the exteriority of the ‘face’ that can never, in principle, be reduced to the interiority of self-consciousness (Husserl) or of Dasein facing itself in anticipation of its own death (als Vorlaufen zum Tode).

§ 4.1.2 The Other and the ‘Face’

The notion of ‘face’ is a very important concept in Levinas’s thought, but it is also a very intricate concept that is articulated by Levinas in relation to many other main concepts in his later works. Throughout his deliberations, however, Levinas considers face not in a metaphorical way but in an ethical and transcendental way. What the ‘face’ expresses is not about a specific person, but about the relationship with this person. Therefore, the phrase, ‘the face of the Other’, indicates not the

8 OB, p. 27.
perception, description, or interpretation of the expression of the face of a person, but the condition for the experience of this face to appear. In other words, the face is an ethical sign that emphasizes the immaterial and non-objectified attribute of human being.\(^9\) In this regard, Levinas’s concept of ‘face’ is functionally similar to Heidegger’s notion of ‘Being’ because both these two terms deal with the first signification (\textit{primum intelligibile}) of human relationship in an indirect way.\(^10\) Their motivations behind the function, however, are not the same. Heidegger’s philosophy lacks a genuine ethical concern and the concept of Being is neutral and anonymous.

\section*{§ 4.1.3 \textit{The Other and Exteriority (of the Face)}}

In order to break through this neutrality and anonymity, Levinas stresses the characteristics of the relationship with the Other in the ways of exteriority and separation as the condition in his analysis of ‘face’. The face of the Other, for Levinas, is a ‘mask’ that covers one’s interiority on the one hand, and reveals one’s exteriority on the other hand. Thus, ‘face’ within this presupposition is both a limitation and a possibility of establishing a relationship with the Other. ‘Face’, as a condition of experiencing the Other, does not mean, however, to fulfil the understanding towards the Other \textit{via} ‘face’, but to deepen the contact with the otherness of that Other in and through a diachronical relationship. The face is visible, but the ethical and transcendental significance behind the face is invisible and inherent in the Other. This invisible face, nevertheless, does not denote the absence of this significance; rather, it implies the determinative connections of the face encounter but which are easily neglected by people. Thus, we will begin our discussion from the traditional interpretations of the Other which are mostly close to both the concerns of our topic and the methods that we intend to explore.

\section*{§ 4.1.4 \textit{The Traditional Interpretations of the Other}}

The traditional interpretations of the Other are discussed in two senses: Firstly, it is in the sense of opening a horizon by means of the formalization of our experience of

\textsuperscript{9} See, GDT, p. 196. Levinas discusses the signification of signs of the face, and especially notes that when ‘the moment the other becomes material, he loses his face’.

\textsuperscript{10} See related discussion about this point in De Boer, p. 28.
the Other. Secondly, it is in the sense of constituting an idea by means of the absolutization of the traits of the Other. Both approaches attempt to detect the truth of the ‘understanding’ of the Other from the perspective of intentional consciousness rather than from the relationship of alterity with the Other. This traditional interpretation of the Other is derived from the characteristic of the reduction of Western ontology. Within this background, to know the other is to know this other from me or within me. Thus, in *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas states that ‘Philosophy [in this sense] is an egology’. Husserl and Heidegger, who influence Levinas, also repeat and continue this tradition. Notwithstanding their differences and focus on intentional consciousness and *Dasein*, both maintain that in the case of understanding the other from the domination of the I in the relationship with the Other, the I has the free will and the capacity of reason to keep one’s own identity from within as an egoism. In Heidegger’s case, he emphasizes the reduction of the Other to the same as the Being, for, although the ‘understanding of Being’ extends equally and inclusively to myself, the world, and my fellow human being, it is the characteristic of mineness in understanding the Being that determines its meaning (for Heidegger). For this reason, Levinas holds that ‘(O)ntology as first philosophy is a philosophy of power’. In this, freedom and reason are then subject to this power. The result of this would be that freedom belongs to Being but not by man; in other words, man is controlled by the false impression of freedom in obedience to Being.

This concern about the characteristics of sameness and totality in ontology from Levinas cannot be explained completely without considering the historical background and his own personal experience, especially the experience of war. If ontology shows the identity of sameness and the relation between things is a spontaneous co-existence in the world, then war is the event that breaks the identity of this sameness and relation. This is a special ‘time’ for man to rethink the objectivity of ontology and the intersubjectivity between two, or more than two

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11 See, Introduction to OB, p. xxxii.
12 TI, p. 43.
13 Ibid., p. 45.
14 See, TI, p. 45. There is a sense in Heidegger’s ‘response’ (*Antwort*) to the ‘question of the meaning of Being’ that we cannot but be puppets responding to the historical-epochal sendings of that meaning and understanding of Being. This is why Levinas, correctly, believes that it is a *false impression of freedom* in obedience to the meaning of Being.
parties in this War. What is left after the War is neither the triumph or the losing nor the meaning of these results as historical concepts in the way of reduction from history. The Other is the irreducible one that is able to escape from the sameness or mineness of ontology into the alterity of ethics.

Memory, in Levinas, is a representation of reduction but it can only be understood in relation to one’s conception of time. Heidegger’s emphasis on forgetting ‘the ontological difference’, for instance, stresses the importance of re-achieving a kind of ontological memory, or ontology-based memory. The traditional way of interpretation of the Other is based on the unity of the ‘truth’ of the Other by means of recalling the distance between the past and the presence about this Other. It is a process that includes both memory and projection, which unites the role of consciousness in memorizing the Other and the role of the essence in projecting the Other.15 The outcome of this unity is that the particularity is classified into the wholeness of an image, as Being in Heidegger, and the subjectivity is classified into the reflective understanding of the objectivity. The Other, in such a configuration, is always held in the constitution of my consciousness and already affirmed in my understanding of the representation of the Other in my memory. The I has the freedom to understand the Other who is deprived of the freedom in the process of being understood. Yet the very existence of the Other is what calls into question my ability to understand the Other from the freedom of my personal point of view. If the limitation of the constitution cannot be avoided, it needs to be recognized as a genuine condition and transcended. We will argue that this is the reason why Levinas gives priority to passivity (before the Other) rather than positivity in his consideration of ethics because he acknowledges the problem of the traditional constitutive way of thinking. This point also relates to Levinas’s distinction between totality and infinity: both of these concepts must be thought together. In this distinction, totality refers to the theoretical constitution of the relationships and infinity refers to the moral conditions for the relationships.16

One of the conditions for revealing the relationship with the other is time, which we have already discussed in both chapter two on Bonhoeffer’s concepts of

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15 See related discussion by Levinas in, OB, p. 29.
16 See Levinas’s discussion on this distinction in, TI, p. 83.
the pen-ultimate and the ultimate and in chapter three on Heidegger’s synchronical time and Levinas’s diachronical time. In the traditional interpretation of time, time is regarded as a physical measuring system used to describe objectively sequential events as well as to explain the causation of people’s actions. When we need to discuss time within the context of ethics, and in particular our responsibility for the other, however, we cannot only focus on specific and disconnected points of time but on the relationships between different streams of flowing time. Thus, the discussion of the Other in the traditional interpretation is in a static and one-sided way which lies at the basis of totality. In Levinas’s view, the investigation of the role of time in this discussion should go beyond the still time and its relation to beings and focus on how the ethical relationship with the other is manifested in the sense of infinity.

Therefore, the elements that are inherent in the infinity would break through the totality. For Levinas, the most essential element that can condition the totality lies in the face of the Other as the gleam of exteriority and a defense of subjectivity at the same time.\textsuperscript{17} Infinity is not a concept that can be restrained by the context of time, but reveals itself in the subject who lives in time as a mode of being. Then a question would be raised about the method that can be used in approaching the infinity, which is an important issue for both philosophy and theology because this is a question that concerns human nature in general. In Levinas, the existence of the Other, especially the face of the Other is an essential approach to affirm my own identity. Undoubtedly, this is how Levinas puts his method or style of passivity into effect. This passivity, however, relates to the recognition of the existence of an independent value.\textsuperscript{18} This independent value cannot be reduced into my consciousness and understanding. In this sense, to experience the Other is to experience the Infinity that goes beyond my being (être, literally and verbally, my ‘to be’) and my power.\textsuperscript{19} The method that Levinas applied within this presupposition is

\textsuperscript{17} See, TI, p. 24.
\textsuperscript{18} The existence of an independent value is discussed by Brown in Continental Philosophy and Modern Theology: An Engagement, pp. 85–86.
\textsuperscript{19} Levinas’s ethical thinking in this sense is closely related to his religious background. See Is It Righteous To Be? Interview with Emmanuel Levinas, edited by Jill Robbins, (Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 18. ‘the face is the site of the Word of God, that the Word of God is the very obligation or commandment that the face addresses to me. That the relation to God never accomplishes itself in the absence of the relation to man is a familiar enough emphasis within Levinas’s hermeneutic of Judaism.’ We will discuss the application of the interpretation from Levinas’s ethical thinking on the problem of religious diversity in chapter five.
the ‘exploration of the pre-objective areas of human experience and in the implicit understanding of being.’\textsuperscript{20} From this, we can see Levinas’s method is clearly different from the traditional interpretation on human relationship. In other words, this method is derived from the Other which has been already situated in a bond to me in a ‘pre-original’ condition, but the traditional interpretation roots in my understanding towards the Other after we encounter, know, undertake, or commit with each other. As Ward holds, Levinas is concerned with the ‘otherwise (autrement) than Being’, or a kind of non-being which is prior to Being, and which is presented as an absence rather than a presence.\textsuperscript{21} The position of the Other is an absence of the I, or, in other words, there is always an Other who is with me but also beyond my existence, even though this Other is not present but it does exist in a specific time in history. The significance of the Other lies in the experiences of the otherness of other people, or of the Goodness of different good things, or of the death of a person, etc. There are some common characteristics of these contents of the Other that are relational, invisible, \textit{a priori}, and asymmetric, and that Levinas invites us to think.

From these characteristics of thinking about the Other, we have found that the methods that Levinas applies are indeed ‘implicit’ and ‘uncertain’ because they are used to reveal transcendental ethics. Correspondingly, the methods that are applied in the traditional interpretation of the Other are ‘explicit’ and ‘certain’ because they are used to affirm the ontological existence of the Other. Levinas brings forward the notion of ‘trace’ to clarify his approach, and to distinguish it (radically) from the perspective of ontology. To use De Boer’s words, ‘(S)omething has happened, the invisible has passed by and left a trace. This trace is a summon of the Other, which invests me with my responsibility, my non-transferable unicity.’\textsuperscript{22} Thus, when something happened, it did not just happen purely and simply (i.e., directly) because it was caused by endless and even non-causal events. This trace, then, is not in the categories of the traditional interpretation of the Other but lies in the traces of what we have done and said. Furthermore, the effect of what we have done and said is beyond our intentions and consciousness. This is also one of the reasons why

\textsuperscript{20} De Boer, p. 26.
\textsuperscript{21} See Ward, p. 109.
\textsuperscript{22} De Boer, p. 65.
Levinas states that to consider an ethical relationship is to act in an immemorial sense, since it cannot be found in a (factual-psychological) memory that is based on consciousness.

When we face the Other, the face of the Other is the first impression for me, which cannot be understood from my memory. Levinas use samples like, the poor, the stranger, the widow, and the orphan to illustrate this feature. Each of these Others have a past but it is one that cannot be understood or recollected by me, yet it can be traced from their faces.23 This approach ‘profoundly disturbs the self-sufficiency of the ego, but does not destroy the ego; in fact, it deepens interiority.’24 Far from rejecting the significance of subjectivity the encounter with the Other (that is to say, ‘the poor’, ‘the widow’, ‘the leper’, in sum, he and she who have been othered in society) unlocks a deeper subjectivity for that subject. Therefore, the discussion of how to keep my ego and yet, at the same time, the Other’s ego leads to the question about how the Other becomes the Other, which is equivalent to the question of ‘who is the Other’.25

Levinas proposes a concept ‘separation’ to explore this question within the context of his definition of infinity because such infinity indicates the transcendental relationship with the Same and the Other.26 Only in the sense of infinity can the discussion of the ethical significance of ‘separation’ be possible. Without the linkage between separation and ‘infinity’, this ‘separation’ is still in my understanding and projection towards the Other.

§ 4.1.5 Separation: How the Other Becomes the Other

As discussed above, the thoughts about the traditional interpretation of the Other in the history of Western philosophy emanate from the within rather than from that which is outside of the subjectivity of the subject. Levinas states in his Difficult Freedom: ‘If “know thyself” has become the fundamental precept of all Western

23 See related discussion, ibid., p. 48.
24 Ibid., p. 49.
25 We have to be cautious, therefore, not to confuse this question with ‘what is the Other?’
26 See De Boer’s discussion: “The relation to the Infinite is a model for the “transcendental” relation between the Same and the Other.”(ibid., p. 14).
philosophy, this is because ultimately the West discovers the universe within itself.' By contradistinction, Levinas’s notion of ‘face’ plays important role in clarifying the question of ‘how the Other becomes the Other’ from the without.

In the traditional sense, the Other is always, in a significant sense, found in one’s experience and in one’s understanding of the Other. Levinas’s approach by analysing the vision of ‘face’ intends to move out from this experience and understanding of oneself. I am the concern of the Other via his or her face, just like the Other is my concern via my face. This process cannot be explained only in (my) experience but in the event of ‘contact’ because this encounter ‘always presupposes an interlocutor’:

one always identifies that other person on the basis of a rich environment and a deep personal history, but these things comprise a sphere of meanings and dispositions which, still, the other approaches from the outside.

In Entre Nous, Levinas clearly states that the problem of the interpretation of the Other from the within does not lie from consciousness itself, but lies in the fact that there is no ‘exteriority’ in consciousness. What does exteriority mean in Levinas? If we put it in one sentence, then it means that one is in a relationship where the Other is prior in this relationship; and this priority leads to a particularity of thinking, which is opposite to the totality of Being (and to one’s natural totalizing of the ‘understanding of Being’). That is to say, in the relation to the prior Other, one can situate oneself not from the category of the whole as Being, but from being oneself in all of that being’s particularity.

The above position sounds quite similar to the existential interpretation about human being, which also deals with the philosophical thought on the existential situation of the individual person as well as his emotions, actions, responsibilities, and thoughts, especially when it emphasizes the slogan ‘existence precedes essence’.

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27 DF, p. 10.
29 See, EN, p. 13. ‘The living being per se, then, is not without consciousness, but has a consciousness without problems, that is, without exteriority.’
The idea of this slogan stresses the difference between facticity and transcendence, as well as the sameness and alienation. We can see, nevertheless, that the existential approaches originate from the constitution of a self-giving meaning and of one’s ownmost self-understanding, rather than from the existence of the Other of that Other’s interiority of their constitution, which is the exteriority of the Otherness of the Other. In this sense, Levinas regards such existential interpretation as also a philosophy of totality because the I absorb the Other into the I’s system of understanding.  

In *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas presents the concept of ‘radical separation’. This ‘radical separation’ lies between the same and the other, precisely because it is, impossible to place oneself outside of the correlation between the same and the other so as to record the correspondence or the non-correspondence of this going with this return. Otherwise the same and the other would be reunited under one gaze, and the absolute distance that separates them filled in.

The reason why Levinas proposes this concept is to stress the primal identity or the genuine self-identification of the I and the Other. This separation paves the way for the self-identification that also identifies the subjectivity (but it is a subjectivity where the other takes the me (*le moi*) in me (*moi*) as hostage (*l’otage*). Levinas, later in the same book, clarifies that ‘separation in the strictest sense is solitude, and enjoyment – happiness or unhappiness – is isolation itself’, which is an ultimate structure. This structure can break up totality and leads to the completion of radical separation. For Levinas, this ultimate structure is transcendence because it reveals a projected distance between the reality of the I and the Other. In other words, to break up totality is at the same time to destroy this projected distance because without this destroying then the Other and the I are still in the identification of the sameness but not in an alienated relationship with the Other.

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30 See, De Boer, p. 8.
31 TI, p. 36.
32 *Herein, therefore, lies the origins of Levinas’s discussion on other crucial concepts, namely, ‘proximity’ and ‘substitution’, which we will analyse below in this chapter.*
33 TI, p. 117.
34 See, TI, pp. 41-42.
This process of establishment and demolition of a relationship is a description and a path which leads to a social superstructure. Radical separation shows both the passivity of responsibility and the positivity of (limited) freedom in a social relationship. The reason is that in this radical separation, the I as a subject who fills the room to step in to dominate, in the meanwhile creates room to step forward to liberate. The former refers to the type of responsibility that is taken on one’s own initiative, according to the social customs, laws or even conscience, and so on; the latter refers to the type of responsibility that is achieved from the freedom that is reconciled by the I and the Other. The second one is what Levinas means by ethical responsibility.

If this ‘radical separation’ in the relationship with the Other is a process of establishment and demolition, then when people deliberate or reflect on this process, they, at the same time, find out the ‘disproportion between the Other and the self’, which is ‘precisely moral consciousness’. Levinas continues to clarify this by noting that,

Moral consciousness is not an experience of values, but an access to external being; external being is, par excellence, the Other. Moral consciousness is thus not a modality of psychological consciousness, but its condition.

This interpretation of moral consciousness provides an answer for Bonhoeffer’s critical viewpoint on human’s conscience as moral consciousness. Human’s conscience is not the ultimate criteria of ethical issues, but its condition. It is a condition that is derived from myself but at the same time is concerned with the Other. When we deliberate ethical issues, our conscience deals with not only our own selves, but also all others in their absence from my self. This deliberation shows the radical separation in fact is a transcendental connection between the I and the Other.

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35 See, GDT, p. 181.
36 This distinction is modified from De Boer’s discussion. See, De Boer, p. 108.
37 See, DF, p. 293.
38 Ibid.
There are two concepts that Levinas discusses in Totality and Infinity: desire and need. We can use these two concepts to illustrate further the significance of ‘radical separation’. Desire, in Levinas, ‘measures the infinity of the infinite, for it is a measure through the very impossibility of measure.’ It is ‘positively attracted by something other not yet possessed or needed’; correspondingly, need refers to ‘a negation or lack in the subject that seeks to fill in.’ Thus, Levinas remarks,

‘Need is primary movement of the same’, states Levinas. Need is also, however, the basis for desire because the ‘need’ comes from the inner requirement and only satisfies this demand inside the subject. The desire is the surplus of the ‘need’ that extends towards the external and reaches the need of the others via the Other’s face. Thus, the infinity that desire measures can be measured from the ‘face’ for Levinas. In other words, ‘Levinas admits that the Other is infinitely and absolutely other not in the sense of purely other. The Other is alter ego but is not only this, is always more than this.’ Thus the traditional interpretation of the Other, and the reasons why Levinas argues against this approach, are connected to his concept of ‘separation’ and its significance in any deliberation on the ethical significance of the face of the Other and the face-to-face encounter.

§ 4.1.6 From Separation to Incarnation: Exteriority and Incarnate Subject

Levinas’s exploration about the exteriority and the incarnate subject follows closely on from the discussion of the concept of ‘separation’. In the previous section, we dealt with the role of the Other in this ‘radical separation’. In this section, we will work out the position of the subject in this separate relationship. The Other, as we have argued, it is not a pre-given material object by the I, the other is not the

39 TI, p. 62.
40 TI, p. 19.
41 Ibid., p. 102.
42 Ibid., p. 116.
43 Manning, p. 110.
empirical other that is given to me, like any other object, by means of outer perceptual-sense experience but is an incarnate subject that is exterior to the I and vice versa. Thus, only if we keep this point in our mind can we discuss the genuine ethical significance of the face.

The term ‘incarnation’ for Levinas is neither a Christian concept that refers to ‘God the Son’, or to the Logos that becomes flesh; nor even a religious term in a particular religious system. Rather, it is close to, though not the same as, its literal meaning, that is to say, it is something embodied in flesh, or which takes on flesh, or which is the process of materialization of a specific entity, god or force whose original nature is immaterial.

In Levinas, the beginning of the incarnation is derived from ‘the sensible experience of the body’. Thus, for Levinas, it is different from the process of materialization in a literal sense. Rather, it is a process of ‘subjectification’ and this subjectification would be accomplished by sensibility, namely, in ‘an exposure to others, a vulnerability and a responsibility in the proximity of the others.’ Thus, the incarnation is not an event that happens in a specific time because it is impossible to know the other person in this particular moment, while it is a living and dialogical action that is accomplished by both subjectivities: the I and the Other in the duration of time. In other words, it is not possible for this process to be completed in one’s consciousness alone, and it is only possible by a surplus of action from consciousness to infinity. This is an indispensable step in arguing for the significance of the ‘face’ that Levinas presents in Totality and Infinity.

The incarnation of consciousness is therefore comprehensible only if, over and beyond adequation, the over-flowing of the idea by its ideatum, that is, the idea of infinity, moves consciousness. This ‘incarnate thought’ corresponds to the separable-separated relationship (between a human being and another or between a You and a Me) because it is a ‘thinking’ that thinks more than it can think in oneself, it thinks the other; but it is a

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44 OB, p. 76.
46 TI, p. 27.
thinking or a living from the Other, which goes beyond the ‘need’ towards the ‘desire’.

This ‘transcendental leap’ of incarnation is related to the diachronical interpretation of separation. In traditional Cartesian interpretation, there is also a separation between thinking and being, which refers to the separation between the *cogito* and the body.\(^{47}\) This static and self-confirmed separation, however, blocks the possibility of reaching the other subject as an integrity of the other’s cogito and body. Levinas, therefore, states that the trace of separation seeks the inwardness of the subject as a unique subjectivity and, at the same time, reaches the other in the form of responsibility.\(^{48}\) This trace of separation prevents one’s consciousness and one’s subjective freedom to violate the ego of the Other. Thus, this separation is a necessary step to establish a concrete but not a representative relationship between the I and the Other, as well as with the world. Levinas describes this situation as ‘*chez soi*’ (at home) in which one maintains oneself (*se tenir*).\(^{49}\) This situation of ‘*chez soi*’ is not a physical or spatial concept but a mental and ethical concept that indicates the non-indifferent relationship between the I and the Other. In other words, the ‘radical separation’ also means that the situation of my existence as ‘*chez soi*’ indicates the absence of the Other, and vice versa, which is a preparation for the hospitality and responsibility towards the incarnate subject as the Other.

It will be useful, at this point, therefore, to compare Buber’s ‘I-Thou’ paradigm and Levinas’s ‘I-Other’ paradigm in relation to Levinas’s discussion and distinction on separation and incarnation and the incarnate subject.

§ 4.1.7 Incarnate Subject: Buber Contrast Levinas

Buber’s I-Thou thinking breaks through the traditional interpretation and thematization of the Other. In *I and Thou*, Buber states ‘Through the Thou a man

\(^{47}\) See, OB, p. 79.

\(^{48}\) See, Ibid.

\(^{49}\) TI, p. 37. Original notes from the translator on explaining the meaning of ‘maintain oneself’: ‘*Se tenir*’ involves the notion of containing oneself; it is the idea of an active identity with oneself. It also involves the notion of holding oneself up, of standing, of having a stance – which is at the same time a position and an attitude, a posture and an intention.’
becomes I’.\textsuperscript{50} This ‘becoming’ is realized when the I and Thou freely encounter each other without focusing on the consideration of any causality. Buber stresses two aspects that are rather similar to Levinas’s argumentation on the I-Other relationship, the face and passivity, for, as Levinas writes,

He who forgets all that is caused and makes decision out of the depths, who rids himself of property and raiment and naked approaches the Face, is a free man, and destiny confronts him as the counterpart of his freedom.\textsuperscript{51}

The approach to the face is a way of waiting but not seeking or finding without seeking.\textsuperscript{52} Buber ascribes this motivation to God, who gives to people the meaning of their lives. God is the ‘God who becomes’ and what a human being can do is to wait for this coming of the God as the face of the Thou.

Friedman remarks that, for Buber, when people know each other in a relationship, and when they approach each other face to face, they will freely decide because this is a process that has happened in two alternatives, side by side, between the I and the Thou.\textsuperscript{53} In this situation, the realization of genuine relationship begins in me from the Other because we need to respond to the Other’s words. The dialogical relationship within a wholeness between the I and the Thou is the most distinctive characteristic of Buber’s thought, which was absorbed by Levinas who moves this dialogical relationship up to a responsible relationship. In Levinas, the I is being responsible for the decision that made by the Other which is out of our control and thus absolutely transcendental. As Friedman argues, the interpretation of the distinction between individualism and collectivism from Buber’s thought does not reveal the genuine person, not to speak of the process of the incarnation of the subject. We argue that, as we have discussed in chapter three, even though Buber raises the ‘Thou’ from the general ‘It’ and points out a dialogical approach to explore human relationship, his discussion has not solved the problem of how man can genuinely meet and accept himself as well as the Other from this dialogical approach out of the wholeness.

\textsuperscript{50} Buber, \textit{I and Thou}, p. 28.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., p. 53.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., p. 80.
\textsuperscript{53} Friedman, p. 65.
To accept oneself is a relevant and an important presupposition in Bonhoeffer’s discussion: the ‘coming-of-age’. In some cases, people would regard the ‘coming-of-age’ as maturity, but in the case of the consideration of the incarnate subject, it is linked to the former but not to the latter. The reason lies in that maturity indicates fullness of growth and readiness for normal functioning, while coming-of-age undergoes the changes that result from the passage of time. ‘Coming-of-age’ emphasizes the negative and destructive changes that accompany growing mature. Therefore, the choice of ‘coming-of-age’ in Bonhoeffer also indicates the thinking of the incarnation of the subject in the structure of responsible life: how people take their responsibility before God.

In these specific situations, for Buber, the Other is to be seen or to be made present by experience and dialogue, rather than through identification or empathy. Thus, the characteristics of ‘wholeness’, ‘decision’, ‘presentness’, and ‘uniqueness’ are Buber’s foundation for his definition of ethics. This is why Buber distinguishes his thinking on ethical relationships from ‘moral autonomy’, and tends to ‘moral heteronomy’, which implies ‘freedom for’ rather than ‘freedom from’. For Buber, then, this thought of ‘freedom to respond’ includes both the free response to the external address of the Other and the free response from the internal voice of one’s own. Buber’s emphasis, therefore, lies on the dialogue that occurs between man and man from these two aspects.

We can see, nevertheless, that the problem of the Other leads to the problem of exteriority, which, in turn, brings forward the problem of separation that is embodied in the discussion of incarnate subject. Buber’s thoughts on language in dialogue, ‘moving between self and other’, presents the other and presents the same, hence the wholly other is also ‘the wholly same’. Although Buber holds that

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54 See, Friedman’s discussion in his Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue, p. 198.
55 Ibid.
56 We can find both similarities and divergences between Buber and Levinas on the discussion of incarnate subject. De Boer summarizes Levinas’s critique on Buber from three points. The first point is Buber’s spiritualism; the second one is Buber’s dialogical thought of formalism; the last is about the problem of alienation and self-realization. Our discussion above corresponds to the second and the third points. De Boer holds that Buber’s I-Thou relation, which depends on mutually ontological and constitutive dialogue, lacks the ethical dimension that Levinas recognises. See, De Boer, pp. 30–31.
57 Buber, I and Thou, p. 79.
‘genuine responsibility exists only where there is real responding’, how this real responding comes to be realizable and how the subject becomes incarnate in this responding in ‘the wholly same’ is left unaddressed. Is responsibility still implicated in the I-Thou relationship when the Thou had existed before but is absent, at present? If it is only through “seeing the other” can this relationship become fully real? Buber appeals to the Eternal Thou to solve the problem of preventing people to lead the other people from a ‘Thou’ to an ‘It’ by encountering and responding to this ‘Thou’. In this way, Buber successfully brings ethical thinking, like responsibility, beyond an abstract and universal moral law or ethical principle. He still, however, has not completely solved those questions which we asked. Levinas’s articulation on the ethical significance of the face provides a possible answer to these problems of incarnate subject and genuine response, which further deepens our discussion on responsibility.

§ 4.1.8  Ethical Significance of the Face

In Levinas’s Is It Righteous to Be?, he writes,

The face is not at all what has been seen. [...] The face is not the order of the seen, it is not an object, but it is he whose appearing preserves an exteriority which is also an appeal or an imperative given to your responsibility: to encounter a face is straightaway to hear a demand and an order.

For Levinas, then, the face, firstly, marks the separation between oneself and the Other and commands both the finity and the infinity in the relationship with this Other. Secondly, when the faces encounter, this manifests a pre-linguistic or pre-conceptual demand of relationship, or a claim that the other has on me that is entailed in ethical significance. Thirdly, this pre-linguistic ethical significance constructs genuine communication as dialogue.

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39 See related discussion in Friedman, p. 204.
60 Levinas, Is It Righteous to Be, p. 144.
61 Ibid., p.48.
In Levinas’s *Ethics and Infinity*, Levinas raises the question whether ‘phenomenology of the face’ is possible since phenomenology describes what appears. Phenomenology is a method of philosophy but when we ponder the possibility and the limitation of this method, this thinking is also a type of philosophy. Phenomenology, as a method, can shed light on the objects that can be constituted by consciousness, yet when we need to discuss the event of being and the ethical significance of this event, this method is beyond the function of the constitution. As for the case of ‘face’, the most intriguing issue is the opaque characteristic of the face. People can observe and tell what the others’ faces look like, even what types of ethnic group they are, or how old these people would be by guessing from the appearance of their faces, and so forth. When we see the other’s face, however, there are something much more important which might never be seen through than that of all we can see. In what sense, then, can Levinas argue that there is ethical significance in the face of the Other?

Levinas deliberates the ethical significance of the face in his different works. In *Ethics and Infinity*, he writes,

The face is exposed, menaced, as if inviting us to an act of violence. At the same time, the face is what forbids us to kill. [...] The first word of the face is the ‘Thou shalt not kill.’ It is an order.

In his essay ‘Ethics as First Philosophy’, he unravels the implications that this call has on ‘me’, remarking,

In its expression, in its morality, the face before me summons me, calls for me, begs for me, [...] and in doing so recalls my responsibility, and calls me into question.

Again, in his essay ‘Meaning and Sense’, he points to the ineluctability of the face, for,

[A] face imposes itself upon me without my being able to be deaf to its call [...] without my being able to suspend my responsibility for its

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63 EI, p. 85.
64 Ibid., p.86, p.89.
distress. Consciousness loses its first place [...] Consciousness is called into question by the face [...] [The face of the other person] proceeds from the absolutely Absent, [but its relationship] does not indicate, does not reveal, this Absent; and yet the Absent has a meaning in the face. \(^{67}\)

For Levinas, then, as Jeffrey Bloechl aptly sums up and concludes,, ‘(T)he face of the other awakens me to a responsibility that is unlimited, unqualified, or simply infinite. This is why Levinas’s account of ethical transcendence cannot be assimilated with his account of Jewish religious transcendence.’\(^{68}\) Thus, this infinite is embodied in the meaning-content of the process of the incarnate subject via the ‘epiphany’ of the face. The face of the Other is something that I cannot own and something that I cannot even understand completely. From this, the face is the condition of thought, which is the beginning of moral consciousness. It is necessary to emphasize the point, then, that face is the origin of moral consciousness rather than a moral law. The moral law indicates a premise or principle about right and wrong and how things ‘ought’ to be done according to this law. However, in Levinas, what we have to deal with is not the truth but the appearance of the truth, though he doubts whether they are the same.\(^{69}\) If ‘truth is a progression’ and ‘the manifestation of being’ is the ‘primary event’, then it is similar to Buber’s opinion that ‘the primacy of the primary is the presence of the present’.\(^{70}\) Then, the signification of this process of signifying only is significant for the one who is incarnating in a diachronic development with a face as moral consciousness. Without this ‘who’, the subjectivity cannot be constructed from the wholeness or the sameness.

The moral consciousness of the face of the Other is prior to the understanding and constitution of it. In other words, the importance of this moral consciousness is not to give us an answer about how to understand and constitute the faces when they encounter each other but to raise questions for us about the relationship between the subjectivities behind the faces. If we consider this, then Levinas’s concept of ‘proximity’ is prior to the moral consciousness, which entails the responsibility that

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\(^{67}\) Levinas, ‘Meaning and Sense’, p. 60.

\(^{68}\) Bloechl, Liturgy of the Neighbor, p.8.

\(^{69}\) See related articulation in OB, p. 24.

\(^{70}\) All quotations are from OB, p. 24.
is born from moral consciousness as the infinite possibility in relationship. Levinas regards this infinity of responsibility from face as the primordial expression, which is the first word: ‘you shall not commit murder’, and the epiphany of the face shows the ethical resistance in the finitude of relationship. 71

The limitation of phenomenology, as we mentioned above, lies in the fact that it shows the surplus of the infinity of the face of the Other. This surplus or claim that the face of the Other, nonetheless, is directed towards ‘me’, it makes its claim on ‘me’. In the case of the discussion of the face, it is not a purely negative or passive reception but a positive or active acceptance. This acceptance indicates a response that responds to the trace that the face leaves behind both in the forms of silence and address. This response also indicates that ‘sentient being takes the place of the other without usurping that place’. 72 This is why Levinas, then, sets the face of the Other in a prior place, which is at the same time a humble way to reveal the concrete form of the Idea of the Good. 73 Compared to Levinas’s emphasis of what the face reveals in his early thought, he stresses the way the infinite responsible significance of one’s own subjectivity towards the Other is both unlocked and revealed from the infinity of the face in his later thought. This is why De Boer is correct to define and succinctly characterize this thought as a ‘philosophical anthropology of subjectivity’. 74

The change from the ethical significance of the face to the responsible significance from the face results in Levinas’s ability to surmount the traditionally hermeneutical fusion of horizons between the Same and the Other. 75 The Other, who we either are willing to or have to face, is a person that calls me or orders me to face and to respond to his or her demand. In this situation we are awakened to face this new relationship, rather than ‘know’ and ‘understand’ the relationship after we face it. This ‘facing’ the face allows Levinas to distinguish between two types of responsibility. The first type refers to the self-consciousness of responsibility that is from the subjectivity of the self towards the objectivity of the Other, which fundamentally exists in the relationship with the Other; the second type refers to the

71 TI, p.199.
72 De Boer, p. 86.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 See, De Boer, p. 107.
moral consciousness from responsibility that is from the face of the Other towards the subjectivity of my self, which is primarily to be inspired and fulfilled by the encounter to the Other.76

So far, we have laid stress on the exploration of the ethical significance of the Face as a responsible response towards the face of the Other. In the following section, we are going to discuss how this face can be responsibly related to language and how language indicates responsibility.

SECTION TWO
THE FACE AND LANGUAGE

Although Levinas holds that language, in the form of dialogue, plays a central role in ethical thinking, he insists that the most essential thing in this thinking is not the dialogue itself but the condition of language itself. When the other person approaches me, this person has been constituted into my consciousness at the same time. This process involves both an overlapping and an outstretched retention between the difference of the identity of other person itself and my constitutive perception about this person. This is a traditionally phenomenological way to interpret how a person understands the other person. If we think about this process from Levinas’s perspective, however, this traditional manner of defining (doing) phenomenology has to stop at this stage precisely because of the boundary between the self and the Other. The existence of the Other cannot be constituted via my acts of outer-perceptual sense experiences. Yet Husserl must maintain the constitution of the knowability of the existence of the other in my experiences because, for Husserl,

nothing can exist if it is not dependent for its existence on the transcendental self. This implies that the essences emerging as residues at the end of phenomenological and transcendental reduction as well as

76 This distinction is modified from Jeffrey Bloechl’s discussion on responsibility, see Bloechl, *Liturgy of the Neighbor*, p. 45. ‘Levinas thus distinguishes between responsibility as the fundamental character of subject always already in an ethical relation, and responsibility in the sense of embracing and attempting to fulfil the command reaching me in the face that calls me to that primary responsibility.’
bodies and other minds are existentially dependent upon the transcendental ego.\textsuperscript{77}

What Levinas intends to stress is the question how the transcendental Other can be approached not merely from the comprehension of this transcendental ego, but from the expression of the Other. Levinas states that ‘Speaking implies a possibility of breaking off and beginning’.\textsuperscript{78} This is a beginning of the face-to-face relation because this speaking is speaking to an exterior subject who is independent from ‘me’, but one who is also, at the same time, a subject that ‘I’ need to depend on in order to establish genuine communication. Based on this presupposition, we need to rethink the question Levinas raises in Totality and Infinity: ‘Is not the presence of the Other already language and transcendence?’\textsuperscript{79} Even though he already provides a very direct answer later in the same work: ‘It is the face; its revelation is speech.’\textsuperscript{80}

But what is the meaning of his point that ‘face’s revelation is speech’ within the context of this question and answer? To address this question we have to begin with what Levinas means by the Silence of the Face and its role in the ‘ethical order’ of speaking, before it is constituted in the order of daily use and theory. Then, we can address two transitions both from ethics to dialogue and from dialogue to ethics, which show Levinas’s structural explanation of language. Based on this point, we will argue that ‘face’ is the expression of language. After this, we will further articulate the ethical significance of language with regard to the element of time, and also will specifically discuss the role of responsibility in two forms of speaking ‘the Saying’ and ‘the Said’. In the last part of this section, we will discuss Levinas’s two important concepts ‘proximity’ and ‘substitution’ in responsible relationship.

\section{The Silence of Face and the Silence of Language}

The ‘face’ is untouchable; it can be seen but cannot be seen through. In this sense, ‘face’ is not an object that can be comprehended in a traditional way of understanding and interpretation. In this sense, the ‘face’ is also silent but its silence is not an absence of sound or the echo of a sound, rather the ‘silence’ of the face

\textsuperscript{78} TI, p. 88.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., p. 155.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., p. 193.
calls forth a response and hence is found in language. In this regard, ‘language’, as Levinas argues, ‘is perhaps to be defined as the very power to break the continuity of being or of history’.  

81 The words are to be said in a form of language firstly to break the silence, and are opaque. In Levinas’s words ‘Speech cuts across vision.’  

82 We argue that this does not mean that speech replaces the vision of the Other but speech is the expression of the command from the face of the Other. This expression indicates two diachronical and parallel moments. The first refers to the moment when the words are being said by the Other, which delivers not only the meaning of those words but the way that the Other organizes this words and the ethical significance of them in a responsible way. The second refers to the moment when the ‘I’ listens to these words, and who not only understands the meaning of these words but also the way that the I interprets these words and the ethical significance of them in a responsible way. Both these two moments are embodied responsibility, which is a two-way transcendental ‘revelation’ of language. This is the meaning of the pre-linguistic, or of ‘silence’ in Levinas’s words. Here is where Levinas discovers the phenomenological origin of ethics, for, here ‘the expression of the face calls the subject into the relationship determined by responsibility, so that the relationship is itself the very institution of ethics.’  

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§ 4.2.2 The Face is the Beginning of Language: Levinas’s Structural Explanation of Language

The general or basic function of language is to express and understand information and ideas via various linguistic systems. In a practical, or operational sense, there is no difference between the positions of all the interlocutors who are using language in a conversation. This practical presupposition, however, is, in fact, also an ideal situation because we are talking with one or some ‘specific’ persons, but not to a person or a group of persons who are just a duplication of one another and have the same faces.

In our discussion, as Levinas argues throughout his works, the role of the Other in the analysis of language is essential because we have something to say, for

81 TI, p. 195.
82 Ibid.
83 Manning, p. 115.
the Other.\textsuperscript{84} If, as we have discussed, the face is the first word, the first boundary as well as the first possibility to approach the Other, then, ‘Levinas’s explanation [of the relation between face and language] is structural rather than causal’.\textsuperscript{85}

In \textit{Entre Nous}, Levinas states that ‘The interlocutor does not always face me. Pure language emerges from a relation in which the other person plays the role of a third party.’\textsuperscript{86} This statement indicates at least three facts that are easily ignored: first, language is not only the words that are being spoken, it also reveals the person who is organizing these words; second, language is not only being organized by a ‘specific’ person, it also records the ‘trace’ of this person, when he or she is not present; third, there would be a third person or party who receives and examines these ‘traces’ left by the former interlocutors.

Therefore, the analysis of language, with regards to the ‘face’, is not in the sense as ethnology, psychoanalysis, sociology, or even linguistics; it is, rather, a new approach that can explore the originality of the expression of the ethical significance of the ‘Face’ without the necessity of the presence of the ‘face’ itself and without attaching the value that is not owned by the face of this subject. In the meanwhile, language, as verbal sign, reveals the subject as a signifier who delivers genuine information and ideas to the Other as a sign receiver and examiner to receive the meaning of this sign and interpret it, though it is not possible to interpret completely.\textsuperscript{87}

As regards to the role of examiner, there are various approaches to examine the expression from the ‘face’. In the Kantian sense, this examiner deals with an incomplete interpretation with this receiver’s reason ‘completely’. In the Heideggerian sense, this examiner deals with an incomplete interpretation from the

\textsuperscript{84} See, EN, p. 161.
\textsuperscript{85} Bloechl, \textit{Liturgy of the Neighbor}, p. 178.
\textsuperscript{86} EN, p. 33.
\textsuperscript{87} This is not to ignore the role that unconscious factors (Freud) or ideologies (Marx) or ‘will to power’ (Nietzsche) plays in the transmission of such ‘information’, but it is a principle of interpretation that meaning expressed (however inelegantly or difficult it is to understand) is saying something and if it not understood the task is still not to assume that the expressed meaning is articulated by someone who is ‘mad’ or ‘ideologically confused’. Such an assumption in the interpreting of a text, a work of art, a play, a poem (or any ‘object’ of culture) would render human communication impossible.
views of Being, which also provides complete hermeneutical significance for beings. In the Hegelian sense, as well as in the Cartesian sense, this examiner combines absolute spirit with infinite consciousness to limit or encompass all relations.  

All of the above approaches to the examination of the expression of the face, for Levinas, would be a totalitarian or an absolute form of conversation that unfolds from within both a limitation and a possibility of man’s constitution by his consciousness and spirit. By distinction, Levinas maintains, ‘(A)bsolute experience is not disclosure; to disclose, on the basis of a subjective horizon, is already to miss the noumenon.’ What Levinas stresses is the role of face that can orient our attention outside of our intentional consciousness in order to find out the original relation with exterior being. Nevertheless, the orientation of the ‘face’ as a ‘revelation’ will not force the other to accept it but shed lights upon it.

In contrast, Levinas explains how the vision functions in a relation with ‘things’ in Totality and Infinity,

As Plato noted, besides the eye and the thing, vision presupposes the light. The eye does not see the light, but the object in the light. Vision is therefore a relation with a ‘something’ established with a relation with what is not a ‘something’. [...] The light makes the thing appear by driving out the shadows; it empties spaces.

From Levinas’s analysis of vision, vision itself is ‘not a transcendence but a signification by the relation that makes it possible.’ When we see something, we are already in the relationship with this something at a distance. Even though the light ‘empties’ this distance and reminds the people whose vision is on the horizon of this vision, one still cannot truly see through this horizon. Apart from this difficulty, however, there are other essential problems as we have mentioned above: is there still any ethical significance when the object of our seeing is no longer present? What is it to have an ethical significance when the object is absent? Would

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88 This is a corresponding discussion to Levinas’s discussion on finitude and infinite from these four aspects. See, TI, p.196.
89 TI, p. 67.
90 Ibid., p. 188.
91 Ibid., p. 191.
92 Ibid.
this absent one play the role of a ‘third party’ in our ethical considerations? We will argue that Levinas’s structural explanation of language intends to resolve these problems.

Levinas’s proposal about the structural explanation of language from the ‘face’ that we are considering provides a new perspective to rethink these questions. This structural explanation is not a description of what we see, or the structure of our seeing, but the openness of this structure, or the development of this structure from the origin. In other words, it refers to how the ethical significance of the face can be transformed into a new expressive form of language. Levinas presents it in this way:

the idea of infinity in consciousness is an overflowing of a consciousness whose incarnation offers new powers to a soul no longer paralytic – powers of welcome, of gift, of full hands, of hospitality. [...] The word is a window; if it forms a screen, it must be rejected.⁹³

It is clear that, for Levinas, the structural explanation of language is both a transcendental and an intellectual one which clarifies the ethical correlation between language and ‘face’. This explanation is the beginning of a journey of exploring the development of the use of language, but not the destination of this journey, which is to describe the genuine ethical attitudes and explore the true responsibility when we face (ethical) exigencies. Levinas asks the question ‘what is to have a meaning’ and provides the answer as ‘meaning is the face of the Other’.⁹⁴

Levinas’s question and answer is not a tautological language game about the concept of the Other. He further stresses the priority of the analysis of the ‘meaning’ in the relationship between language and face. In the daily and practical sense, language plays a very important role in communication between people. There is, however, a primary signification of language prior to the instrumental use of language. For Levinas, this primary signification depends on the primordial face-to-face relationship. Therefore, we have shown that this structural explanation of language in Levinas focuses on the role of ‘priority’ in the tension between man’s

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⁹³ TI, p. 205.
⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 206.
dual attributes: the finite and the infinite. This priority is embodied in language as a ‘gesture of behaviour’. This ‘gesture of behaviour’ for Levinas indicates what is essential in language: ‘the coinciding of the revealer and the revealed in the face […] gestures and acts produced can become, like words, a revelation’.

If this revelation is derived from the gestures and acts which indicate what is essential in language, then we can argue that the tension of man’s finite and infinite dimensions is precisely embodied in this revelation from the face of the Other. Furthermore, combined with Levinas’s idea of ‘language as the presence of the face’, we can conclude that the priority of the face of the Other in the structural explanation of language points to a possible solution for solving the tension of man’s finite and infinite dimension by revealing language as justice.

This structural explanation of language indicates two situations when we consider Levinas’s discussion of third party (illeity) as the Otherness of the other, in terms of both the presence and the absence of the face. ‘Face’ itself is not only a part of the body of a person, but also an indication of this person as a whole. When the face of a person is absent physically, then, the trace of the face in the form of language is still present. This is why Levinas again emphasizes in his Difficult Freedom that ‘the expression of the face is language’.

§ 4.2.3  Face as an Ethical Expression of Language

In the previous section, we have clarified the meaning of the structural explanation of language and the role of ‘face’ in this structural explanation. This clarification is a necessary step for us to set out the perspective for our consideration of language and is an important preparation in order to locate the concept of face with regard to this consideration.

95 Ibid., p. 67.
96 Ibid., my emphasis. The analogy for Levinas, then, is not of ‘perception’ or of ‘perceptually founded acts’ as in Husserl’s phenomenology, rather, it is taken from the experience of language, following Heidegger, but not following Heidegger’s totalitarian account of ‘language as the House of Being’.
97 Ibid., p. 213.
98 DF, p. 294.
In a previous section (§ 4.1.5), we discussed separation as the way of letting the other become the other via the face as exteriority. Based on this, desire measures infinity as the face of the Other. In the preceding section (§ 4.2.2), we noted that language cannot ‘touch’ the physical face but can ‘reach’ the infinity of the face of the Other because, in Levinas, the ‘face to face’ approach in conversation is justice.\(^\text{99}\) In what follows, then, we are going to explore in detail the ways in which face can be an ethical expression of language.

For Levinas, language is not a tool to express or repeat thought (or ideal meanings, as in Husserl), but bears witness in the form of a verbal system.\(^\text{100}\) And it is this attribute of bearing witness which requires the structural explanation of language, rather than the descriptive language of phenomenology and existential ontology, that Levinas wishes to draw our attention to. In Levinas’s words,

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\text{The discourse is therefore not the unfolding of a prefabricated internal logic, but the constitution of truth in a struggle between thinkers, with all the risks of freedom. The relationship of language implies transcendence, radical separation, the strangeness of the interlocutors, the revelation of the other to me.}\(^\text{101}\)
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There is a dynamic formalization of language when discourse happens in a face-to-face situation between interlocutors, rather than a generalization or conceptualization of language as the condition forced upon the other interlocutor. This dynamic formalization of language is ‘a manifesting of the signifier, the issuer of the sign’\(^\text{102}\) because it draws in ‘the face that looks at me [which] introduces the primary frankness of revelation. In function of the word the world is oriented, that is, takes on signification’\(^\text{103}\)

This formalization does not refer to the process of our thinking in a linguistic formula. Rather, it emphasizes the ethical order of each linguistic symbol in this formula when we are thinking. In other words, even though we have confirmed that Levinas intends to use phenomenological approach to explore the ethical significance

\(^{\text{99}}\) See, TI, p. 71. Original text: We call justice this face to face approach, in conversation.
\(^{\text{100}}\) See, GDT, p. 198.
\(^{\text{101}}\) TI, p. 73.
\(^{\text{102}}\) TI, p. 96.
\(^{\text{103}}\) Ibid., p. 97.
of the face, he also needs to reconsider the basic suppositions of phenomenological linguistic philosophy altogether.\textsuperscript{104}

De Boer stresses that ‘Levinas’s philosophy of language reveals a depth-dimension of language’.\textsuperscript{105} This depth-dimension of language refers to the first or primordial signification in all genuine communication, which indicates the reason why Levinas defines it as ‘First Philosophy’. The ‘first’ does not only refer to the ‘first place’ of the importance of ethics in intellectual thinking, but also points out the ‘first word’ and ‘first event’ of human beings. For Levinas, the ‘first word’ is obligation or responsibility and the ‘first event’ is the face-to-face encounter. We can use Levinas’s articulation of speaking and hearing to clarify this ‘first word’ and ‘first event’. He writes,

Speaking and hearing become one rather than succeed one another. Speaking therefore institutes the moral relationship of equality and consequently recognizes justice. […] What one says, the content communicated, is possible only thanks to this face-to-face relationship in which the Other counts as an interlocutor prior even to being known.\textsuperscript{106}

The first event is the word that is being spoken to the other people when he is also hearing this word, which is a face-to-face relationship that entails a genuine communication. In other words, the face as the pre-linguistically ethical order indicated in the first event already conditions the conversation with the other before we speak the first word.

The face, then, is better understood as an ethical order that conditions the ethical expression of language. It is also, therefore, a perspective that contrasts the traditional phenomenological approach because within this presupposition, ‘language is not enacted within consciousness; it comes to me from the Other and reverberates in consciousness by putting it in question.’\textsuperscript{107} Language, in this sense, does not focus on the constitutive and instrumental features but on the level of its ‘incarnate’

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{104} See De Boer, p. 81.
  \item \textsuperscript{105} Ibid., p. 17.
  \item \textsuperscript{106} DF, p. 7.
  \item \textsuperscript{107} TI, p. 204.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
essence: the incarnation from ethical relationship to the ethical significance of language.

§ 4.2.4 Ethical Significance of Language (The Said and The Saying, History/Time)

‘Face’, considered as an ethical expression of language, recalls the importance of the ‘who’ question and points out the inadequacy of the ‘what’ question. The ‘what’ question corresponds to Descartes’ paradigm of the ‘subject-object’, to Kant’s paradigm of ‘phenomena-noumena’, to Husserl’s paradigm of ‘noesis-noema’, as well as to Heidegger’s paradigm of ‘beings-Being’. Although the emphases and the approaches of all these paradigms are not the same, there is still a common characteristic of them: the relation between those two poles is supposed in a coexisting situation. Husserl and Heidegger take the element of time into consideration when they reflect upon this relation, especially in human relationships, which is the most striking difference with Descartes’ and Kant’s approaches.108

Though Kant discusses the nature of time in the “Transcendental Aesthetic” of his Critique of Pure Reason (1781), his basic purpose, nevertheless, is to illustrate the relationship between time and human experience, especially in the form of the inner sense that constitutes the object via its appearance, as well as with his discussion of space. Kant’s discussion on time, either in the way of ‘empirical reality’ or ‘transcendental ideality’, therefore, focuses indeed on the a priori structure of time. His consideration of time, however, is in the form of representation of time in our consciousness and it is difficult to detect an ethical concern in his discussion with regards to this a priori structure of time. Levinas notes that, ‘(T)he flow of time in which, according to the Kantian schema, the world is constituted [is] without origin.’109

Husserl’s discussion on time, especially time consciousness, is related to his consideration of inter-subjectivity. He deliberates this topic in his On the

108 The origin of the discussion of time can be traced back to Augustine’s Confessions, especially in Book XI, chapter 14 on the nature of time. Plato develops a Greek concept of time, especially in his dialogue Timaeus about ‘the moving image of eternity’, which already takes the relationship between ‘being’ and ‘becoming’ into account. By contrast, Aristotle develops a cosmological view on time which is more complicated than his predecessors, especially in his Physics Book IV, chapter 10-14.

109 TI, p. 65.
Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1928).\textsuperscript{110} He puts forwards three concepts to identify different aspects of time: retention, which is an immediate memory; original impression, which is the awareness of perception; protention, which is an immediate anticipation. For Husserl, this is the structure of the consciousness of internal time and when these three aspects are constantly constituted as past, present, and future, the experience of time would be conscious of and play important role in the relationship of inter-subjectivity. Husserl’s analysis of time, however, has not been applied in detail to his articulation of empathy, inter-subjectivity and life-world. Thus, the ethical significance in Husserl’s consideration of time is insufficient, though it indeed paves an important way for Levinas’s deliberation on this topic.

Heidegger’s discussion on time has been discussed in chapter three, which is related to his consideration of Dasein. As mentioned previously, Heidegger articulates time in ontic mode and in an ontological mode of temporality.\textsuperscript{111} The ‘Mineness’ is a distinctive feature of Dasein, which is determined by death. Death defines our facticity as an ‘a priori past’ which decides our original structure of time in the form of past, present and future within the context of Being. The examination on time in Heidegger, however, is derived from the self-centred sameness of each individual Dasein and lacks any reference to socio-ethical concerns. Thus, at best, Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology can only lead to the utilitarian present in synchrony. The present speaking or the mode of ‘saying’ of the ‘I am a being-for-my-own-death’ is related to the self-understanding of Dasein in a ‘dialogue’ with itself, and thus is really a ‘monologue’ which ignores the diachronically other-oriented ‘saying’ in an ethical relationship.

\textsuperscript{110} Though published later in 1928, and edited by Heidegger (with the major help of Edith Stein), these reflections date back to Husserl’s earlier lecture-course in 1905 on immanent time-consciousness. For Husserl, the ability to reflect upon one’s own experiences presupposes a time dimension to one’s own consciousness in terms of being extended into the future and into the past, in the present. His ideas are similar to Augustine’s but Husserl subscribes to the Brentanian-Lockean-Humean view that access to consciousness is particular direct and certain compared to any thing else. Thus Augustine’s reflections on the temporality of the self in relation to the eternity of the mode of being of God (as the Absolutely other) does not feature in Husserl’s elaboration of and version of post-Kantinan transcendental phenomenology.

\textsuperscript{111} See, Chapter III of this study.
We have briefly reviewed and discussed the problem of time from three important perspectives, which illustrate the necessity to re-think the concept of time both in ethical relationship and in the form of language that entails this relationship. In an ethical relationship, especially a responsible one, ‘our relation and my responsibility depend on your becoming present to me as yourself, and in a way I can understand.’

Bloechl’s description stresses the role of language in the ethical relationship as a response to another person in the forms of ‘the Saying’ [le Dire] and ‘the Said’ [le Dit] in Levinas. Saying refers to the foundational form of speech, discourse and communication, and which is not the act of speaking itself but ‘the encounter of two utterly unique persons’. The Said refers to the everyday language, which is preceded by ‘the Saying’. In other words, the Said is the record and testimony of the Saying. For Bloechl, ‘the Saying animates that established order, or Said’ and ‘Saying, then requires the Said, even if the Said can never satisfy or contain it.’

Thus another perspective to explain the ethical order of language, one that is not understood in terms of a synchrony but rooted in the concrete forms of diachrony that is operative in the distinction of ‘Saying’ and ‘Saying’ is needed and specifically put forward in Levinas’s Otherwise than Being.

§ 4.2.5 Ethical Significance of Time in Language

In contrast to the stress of the past in the traditional views of time, Levinas emphasizes our anticipation of the future because ‘the “relationship with the other” is the “relationship with the future”’. The reason why he is concerned with the future, rather than with the past, is because of people’s inner desire and requirement of the responsible relationship. Levinas adopts Rosenzweig’s view of time rather than Kant’s, Husserl’s and Heidegger’s. According to Rosenzweig, in Michael Morgan’s interpretation:

our experience of the past refers to ‘the religious consciousness of creation’; our experience of the present refers to our ‘listening to and receiving revelation’; our experience of the future refers to our ‘hope of

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112 Bloechl, Liturgy of the Neighbor, p. 215.
113 Morgan, p. 131.
114 ‘God and Philosophy’, in Basic Philosophical Writings, p. 145.
115 Bloechl, Liturgy of the Neighbor, p. 215.
116 See, Morgan, p. 212.
redemption’. These three religious ideas become ‘conditions of temporality itself’.\textsuperscript{117} We agree with Morgan’s argument that Levinas’s contribution to the discussion of time lies in the fact that he goes beyond Heidegger’s ‘immanent centres of meaning’ and attempts to reach ‘the transcendence of the immanence’.\textsuperscript{118} This consideration cannot be carried out completely without also involving a discussion of diachronical time.

To live in the present refers to an integral attitude that diachronically connects both the past and the future in the subject who is aware of this connection. In Husserl’s phenomenology of immanent or internal time consciousness, the past can be rememberable and even recoverable in the retention. In Husserl’s case, the subject is also conscious of the connection between the past and the present but the explanation of this past is represented and constituted by the subject. A question concerning the concept of time that Levinas analyzes in Otherwise than Being is how the past finds its proper position in the present. In other words, this inquiry is about how to balance the consideration of the past and the present. For Levinas, the past directly and indirectly affects the present but the past indeed passes, the past that renders itself in the present is not the past itself. To justify the position of the past in the present is a difficult but necessary responsibility.

This is a preparatory step for the following discussion on ‘alterity’ and ‘proximity’, both of which will be discussed with regards to time in the articulation of its ethical significance in language. The original meaning of ‘alterity’ is the state of being other or different, i.e., otherness. The past is my past and when I recall this past, it is not the past itself but a trace of past in my memory or the ‘otherness’ of the past. The past itself is immemorial but we have to encounter the otherness of the past, face the Other with the past, and respond to the past of the Other. This immemorial past escapes from retention but only can be found in the trace of the face of the Other. Proximity, for Levinas, then, is the ground of interpersonal contact, which is also the ability to give an immediate response. This immediacy does not

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., p. 221. 
\textsuperscript{118} See Morgan’s discussion in his, Discovering Levinas, p. 221.
refers to how close the spatial, or the mental distance between two persons is, but stresses how one person can essentially approach the other as the other feels himself or herself but, at the same time, keeps the difference between these two people in the diachronical time. Levinas writes, ‘proximity is a disturbance of the rememberable time,’ and so, it is also a pre-original reason that is prior to the self-consciousness of one’s identity.  

Levinas’s aim, therefore, is not to analyze time in human experience and consciousness as Husserl did but to explore how to treat or evaluate justly all aspectes related to time. This justice requires an in-depth responsible consideration towards oneself and one’s relationship with the others, both in an individual and in a social sense. Levinas writes:

The past of the other is, in a sense, the history of humanity in which I have never participated, in which I have never been present, is my past. As for the future [...] it is the time of prophecy, which is also an imperative, a moral order, herald of an inspiration. [...] a future that is not a simple to-come [venir].

Levinas explains the essence of the diachrony of time and its internal relationship within a moral order: we always already have been responsible but not coming to be responsible. In other words, to be responsible is an *a priori* condition of human existence rather than an *a posteriori* consititution of human being.

Therefore, for Levinas, the genuine retaining is not of one’s memories or reminiscences, but the moment when the memory is brought into the present and altered by our difference to the other within our identity. In other words, in the proximity of contact and following the detection of alterity, we will be conscious of the tension of one’s freedom and responsibility when we need to respond to the Other. Without considering the proximity of the Other, my consciousness of time, which constrains my memory, would reduce my relationship with the Other, or the

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119 OB, p. 88.
120 EN, p. 115.
121 See, Morgan, p. 223.
122 See, OB, p. 32.
encounter with the Other, into a projection of my apperception. In this case, there would not be a signified response but a self-righteous reaction to the Other.

In order to clarify the structure of the ethical significance of time and to stress its diachronical structure, Levinas in Otherwise than Being explains the relationship between time and language, and their roles in ethical events. For Levinas,

The verb understood as a noun designating an event, when applied to the temporalization of time, would make it resound as an event, whereas every event already presupposes time.\textsuperscript{123}

The verb, in contrast to the nature and characteristic of the noun, shows the flowing of time and the content within this flowing. When the event is finished and is recorded with words, this event become a noun, a historical noun, which is kept in the retention of man’s consciousness.

From this perspective, we can say that being, especially human being, should in fact be a ‘verb’ rather than a ‘noun’ because human being is always coming to be.\textsuperscript{124} Language, at the first level, is the description of this forming and ‘making being understood’, however, in the second level, is ‘the verbalness of a verb’ which ‘makes its essence vibrate’.\textsuperscript{125} The meaning of the verb is not given when the action of this verbalness becomes the past but is given along with this action. If we apply this idea into language, then the meaning of our speaking lies in the ‘Saying’ and the ‘Said’ is prior to, but also consists of, the ‘Saying’. A verb designates a \textit{nomen actionis}, \textit{and the name of the action} that Levinas is identifying is a ‘saying’.

In sum, therefore, when we speak to a person, we are in a face-to-face relationship that requires the consideration of the role of time in our speaking because in the course of the ‘verb-noun’ formation, the ethical order of language is founded.

\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., p. 34.
\textsuperscript{124} Levinas writes, ‘being is the verb itself’. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.
In this part, we will move on to the discussion of two forms of language namely, ‘the Saying’ and ‘the Said’, which indicate the ethical significance of time in language.

For Levinas, language operates in the form of ‘saying’ and ‘said’: ‘the saying bore this said, but goes further, was absorbed and died in the said, [which] was inscribed.’\textsuperscript{126} The words here that Levinas uses are dense and opaque and need to be explained. The said, in Levinas, is not equal to ‘a sign of a meaning, nor even only an expression of a meaning’.\textsuperscript{127} It contains more than that. Also, Levinas argues, ‘The birthplace of ontology is in the said.’\textsuperscript{128} All ‘talk of being’ (ontology) takes its cue from the said. Thus the said synthesizes the past as time or history, as well as the self as the past subjectivity, and also the language as a reconstitution that is prior to consciousness and also constitutes consciousness.

Thus, we argue that the said-saying paradigm can be regarded as a diachronical synthesis of the process of the verbalness of the verb, which absorbs the saying into itself on the one hand, but has gone beyond the saying, on the other hand, when this said is faced and anticipated towards the future. In other words, there is not an essence, even in the temporalized moment as Heidegger states, in this process except the ‘alter change’ in continuous time. If the said is the birthplace of ontology, then the saying is the birthplace of ethics and responsible relationship. Levinas writes,

\begin{quote}

The responsibility for another is precisely a saying prior to anything said. [...] the saying is both an affirmation and a retraction of the said. [...] To enter into being and truth is to enter into the said; being is inseparable from its meaning! It is spoken. It is in the logos. But the reduction is reduction of the said to the saying beyond the logos, beyond being and non-being, beyond essence, beyond true and non-true. It is the reduction to signification, to the one-for-the-other involved in responsibility (or more exactly in substitution), to the locus or non-lieu, locus and non-lieu, the utopia, of the human.\textsuperscript{129}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{126} OB, p. 36.
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., p. 41.
\textsuperscript{129} Ibid., pp. 43, 44, 45.
This long quotation shows both the difference and the relationship between ‘saying’ and ‘said’ in the ontological sense and in the ethical, or responsible sense. When I am speaking to the other, I am already separating myself from this other; but, at the same time, I am intending to approach this other in order to establish a platform for communication. The saying signifies the said as the way that the subject organizes one’s language to the other. Thus, when we are speaking in the face-to-face relationship, the signification from the saying-said correlation shows the proximity between interlocutors. Levinas stresses,

Proximity is quite distinct from every other relationship, and has to be conceived as a responsibility for the other; it might be called humanity, or subjectivity, or self.\textsuperscript{130}

Levinas intends to distinguish his thoughts of subjectivity from Husserl’s subject-object structure for the reason that Husserl sets out the role of language in the form of a thematization within the context of noesis-noema paradigm. Levinas raises the concept of ‘trace’ as the human face to argue against the subject-object systematic structure.

The concept of ‘trace’ contains two meanings: the first is the trace of human face as we have discussed at the beginning of this chapter; another is the trace of language, which is closely related to the first one as well. In other words, the trace of language realizes the trace of human face by an other-oriented self-expression. To detect the trace of human face is ‘to catch sight of an extreme passivity’in the relationship with the Other;\textsuperscript{131} to track down the trace of language is to listen to the saying as ‘the extreme passivity of the exposure to another’.\textsuperscript{132} In this case, silence is also a response, but a response in a waiting situation. From this, Levinas’s articulation of language goes beyond the philosophy of dialogue, or it should be called ‘dialogue-before-the-dialogue’.\textsuperscript{133} The ethical significance of this linguistic structure, or the ethical order of language, refers to ‘the exploitation of language –

\textsuperscript{130} OB, p. 46.
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid., p. 47.
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{133} De Boer, p. 76.
‘responsibility-before-freedom’. In *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas already explains this structure clearly.

This bond between expression and responsibility, this ethical condition or essence of language, this function of language prior to all disclosure of being and its cold splendour, permits us to extract language from subjection to a preexistent thought, where it would have but the servile function of translating that preexistent thought on the outside, or of universalizing its interior movements.

From this, language is not the beginning of our expression, but the struggle with the thinking that lies before we express, which also would be composed of comparison and judgment. Levinas deepens the discussion by arguing that the ethical order not only would be considered in the situation of I and You but also when the evaluation of the third party (what he terms, ‘Illeité from the Latin, ille, meaning, ‘he’) comes into the process of comparison and judgment. This consideration is no longer in the semantic sense of how language practically works but in the moral sense of how people ethically judge.

In order to judge ethically, saying plays an important role in the course of my approach to the other. In other words, saying is ‘the proximity of one to the other, the commitment of an approach, the one for the other, the very signifyingness of signification.’ When the proximity is realized in this context of pre-original language, substitution is another aspect to carry out the saying-said paradigm in responsible relationship. Substitution within the context of saying-said paradigm does not refer to the replacement of the other person or thing, but the passivity of alterity. When I am speaking to the other person, the words I am using are the manifestation of my ethical concern for this person, if we are in a responsible relationship. The saying is manifesting the said and the said is delivering silently in the saying when we approach the other and stand in the place of this other substitutionally. We argue that this is also a ‘for-structure’ like Bonhoeffer’s ‘pro-me’ structure. Levinas elaborates in *God, Death, and Time*,

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134 Ibid., p. 77.
135 TI, p. 200.
136 See more related discussion from Morgan, *Discovering Levinas*, p. 141.
137 OB, p. 5.
What we are seeking here is a signification that is prior to, and independent of, every content and every communication of contents, and that can be fixed by the term ‘Saying’ as a ‘Saying to another, as the one-for-the-other. The ‘for’ is what we must consider; it has a meaning different from what it would have at the thematizable level of ontology.\(^{138}\)

This ‘for structure’ answers the ‘who question’ which we asked at the beginning of this chapter. When we speak, we speak to the other but, at the same time, speak ‘for’ this specific person. The ‘for’ is bearing witness to my openness towards the openness of the other in the saying. Heidegger also argues that man’s response is to the other being in the *Ereignis* (an event). Heidegger, however, stresses the passivity of man’s response in his or her own finitude, while Levinas emphasizes the passivity of man’s response in the infinite towards the other. Thus, in Levinas’s thought, the saying shows double-levels of passivity: the passivity for the other and the passivity for the infinite. Levinas repeats, ‘this passivity of passivity, this dedication to the other, is a sincerity, and this sincerity is *Saying*.’\(^{139}\) Thus, the passivity of the ‘for structure’ prevents the violence of occupying someone else’s place but, at the same time, keeps the openness of responsibility in the origin of language as ethics. In Levinas’s words, ‘the overemphasis of openness is responsibility for the other to the point of substitution, where the for-the-other proper to disclosure, to monstration to the other, turns into the for-the-other proper to responsibility.’\(^{140}\)

From this, we argue that the significance of responsibility in the saying-said paradigm is not to provide a standard or principle of the concept of responsibility, or a hermeneutics of responsibility, but to find out ‘who is a responsible person’, especially in the saying of this person. It is not to know and understand firstly ‘what responsibility is’, and then to be a responsible person, but to be a responsible person, then genuine responsibility would be found and understood by oneself and other people. Responsibility, therefore, is not situational and relativistic even though the manifestations of responsibility are always changing. Thus, in Levinas, the subject of saying who shows the pre-linguistic system as the order of morality is the sign of

\(^{138}\) GDT, p. 156, see another discussion about ‘saying as signification’ in GDT, p. 161.

\(^{139}\) Ibid., p. 191. Italics is original.

\(^{140}\) OB, p. 119.
responsibility within the context of the changing plots or settings but not the one who establishes this sign according to different situations and environments.

Thus, the saying-said paradigm is an openness or exposure that constitutes the infinite of the subjectivity in the ‘for structure’, and the subjectivity finds its ethical expression in the saying-said paradigm in responsibility. As one commentatoar puts it, ‘the diachrony of personhood repeated itself in the diachrony of language’, which is the structure of both ethics and linguistics. Ward also clearly concludes the relationship between this paradigm and responsibility from Levinas’s *Otherwise than Being*, remarking,

According to Levinas, a Saying [*le Dire*] prior to any said; a signification in the responsibility one-for-another that is prior to the signifier/signified schema of discourse; a Saying prior to transcendental subjectivity and therefore outside representation and ontology.

Thus it is not to only understand what is said, but to understand the speaker who is saying as a subjectivity and also the trace of the infinity from this saying. This is the reason why we repeat that language in the forms of ‘the said’ and ‘the saying’ as the trace of the infinity is the condition for the in-depth dimension of ethics by participating in the difference. This participation, at present, shows the ‘trace’ of saying in the said and out of this participation, the responsibility is justified.

§ 4.2.7  *Proximity and Substitution in Responsible Discourse/ Relationship*

The carrying out of the saying-said paradigm implies two necessary aspects as we already mentioned above: proximity and substitution. We can move on to discuss how these two aspects achieve responsibility in a deeper sense.

Proximity is the beginning of the alterity after the separation is realized by the approach of the face of the Other as we analyzed in the first section of this chapter. Altery would be achieved by the effectuation of proximity and substitution in the relationship with the other. Speaking in the form of

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141 See, Ward, p. 111.
142 Ibid., p. 110, also see OB pp. 141, 158, 220.
143 See section 4.1.1.2.
communication needs proximity but it is not a mode of communication, not even part of it but the condition of it in order to keep the ‘absolute singularity’ of the interlocutors in this communication. This ‘absolute singularity’ is the result of the radical separation, which leads to a situation of ‘absence’ as proximity. Levinas holds that ‘caress is the unity of approach and proximity. In it proximity is always also an absence. […] Proximity is not a simple coexistence and rest.’ We will argue that this absence is precisely the presence of infinity in the relationship with the Other because the presence of infinity is in the diachronical future which is to be concretized by the ethical relationship of ‘absolute singularity’.

In Levinas’s words, ‘the proximity of the other is signifying of the face.’ That is to say, the invisible morality is revealed via the proximity of facing with the Other. When we approach the face of the Other, the presence of the face is the presence of infinity, which is absent from my existing or my preceding consciousness and reason as passivity. We find corresponding statements in Levinas’s Otherwise than Being, where he points out,

> It is perhaps here [negative quantity as passivity], in this reference to a depth of anarchical passivity, that the thought that names creation differs from ontological thought. […] It is not here a question of justifying the theological context of ontological thought. […] for the word creation designates a signification older than the context woven about this name.

Here, Levinas stresses the concept of ‘creation’ in three meanings. Firstly, the concept of creation indicates the negative quantity as passivity of the origin of human relationship; secondly, it also refers to the passive feature of proximity in the human relationship; thirdly, the signification of the creation points to the pre-original foundation of language and human being’s understanding about this pre-linguistic ethical significance in human relationship as well as in all kinds of human written works, which is an important condition for human understanding and interpretation.

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144 Emmanuel Levinas, ‘Language and Proximity’, trans. by Alphonso Lingis, in Collected Philosophical Papers, p. 120.
145 EN, p. 145.
146 OB, p. 113.
Corresponding to and following from proximity, substitution is another important aspect in order to explore responsibility. The basic meaning of substitution is to replace someone or something with another person or thing. In Levinas, however, it does not refer to the appropriateness of the replacement between persons or things, but to whether one person is aware of and then acts in respect of the other people’s integrated existence and his or her need according to this awareness, or not. Thus, if proximity stresses the necessary closeness in a relationship, then substitution emphasizes the openness in this closeness.

For Levinas, substitution is derived from the sensibility of the subject’s subjectivity. Substitution in the saying requires the presupposition of responsibility because it needs justification of the order of the said, which is entailed in the order of ethical signification. In the history of Western philosophy, there are many approaches to dealing with ethical significance of human relationships, such as, for instance, Hegel, who reduces human relationships into the subject and object of thought or absolute essence in his *Phenomenology of Mind*. Heidegger’s analysis of *Dasein* implies the problem of substitution by bringing about the projection and objectification of other people as another *Dasein* who shares the same Da (there) in the world. The process of projection and objectification concentrates on the sameness and integrates this sameness into mineness. Thus, in Heidegger’s case, he reduces every being into the essence of Being.

In contrast, Levinas uses substitution rather than reduction in order to avoid the reduction as a violence to a relationship. He states,

Irreducible to being’s essence is the substitution in responsibility, signification or the one-for-another, or the defecting of the ego beyond every defeat, going countercurrent to a *conatus*, or goodness.\(^{148}\)

Therefore, we could conclude that substitution indicates the fact that to live is not to live as an existent or a being (concerned about one’s own manner of being) but to live in the ethical significance of this *other* existent or being. Only by means of this signification, which is entailed in substitution, can responsibility be achieved by

\(^{147}\) See, OB, p. 14.  
\(^{148}\) Ibid., p. 18.
putting oneself in the place of another. From this, ‘speech and its logical work would then unfold not in knowledge of the interlocutor, but in his proximity [...] proximity is by itself a signification.’\textsuperscript{149} In other words, proximity and substitution pave the way for the order of ethical significance in the formulation of language.

Proximity and substitution in Levinas can be regarded as a primal humanity, or in De Boer’s words, an ‘original ethical situation of human beings, of the condition humaine’,\textsuperscript{150} and thus reveals the most foundational human relationship, which is prior to consciousness, understanding and knowledge. This is the origin of the relationship that is also prior to the identification of the difference of individual and collective as well as of singularity and universality. The proximity and substitution bring about the ethical ‘we’ in face-to-face relationship, which ensure from the responsibility of the Other and for the Other. In other words, ‘in the proximity of the face, the subservience of obedience precedes the hearing of the order’.\textsuperscript{151} And substitution can be regarded as the ethical dynamism of a humane society,\textsuperscript{152} which refers to someone who makes the fate of the Other his own.\textsuperscript{153}

From this analysis of proximity and substitution, we can see that responsibility as an ethical signification in human relationship and in human pre-linguistic construction is ‘an obedience to the absolute order’.\textsuperscript{154} There are, of course, diverse manifestations of this absolute order especially in ethical, religious, and political issues, and so forth, but the one that Levinas identifies is this pre-original and inspired order that both determines and yet distinguishes itself from the constituted order of ethical, religious, and political norms or principles. In Levinas’s words, ‘responsibility for the other man is ordered […]which] is a commandment ordering responsibility for the other.’\textsuperscript{155}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{149} CPP, p. 115, p. 116. Italics is original.
\item \textsuperscript{150} De Boer, p. 91.
\item \textsuperscript{151} EN, p. 151.
\item \textsuperscript{152} Burggraeve, p. 15.
\item \textsuperscript{153} De Boer, p. 61.
\item \textsuperscript{154} EN, p. 151.
\item \textsuperscript{155} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
The human being is responsible for not only following the Good but also for
gross inhumanity to each other. Man’s inhumanity to man is a fact of life, and if
ignored by any philosophy that proposes to examine the meaning of human
existence, such as Heidegger professes in his early philosophy, has seriously
implications for the ethical status of such philosophy. Suffering is not avoided by
Levinas. Levinas, in fact, intensively articulates the concept of ‘suffering’ in his
essay ‘useless suffering’. It is of importance, then, to examine the relationship of
suffering not only to proximity and substitution but also to responsibility.

Suffering, in a general sense, refers to ‘a datum in consciousness’ and ‘a
certain psychological content’, which is similar to ‘the lived experience of color,
sound, contact, or any other sensation’. In Levinas, however, suffering is
precisely passivity that is ‘more profoundly passive than the receptivity of our sense,
which is already active reception, immediately becoming perception’. In other
words, suffering as a passivity is no longer a painful experience but a lasting ordeal
which goes beyond the self-consciousness of pain. Thus, what Levinas emphasizes
in the suffering of the suffering of the other is that,

the suffering for the useless suffering of the other, the just suffering in me
for the unjustifiable suffering of the other, opens suffering to the ethical
perspective of inter-human.

Based on this, Levinas points out a ‘radical difference’ between ‘the suffering in the
other’ and ‘suffering in me’. The suffering in me can be explained or interpreted
and understood in my consciousness with my past experience. With ‘the suffering in
the other’, however, can I have anything to do? Can I understand the suffering of the
Other? What can I do with this suffering outside of my experience?

To try to answer these questions about ‘suffering’ in Levinas is not to be
limited to religious and philosophical discussions for they arise from the
consideration of the primal existential situation of human being. The meaning of

156 Chapter Eight of *Entre Nous*.
157 See EN, p. 91.
158 Ibid., p. 92.
159 Ibid., p. 93
160 Ibid.
‘uselessness’ stresses the finite nature of human being in the order of ethical significance. I cannot really place myself in the other’s position to experience his or her suffering. Nor can I judge of others as I should, if I were in his or her place. I myself, as a subject that is alien to the Other, cannot justify the Other’s pain, and vice versa. Levinas even states that ‘the justification of the neighbour’s pain is certainly the source of all immorality.’\textsuperscript{161} To explore the suffering of the suffering, however, is not only necessary but also ‘the most profound adventure of subjectivity’.\textsuperscript{162} Indeed, the suffering of the Other is the pain of the Other that I cannot share, while I can share the meaningfulness of this suffering of the Other. In other words, I can take responsibility for the suffering for the Other. In \textit{Entre Nous}, Levinas explains the particular perspective from which he attempted to examine the concept of suffering. He writes,

It is in the inter-human perspective of my responsibility for the other, without concern for reciprocity, in my call for his or her disinterested help, in the asymmetry of the relation of one to the other, that I have tried to analyze the phenomenon of useless suffering.\textsuperscript{163}

Thus, when the subjectivity of a subject transcendentally searches the meaning of this useless suffering, this subject is already in the process of proximity and substitution. To suffer for the others is an in-depth level of proximity and substitution that is embedded in the responsible relationship.

This in-depth proximity and substitution in suffering for the other also indicates the paradoxical in our human relationship: the ability of the finite human being to come close to each other in the presence of the gulf of the infinite characteristic of the separation and ethical responsibility between each other. In De Boer’s words,

Suffering — not as the magical or mythical expiation of evil, but as the ultimate experience of responsibility — is a passion that is more passive than things (to which this category is usually applied).\textsuperscript{164}

\textsuperscript{161} Ibid., p.98. \\
\textsuperscript{162} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{163} EN, p.100. \\
\textsuperscript{164} De Boer, p. 37.
This ‘ultimate experience of responsibility’ reveals that the subject always has limits in human relationship but, at the same time, it reveals that this responsibility always requires human being to transcend what it limits.

From the previous analysis, we can conclude that when the ‘I’ responds to the other, the ego of the I has been formed in the course of proximity and substitution. Furthermore, the Otherness of the other has also been located in a responsible relationship with me, which is prior to this other’s presence in this relationship. The approach to the Other is no longer constituted in the sense of Husserlian phenomenology but substituted in the sense of Levinasian ethics. Proximity and substitution is the condition of the formulation of relationships and the manifestation of language in the forms of ‘saying’ and ‘said’. This condition is manifested in the trace as the face of the Other, which also resolves the tension between particularity and universalism between the interlocutors who are in the order of ethical significance.

§ 4.2.8 Conclusion: Infinite Responsible Significance of Finite Response

Looking back over this chapter, we have deliberated how the I approaches and accepts the other from the perspectives of time, subjectivity, and language, which illustrate the structure of the response and responsibility for the Other. We noted that there are three aspects to this structure. Firstly, this structure guarantees the preceding essence of responsibility rather than responsibility in the relative and situational sense. Secondly, this structure is concealed in the finitude of subjectivity but it would be awakened by the encounter with the face of the Other, which is the genuine event of transcendence in life. Thirdly, Levinas’s concept of the ‘third party’ keeps the openness of this structure because it not only emphasizes the multiplication of the Other but also accentuates the response of the I among these Others. It is this which brings forward the core of the Otherness of the other in the order of infinite responsible significance. Between ‘I’ and ‘Thou’ there is ‘He’ to whom and for whom and before whom the ‘I’ and the ‘Thou’ are responsible. Thus the birth of ethical responsibility lies in the recognition of the ‘illeity’ of the Other and the suffering of that other. This is why Levinas stresses that it is only with and
in the appearance of ‘the third’ (of ‘he’, rather than of ‘me’ and of ‘you’) that the exigency of an ethical responsibility both manifests itself and demands to be heard.

Levinas’s ethical reflections have significant implications for how we understand the origins of philosophy in general and the rise of Husserlian and Heideggerean phenomenology in particular. According to Levinas, when the third party interferes in the relationship between the I and the other and when we need to explain ‘the said’ of the I and the Other to third people in the form of saying, then philosophy and hermeneutics come into being. This is why Levinas, especially in his later works, argues that ‘the face of the Other is perhaps the very beginning of philosophy’.  

Levinas’s concept of ‘first philosophy’, then, emphasizes the order of ethical responsibility in the first meeting with the first comer as well as the third party. The reason for this lies in the fact that when the ‘I’ faces the others both as the first comer and as the third party, that ‘I’ needs to approach them proximately and judge these relationships substitutably. Both this approach and judgment require justice, however, to take precedence between the first comer and the third party. This is an ‘incomparable comparison’ because everyone is unique but everyone lives in the same world. In Levinas’s words, it is an ‘asymmetry of inter-subjectivity’, which lies in the order of justice in my responsibility.

The order of justice as ethical significance needs and demands ‘language’ to deliver its meaning from a pre-linguistic relationship with the Other. Responsibility is a bond to connect the words that would be used by the subject, and also to link the present subject and the past subject in the form of ‘the saying’ and ‘the said’, as well as to transcend one’s own feeling of suffering towards the suffering of the Other as the suffering of suffering. Thus, responsibility is a surplus or an excess (excédance) over the finite of the subject in the infinite ethical significance from the event of encountering with the Other via the act of response.

165 EN, p. 103.
166 See EN, p. 104, also EI, p. 89.
167 See Levinas’s related discussion, EN, p. 104.
From this, as Levinas states, ‘when [ethics is] proposed as a modality of transcendence, [it] can be thought on the basis of the secularization of the sacred.’\textsuperscript{168} We can interpret this statement with regard to the proposal of Bonhoeffer’s ‘non-religious interpretation of Christianity’ on how people live without God, but still need to respond to the divine in a secularized and coming-of-age world. Levinas shares similar concerns to Bonhoeffer. Levinas writes in \textit{Difficult Freedom}, ‘The path leads to the one God must be walked in part without God.’\textsuperscript{169} A poetic metaphor can be used to explain this: God hides His face in order to awaken human being’s maturity from all the dis-ordered things that happen in the world via inter-human relationships.

The meaning of this hiding of the face of God indicates that the role of God has been changed in the process of secularization. The traditional sense of God is absent but the very original desire towards transcendence or ultimate reality is always there. The ethical significance of responsibility, in Levinas’s sense, lies in the ways that the words used by the interlocutors can reveal this transcendence when human being encounters the face of the Other and communicates with this Other.

In Bonhoeffer’s terminology, a non-religious interpretation of religion that prioritizes the ethical is still not only possible but necessary. In both cases, words used ensure the possibility that man would have the sincere confidence to admit his or her own weakness by removing the mask from one’s face in the face-to-face relationship. Only when the person recognizes his own finitude can that person demand the genuine infinite, either as God or as ultimate reality, as well as the genuine ethical relationship with the Other. In this sense, ethics is indeed an optics of the Divine, but it indicates the way or the ‘how’ the infinite responsible significance is embedded \textit{in} the finite response.\textsuperscript{170} Not only, therefore, is there an inherent ethical significance to this responsibility advocated by Levinas and Bonhoeffer, there is also an endemic ethical \textit{structure} to this responsibility. To the ethical structure of this responsibility, we now turn.

\textsuperscript{168} GDT, p. 163.
\textsuperscript{169} DF, p. 143.
\textsuperscript{170} Ibid., p. 159.
CHAPTER V

THE ETHICAL STRUCTURE OF RESPONSIBILITY

Central to Bonhoeffer’s and Levinas’s thought is the recognition of the depth-dimension that ‘the Other’ and ‘language’ occupies in the ethical structure of responsibility. This final chapter of our study, therefore, examines the role and the inter-play of ‘the Other’ and ‘language’ in the ethical structure of responsibility. We begin by outlining first, however, another possible approach to and method of analysing the ethical significance of responsibility in the phenomenology of sociology elaborated in the work of Alfred Schutz (1899–1959). ¹ Unlike Bonhoeffer’s focus on the Church as responsible community and Levinas’s identification of ‘the Other’ as pivotal to his conception of ethics as ‘first philosophy’, Schutz concentrates on the primacy of the ‘we’ in his analysis of the human being. In this regard, the specific role of ‘the Other’ and of ‘language’ is not central to Schutz’s account, even though he recognises the significance of the other in social interaction and social responsibility. In the first section of this chapter, therefore, we have to address the question: is a phenomenology of sociology sufficient for exploring the ethical structure in responsibility? We will see that, though this approach has its merit, recognition of the interplay of ‘the Other’ and ‘language’ in ethico-religious experience is indispensable in the ethical analyses of responsibility. In section two, therefore, we will analyse ‘religion’ in the ethical structure of responsibility, taking into account Bonhoeffer’s reflection on the relationship between religion and faith, as well as his ‘non-religious interpretation of Christianity’. This aspect is also highly relevant for locating the ethical significance of responsibility in the entire issue of the re-consideration of religion that occupies the minds of many twentieth century philosophers, including Levinas and Bonhoeffer (section three). Reflection on the ethico-religious dimension of responsibility, however, is not of course exclusive to western religions; all religions and all ethical theories acknowledge responsibility as a fundamental and universal value. In the concluding section of this chapter, therefore, we will analyse the

concept of ‘responsibility’ by comparing the ethical structure of responsibility as a whole from the Western perspective (based on the thinkers we have considered in this thesis so far) to a Chinese perspective on responsibility, based on writers of the Confucian tradition, especially from Neo-Confucianism. In this way, we will be able to show similarities and differences between Western and Chinese perspectives on responsibility. This, in turn, will illuminate further different understandings to both how and what it is to treat each other responsibly. Although the universal dimension of ‘responsibility’ and various approaches to and forms of its manifestation in cultures and religions can never be the same, precisely because of its historical and cultural conditioning, this analysis both confirms and reveals the plurality that is constitutive of the kind of universality characteristic of ethical responsibility in both Western and Chinese cultures.

SECTION ONE
IS PHENOMENOLOGY OF SOCIOLOGY SUFFICIENT FOR THE EXPLORATION OF THE ETHICAL STRUCTURE OF RESPONSIBILITY?

In chapter two, we noted that Bonhoeffer, in his early works (both in Sanctorum Communio and Act and Being) attempts not only to uncover sociological and ethical evidence for what is supposed to be true faith but also to determine the role which this faith plays in the form of ‘being-in-relationship’ in the Church as a responsible community. We also noted, however, that part of this position that Bonhoeffer adopts is based upon his rejection of the methods of the tradition of idealist epistemology that separates the wholeness of knowing and being. Schutz, likewise, in his The Phenomenology of the Social World, rejects idealist epistemologies and elaborates a phenomenology, based on Weber’s social theory, which considers similar inquiries to both Bonhoeffer and Levinas, but deals these topics from within a different approach, namely, from a phenomenology of sociology. It is of relevance to our study, then, to ascertain whether Schutz’s phenomenology of sociology can provide a possible answer to Bonhoeffer’s and Levinas’s inquiries and their analyses.

2 Schutz was an Austrian social scientist. He integrates sociological and phenomenological traditions into a method of social phenomenology to explore human relationships. Many, in particular, Max Weber, Henri Bergson, William James, as well as Edmund Husserl, influenced his thought.
of the phenomena of social relationships and the significance of the existence of Levinas‘the Other’ in human relationships. Is phenomenology of sociology sufficient for the exploration of the ethical structure of responsibility? This is the question that this opening section of our chapter addresses.

§ 5.1.1 Schutz’s Sociological Reflections on the Phenomenon of the ‘We’

Schutz’s work in sociology is renowned for the attempt to emphasise the experiences of the ‘we’ in social relations, experiences that did not feature centrally in Husserl’s transcendent-idealistic view of human consciousness. From the outset, then, Schutz turns to the social theory of Weber and adopts Weber’s approach of ‘ideal types’ to classify different types of social relationships and the way in which social beings typically act in these relationship towards the past, present and future, a focus he inherited from Bergson. Schutz, however, points out that one of the main problems with Weber’s ‘interpretive sociology’ is that it cannot provide sufficient evidence regarding ‘the essential characteristics of understanding (Verstehen), of subjective meaning (gemeinter Sinn), or of action (Handeln)’. In other words, Schutz creatively applies and modifies Weber’s term and method of ‘ideal type’ to ‘penetrate to the subjective meaning of individuals’ in order to explore in what sense these ideal types can be ‘type-transcendent’. In this regard, Schutz develops his thinking by applying the method of phenomenology that he inherited from Husserl to the concept of ‘ideal-type’ as a basis for a critique on the limitation of Weber’s interpretive sociology.

In order to develop this approach, Schutz brings forward an important pair of concepts: the ‘in-order-to motive’ (Um-zu-Motiv) and the ‘because-motive’ (Weil-Motiv). The former refers to the reason why the subject chooses to act prior to the whole action, while the latter refers to the explanation for the kind of action that unfolded in the past event. This duality enables Schutz to address the problem of ‘the genuine understanding of the other person and the abstract conceptualization of

\[\text{References:}\]


\[\text{\underline{4}}\] Ibid., p. xxii.

\[\text{\underline{5}}\] See related discussion, ibid., pp. xxiv, 86, 90, 96, 169, 171, 174–175.
his actions or thoughts as being of such and such a type. Focusing on the ‘in-order-to motive’ is different from focusing on the ‘because motive’. The former takes into consideration the experiences of the actor as a subject. The later can take into consideration the many things that are connected to the ‘type’ of action done. For Schutz, then, this distinction is set to deal with the transcendental problem of inter-subjectivity.

Schutz’s distinction, nevertheless, raises two questions. The first question relates to whether this distinction overcomes the problem of the limitation of interpretive sociology in reaching a genuine understanding of the other. The second question concerns whether this solution is sufficient for ‘letting the other be the other’ in the social relationship, or not.

Regarding the first question, Schutz’s approach to and crucial focus on the priority of synchronized consciousness in social interaction is, in many respects, is quite similar to Heidegger’s position. In this sense, Schutz agrees with Heidegger that the interpersonal relationship is reciprocal, but in a limited mutual way. Even though Schutz proposed another approach to Heidegger’s to interpret the other’s subjective experience, which is to wait the event that is attended by ‘the Other’ whereupon ‘the me’ recedes into the past, and then evaluate the subjective experience of the Other, this does not lead to a genuine understanding of the other in such a relationship. This is, nonetheless, on Schutz’s part, a genuine attempt to examine, in a most objective way, the subjective experience of the other, even if it is still formulated from within the limited scope of ‘ideal type’ and the room for to ‘let the other be the other’ is extremely narrow. Though the distinction between the ‘in-order-to motive’ and ‘because-motive’, then, does indeed provide an efficient perspective on clarifying the motivation of human actions in human relationships, whether it is sufficient to provide a starting-point for any discussion of the in-depth

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6 Schutz, p. xxv.
7 Ibid.
8 See Schutz analyses of objective and subjective meaning for sociology (ibid., pp. 37–38). He believes that it is necessary to find out the objective meaning, which would be equivalent to a kind of ideal-type, in order to constitute the meaning-content that can be shared by each subject who is in different specific relationships. It is, however, necessary to point out that, though the objective meaning as an ideal type has an anonymous character, Schutz clearly realizes that subjective meaning is never anonymous. This paradoxical situation has not completely been resolved in Schutz’s thought; it is, therefore, still open for discussion.
ethical significance of responsible relationship is a different point, and an entirely
debatable point at that.

Schutz, nevertheless, draws attention to the significance of memory in human
relationship, utilizing Husserl’s analyses of protention and retention. These three
elements of protention, retention, and retention of retention, are closely related to
Schutz’s distinction and analysis of ‘in-order-to motive’ and ‘because motive’. Thus Schutz’s approach can be traced back to Husserl’s analyses on memory, expectation and recollection in his 1905 lecture course on The Phenomenology of Inner Time-Consciousness (published in 1928). Here, Husserl remarks,

Every Act of memory contains intentions of expectation whose fulfillment leads to the present […]. The recollective process not only renews these protentions in a manner appropriate to memory. These protentions were not only present as intercepting, they have also intercepted, they have been fulfilled, and we are aware of them in recollection. Fulfillment in recollective consciousness is refulfillment (precisely in the modification of the positing of memory), and if the primordial protention of the perception of the event was undetermined, and the question of being-other or not-being was left open, then in the recollection we have a pre-directed expectation which does not leave all that open. It is then in the form of an incomplete recollection whose structure is other than that of the undetermined primordial protention. And yet this is also included in the recollection.  

This immanent time structure that enables a human being to reflect upon one’s own experiences, however, is focused on and tied to just that — the ability of my consciousness to reflect upon its own contents in time. The existence of the other and the significance of the existence of the other in my memory of such experiences is, therefore, evaded by Husserl.

This, then, is why Schutz’s development of Husserl’s reflections on the immanent time-structure of one’s actual consciousness in social consciousness follows in the same trend as Heidegger’s, especially on the examination of the role of projection in the discussion of act. We cannot carry out all the details about this similarity in this thesis, but it is important to point out that the distinction of

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reflective and non-reflective experience that Schutz derived from Husserl and Schutz’s analyses of projection in the act and time pre-determines and constrains Schutz’s discussion of human relationship in the sense of phenomenology of sociology. This type of discussion is still ego-oriented in the process of transformation towards to the Other, even though Schutz is fully aware of the complicated ‘transformation from multiplicity to unity’ in the process of understanding the Other and interpreting the act of the Other. The unity that Schutz can only find, however, is the unity of meaning in my experiences, via the development from the intentional act, which is based on the meaning-context of my experience. This unity, then, is both real and ideal in the sense of ideal objectivity. This ideal objectivity, for Schutz, is an important presupposition for judgment in the action between human relationships because based on this, people can carry out their self-interpretation of that lived experience to achieve the intended meaning and renew it in the next new lived experience in the future. As Schutz points out, therefore, Weber ‘fails to discuss either the nature of the meaning-context or its dependence on the meaning of a particular concrete actor’ because in the context of Weber’s sociological theory, the actor’s subjective feeling and the observer’s objective perspective are incommensurable.

In order to solve this problem of other person in the meaning context or structure, Schutz seeks to apply the ‘in-order-to motive’ and the ‘because motive’, as we have already explained above, to locate our perspective of horizons. This is not the quite the same issue that Husserl raises regarding ‘the constitution of the Thou within the subjectivity of private experience’ in pure phenomenological sense but the issue of how to solve the tension, from both a sociological and a pragmatic point of view, between the meaning that I give to the other’s experience and the meaning that the others give to them. Therefore, the issue for Schutz now changes from Weber’s ‘actor-observer’ problem, and to the ‘I-Other’ problem in the meaning-context of human lived experiences.

10 Schutz, p. 69.
11 Ibid., pp. 77–78.
12 Ibid., pp. 86–90.
In dealing with the ‘I-other’ problem, Schutz stresses in particular the error of the empathy theory, which also applies projection to understand the other person’s experience. ‘(T)he projective theory of empathy,’ Schutz critically remarks, ‘jumps from the mere fact of empathy to the belief in other minds by an act of blind faith.’

By criticizing the limitation of both the significance and the role of empathy in a transcendental-phenomenologically reduced account of the self and the other, without a structural parallelism between the I and the Other, Schutz continues to stress the general thesis of the alter ego in the ‘expressive act’ (Ausdruckshandlung) rather than in the ‘expressive movement’ (Ausdrucksbewegung). The former refers to what it is that a person is doing and the latter refers to the process of an observer who draws meaning from one’s observation of the person as actor. Schutz holds that the initial ‘expressive acts are always genuine communicative acts (Kundgabebehandlungen) which have as a goal their own interpretation’.

From this, we can detect that for Schutz both the motivation and its expression are of importance in any sociological exploration of meaning in human relationships, in particular the location of the words as well as the development of a word that the interlocutors use in their own meaning context. The reason behind this, of course, is that ‘discourse is itself a kind of meaning-context’. Although Schutz himself admits the limitation of analyzing objective meaning in conversation or communication (because it is merely the ordering of one’s past experience and future projection in a total context of meaning), the discussion of subjective and objective meaning is ‘the open door to every theology and metaphysics.’ Therefore, it is still an open topic for us to explore and to explore further in relation to another distinction he draws between ‘Other-orientation’ and ‘affecting-the-Other’. Only the former will bring in genuine communication in social

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13 Schutz, p. 115.
14 Ibid., p. 117. This is similar to Dilthey’s view, which influenced Schutz, on the way in which the understanding and meaning of an experience is raised and completed (rather than cancelled) in its meaning through articulation in written expression (e.g., in a play, a poem, a prayer, a treatise etc.). By taking the experience of language (e.g. reading a poem and trying to understand what is deposited in the poem), rather than the experience of perception, Dilthey develops an alternative ‘phenomenological’ approach to Husserl. It is one, nonetheless, that was highly influential on others who also departed from Husserl’s stress on perception in phenomenology (e.g. Heidegger, Levinas, Derrida).
15 Ibid., pp. 125–127, my emphasis.
16 Ibid., p. 135.
17 Ibid., p. 148.
relationship. This orientation relationship (Einstellungsbeziehung) is quite similar to Levinas’s concern about the I-Other relationship.

Interestingly, both Schutz and Levinas stress the significance of the face-to-face relationship in human interaction. Schutz’s thought of the face-to-face relationship is of a living social relationship indicating ‘an actual simultaneity with each other of two separate streams of consciousness’, and which assumes an attitude of ‘Thou-orientation’. Levinas’s face-to-face relationship is also a social relationship, as well as an individual relationship between the ego and self, but the Other has priority in that relationship. The difference, then, between Schutz and Levinas lies in that Schutz’s Other-orientation includes the ‘they-orientation’ and ‘we-orientation’, while the ‘Thou-orientation’ is a formal concept or ‘ideal limit’ in Husserl’s sense of that term. In contrast, Levinas does not use the term ‘Thou’ but stresses the priority of ‘the Other’ in the ethical consideration of human relationship. This difference implies that Schutz, similarly to Heidegger, admits the existence of the Other (Dasein in Heidegger) and the significance of the relationship with the Other ideally and objectively, but the ‘care’ towards the Other or the mind of the Other is neglected. On the other hand, Schutz emphasizes the characteristic feature of sympathy in the face-to-face relationship, or, more accurately stated for Schutz, in the ‘pure we-relationship’ because only in this simultaneous ‘we’ which experiences itself in synchronical time that the ‘we’ can ‘live in each other’s subjective contexts of meaning.’ The second aspect is likewise very similar to Heidegger’s approach that the ‘we’ can be approximately regarded in its Being (mitdasein). The problem with both Heidegger’s and Schutz’s account of the face-to-face relationship, however, lies in the fact that this relationship is subjected to the reciprocal We-relationship whereupon the uniqueness of the two faces is eliminated. This is exactly what Levinas argues against, for, even though Schutz’s approach can reduce the subjective involvement of the I in the understanding of the Other in the face-to-face relationship, in pursuit of the objectivity of the understanding the Other, the Other becomes an object of my thought rather than the Other itself. Thus ‘I’ can be

\[\text{\underline{\text{\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., p. 150.}}}\]
\[\text{\underline{\text{\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., pp. 157–164.}}}\]
\[\text{\underline{\text{\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., p. 163.}}}\]
\[\text{\underline{\text{\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p. 164.}}}\]
\[\text{\underline{\text{\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.}}}\]
\[\text{\underline{\text{\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., p. 166.}}}\]

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‘with’ (mit) another human being in a social relationship but not with that other being in terms of a responsibility before and to that other. And it is the latter relating that, for Levinas, characterizes the essential feature of human inter-personal responsibility.

From a sociological point of view, nevertheless, Schutz’s articulation of the face-to-face relationship focuses on a higher level of awareness of ‘my’ understanding concerning ‘the Other’ in the social ‘We-experience’ with a reciprocal motivation. He is clearly aware of the unavoidable separation between the observer and actor in an objective perspective. And he is also quite clear about the danger when the observer applies the inappropriate ‘ideal-type’ to understand the actor’s action, if this observer never has the chance to be in a genuine ‘we-relationship’ with the particular actor.24 In addition, Schutz shares the critical comments of Levinas on the role of memories because ‘memories are not in the full sense experiences of my world of predecessors, for in each memory the sense of the simultaneity of the experiences of the partners in the We- or They-relationship is preserved.’25 This point supports Levinas’s emphasis on the significance of the immemorial past because it is not sufficient to establish an ethical relationship which bases on one’s actual memory. The significance of this immemorial past, nevertheless, shows the passive dimension to Levinas’s conception of ethics but it is a dimension that is overlooked by Shutz (as much as it had been by Heidegger earlier).

In sum, Schutz’s phenomenology of sociology provides an objectively based, social perspective to explore human relationship and its meaning-context. Schutz’s purpose is to arrive at scientific knowledge for social human relationship. This goal sets up his theory in an objectively-oriented manner because,

All scientific knowledge of the social world is indirect. It is knowledge of the world of contemporaries and the world of predecessors, never of the world of immediate social reality. Accordingly, the social sciences can understand man in his everyday social life not as a living individual person with a unique consciousness, but only as a personal ideal type without duration or spontaneity.26

25 Ibid., p. 205.
26 Ibid., p. 241.
The merit of Schutz’s theory, then, is that his thinking provides an objective frame of reference for various disciplines to explore the subjective and objective meaning in social human relationship. In other words, it is valuable for our consideration on themes, such as, for instance, the ideal-type of the Church, the objective meaning of religion in various religious groups, and the various ways of the sharing of the subjective experiences in genuine faith, which correspond to Bonhoeffer’s inquiries. It is also helpful in comparing several concepts that share Schutz’s and Levinas’s similar concerns, even though they are used in different sense of definitions and approaches. From these comparisons, nevertheless, we can see that Levinas’s approach is not sociological or scientific. Schutz integrates Weber’s sociological theory and Husserl’s phenomenological approach to bring forward the idea of transcendental alter ego for the purposes of going beyond the boundaries of the subject matter of social science. To be fair, if there is any so-called ‘demerit’ of Schutz’s method of the constitution of the Thou via the transcendental ego between the sociological persons, it does not lie in his theory itself but in the non-priority of the ethical concern even though Schutz himself already recognised (but did not resolve) such problems in his analyses.

In the following section, we will examine Schutz’s classification of the ideal type for the social human relationship, with particular reference to the role of the Other in the ethical structure of responsibility, and stress the different proportion of ethical concern in these types of relationships.

§ 5.1.2 The Role of the Other in the Ethical Structure of Responsibility

The priority of the Other in the ethical structure of responsibility is not only a matter of purely philosophical concern but also, as Levinas remarks, a response to the ‘most revolutionary fact of our twentieth-century consciousness’. All the events that did happen in this era and all the people who suffered from these events remind those

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27 EN, p. 97. Levinas remarks, ‘(T)his is the century that in thirty years has known two world wars, the totalitarianisms of right and left, Hitlerism and Stalinism, Hiwashima, the Gulag, and the genocides of Auschwitz and Cambodia. This is the century that is drawing to a close in the obsessive fear of the return of everything these barbaric names stood for: suffering and evil inflicted deliberately, but in a manner no reason set limits to, in the exasperation of a reason become political and detached from all ethics.’ (Ibid.).
people who did not experience them to re-think how we have responded to ‘the Other’ in the way of answering before the Other, for the Other and in the place of the Other who may be a stranger. This answerability or response, however, is not limited only to the twentieth century but extends to the unfolding history of philosophy itself down through the ages, and, indeed, to the unfolding history of humanity. As noted above in our discussion on the ideal types of human relationship, intentional description can be applied to explore the apprehension and action of the other person. Thus, in the next section, we will apply the classification of ideal types to explore the ethical relationship of responsibility and obligation.

§ 5.1.3. The I-They and I-We Relationship

In the first case, we will define and compare human relationship in the form of ‘I-They’ and ‘I-We’ relationship in order to analyze the role of responsibility and the role of language in these two types.

In the ‘I-They’ relationship, the proportion of responsibility is comparatively lower than the other types of relationship. The reason for this is that the ‘they’ implies a gap, or a distance between the I and the rest of the others that establishes both difference and indifference. The feature of the language that is used in the I-They relationship, therefore, is characteristically tentative.

By contrast, in the I-We relationship, the I is a constituent part of the We. Though the I is identified by recourse to various backgrounds and is, therefore, disengaged from a totality, the ‘we’, nevertheless, implies both similar characteristics of every individual and the unified aspects of these characteristics. Thus the characteristic feature of language that is used in the I-We relationship indicates commonly owned interests and values. Such language, therefore, is not only tentative, though it could be instrumental, but it also could be personal.

I-They relationship can be regarded as the pre-I-We relationship because when they gradually recognize each other, the I-They relationship will change into the I-We relationship, and the isolation between the I and the They will be settled. In the second situation, the well-established I-They relationship seems like the I-
Other relationship. In our ethical concern, however, the I-Other relationship indicates the uniqueness of the individual while the I-They relationship stresses the difference between the I and the other people as a group. In other words, the difference and isolation between the I and the ‘they’ is essential but neither the I itself nor the ‘they’ themselves are of importance in this meaning-context.

The difference, therefore, between the I-They and I-We relationship is the quality of the relation rather than the origin of it. Only in the I-We relationship is it possible to have genuine discourse or communication with each other. For our ethical concern, nevertheless, the We should not be a plural form of the ‘I’, otherwise the We is equivalent to Heidegger’s Being, then there is no genuine difference between the I and the other I in the We. The separation of each individual should be the foundation of the genuine plurality necessary for ethical concern. This radical separation, then, is a primordial situation for the very formation of plurality is what establishes the ethical order of human relationship. Only under the situation of the genuine plurality, therefore, can the ethical encounter and response be possible. Compared to the I-They relationship, the proportion of responsibility in the I-We relationship is higher. Because of the uncertain situation of the I in the We, nonetheless, the realization of responsibility and the expression of language in this situation cannot be completely guaranteed, pre-determined, foreclosed and thoroughly analysed.

§ 5.1.4 The I-Thou and I-God Relationship

In the second case, we will define and compare human relationship in the form of ‘I-Thou’ and ‘I-God’ relationship in order to analyse the role of responsibility and the role of language in these two types.

Firstly, we are examining the ‘I-Thou’ relationship in a general sense here. In the ‘I-Thou’ relationship, the other person in the We-relationship has already separated from the We-group, and has become a genuine individual. This individual can be conscious of himself as a subject who can experience and think freely. In other words, this Thou has its own subjectivity and has the freedom to share its subjectivity with the other subject in a social and multiple relationship. At the same
time, the I is also a Thou for the other person in this relationship. Thus, in this situation, the relationship between the I and the Thou is reciprocally established. In other words, the existence of the Thou is for me, and vice versa. This is a mutually ideal relationship, as well as an actually empirical relationship. There is, however, no fixed structure of the I-Thou relationship precisely because this relationship itself is a dynamic event, rather than static restraint. Correspondingly, the role of responsibility can be examined in the ideal and metaphysical level in this situation. The role of language can also be discussed in the primordial and pre-linguistic sense, rather than in the practical and instrumental sense.

Secondly, the I-God relationship can be regarded as a special type of I-Thou relationship. The reason for this is that the I-God relationship can only be set up when the revelation, as a special event, occurs between the I and the Thou. The divine element unifies human experience in a transcendent sense, or people explain the significance of their experiences with a specific transcendent perspective. The I-God relationship, nevertheless, is not completely the same as I-Thou relationship because if we define I-Thou relationship as two-dimension between two subjectivities, then the I-God relationship would be multi-dimension in the sense of sociality. From our discussion of previous chapters, God as a wholly Other for man in Barth’s thought’s brings forward a Kenotic Christology, which indicates the increasing importance of human interpretation on divine element in I-God relationship. The method of analogy is essential for this interpretation. Bonhoeffer critically develops this approach in his exploration on the Church in a socio-theological-oriented sense. In other words, the focal point of the I-God relationship, under the consideration of non-religious interpretation of Christianity, turns from the examination of the nature and existence of God, and to the transformation of God, especially to the exemplary role of Jesus, for Bonhoeffer, in human social relationship. Bonhoeffer’s inquiry about the language used in interpreting Bible should be kept in mind, therefore, because this inquiry, on the one hand, desires to keep the original and genuine faith in the world of coming-of-age when the forms of religions have been changed; on the other hand, the understanding and attitude of people towards religion has also been changed. This is why Bonhoeffer’s inquiry is open, and in chapter four we have attempted to apply Levinas’s theory to provide a possible answer with the analyses of ‘the Other’ and language to this inquiry.
other words, our argument is that the feature of the infinite in the ethical relationship would be a fundamental presupposition for understanding various I-God relationships nowadays. This especially necessitates, then, the examination of various forms of language that are used in these relationships in conjunction with the attitude of putting the priority of the Other forms of I-God relationship in order to genuinely understand them.

In support of this line of argument, Levinas, in *Totality and Infinity*, brings forward a unique ‘atheistic’ point of view about I-God relation.

The atheism of the metaphysician means, positively, that our relation with the Metaphysical is an ethical behavior and not theology, not a thematization, be it a knowledge by analogy, of the attributes of God. God rises to his supreme and ultimate presence as correlative to the justice rendered unto men. The direct comprehension of God is impossible for a look directed upon him, not because our intelligence is limited, but because the relation with infinity respects the total Transcendence of the other without being bewitched by it, and because our possibility of welcoming him in man goes further than the comprehension that thematizes and encompasses its object. […] A God invisible means not only a God unimaginable, but a God accessible in justice. Ethics is the spiritual optics. 28

In light of this, Levinas identifies and stresses the inseparable connection between divine God-man relationship and ethical man-man relationship. This so-called ‘atheistic’ viewpoint is to trace back to the origin of the religion before it was artificially defined as ‘theistic’. That is to say, it is the original manifestation of the divinity of God *in a responsible human relationship* with regard to everyone’s personal uniqueness, and the choseness of one’s faith in the genuine form of communication, that sustains the nature of religion or the presence of the divine. Only when we know and act according to the nature of religion can the inter-religious understanding be possible, which is, as we have argued, also the essence of Bonhoeffer’s non-religious interpretation of Christianity and Biblical words.

Therefore, in this context, God is an invisible force of the Other and only by means of his ‘voice’, either in the form of biblical words or in the form of preaching

28 TI, p. 78.
or so forth, can man carry out the infinite movement of the Good as the form of ethical imperative that is inherent in God’s voice. This raises two questions, then. ‘Is God the human other?’ and ‘How are we to understand such a reformulation of the face-to-face in religious language?’

These two questions are questions that are often asked regarding the relationship of the human to each other and the radical otherness of the divine. Indeed, ethical action is not all of religious experience, but it is the essential part of it. Therefore, the essence of Bonhoeffer’s idea of non-religious interpretation would be an ethico-divine interpretation. The idea of ‘trace’ from Levinas can be regarded as the ethical force in the I-God relationship. And this ‘trace’ can be manifested when people encounter each other face to face. Michael Morgan provides a very clear explanation and summary about the role of God in human relationship, when he remarks,

First, that God as illeity is present in the face, but that the third party has a different relation to the face of the other. In society, God is related to the other but not as a third party; God is the other’s ethical force. The third party is other to my other; there is a third, a fourth, and more; […] God as illeity is other, but not as an other. […] Second, God is what calls to me from the face, whereas the third party compels me to stand back and to judge and assess how I am to execute my responsibility to all others. […] Finally, God is the author of responsibility and a kind of identity through substitution for the other; […] [If] God is involved in my being “a member of society”, [then] this involvement is a betrayal of and also the establishment of a new relationship with God as illeity.

From this it follows that the Good in the trace of God as an ethical force only can be detected in concrete human relationship. In Morgan’s words: ‘God is “neither an object nor an interlocutor” but an “absolute remoteness,” which “turns into my responsibility.” God is not the other but “other than the other” and “prior to the ethical bond with the other.”’ This idea directly corresponds to Levinas’s articulation of substitution and responsibility.

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29 See Morgan’s questions in his, Discovering Levinas, p. 180.
30 Morgan, p. 192.
31 Ibid., p. 200.
In this way, the ethical sensibility is fundamental to religious sensibility because it is inherent in the responsible relation to the other person when the ‘trace’ of God functions in the face-to-face relationship. In the meanwhile, this ethical sensibility is also essential to help people to understand the theological language used in religious life with an ethical perspective. In next section, we will further discuss this point.

§ 5.1.5 Responsible Relationship: Face-to-Face

In the last case, we will define and analyze human relationship in the form of ‘face-to-face’ in order to explore how the role of responsibility and the role of language integrate in this form together as an ultimately ethical structure.

The most distinct difference between the face-to-face relationship and the previous relationships outlined is that the nature of this relationship is neither a type, as the I-We and I-They relationship, nor an event, as the I-Thou and I-God relationship. The face-to-face relationship is both a prerequisite and a condition for previous relationships, or it is a necessary presupposition to make the rest of relationships possible. In other words, the face to face relationship is a necessary pre-condition of the other relations discussed above.

Face to face is a primordial relationship that reveals how the I and the world, as well as the I and the other person relate to each other ethically. When the I meets the face of the other, for the first time, this face-to-face situation is both the origin and the condition of this encounter. It means that this encounter is the first event that happens between two subjects, but it is also the condition for its later stages that may be developed into the other relationships and that we have discussed above. The second obvious characteristic of face-to-face relationship is that it shows the difference between the same and the other but this difference cannot be, at the same time, be generalized into a totality. It means that in the face-to-face situation, the position of the I and the other cannot be reducible to, or reduced as mutually cognitive objects and co-existences in synchrony. This ‘we’, rather, are separated but this ‘we’ maintains its separateness in a plural society in time but in a diachronical sense of time.
This separation is primordial because only when the I faces the other can the I locate the boundary between my self and the Other. This boundary, nevertheless, is not jointly set up by the I and the Other, but is revealed in a ‘for me’ (pour moi) structure, in Levinas’s word, or a ‘pro me’ structure, in Bonhoeffer’s word. This ‘for me’, or ‘pro me’ indicates a primordial subjectivity with regard to a genuine Otherness. The main point here is not the ‘mineness’ of the subjectivity but the ‘alterity’ of this ‘mineness’ concerning the Other. In other words, the Other is endowed with the priority in a face-to-face relationship, even if the subjectivity of the I and the capability to apply the ‘alterity’ towards the Other is initial and essential. It is with this fact of experience, with this fact that the face of the other claims, first and foremost, an ethical responsibility from me towards that particular other that is the origin of ‘ethics’ for Levinas.

When we examine the face-to-face relationship itself, this relationship automatically indicates the existence of the ethical order in a society because this order is an essential condition of showing its social essence. Namely, the face-to-face relationship as a condition clarifies different layers of relationship. This clarification shows the fundamental role of face-to-face relationship as the bond or obligation in ethical relationships in that not all human relationships are ethical relationships.

We define this fundamental face-to-face relationship as responsible relationship because of its immanently singular and finite aspects, as well as its transcendentally multiple and infinite aspects. Responsibility, which is different from what we have discussed in the first chapter from agential theory, social theory and dialogical theory, is re-defined, according to Bonhoeffer’s discussion, on ‘the responsible life’ and through Levinas’s articulation on the paradoxical tension between response and responsibility. It is precisely the limitation of human being’s response to the divine other and to the other person when they are in the face-to-face situation that leads to the reconsideration of one’s responsibility in a broader context or horizon. Therefore, responsibility cannot be regarded as a conventional custom in daily life, neither as a kind of basic law in any legal system, nor even as moral law followed by personal conscience anymore in this context. Responsibility, in the
face-to-face situation, is to locate one’s genuine subjectivity that already bore all
types of situation we mentioned above in order to justly make every ethical decision.
These ethical decisions are difficult to make correctly, just like responsibility is
difficult to bear properly. The face of the Other reveals itself but, at the same time,
conceals itself. Correspondingly, in the face-to-face situation, we enjoy our freedom
but, at the same time, bear our responsibility. This dividing line is never clear but it
always requires us to draw.

As we indicated towards the end of the last section of this part, ‘trace’ would
be an essential clue to explore the role of responsibility in one’s subjectivity and its
relation to the other’s. We will further argue, in the following section, that the role
of language is one of the most indispensable elements of the ‘trace’, which also
includes the pre-linguistic stages because it is entailed in the formulation of language
itself.

SECTION TWO
THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE IN THE ETHICAL STRUCTURE OF RESPONSIBILITY

Many thinkers frequently raise two questions in relation to the viability of ethical
language considered: ‘After the Holocaust, is ethical language still possible, still
valid?’ and ‘Can we speak of morality after the failure of morality?’

These two questions are difficult questions to answer with just a ‘yes’ or a
‘no’, but they have to be addressed not because we are still speaking of, or trying to
speak of morality and ethics here but because morality and ethics require us to do so.
In other words, it is a responsibility that we bear that urges us to find an answer to
these questions for ourselves. We may well not have the ability to search for the
origin of these questions in the past, but we still have the chance to find out how
these questions come into being and why they are so difficult to answer at the present
and in the future. Bonhoeffer and Levinas cannot escape from these questions

32 Emmanuel Levinas, ‘The Paradox of Morality: An Interview with Emmanuel Levinas’, trans. by
Andrew Benjamin and Tamra Wright, in The Provocation of Levinas: Rethinking the Other, eds. by
either, not because they had experienced the content of these questions but because of their ethical concern for future generations that urges them to speak out. They are, however, neither the first ones, nor the last ones to speak of ethical language. Condillac, Husserl, Rosensweig and Barth, and many more before them, and Derrida, Lacan and Kristeva, and many more after them, all provide various perspectives from which we can explore this problem. Even though the approaches that they have applied are different, there is a common concern in all of their thinking: to seek the very essence of human language itself and the formulation of this language via the speakers themselves which is prior to the analyses of an existent or particular language. Only through this way can the ethical significance of language be revealed from language.

Thus, generally speaking, we stress that it is the speakers themselves, who speak and communicate with the Other, that play the important role in the face-to-face situation as a responsible relationship precisely because only therein do the speakers become the signifiers of the signification of the signs of their dialogue. The reason we emphasize the role of the signifier rather than the sign is that the formation of a sign itself is developmental; that is to say, the same sign used by one signifier changes, and there are different interpretation of the same sign from different signifiers. It is practically significant to analyze the sign in a particular language. However, when we need to explore the essentially ethical significance of human relationship, this is not sufficient. We, then, will focus on the ethical constitution of language. In order to clarify this ethical constitution of language, we can illustrate the difference using two basic contrasting examples. The first one is the difference between the use of language when a person is in soliloquy and when a person talks to his or her family members. The second one is the difference between the use of language when a person talks to his or her family members and to his or her boss. In these two cases, it is the ethical relationship that would determine the languages which would be used to communicate with the other person in a social network. These two situations are very common in our daily life, and so, they are

33 Étienne Bonnot de Condillac (1715–1780), French philosopher and epistemologist. He holds that language bears the sensory and emotional elements. The structure of language thus reveals the structure of mind and thought. His theory, therefore, has been regarded as a kind of ‘sensationalism’ that emphasizes the role of sense in human language.
34 See, Ward, p. 4 and p. 148.
easy to understand, but they are not the most fundamental or original cases. The original ones are far more complicated, such as, for instance, Levinas concept ‘the third’. That is to say, the language used between you and I would be different from the situation that when the third person turns up. Society only comes into being, however, when the third person is involved in the I-Thou relationship. Therefore, all these differences lie in the response to the interlocutor. All elements in this response have to be taken into account when we examine the integrated responsible relationship with regard to the role of the Other.

In the following sections, we will examine three aspects about language. The first aspect is about the role time in language, which is derived from Bonhoeffer’s ideas of pen-ultimate and ultimate, in his consideration of responsible life, as well as from Levinas’s ideas of diachronic saying and said. The second one is about the role of memory in language and its relation to responsibility. The last is about the role of response and responsibility as a whole.

§ 5.2.1 Language in History and Time

The ethical significance of language is closely related to ‘time’, especially when time is presented as ‘history’ in the development of human society. Time also occupies an essential element in the role of language in ethical relationship because language itself is both individual expression and social phenomena. When we use language to describe and communicate, it forms an integral part of the process that establishes social human relationship. Some types of words that constituted language are recorded and remembered, while the other types maybe forgotten and disappear. With regards to the ethical aspect of language, however, even the vanished language still leaves a trace for the presence of languages that are in current use. In this respect, it is similar to the unconsciously collective memory of language that keeps the cultural elements in the way of dialogue rather than conscious memory that stores the functional or instrumental elements in the sense of linguistics.

As we have discussed in chapter three and chapter four, the difference between Heidegger’s synchronical way and Levinas’s diachronical way of language has been stressed and we argued that the latter give prominence to the priority of the
uniqueness of the subjectivity between the Other and the I. Nevertheless, synchronical time is still a basic form of time in ethical consideration of language, even though it just shows one aspect of ‘duration’ in the development of language. In other words, when we speak to the other, we face the other interlocutor ‘here and now’. The ethical significance of this face-to-face relationship comes into being along with the dialogue. This is a synchronical aspect of the dialogue. When, however, the ‘I’ tries to make decisions or judgments in relation to my ‘exposure’ to the other as an interlocutor, the expression of language in this dialogue is ethical. It is time, then, that gives significance to this expression of language, when the speaker is conscious of the tension between his or her own freedom and responsibility towards the other. Thus far, the relationship between language and time is in the scope of consciousness, in a phenomenological sense. In this regard, people can provide ethical interpretation for their action or behaviour with their conscious memory.

When both of us, however, are in this ‘duration’ — the other person and I, at the same time — we are also in a diachronical situation. Without this diachronical aspect, there is no way to explore ethical responsibility because of the double-attribute of time. General speaking, time is both objective and subjective. The objective time means physical time that can be measured by physical process (seasons), or by instruments, like clocks and sundials, or by the radioactive decay of elements. Objective time is public because everyone on this earth can use it as a frame of reference. Thus, the characteristic of synchrony or simultaneity of objective time is noteworthy. The subjective time is more complicated than the objective one. Subjective time, sometimes is equivalent to psychological time, especially when people are conscious of the passing of time, even though the duration of the psychological experience of time is not equal in every unit of time. For instance, when one is in pain, even if only for a very short time, it is experienced as a very long time, whereas one can be hours happy doing something but it is experienced as a very short time. Our discussion, then, needs to centre on the nature of subjective time that would be experienced by different subjectivities.

The I, in the sense of subjective time, is both the origin and the end of time because this I could have freedom to decide how to interpret all the events happened,
or is happening, or will happen in his or her life. From this point of view, time has an interpretive power for each ego. When we consider an ethical relationship, however, we need to explore how two or more subjective times meet and weave with each other. Here, Levinas’s concepts of proximity and substitution provide solutions to explore the ethical significance in the explanation of language in time and history. Indeed, one person cannot completely know and understand the subjective experience of others. The way of using language, according to different identities of interlocutors, shows the ethical consideration towards the other. In other words, the I is conscious of the boundary of one’s freedom and responsibility in this relationship. The refrainment in the form of language, which is decided precisely by this boundary, indicates the priority of my responsibility compared to my freedom. In Susan Wolf’s word, ‘we have the “ability to step back from ourselves and decide whether we are the selves we want to be.”’35 Furthermore, as William Schweiker holds,

We understand ourselves, we have our moral identities, as historical agents in relation to others and the world. Persons exist as selves in a moral space of relations through time. Thus, it is ordinarily believed that a person is and ought to be responsible for the consequences of his or her action. Assuming responsibility […] has a retrospective and future oriented character to it. And it is also the case that a person is responsible in the present. Being responsible entails a commitment to self-constancy through time with respect to actions, intentions, and consequence of actions.36

It thus follows that the issue of responsibility is also closely related to the question of personhood in different times and of this person’s self-knowledge and self-identity in history. In Levinas’s words, ‘Time as question: an unbalanced relationship with the Infinite, with what cannot be comprehended.’37

To deal with time in the relationship to both the other person in the form of dialogue and to the divine Other in the form of interpreting the Scriptures, is in an infinite horizon. The common ground of these two aspects is that this infinite

36 Schweiker, p. 167.
37 EN, p. 73.
horizon is subjective but also transcendental in various forms of the use of language. When the I knows the other person or the divine Other better, he or she will know himself or herself better in one’s improvement of understanding along with the flowing of time or the development of history.

If time, however, is an important factor in our consideration of ethical relationship to the Other, then what role does memory play in the integrated structure of responsibility with regard to language? The reason why this inquiry is raised is that memory is usually regarded as an ability to store, retain and recall information in the flowing of time. Yet, in the meantime, the role of language has changed in different times and in different situations. How do people think about the words that they spoke to the other person before? How do people select words to speak to different persons, when they are in conversation? Would the words that I had used before change my selection of words for the future? What influence will the other person’s words have on the ethical relationship between him or her and me? In next section, we will attempt to answer these questions.

§ 5.2.2  Language in Memory and Responsibility

In this section, we will not discuss memory in merely a psychological sense but in an ethical sense, though they are closely related.

Several works have discussed the relationship between ethics and memory from various perspectives. Jeffrey Blustein’s *The Moral Demand of Memory*, in particular, provides an ethical examination on memory. In this work, Blustein systematically discusses main themes that are relevant to responsibility and memory. He begins from the analyses of memory as a subject of evaluative inquiry and

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38 Memory is a topic that has been explored by several writers in ancient Greek, medieval, modern and contemporary philosophy (e.g. Epicurus, Plutarch, Plotinus, Locke, Leibniz and Kant). Augustine is, perhaps, most famous for his drawing of our attention to and defence of the centrality of ‘memory’ in the identification of the ‘self’ (before God) in Book X of the *Confessions*. See, James McEvoy’s excellent discussion, ‘Does Augustinian *Memoria* Depend on Plotinus?’ in *The Perennial Tradition of Neoplatonism*, ed. by John J. Cleary (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1997), pp. 383–396.

develops various points of view on taking responsibility for one’s own past. For Blustein, the aim to do justice to the past necessarily involves a clarification of the relationship between ethics, truth and collective memory. In the last two chapters, he examines the responsibility of remembrance and the role of memory in bearing witness. Indeed, memory plays an important role in psychological and bio-ethical consideration. To research memory, however, is at the same time to pursue the reasons why we would remember something but forget other things, maybe consciously, maybe unconsciously. Thus forgetting too, as Augustine notes in his famous discussion on memory in Book X of the Confessions, is a power (vis) of memory (memoria). It is outside the limits of this study, nevertheless, to provide a detailed analyses of memory or Blustein’s work in this section, but we will make use of only those main points of view that he expresses that are most relevant to the understanding and evaluation of the topic of our enquiry.

In his first chapter, Blustein remarks,

When we study, discuss, analyze a reality, we analyze it as it appears in our mind, in our memory. We know reality only in the past tense. We do not know it as it is in the present, in the moment when it’s happening, when it is. The present moment is unlike the memory of it. Remembering is not the negative of forgetting. Remembering is a form of forgetting.\(^{40}\)

He also notes in chapter three of his work, what memory is not and what it cannot do:

Memory does not consist in subordinating the past to the needs of the present […] for he who looks to gather the materials of memory places himself at the service of the dead, and not the other way around.\(^{41}\)

Thus, at the beginning of the last chapter in his work, Blustein arrives at the conclusion for which he is striving to reach, namely,

\(^{40}\) Milan Kundera, Testaments Betrayed (London: Harper Collins, 1995), p. 128; quoted in The Moral Demand of Memory, p. 1. (St Augustine, as we have noted above, makes a similar point in his famous discussion on memory in Book X of the Confessions.)

Those who are alive receive a mandate from those who are silent forever. They can fulfill their duties only by trying to reconstruct precisely things as they were, and by wresting the past from fictions and legends.\textsuperscript{42}

From the above three quotations, there is one common ground to all of them. To research memory ethically is not only to find out how memory itself functions from the view of psychology and even neuropsychology, which provides a substantially experimental foundation to explain memory, but also to find out how memory is to be ethically interpreted, reconstructed and communicated in one’s mind or between people’s minds. The truth of the memory counts.

We can, therefore, summarize three features for the ethical research on memory as follows. Firstly, memory does not only lie in the past tense, but also in the present and future tense. For example, William James rhetorically asks and answers three ‘big’ questions about memory in order to lead the readers to think about them\textsuperscript{43}: first, do emotional memories result from the retention of emotions as such? James gave a negative answer; secondly, can memory be improved? James answer was again negative; thirdly, is everything personally experienced capable of being remembered? James’ answer is the same as the previous two. Indeed, the ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer is far from enough to clarify the psychological, social and ethical significance of these questions. The negative answers, nevertheless, confirm the complicated nature of these questions, and the need of further research on them. This brings us back to the topic about the relation between these questions and our first feature of the ethical research on memory.

James’ three rhetorical questions can be re-interpreted and re-formulated to make the following three main points. Firstly, the quantity of time is not necessary to determine the quality of time. Secondly, the skills of memory may be improved consciously, but the ability of memory cannot be decided and changed consciously by people themselves. Thirdly, personal memory cannot be completely remembered and controlled by the person who owns it. In other words, even though memory plays a very important role in man’s experience, the influence and significance of


\textsuperscript{43} Ross, pp. 13–14.
what memory brings about would be out of the examination of memory itself. From these three points, we argue that there is no direct causal relationship between time and memory, however the quantity and quality of time may be altered by memory consciously and unconsciously. This is basic fact that paves the way for following two features on ethics and memory.

The second one: ethical research into memory does not only focus on the private and subjective aspects of memory but also the shared and narrative aspects of memory. As we have discussed in the first feature, even though the content of the memory is the same, the influence and the feeling of the owner about this memory will not be the same in different times. Thus, when the I mentions a specific memory to other people, the order of my narrative about this memory may not be the same as the order of the actual content in this memory. The main issue of responsibility lies in the identification of the content of one’s memory and the narrative of it. This issue is significant in the consideration of responsibility, in that, memory, in both the social and ethical sense, is a reflection or projection of history as well as the collective memory that are shared by the others. Therefore, the ethical significance of memory cannot be accurately measured by strictly experimental method; it can be and will be reflected and clarified, however, only by way of the encounter of the other’s memory in all shared ways, especially in the way of conversation or communication.

The third one: memory does not only emphasize the memorable aspect of memory but also the forgettable aspect of memory. In other words, we need to concern ourselves with the relationship between forget and forgive as well as the memorial and the immemorial. As we have analyzed in the first feature, memory cannot be completely controlled by the owner, even though it is nearly the most private aspect that only can be controlled by its owner. We argue that the memorable aspect of memory is the primary memory that is comprised of one’s experience and can be retained in the level of one’s consciousness. The other aspect of memory is the secondary memory that sometimes we may already forget or try to forget. Whether forgotten, or not, this deeply affects our ethical consideration, especially in conversation with oneself and the other. Trauma is a distinct example for this feature. In this case, the immemorial shows the boundary of memory itself,
which, in turn, also leads people to the origin of the ethical significance between human relationships.

This immemorial, then, corresponds to the call of infinite from the other people when ‘the I’ responds to it. The ‘I’ cannot recall from its own (=my) memory, from its self-knowledge, or from any other reason that I need to respond but ‘the I’ responds to this precisely because it comes from the most original situation, the basic place of our humanity. When ‘the I’ responds to this call from an immemorial situation, it is not a call to fulfil a promise as the traditional views on responsibility, but a call to establish a new promise for the future conversation. In this promise, we also get to know each other and set up the ethical way of linguistic expression because, in a responsible relationship, the interlocutors show their responsibility to the other people by means of the identity of one’s words or knowledge and one’s deeds or actions. In William Schweiker’s words,

In uttering the sentence, who I am appears, as it were, as the link between a linguistic designator (‘I’) and a particular deed (breaking a promise). This is important for our capacity for reflexive self-understanding and self-designation. Yet under the pressure of linguistic analysis it also threatens to reduce the self, the ‘I’, simply to a function of language. Who I am is dependent upon the language I speak or which bespeaks me.44

It thus follows that the form of the language that we use in the ethical or responsible relationship is in fact daily language, however, there is a transcendental attitude in this language when it is spoken as a responsible response to the call from the other people precisely because it would be understood beyond what it is said and saying. Therefore, the responsible language, both in a linguistic form and in a silent form (the face of the other as we discuss in chapter four), is a way to show the in-depth identity of one’s subjectivity and responsibility to the Other in social relationship. Memory, which especially refers to a diachronical memory, is a trace, both in a memorial and immemorial way, for not only understanding the relationship with one’s self and to the other, but also for making a promise to face the past and the future with the other in the present together.

44 Schweiker, p. 165.
§ 5.2.3 Responsibility as A Response to the Other

Language, especially in the form of response, not only functions as expression of one’s self but also as address towards different others. Thus, language shows the subtle but essential differentiation of each ‘other’. In other words, even though the words that the I uses to speak to the others are still those words, the words that can show each specific relationship and the words that can make this other person responsible are not the same.

There are two essential characteristics about language as a responsible response. Responsible response is transcendental and, at the same time, is also passive. The characteristic of transcendence is related to the face of the Other when the I addresses to this interlocutor, and vice versa, as we have discussed in chapter four, especially from Levinas’s point of view. When the other addresses and questions me, the language that embeds in this process puts the other’s self or myself into an in-depth subjective and responsible consideration. This consideration itself is passive because the ethical encounter or event is both essentially and inter-subjectively uncertain. This uncertainty requires a dialogical and diachronical ‘growth’ or ‘evolution’ of the ethical significance in using language.

Thus, ‘the response to the Other’ always takes place in an uncertain situation, the words selected to communicate with the other is uncertain, and the relationship that is to be established based on the dialogue is also uncertain. All of these uncertainties, however, are undoubtedly in paradoxically and ethically tight relations. Thus, the response to the Other is a pursuit of certainty, which is not to be found in the proof of every word that we use in the communication, but in the way these uncertainties brings ‘us’ into meaning. It challenges ‘the I’ to be responsible before the ‘Other’, for the ‘Other’ and to the ‘Other’.

This principle, Levinas argues, is fundamental for an ethical reflection about the significance of response in the question-answer form for both philosophy and theology. If we apply this principle to Bonhoeffer’s idea of non-religious interpretation, we can clearly find out that his inquiry is not to provide new principles of interpretation for Christianity or even religion, but to raise a dynamic
question for people to answer. The question itself is about the changing forms of religion, the change of the usage of language, the change of the relationship with the Other, the change of the understanding and its significance of responsibility which connects all the aspects mention above. We have found that Morgan provides a possible way to carry out this non-religious interpretation from Levinas’s point of view for Bonhoeffer’s inquiry. He suggests,

‘Sacrifice’ is a religious term, and ‘substitution’ is its secular paraphrase; it is a giving-over and an offering of the self for the other. Somehow – in a way he has not yet clarified – communication between persons depends upon my standing in for others, my being in the other’s place.\(^{45}\)

The religious term, in this respect, therefore, is equivalent to and situationally replaceable by an ethical term. Indeed, this replacement perhaps would change or reduce the divine element of the word ‘sacrifice’ and the word ‘substitution’ would be regarded as a reciprocal exchange in a relationship. This, however, is different from Bultmann’s existential interpretation of Christianity which is derived from Heidegger’s existential thinking as Bonhoeffer criticizes. The reason is that the language itself used in communication between the I and the others in an responsible context is transcendental. This transcendental characteristic manifests its spirit in a response of man to the Other. Thus, the essence of the responsibility as a response to the other lies in how the spirit of response between the I and the Other is to be revealed both from the language and from the ‘unsaying of the said’, which is in order to re-awaken the primacy of saying.

We are going to intensively analyze Bonhoeffer’s idea of non-religious interpretation of Christianity with Levinas’s ethical analysis of language in order to show that the role of language in our ethical structure of responsibility would be a possible answer for Bonhoeffer’s inquiry, which is also the essence of Levinas’s conception and understanding of ‘First Philosophy’.

Levinas states in *Infinity and Totality*:

Language is consummated as a sequence, in speech and counter-speech. Here alone does the word that is formed in language meet its response.

\(^{45}\) Morgan, p. 132.
Only here does the primary word go backwards and forwards in the same form, the word of address and the word of response live in one language, I and Thou take their stand out merely in relation, but also in the solid give-and-take of talk. […] The relation with man is the real simile of the relation with God; in it true address receives true response; except that in God’s response everything, the universe, is made manifest as language.  

Indeed, ‘ethics occurs […] in the demand for response’ and the term ‘religion’ itself is etymologically an obligation or a bond in a relationship that also requests response. Different from the sign system or structure that is constituted by the meanings attained from a mutual relation that transcends each individual interlocutor in a social sense, the language as a discourse about deeper human relationship is to share one’s spiritual things to others by the form of an initial saying: a saying that is prior to consciousness and intentionality. The ethical significance of language’s priority implies that ‘I am not my origin unto myself; I do not have my origin in myself.’  

Religion, in its initial and etymological sense, however, is not only about various obligations and bonds between the I, the You, the We, and the relation to God but it is also about the order of these relationships after the ‘fall’ (in Christian religion) or ‘ignorance’ (in Buddhism). Impartial love and eternal goodness is usually regarded as a transcendent ideal of religions. At the same time, nevertheless, this also implicates that the essence of religion is the ‘return to unity’ in order to achieve love and goodness. This achievement lies in the relation to one’s self and of one’s response to the other in responsible relationship.  

We thus conclude that, for Levinas, the ethico-religious language, which is not the same as purely ethical language that has descriptive characteristics, stresses the transcendental and passive unity of divine and secular aspects in language concerning the ethically responsible relationship to the Other.

46 IT, pp. 102–103.
47 EI, p. 12.
48 GDT, p. 172.
SECTION THREE

RE-THINKING RESPONSIBILITY (I):
RELIGION IN THE ETHICAL STRUCTURE OF RESPONSIBILITY

The ethical structure of responsibility is neither a principle nor rule to be followed; nor is it an idealized concept to be theoretically analysed. It is, rather, a requirement for people to respond to in his or her subjectivity, which is prior to one’s conscious intentionality. If we have to find an analogical example to further clarify the ethical structure of responsibility, then mentality would be the case. As Levinas states, ‘Mentality is that orientation prior to the choice of knowledge [savoir], which is a modality of that orientation.’49 Mentality plays an important role in man’s action. Whereas mentality, then, is the dynamic process for pointing out an orientation, responsibility is the essential content of this process. Thus, we will further discuss two important issues that relate to the ethico-religious language in the integrated structure of responsibility and find out that how this structure would be settled in one’s mentality and in the mentality of a society. The first issue, in this section, specifically continues to deal with ‘religion’ in the ethical structure of responsibility. The second issue, which we will examine in section four, explores the Chinese perspective on the ethical structure of responsibility as the Other to the Western perspective and vice versa. In this way, the significance of the mentality of the Other in relation to the significance of ethical responsibility to the Other will be brought into sharper relief.

§ 5.3.1 Analysis of Religion in the Ethical Structure of Responsibility

At the beginning, we have to limit the scope of our discussion of religion in this section because the term ‘religion’ would cover a vast arrange of topics. What our discussion will focus on is, how ‘religion’ changes, what is the ethical significance of this change nowadays and whether responsibility can be a possible foundation for people to explore this change, from the perspectives of ‘the Other’ and ‘language’.

49 EN, p. 51.
§ 5.3.2 Re-consideration of Religion

Under the influence of the social environment, people’s religious experience and the interpretation of their religious experience change. As Bonhoeffer arguably proposes, the era of our world is coming of age. It is difficult to ascertain, nevertheless, whether the world is mature enough because it is continuously changing and the standard, if there is any, is still changing. By advocating reason as the primary source for legitimacy and authority the role of human being and our human self-understanding has become, however, more ‘mature’ than the time before the Age of Enlightenment and more independent from the doctrines of religion and theology. People begin to ‘think’ about religion, rather than only believe in ultimate reality; and endeavour to ‘analyse’ their religious experience, rather than only accept it as revelation. Indeed, faith and reason has been consistently considered as two wings of human spirit and this relationship is traditionally regarded as the sources of justification for religious belief. In the age of reason or the age of rationalism, nevertheless, the key point of these two wings tends to reason, rather than to faith, and it no longer just focuses on religious belief itself but the process of justification. The way in which, therefore, that the human being receives and interprets the religious message is quite different from before. In such a context, the so-called maturity of the world means the extensive use of reason in every field of human life, even in the ethical and in the spiritual dimensions. Religions become objects of research in various disciplines, and are explained in a different light and with different specific terms. This also can be regarded as a process of ‘de-mythologization’, as Bultmann suggests, and as a necessary path towards a non-religious interpretation of Christianity, as Bonhoeffer likewise argues. Bonhoeffer, nevertheless, was equal critical of this very approach because, in his estimation, such a project of de-mythologization is not a thorough method for it overemphasizes the existential elements in the analyses, leaving, in its wake, the real danger of missing the essence of Christian faith (as we have analysed in chapter three).

The ‘truth’ of religion and ‘telling the truth’, for Bonhoeffer, therefore, do count and, more importantly, are intimately connected socially.\textsuperscript{50} As Steven Plant

\textsuperscript{50} See, Bonhoeffer’s Ethics, esp., on ‘What is meant by ‘telling the truth’?
points out, referring to the challenging nature of intellectual honesty or ‘telling the truth’ that arises from the tension between religion and living one’s faith,

In ‘What is meant by “Telling the Truth”’? Bonhoeffer returns to how being good is worked out within social relationships — a theme at the heart of his thinking about the warrant for ethical discourse and his mandates theology. Within a social relationship, the position and role one has bears strongly on one’s moral responsibility. [...] He understood that ‘the more complex the actual situations of a man’s life, the more responsible and the more difficult will be his task of “telling the truth”.’

For Bonhoeffer, then, the term ‘responsibility’, in the context of religion, means whether an individual bears the obligation to keep his or her intellectual honesty in relation to this reality in his or her thinking and whether the religion he or she claims to believe in is identified with his or her truthful faith. This problematic identity of my’s religious belief, telling the truth, and institutional religion is directly based on Bonhoeffer’s idea of a non-religious interpretation of Christianity because the main issue facing a religious believer is precisely whether people know the religion correctly and acts out of that content, or put it into practice subsequently, in a modern time that is no longer the same as before. As Ebeling holds, ‘(T)his rightly understood autonomy of the reason is so much a part of the reality of modern man that he is not even asked whether he is willing to make use of it, but only how in face he does make use of it.’

Therefore, the problem does not only lie merely in the content of faith and reason because there is a premise which is prior to these two wings: the responsible attitude on these two subjects.

From this it follows that the solution to the tension between faith and reason or between one’s religious experience and one’s rational interpretation cannot be found only from a focus on each of these two aspects, but explored from a third possibility: the condition that leads to or causes this tension. In Bonhoeffer’s own words, this premise is presupposed in his question ‘What do we really believe? I mean, believe in such a way as to stake our whole lives upon it?’ and ‘What does it mean to “tell the truth?”’ when the answer one gives can cost another their life, just

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32 Ebeling, p. 113.
33 LPP, p. 238.
for being an “other”? Levinas also raises similar questions about the useless suffering as the Holocaust, and that has overturned the thinking of traditional theodicy. In order to answer the questions raised by both Bonhoeffer and Levinas, it is insufficient, therefore, either to trace back to the history of philosophy from a rational interpretation for an answer to this question or to seek the answer from the interpretation of a theodicy that posits an ultimate reality which is the greatest being of all beings, making such suffering meaningful, as there is a bigger picture or a longer chain of causation that the human being is not able to see or able to chase. What Bonhoeffer and Levinas propose, it that the human being rather seek out to find the answer from religious, philosophical and ethical perspective as a moral faith and also act out of this answer, which is an integrity of act and being. This moral faith is described by Levinas in Entre Nous as this,

One has every right to wonder whether the devotion that animates this religion, which was originally inseparable from the love of one’s fellowman and concern for justice, would not find in this ethics itself the place of its semantic birth and thence the significance of its non-in-difference for the infinite difference of the One, instead of owing it to the non-satisfaction of knowing. A radical distinction which would impose itself between religion and relation! 54

From this, relation, ethics and language as the semantic element would be the key words for our initial re-consideration of religion and the challenge of the interpretation of the Word of God in a coming-of-age. With regard to these elements, religion is still the relation between men or beings, however, in a mature age, human being faces the infinite Other and his intellectual honesty towards this Other in a different way.

Therefore, we argue that religion is in a paradoxical situation under the ethical structure of responsibility. Religion itself is the relation between human beings and, in the meantime, religion also stands in relation to a radical exteriority, the Other, or the third party of human relationship. This, then, is the reason why religion has both the transcendent and the immanent nature in human relationship. This duality consistently guarantees and ensures the role of justice in the dialogue between human beings. It is precisely because of this dual feature of religion that

54 EN, p. 136.
man could manifest his own subjectivity and extend both his intention and action in a furthest sense *without violently invading the other*. In sum, there is an infinite Other as the third party to make sure the existence of social justice in the human relationships.

It is of importance, then, to concentrate on the change of religion, and on the meaning of this change, against the background of modernity and post-modernity. Morgan provides an important insight about this change, when he notes,

What Levinas will advocate is a new sense of religion and of God, where the weight falls on the face-to-face and its ethical character. This is one meaning of atheism, an acknowledgment of God that is not a belief in the existence of a transcendent God.\(^{55}\)

We cannot interpret Levinas’s atheism in a literal way, or in a negative sense because it does not mean that God does not exist. This is not the question that Levinas intends to discuss, nor does our thesis. The essence of Levinasian atheism is to remind people to detect the origin of religion and of one’s faith. It means to locate oneself in an acknowledgment of each face-to-face relationship in this world in the context that each individual subject has found his own subjectivity, his own responsibility, and the limit of this responsibility, from which my freedom and the freedom of the other can be limited. For example, the word ‘revelation’ does not play the same role as it did before but it could be elucidated in terms of a concrete ethico-religious content in the ‘here and now’ with the revelation of other in the face to face relationship.

§ 5.3.3 *Religion and Its Ethical Significance*

Levinas writes in *Entre Nous*, ‘(T)ranscendence: this term is used without any theological presupposition. It is, to the contrary, the excession of life that is presupposed by theologies.’\(^{56}\) In other words, it is the excessive aspect of life that makes theology possible, but not the other way around. This reminds us two points. First, the transcendent cannot be identified with religion itself. Second, the transcendent manifests itself in the surplus aspect of life, which is the origin of

\(^{55}\) Morgan, p. 180.

\(^{56}\) EN, p. 88.
religion. From this, we intend to clarify that even though the forms and the emphasis of religions has changed, the transcendent as the essence of religion remains unchanged. Moreover, the surplus aspect of life is closely related to the ethical foundation of life itself, otherwise this ‘surplus’ would be only an idea in vain.

This, then, brings us to the question: what is the role of religion today? Can we say that the ultimate end of religion is equivalent to the supreme nature of morality? If the answer is positive, then can we propose that there is an ‘invisible religion’ that presupposes the moral faith in the multiple backgrounds of human society? The concept of ‘invisible religion’, of course, is borrowed from the concept of the ‘invisible church’. The original meaning of this concept can be traced back to Augustine’s thinking about the true reality of God and reality. Augustine holds that the visible reflects the invisible of the true reality and applies this idea (that is influenced by Platonic idea of the higher Form as cause of the existence of the lower form) into his thoughts of Church. Augustine’s opinion on the ‘invisible church’ was adopted by the Protestant Reformation as to distinguish itself from Catholic Church as the ‘visible’ church. Schleiermacher, for instance, specifically discusses this distinction in his work The Christian Faith, remarking,

There as for us the invisible Church as a fellowship (and in our reading of these matters the conception of fellowship is given greater prominence than ever) is mediated through the visible. [...] In the one case, reaching over and abstracting from the confused multiplicity of particular acts (our neighbour, too, contemplating us in exactly the same way), we each of us enter into a mutually strengthening and supporting union with the innermost impulses of the other, and thus constitute an element of the invisible Church; in the other, we enter into a fellowship of these very particular acts and forms of self-expression, so as uniformly to occupy a common area with those who have closest affinity with ourselves and to repel what is alien — and thus constitute an element of the visible Church.

Roger Haight explains Schleiermacher's point of view, ‘The invisible church is the divine dimension of the church, the effects of grace or of the work of God as Spirit within the empirical organization. [...] In fact, the dimensions of the visible and invisible church are also at work in a single individual person.’

We can distinguish two features of the ‘invisible church’. First, the invisible church stresses the innermost impulse of each subject in the fellowship of the divine dimension of transcendence. Second, each single individual person can be the constituent part of the invisible church. Thus, the invisible church indicates a duality between private manifestation and public communication. These two aspects require both the foundation of morality and the transcendence of this foundation at the same time. When a person questions the meaning of ultimate reality, he stands in front of this reality as a moral man, but, in the meantime, he also seeks for an answer that is beyond morality. At this moment, he is also a religious man. The connection between the moral man and the religious man, however, is in a tension. This tension is precisely what is entailed in and through ethical responsibility. We may call it as ‘invisible religion’. Buber describes this situation in *I and Thou*, and its historical implications, noting,

> The man is not freed from responsibility; he has exchanged the torment of the finite, pursuit of effects, for the motive power of the infinite, he has got the mighty responsibility of love for the whole untraceable world-event, for the profound belonging to the world before the Face of God.

From this, the religious, or, more precisely, the spiritual meaning in the private manifestation is what is embedded in the public communication of ethical relation. We cannot carry out the relationship of invisible religion and ethics in detail in our thesis, but the emphasis of the relationship between the invisible religion and ethics makes it clear that morality cannot be identified with religion, while it also cannot be separated from the transcendental divine. We need to pay attention that a progressive relation lies in this emphasis. In other words, we need to distinguish three things: the ‘morality’ that is referred to in a normal or general sense of people.

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following the moral regulations or rules in their daily life; the ‘religion’ that is referred to, in Bonhoeffer’s sense, that has been changed nowadays; and the transcendental divine that is referred to the ultimate Goodness that is prior to the freedom of our choices. As Levinas points out and stresses,

This antecedence of responsibility to freedom would satisfy the Goodness of the Good: the necessity that the Good choose me first before I can be in a position to choose, that is, welcome its choice. That is my pre-originary susceptiveness.⁶²

From this, it does not mean that the Good replaces God, which would lead to the ‘death of God’. On the contrary, it is this Goodness of Good that maintains or purifies the divine foundation of human’s relation to God.

The ethical significance of the invisible religion lies in that the religious transcendence is not only to be found in the doctrines but also in fellowship in a responsible community. In other words, it is the manifestation of the responsible relationship between human being that makes the ultimate reality or God visible. This is not a proof of the existence of God, but a pursuit of the ‘trace’ of God in man. Thus, it is no longer the problem whether ‘God is dead’ or not, but the question about ‘the life of God’ in man’s response when ‘God who comes to mind’.⁶³ It also needs to pay attention to the fact that to find out the ethical significance in religion is not to reduce religion into ethics or replace religion with ethics but to clarify the moral foundation of religion as the original consideration about faith and the divine element of moral relationship as the other-oriented consideration about man’s subjectivity itself.

§ 5.3.4 Responsibility and Religions

Religiosity and the human morality of goodness, then, still retain after the so-called ‘end’ of theodicy. The problem, therefore, is not about the justification of the doctrine of theodicy itself anymore, but about the meaning of theodicy and its

⁶² OB, p. 122.
manifestation in social relationship. An answer to this question would be found in the discussion on the relationship between responsibility and religions.

Levinas explicitly states this relationship in his *Difficult Freedom*.

A truth is universal when it applies to every reasonable being. A religion is universal when it is open to all. In this sense, the Judaism that links the Divine to the moral has always aspired to be universal. But the revelation of morality, which discovers a human society, also discovers the place of election, which, in this universal society, returns to the person who receives this revelation. This election is made up not of privileges but of responsibility.  

Clearly, Levinas argues the importance of the duality of particularity and universalism from Judaism and stresses that the election itself comprises the taking up of responsibility. We will not expand our discussion about the issue of election of Judaism and its relation to responsibility. The reason why we quote this passage is that when a person chooses to believe in a religion or in a specific creed, or in a word, when this person is in the faith, he is already in a process of selection. This is a process that includes the action of selection and being selected. The action of selection refers to the responsibility from one’s subjectivity that may be in accordance with what he believes in, while the action of being selected refers to the transcendental Otherness of the other that is alien to what the subjectivity is as it is.

Consequently, responsibility is prior to the knowledge of what the people believe in and the actions of faith because it conditions the coming-into-being of one’s subjectivity and of one’s action of choosing which is based on one’s subjectivity. In other words, ‘moral subjectivity as responsibility occurs as a reconditioning of “for-itself” selfhood (immanence) into a for-the-other moral self responsibility.’  

Responsibility, therefore, actually means to be a responsible subjectivity, rather than do responsible things in specific situations according to moral rules or regulations. Thus, to be a responsible subjectivity means, in fact, to believe in the

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64 DF, p. 21.
65 Burggraeve, p. 61.
order of moral faith as the invisible religion. This invisible religion, as a fundamental humanity, does not belong to any religious belief but is the condition of them. The essential element of exploring the essence of religion and relationship between religions has to be non-religious in this sense because it is the prior condition for all religions, which is also what Levinas means by an ethical commitment to ‘atheism’. This condition is the ethical responsibility for one another. To stress this condition is to reveal the fact that each religion in this world has their own reasons to be itself and to regard the others as alien. Thus it follows that the condition of responsibility reveals at the same time the limits of each religion and the relationships between these religions. Furthermore, this condition is also entailed the dialogue between these religions in order to understand each other.

SECTION FOUR
RE-THINKING RESPONSIBILITY (II): WESTERN AND CHINESE PERSPECTIVES ON RELIGION, ETHICS AND RESPONSIBILITY

In the previous section we found that plurality is an essential dimension of not only dialogue, ethics, and responsibility but of religions too. A discussion on the other is inseparable from a study on religion and between religions as well as the development of the concept of responsibility. In this concluding section of our study, therefore, we will analyze the role of religion in the ethical structure of responsibility, paying particular attention to this structure from a Chinese perspective in order to find out the similarities and the differences about the way in which responsibility is understood and addressed in Chinese and Western philosophy.

§ 5.4.1 The Importance of an Analysis of the Ethical Structure of Responsibility from Western and Chinese Perspectives

Chinese philosophy is usually regarded as the ‘Other’ to Western Philosophy. From this point of view, each of their respective reflections on and considerations of ‘the Other’ are often believed to be poles apart. Whether this is a true belief, or not, depends on an examination of both Chinese and Western reflections on ‘the Other’ and their respective understandings of responsibility and ‘the Other’.
It is, of course, true to note that, in recent times there has emerged a tendency towards globalization, wherein various cultures have encountered with each other quite frequently and in many different areas. This necessitates a quest to find out the spirit that is embedded in these cultures. There is, however, a possible danger that lies behind the phenomenon of globalization. This problem is that when people who come from different cultural backgrounds want to communicate and understand each other, they tend to establish a platform that is based on agreed similarities in their different backgrounds. When people become used to these similarities, however, the differences behind their background are neglected, while they still exist. When this globalized tendency progresses, these differences may bring in misunderstandings, even obstacles in communication. Thus, it would be significant to examine the issue of responsibility under this context to detect how to balance the ‘similarities’ and ‘difference’ between different cultures. Furthermore, this encounter of West and East also will remind us to be aware of the original boundaries as well as the approaches that we have applied to research these boundaries. Compared to the emphasis of ontology and the question of ‘what the good is’ in Western thoughts, Chinese thoughts stress ethics and the question of ‘how to become good’. Thus a focus on what Chinese philosophy has to say on responsibility would be a good example to begin with.

At the beginning of this section, we need to define the scope of our discussion on Chinese philosophy. Generally speaking, there are three main schools in traditional Chinese thought: Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism with other minor schools, like Legalism, Mohism and Logicians. We will discuss a branch of Confucianism in this section: Neo-Confucianism (宋明理學, Song Ming Li Xue), which was developed mainly from Mencian philosophy during the Song Dynasty and Ming Dynasty. A distinct feature of Neo-Confucianism is that it attempts to synthesize the other two ways of Chinese thinking, Taoism and Buddhism, into a metaphysical framework. Another feature of Neo-Confucianism is that it mainly concerns the importance of self-cultivation in the society and the harmonious

relationship with heaven. For Neo-Confucianism, the self-cultivation is the basis for the understanding and communication with the Other, on the one hand, and it also will establish and enlarge the Other, on the other hand.

Before we move on to the detailed discussion, it would be helpful to have a brief review of the concept of self-cultivation in Chinese thought as an important background. There is a long history on the moral self-cultivation in Confucian tradition. Confucius (孔子, 551–479 BCE, Kong zi) is usually regarded as the first to stress and teach ethical issues to his disciples in the form of dialogue. Mencius (孟子, 403–221 BCE, Meng zi) systematically developed Confucius’s ethical thought and emphasize the role of human nature and self-cultivation. Zhu xi (朱熹, 1130–1200) and Wang yangming (王陽明, 1472–1529) are two prominent representative figures of Confucian moral tradition in Song Dynasty and Ming Dynasty. Zhu xi was the leading figure of the rational school of Neo-Confucianism in China while Wang yangming, after Zhu xi, is the most important Neo-Confucian who is opposed to Zhu xi’s rationalist dualism. In Qing Dynasty, Neo-Confucianism has been critically developed by Yan yuan (颜元, 1635–1704) and Dai zhen (戴震, 1724–1777). Both of them stress the practical application of moral principles, rather than the spiritual cultivation of the self, and they also emphasize the rational investigation of the external world, rather than the introspective self-examination of human desire.

For the remainder of this section, therefore, we will, firstly, analyse the role of sensitivity as a beginning of self-cultivation and will investigate how the innate knowledge is developed into moral language; secondly, we will specifically discuss the role of self in Neo-Confucianism and its relation to the issue of the other; lastly, we will explain the concept Ren as co-humanity and its relation to responsibility.

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As Tu Wei-ming analyzes: ‘Only Confucianism among the Three Teachings unequivocally asserts that society is both necessary and intrinsically valuable for self-realization. Taoism and Ch’ an do not seem to have attached much importance to human relations.’ See, Tu Wei-ming, Confucian Thought, Selfhood as Creative Transformation (Albany: State University of New York Press, 8th ed., 1997), p. 26.
Our discussion will concentrate on the lineage of Confucius, Mencius and Wang Yangming. Though Confucius was the first to stress the moral self-cultivation in social life, he did not provide specific ideas on human nature. Correspondingly, Mencius firstly and systematically presented his ideas about human nature. His fundamental tenet is that human nature is good and that people will keep and develop this goodness or kindness when they carry out the self-cultivation based on the ‘virtue’ (德, De). The response between people is an important component in the process of self-cultivation. This response is not only in the linguistic form but also in action. There is a well-known case or moral thought experiment that is used by Mencius: the reaction of a person who suddenly sees a child about to fall into a well. By means of analyzing the reaction of the person in this sudden case, Mencius intends to find out the most fundamental element in humanity in general and the origin of humanity from human nature in particular. For Mencius, it is the unbearable pity for the suffering of the other that shows the innate compassionate impulse, which is the beginning of humanity, as the moral ‘seed’ or ‘sprout’. These seeds or sprouts, however, need to be cultivated in order to grow into a mature and stable situation. Based on this background, Mencius further developed four essential virtues corresponding to four seeds. The feeling of commiseration corresponds to the seed of humanity; the awareness of shame and dislike is the seed of righteousness; the sentiment of respect and reverence corresponds to the seed of propriety; and the sense of right and wrong corresponds to the seed of wisdom. From this it follows that Mencius’s argument of human nature is founded on a natural and developmental view of human mentality because the moral seeds are to be developed both from the inner mental ability and from the external environment with his use of analogical language.

Wang Yangming is both an inheritor and a defender of Confucianism, especially from the line of Mencian moral philosophy. Living at the time that Daoism and Buddhism had been flourishing, Wang integrally synthesizes the distinctive theory of human nature from these two schools with Mencius’s thinking of self-cultivation in order to develop a comprehensive perspective on the unity of

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knowledge and action. In other words, Wang intends to go beyond the questions of ‘what human nature is’, ‘what the good is’, and ‘how human nature is good’; rather, he, and other Neo-Confucians at that time, attempts to provide a new horizon for reflection on the cultivation of one’s mind and its relation to the external things. If we use the words of Western philosophical context, Wang intends to illustrate how to develop the moral subjectivity, rather than to propose a systematic theory of morality. In the last section of this chapter, we will explore Confucian moral theory that is based on the lineage of Confucius, Mencius and Wang as a whole, and find out the corresponding elements of language, the self and the Other, and the concept of Ren in the ethical structure of responsibility as we proposed in previous section.

§ 5.4.2 From Innate Knowledge to Moral Language

By comparison to Confucius and Mencius the emphasis on the unity of knowledge and action is a distinctive feature of Wang’s thinking because he detects the lack of moral foundation on human nature in Confucius’s moral teaching and the lack of moral practice in Mencius’ introspective moral self-examination. Wang, in other words, proposes to find out the balance between moral knowledge and action. This is a topic that have been discussed in both Western and Chinese intellectual tradition. Again, a distinguishing feature of Wang’s approach to other theories is his emphasis on the role of basic human desires and affections, rather than the rational intellect aspect in one’s moral decision.

The issue that Wang addresses, therefore, is this. Even though the questions of ‘what the good is’ and ‘what human nature is’ have been discussed for centuries, our knowledge about these questions cannot guarantee that we always do the right things. There are at least two opinions on this issue. The first opinion is that people do not have sufficient rational knowledge about these questions which leads to the failure of moral action. The second opinion is that, even though we have acknowledged the knowledge of morality, other aspects of our ‘selves’, other than such a rational aspect, interfere with this knowledge when we make moral decisions. Wang holds the second opinion and attempts to take both rational and emotional aspects of the ‘self’ into account. Based on this dual but integral consideration of self, Wang distinguishes knowledge into the ‘innate knowledge’ and ‘ordinary
knowledge’. As Philip J. Ivanhoe interprets, the former refers to the ‘knowledge of something’ while the latter refers to the ‘knowledge about something’. The knowledge of something cannot function properly without the unity with action in a self. The knowledge about something, however, can be separated from the action of the self as this knowledge is external for the self as an projected object. In other words, the first opinion about the insufficiency of knowledge in man’s moral action refers to ‘knowledge about something’. For Wang, this is not a ‘real knowledge’ in moral life. ‘Knowledge of something’ indicates the process of internalizing the virtue into the moral self-cultivation. Thus, when the subject encounters a sudden event and needs to respond to this event, this subject uses his innate knowledge rather than the ordinary knowledge in this situation. The response itself is an action that complete the ethical signification of moral knowledge. And this response is based on the sincerity of one’s innate moral mind.

For the perspective of Neo-Confucianism, the sincerity of one’s innate moral mind is derived from human sensitivity, which refers to the ability of feeling, experiencing, sympathizing one’s selfhood and its influence on the moral will. The Chinese concept Ch’i (氣) (as the vital force, or vital power) refers to this ability. Ch’i is a concept that is difficult to be explained analytically because of its immanent integrity of spirit and matter. As one commentator, however, puts it, ‘[Ch’i] provide[s] […] a metaphorical mode of knowing, and epistemological attempt to address the multidimensional nature of reality by comparison, allusion, and suggestion.’ Ch’i, then, is a comprehensive concept of innate knowledge that synthesizes both the intellect and the sensitivity of one’s mind in one’s own moral self-cultivation. Ch’i also manifests one’s subjectivity in the process of ‘perception...

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69 Philip J. Ivanhoe uses ‘real knowledge’ to refer to ‘personal experience and brings together both cognitive and affective types of knowing.’ See, Ivanhoe, Confucian Moral Self Cultivation, p.62. However, based on the context of Wang’s theory, which is developed from his articulation of mind and its relation to external things and the nature, I prefer to use the concept ‘innate knowledge’ that Chen Lai uses in the table of contents in his book You Wu Zhi Jing, 《有無之境》, (Peking: Peking University Press, 2007).

70 Ivanhoe, Confucian Moral Self Cultivation, p. 62.


72 We will not discuss this concept in detail in this section while Ch’i is an important concept to understand the tradition of Chinese intellect and its difference with Western dichotomy of spirit and matter. More related discussion can be found in Tu, pp. 37–47.

73 Tu, p. 37.
and response’ (感應, Gan Ying), which at the same time shows sincerity as well. In fact, perception and response happen at the same time but they do not happen in two sequent stages. It is precisely this spontaneity that defines the role of sensitivity and sincerity in one’s will.

We can use Mencius’s example to explain further this point. A person sees that a child is about to fall into a deep well. Mencius stresses that the unbearable pity for the suffering of this child is the ‘seed’ or ‘sprout’ of humanity, which proves that human nature is primarily good. This formulation, nevertheless, cannot thoroughly explain the difference of the reactions. When this person faces this event, the foremost reaction shows the reflection of this person’s most genuine moral-self. The period of time is too short for a person to consider and weigh up this situation, according to one’s evaluation from his past experience and memory. Thus, the different reactions from different people directly show the different moral subjectivity and one’s sensitivity to the suffering of the Other. In other words, from these reactions we can detect the process of inner transformation of one’s Ch’i: the rational measure and sensory feeling do not function separately but have been internalized into the moral subjectivity. Moral self-cultivation, therefore, is not merely about ‘what the good is’ and ‘what human nature is’ but about ‘who this moral subjectivity is’ and ‘how this moral subjectivity responds to the suffering of the Other sincerely’.

The stress on the manifestation of one’s innate knowledge, nonetheless, does not indicate that the main argument of Neo-Confucianism is subjectivistic. As we have discussed above in Mencius’s example, when the person faces this event, he is not only a bystander but also a witness who is part of this event. The emphasis of the sensitivity in the moral subjectivity in Neo-Confucianism, especially in Wang’s thinking, demonstrates the concern of sincerity as ‘telling the truth’. The reason lies in two aspects. First, sensitivity plays an important role in being sensitive to the gap

74 感’ can be translated as feeling, affection, and perception, etc. According to the background of Neo-Confucianism, the process of ‘感應’ is not an instinctive reaction but an intuitive understanding and insight along with the awareness of something through the sense. Thus, we choose ‘perception’ as the translation of ‘感’ in this context.
between one’s perception of inner morality and social norms in one’s subjectivity; namely, it refers to the problem of identity between ‘the private I’ and ‘the public I’. The task of moral self-cultivation for Neo-Confucianism is to bridge the distance between these two Is, which, in turn, is the manifestation of sincerity. Second, when the I face another person, sensitivity also plays crucial role in being sensitive to the gap between ‘my subjectivity’ and ‘the other’s subjectivity’. Another task of moral self-cultivation, then, is to learn how to respond to the other’s experience and to find out the proper location of myself in the relation to this other and in the society as well.

Given this backdrop, language, especially in the form of dialogue, shows how the I locates one’s self in the society and participates in it. We can find many examples in the conversation between Confucius and his disciples that illustrate this in the Analects. It looks like that the analects of Confucius is similar to the dialogues of Plato. Indeed, both Confucius and Plato concern themselves with similar ethical and political issues: Confucius stresses Ren as humanness or humanity, while Plato emphasizes ‘justice’ in his Republic, which are both presented in the form of dialogues. The intention and the methodology that lie behind their dialogues, however, are dissimilar. Briefly speaking, Plato presents his ideas through the characters in his dialogues based on his theory of Forms. The plots of the dialogues are constructed, both deliberately and dialectically, in order to show the inner dilemmas of one interlocutor’s words and prove the validity of the other interlocutor’s ideas in the dialogue. Confucius also presents his ethical thoughts in dialogues between Master and disciples based on his instructive teaching. The main form of the dialogues, nevertheless, is to raise questions by the disciples, which would be answered or responded to, step by step, by Confucius. This is an intersubjective relationship because Confucius answers or responds to his specific disciples’ concrete questions in the dialogues. This is an exchangeable and communal process in which both can clarify and deepen the answer of a particular question, and can provide different answers for the same question, if it is raised by

75 ‘慎獨’ (shen du), which is usually translated as ‘vigilant solitude or be prudent when alone’. This is an important concept, not only for Neo-Confucianism but for the whole tradition of Confucianism. There are various interpretations of this concept. In the context of our discussion, we intend to stress ‘the private I’ as the original mental state of one’s subjectivity and ‘the public I’ as the self-evaluated I that is shown in a public surrounding.
different disciples. From this, we can find out that, even though Ren is the key concept of Confucius, there are various forms or manifestation of Ren in various situations. Instead of conceptually stressing the idea of Ren in dialogues, by pointing out the improper arguments of his disciples, Confucius prefers to provide a response according to the interlocutors’ personhood and to help him to improve his ability of self-realization of Ren. Compared to Plato, then, generally speaking, Confucius’ concern is with how the idea of Ren can be both internalized in a person through this person’s self-cultivation and externalized in human social relationship via dialogues, rather than to abstract the Form or Idea from various phenomenon and experience in different dialogues. In sum, Confucius’s approach accentuates the mutual response in the communal form of teaching and learning between the minds of two subjectivities.

In this section, we have noted the meaning of innate knowledge and its distinction with ordinary knowledge; and, secondly, pointed out the importance of sensitivity and its relation to sincerity; and, thirdly, illustrated the way in which Confucius uses moral language in his analects by comparing this with the dialogic method of Plato. From this, we can see that self-cultivation, rather than conceptual pursuit of moral idea plays the essential role in Confucian tradition. In next section, therefore, we will discuss further the role of self in moral cultivation by examining the relationship between ‘to be oneself’ and ‘having no self’.

§ 5.4.3 From ‘To be Oneself’ and ‘Having no Self’

As Tu Weiming notes, there are two distinctive approaches to or features of moral self-realization emphasized in East Asian thought.\(^\text{76}\) Firstly, each human being can attain self-transformation, in the form of sageliness in Confucianism, or Buddhahood in Buddhism, and True person in Taoism, based on one’s inherent human nature and one’s own self effort. Secondly, this process of self-cultivation is ceaseless. Tu also points out that the dimension of transcendent reality would be problematic for East Asian thought, and this finds its roots in the dichotomies that lie behind the Western and Chinese tradition of intellect. And this tradition will directly determine the difference of perspective and methodology of Western and Chinese thinking on

\(^{76}\) See detailed discussion from Tu, p. 8.
the examination of the self and its relation to the Other. Compared to the dichotomies of body and mind, sacred and profane, creator and creature in Western tradition, Chinese tradition takes much count of the dichotomies of inner and outer, substance and function, and Heaven and man.\textsuperscript{77}

Thus in Chinese thought, the problem of self does not merely focus on the ‘self’, but the ‘self’ is considered at the beginning as a site to explore the transcendent reality, especially from the self-feeling and self-knowledge. In other words, the problem of self in Chinese tradition is an ethico-religious problem, rather than an ontological and epistemological problem. Similar to, though not completely the same as Bonhoeffer’s and Levinas’s ethical ideas, the core of Chinese thinking, including the three main schools, does not focus on the ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions, but on the ‘who’ question. The question of ‘who’ raised by Confucians, then, is ‘Who is the Confucian Self?’

In order to answer this question, it requires man to eliminate the duality of rational and emotional aspects in one’s self and manifest the genuine nature of the self by self-transcendence in human relationship. In the tradition of Confucianism, Confucius advocates self-overcoming (克己, ke ji) and Mencius stresses the control of ‘small self’ (小體, xiao ti) through cultivation of the ‘Great self’ (大體, da ti).

Literally interpreted, the small self refers to the physical, private and independent self, while the great self refers to the social, relational and interdependent self. There is further significance, however, about this pair of concepts. As The Doctrine of the Mean (中庸, zhong yong) records,

It is only he who is possessed of the most complete authenticity\textsuperscript{78} that can exist under Heaven, who can give its full development to his nature. Able to give its full development to his own nature, he can do the same to the nature of others. Able to give its full development to the nature of others, he can give their full development to the natures of animals and things. Able to give their full development to the natures of creatures and things, he can assist the transforming and nourishing powers of Heaven and Earth.\textsuperscript{79}

\textsuperscript{77} The classification of the dichotomies from Western and Chinese perspectives are adopted from Tu Weiming’s Confucius Thought, pp.8–9.

\textsuperscript{78} In Chinese, it is 誠, which also can be translated as sincerity.

\textsuperscript{79} Confucius, The Doctrine of the Mean (Kila, Mont.: Kessinger, 2004), p.12.
The self is the centre, in Confucian tradition, like the centre of a radial circle. This centre, however, would be transformed in relation to the encounter with others in the course of self-examination, self-cultivation and self-transcendence. Thus, in this context, the ‘small self’ is the first step to be oneself, but in order to transform into the ‘great self’, the self must experience the second step of ‘having no self’, which means to abdicate the centre for the other.

‘Having no self’ is also a concept that used by Taoism and Buddhism to illustrate the emptiness of the self and of this world, but it is one that stresses the problem of self-possession, rather than professing a nihilistic teaching. Confucius’ self-overcoming indicates the elimination of selfishness and of one’s persistence on the self. Wang Yangming’s argument of ‘having no self’ also covers these two aspects, but he further emphasizes the selflessness and detachment in human relationship, which is quite close to Levinas’s discussion on ‘separation’ as we have discussed in chapter four. As we have argued in that chapter, to separate with the Other is the first step to know the genuine boundary between the self and the Other. In other words, only after one has already found his self-identity from this separation, known his self-determined way and been honest with himself, can he move on, as Wang proposes, to the stage of ‘having no self’.

At this stage, an ethico-religious question raised by Tu which is important for the problem of the self: ‘What kind of person can really experience a sense of inner freedom and thus claim to be autonomous?’ Freedom, indeed, is difficult, as Levinas discussed in his book *Difficult Freedom*. The difficulties emerge from the dynamic and changing boundaries of the dichotomies with regard to various situations when facing concrete subjects. This is why the Confucian tradition has to seek the substantial foundation of the self in order to apprehend the other in the first step. Neo-Confucianism, like Taoism and Buddhism, nevertheless, also lays much stress on the role of ‘no-self’. Wang holds that the ‘no-self’ can be regarded as the reality of the non-self-possessing as well as the self-cultivation of the diminishing. The purpose of seeking the ‘having no self’ is, however, to achieve the unconstrained mind from diminishing the self-centredness. Thus far, the

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80 Tu, p. 78.
unconstrained mind with the attitude of ‘no-self’ has the inner freedom to welcome the Other and, in the meantime, to be true to oneself.

See within this light, the other cannot be a ‘wholly other’ because even though in the first step the other is separated from my self and, then, in the second step the self welcomes the other, only when this other participates in my selfhood does this other make sense for the relationship between the self and the other. This participation of the other in my selfhood is the third step: forming one body with the other. Now, this ‘one body’ should not be equated to the Being (of selves) in Heidegger’s thinking because this ‘one body’ maintains the independency of the self and the other while, at the same time, guarantees the interdependency of the self and the other in the first and the second steps respectively. This third step is to stress the in-depth relationship to oneself and the other. In the book *Chuang Tzu* (莊子, *Zhuang zi*), the second chapter ‘The Adjust of Controversies’\(^{81}\), Chuang Tzu writes, ‘Heaven, Earth, and I were produced together, and all things and I are one.’\(^{82}\) This One, nonetheless, is based on Chuang Tzu’s relativistic thinking which neglects the differentiation inherent in things. Wang’s ‘forming one body with the other’ stresses the responsibility and the sense of a calling or of a mission of the self for the other. This one body is also a ‘great self’ in a broader and deeper sense, which maintains the independency of each subjectivity in this body. It seems that this idea also lays too much stress on the role of self but neglects the transcendent reality. We could, however, interpret it from Bonhoeffer’s inquiry of non-religious interpretation of Christianity. In the coming-of-age or in the societies of non-Christian background, the forms of divinity has been changed. In the traditional sense, the historical Jesus was regarded as the incarnated God and moralized as a witness of human’s words and action in order to save those who believed in him. In Confucian sense, the ‘great self’ has both the immanent and transcendent characteristics to make each subject responsible to one’s self and to the other.

As paradoxical as it may sound, there is a profound affinity in the relationship between ‘to be oneself’ and ‘having no self’, as well as a developmental relationship

\(^{81}\)The title of this chapter is also translated as ‘On the Equality of Things and Theories’, or ‘On Levelling All Things’.

\(^{82}\)The Adjust of Controversies, paragraph 9.
between the ‘small self’ and ‘great self’ in different stages. By clarifying the role of self in this way, we could genuinely comprehend myself and the other and establish ‘one body with the other’. From this, we can apply this Confucian idea, especially in Neo-Confucian thought, to briefly explain the problem of ‘the unbearable pity for the suffering of the other’ at the end of this section. For Wang, this ‘one body’ does not only include the self and the other people, but also cover everything in this universe. Even a grass or a stone is one part of the ‘great body’. If I hurt my little finger, I will feel painful. If we take the grass as a part of the ‘great body’ in the universe, then the damage of the glassland will directly or indirectly affect everyone’s life. In other words, to destroy the glassland is, at the same time, to hurt myself. The ‘suffering’ of the glassland also would be my ‘suffering’ because we are in a ‘great body’. Thus, to protect the glassland, or to be responsible for it is equal to being responsible for ourselves.

This might remind many of Dostoevsky’s words that everyone of us is responsible for everyone else in every way, and the I most of all. In his work, he also asks himself,

how can I possibly be responsible for all? Everyone would laugh in my face. Can I, for instance, be responsible for you?’ [The answer in this novel is:] ‘You may well not know it, […] since the whole world has long been going on a different line, since we consider the veriest lies as truth and demand the same lies from others. Here I have for once in my life acted sincerely and, well, you all look upon me as a madman. Though you are friendly to me, yet, you see, you all laugh at me.

Similar to Dostoevsky, Wang holds that ‘to be responsible for all’ is the essence of Ren. Therefore, in next section, we will examine in detail the relationship between Ren and Responsibility.

§ 5.4.4. From Ren to Responsibility

There are various English translations for the concept of Ren: benevolent love (H.H. Dubs); love (Derk Bodde); humanness or humanity (W.T. Chan); human-heartedness

(E. R. Hughes); Goodness (Arthur Waley); Virtue (H.G. Creel) and co-humanity, and several more. We could find out its original meaning from the Chinese character Ren (仁). This character is comprised of two characters, the left signifying humanity (人, ren), and the right, two (二, er). We, therefore, choose ‘co-humanity’ as the English translation in our thesis because it stresses the human relatedness while in fact the meaning of Ren is multifaceted in Confucius’ Analects and in other Confucian thinkers’ works.

In Analects chapter 12 (顏淵, Yan Yuan) paragraph 22, Fan chi asked about Ren. The Master said, ‘It is to love all men.’ While, in chapter 4 (里仁, Li Ren) paragraph 3, The Master said, ‘It is only the man of Ren, who can love, or hate, the others.’ It seems these two dialogues indicate different opinions on Ren. The former points out that love is the essence of Ren, while latter implies that only man of Ren has discriminability in his assessment of the others. We cannot go into detail on this topic in this section, but it is of importance to note that this tension between love and discrimination reveals the primary concern on justice in Confucian tradition. Love is the fundamental feature of Ren, while the ‘love with distinction’ also shows that Confucius critically concerns the moral qualities in different levels of self-cultivation of people.

This concern is also reflected in the cultivation of the distinctive relationship with the other. ‘Five Cardinal Relationship’ is the ethical structure of ancient Chinese society, and which is still important today. It refers to the social hierarchy of ruler and ruled, parents and children, husband and wife, sibling relationship and friendship. This social hierarchy is the model of moral hierarchy in Chinese society. The Great Learning (大學, Da Xue) also provides a practical eight entry steps in order to fulfill this ethical structure, especially the last four steps: from the cultivation of oneself to the peace of the world. Furthermore, from these entry

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84 Eight entry steps: 1) Investigation of things (格物); 2) Extention utmost of one’s knowledge (致知); 3) Sincerity in one’s thought (誠意); 4) Rectification of one’s heart (正心); 5) Cultivation of a person
steps, we can find out a feature of Chinese ethical wisdom that the word and deed are to be manifested at the same time: the ultimate self-transformation of moral knowledge cannot do without carrying out the communal action of moral thinking.

The basic purpose of the unity of knowledge and action, therefore, is to fully realize the primordial awareness in one’s mind. This primordial awareness, in Chinese, is Liang Zhi (良知), which is the beginning of innate knowledge for Wang Yangming. As Tu concludes, the process from the primordial awareness to innate knowledge is the unification of consciousness and conscience. Thus,

To Yangming, consciousness as cognition and conscience as affection are not two separable functions of the mind. Rather, they are integral aspects of a dynamic process whereby man becomes aware of himself as a moral being.  

The extension of this innate knowledge to the other is an altruistic concern for others. This concern, nevertheless, is not an altruism because, as we have argued, the centre still lies in the subjectivity of the self. This altruistic concern is corresponding to the concept of ‘no-self’, which abdicates one’s freedom to undertake the responsibility for the Other. In order to illustrate this point, we use Tu’s translation of Analects about Ren:

a man of humanity [Ren], wishing to establish his own character, also establishes the character of others, and wishing to fully manifest himself, also helps others to fully manifest themselves. The ability to take what is near at hand as an example may be called the method of realizing Ren’.  

The thinking of Ren has been developed into a more deliberated form in Neo-Confucianism. The ethico-religious interpretation of Ren in Neo-Confucianism stresses the relationship between subjectivity and sensitivity, which is distinct in Wang Yangming’s concept ‘innate knowledge’. As Tu has pointed out, in order to deepen one’s subjectivity, it is necessary both to broaden and to deepen one’s

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85 Tu, p. 31.
86 Confucius’s Analects, chapter 6, Yong Ye, paragraph 30. Quote from Tu, p. 88.
sensitivity. The emphasis of the sensitivity, then, can be understood as the preparation of the welcome to the Other, as an example. This, indeed, is paradoxical because in order to welcome the other, one has to transform one’s self-centre; in order to attain the level of no-self, one has to establish and master the self first. This process is an unceasing approach to the sincerity of oneself and responsibility for the other, which is also a self-transformation from the finite to the infinite.

Thus, we could aptly use Levinas’s corresponding words as the conclusion for this section from his work Otherwise Than Being:

That the way the Infinite passes the finite and passes itself has an ethical meaning is not something that results from a project to construct the ‘transcendental foundation’ of ethical experience. The ethical is the field outlined by the paradox of an Infinite in relationship with the finite without being belied in this relationship.88

As Levinas also writes in his work God, Death and Time, ‘the awakened subjectivity were equivalent to the infinite in the finite.’89

There are three distinct but related issues that we have addressed in this chapter. The first, and most important issue, is the way of awakening the subjectivity of a human being in relation to the Other. The awakening is a complicated process, about which we have argued that the role of the other and language are two indispensable elements that help to realize this process in the ethical structure of responsibility. Religion, etymologically, is the obligation and bond that is inherent in the primordial form of human relationship. The transcendent dimension of religion, therefore, cannot be realized without the manifestation of the ethical significance between subjectivities. It is the response that is expressed in the form of language, without merely depending on one’s experience and memory, that awakes the subjectivity of the self to welcome the subjectivity of the other.

The second most important issue that we addressed is the relationship between ethics, what is meant by ‘non-(religious)’ religion and the notion of ‘in-

87 Tu, p. 137.
88 OB, p. 148.
89 GDT, p. 215.
(finity). As Manning summarizes, ‘(T)he identification of revelation with ethical command has tremendous consequences for Levinas’s interpretation of what religious language means and how it should be conceived of and employed.’ The transformation from the Biblical words to the ethical command provides us, as we have argued, with a possible answer to Bonhoeffer’s inquiry of non-religious interpretation of Christianity. There is, however, a deeper link between the prefixes of ‘non-’ and ‘in-’ in the concepts of ‘non-religious’ religion and ‘in-finity’. This connection indicates the religio-ethical turn both in the ontological and in the epistemological sense. From an ontological point of view, the ‘non-’ shows that the forms of the manifestation of the divine are no longer in the traditional forms for religion, while the ‘in-’ shows that the realization of the divine is now moving in the infinite claim of the Other in ethical demands.

The third issue is the relationship between the infinite and the finite, which We examined by way of a comparison of the ethical structure of responsibility between Western perspective and Chinese perspective, especially on the self-cultivation from Neo-Confucianism. This issue is the continued and expanded discussion of the second one, noting the differentiation in the ‘great body’ which maintains the independency of the self and also opens the possibility for the interdependency of the self and the other which is based on the transformation between the self and the no-self. In some sense, this extension of the self-centre looks like the reverse of Levinas’s other-orientation, however, both of these two perspectives stress the role of responsibility in human-relatedness. The difference, therefore, lies in that Neo-Confucian opinion holds that the self-cultivation of the subjectivity is prior because it is the foundation of the self to welcome the other, while the Levinasian opinion holds that the Other is the genuine awakening element for the self-realization of my subjectivity. The starting points of these two perspectives are not the same, but both of these two arguments lead to the same end: the awakening of the primordial awareness of subjectivity as responsibility before the other, for the other and towards the other. In this regard, different understandings of what constitutes the subjectivity of the subject and the alterity of the other enhance, rather than diminish the understanding of responsibility and the Other in Western and Chinese thought.

90 Manning, p.160.
CONCLUSION

What is responsibility? This is the central question that both Bonhoeffer and Levinas raised and addressed in their thought and which we too attempted to raise and respond to in this study. In other words, this critical question is not a question that can be answered by providing a definition, or an explanation with illustrated examples, or even through theoretical analyses of moral norms and laws precisely because it is an unceasing question or demand, as both Bonhoeffer and Levinas argue, that reminds us or alerts us to every word we say, every act we do, every decision we make, even every idea we think in our everyday life. This is also the reason that we argued in this study that in order to address this question, we have to consider a dynamic and an ethically-oriented structure to responsibility which is manifested via two indispensible elements, namely, ‘the other’ and ‘language’. The structure of ethical responsibility, then, is like a triangle in that when we research one angle of this triangle, we need to consider the other two angles. This does not imply that every human relationship is shaped by this triangle, but a responsible human relationship cannot be shaped stably without considering each of these three interlacing elements.

The three elements of responsibility, the other, and language that are present in ethical responsibility, then, are distinct but related. They are mutually related to each other in that subjectivity owns the uniqueness of that responsibility to the other, and the disproportion between the Other and the self is precisely responsibility as moral consciousness, represented in and through the expression of the face of the Other in an ethical relationship of language. Because of their interconnection, the awakening of the subjectivity presents itself in the language that is spoken to the Other. This is why Levinas is correct to insist that he is addressing a ‘phenomenon’, but it is a phenomenon that cannot be seen or permitted to be seen in a philosophical position that privileges and prioritizes consciousness and its objectivities (Husserlian phenomenology) or the question of the meaning of Being that either manifests in the mineness of Dasein or in self-sameness of language as the house of Being (Heideggerean ontology). In other words, it is in language that we find the spiritual order of morality, and it is in language that we also find entailed an ethically
irreducible freedom of the Other, which goes beyond Barthian *Totaliter aliter*. The relationships between these three essential elements raise three important implications and considerations.

Firstly, responsibility precedes and conditions the freedom of the subjectivity that exists between the self and the Other. Secondly, responsibility for the Other demands the self’s genuine response in the way of hearing and answering. Thirdly, and lastly, language plays an integral role in one being’s receptiveness to an absolutely other being which conditions the very possibilities of understanding one another.

§ 1  *Responsibility, Freedom, Subjectivity and the Other*

Turning to the first aspect: responsibility precedes and conditions the freedom of the subjectivity that exists between the self and the Other. To meet the Other is, at the same time, to see his face, which is also a process to hear an ‘invisible’ voice from exteriority. In Levinas’ words, ‘to speak, at the same time as knowing the Other, is making oneself known to him. The Other [however] is not only known, he is greeted (*salué*).’¹ The distance between this ‘face-to-face’, therefore, is the distance between ‘speaking and hearing’. This distance guarantees the absolute alterity of the Other which, on the one hand, would not be absorbed by my own identity, but which, on the other hand, call into question my freedom to understand what I hear and my freedom to respond to the Other in a sincere way.² What Levinas wants to clarify and emphasise, then, is that it is imperative, for ethical reasons, not to fuse (or confuse) different horizons between the Same and the Other.

This position, however, gives rise to the following critical question. If my experience of the Other comes from absolute alterity, how can this Otherness as a stranger *be thought*? When I face a stranger, it is impossible for me to know him or to understand him. What I can do is to ‘be drawn into intrigue with the Other’, to confront the face of this Other.³ In order to address this question we have to

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¹ DF, p.7, my emphasis.
² See, de Boer, p. 12.
³ Ibid., p. 131.
distinguish the natural existence of the I and the Other and the encounter of the face in the relating of the I and the Other. The former refers to the relationship in a natural state and the latter refers to the relationship in a responsible state. In the responsible state, both the I and the Other are conscious of the boundary between them. Levinas’s speaking of responsibility-prior-to-freedom should be discussed against the background of this boundary. That is to say, the I cannot set this boundary, but it can encounter this boundary, and so, in this sense, this boundary is given to the I. In other words, ‘encounter does not mean that my freedom is restricted but that I am awakened to responsibility.’ This is why responsibility is always my responsibility, which limits my freedom.

The discussion on my freedom and my responsibility can be examined in light of a distinction between self-consciousness and moral consciousness. In one’s moral consciousness, the Other is not a new edition of myself, nonetheless, in order to know the Other as the Other is, we still need to keep self-consciousness to keep the boundary between the I and the Other at the same time. Self-consciousness, in this sense, therefore, is in the centre of moral consciousness. Both self-consciousness and moral consciousness deal with ‘for-itself’ responsibility in an immanent sense and with ‘for-the-other’ responsibility in a transcendent sense. ‘This is somewhat like the difference between a person whose personality fills the room and another whose personality creates the room.’ The first one is to take the responsibility from the Other, in this case, the Other’s responsibility transforms into my responsibility; and the second one is to take the responsibility for the Other, or to remind the Other to take his own responsibility when my responsibility is defined.

The significance of the Other, then, lies in its disturbance of the self-sufficient ego. This exterior disturbance helps to deepen my interiority and the Other’s interiority as well. This is why the boundary that exists between the exteriority and interiority of the face to face relationship represents the responsibility that precedes and conditions the freedom of the individuality between the self and the Other.

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4 Ibid., p. 31.
5 De Boer, p. 108.
Turning to the second aspect: the responsibility for the Other demands of a genuine response from the self in the way of and through hearing and answering.

From Socrates to Hegel, philosophers have worked on the ideal of language and how language expresses the content of consciousness. There is, nevertheless, a more important feature of language that lies in what has not been expressed from the content of our consciousness. We need to hear and then answer. This process of hearing and answering can be explored via ‘speaking’ because ‘speaking’ links these two. We can analyse this process from two perspectives. The first perspective is to speak ‘about’ something. The second perspective is the intention of the behaviour of this ‘speaking’. The intention of ‘speaking’ and what this ‘speaking’ speaks about, therefore, are two different things. To understand language we have to be aware of both perspectives; otherwise, one can understand what is said, but never understand the reason why the speaker said it.

From ‘speaking’ we can move to analyse ‘dialogue’. Dialogue is a form of speaking. It is not monologue, rather the topic of a dialogue is open to discovery by the participants (conversants). Thus the aim of dialogue is not to locate the common ground, but the truth in difference. It fosters an understanding of otherness, particularity, and uniqueness. This is a dialogue-before-the dialogue. In this sense, our purpose in dialogue is not to deconstruct language itself, but to ‘demythologise’ the world as it truly is via language. Until now, the discussion of language has been focused on an ontological approach. When we bring in the Other, who speaks to the I or who makes the I hear, then the inter-action of this communication shifts the ontological approach to an ethical-transcendental-dialogical approach. In other words, we move ‘from intentionality to sincerity.’

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6 See, DF, p. 207.
7 See, de Boer, p.43.
8 Ward, p. 145.
9 De Boer, p.76.
10 Ibid., p.19.
11 Ibid., p.78.
Levinas used two words to represent these two approaches. For the ontological approach, he calls this type of language ‘the Said’ (le Dit); and, for the ethical one, he calls it ‘the Saying.’ (le Dire). Thus the earlier theme of thinking on the Other and the Self can be incorporated into the linguistic philosophical theme of the Saying and the Said. The said corresponds to the presupposition or pre-understanding of the self-sufficient ego before he speaks. The saying refers to an inter-subjective hearing and answering in a proximate and substitutive way.

This proximate and substitutive way is derived from the problem that when the I and the Other communicate, the I cannot avoid different opinions from the Other. Thus the question arises, what should the I do so that they can have sincere communication? For Levinas, proximity and substitution further describes ‘responsibility as the highest form of passivity.’ In this regard, a feature of dialogue is that the I can not only attempt to understand what the Other says but also accept the reason why the Other says so. To accept this reason, however, is not necessarily to accept the content or standpoint of the Other’s opinion.

Following this train of thought, substitution in relation to responsibility is to be responsible for the freedom of others. Is this kind of responsibility, then, too passive? Levinas does indeed emphasise the passivity or receptivity of responsibility, but this passivity is not completely passive because it is actively restrained in the mutual responsible understanding of language. This leads to the third aspect of our topic.

§ 3  Language and the Possibility of Human Self-Understanding

Our human self-understanding of ourselves is bound up with the way we understand others, but how is it possible to understand others? In response to this question, Levinas argues that Language in one being’s receptiveness to an absolutely other being is that which conditions the very possibilities of understanding one another.

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12 See, De Boer, p. 67.
13 Ibid., p. 108.
Language is essentially a communal platform for living beings to deliver their expressions. The speakers who use language, however, make the role of language deviate from its originally neutral stance. The reason is that ‘the Other speaks to me from above as he calls me to responsibility.’\(^\text{14}\) When the Other speaks to me, he already has his intentions in his mind and waits for my response. This proposing of a speech and waiting for a response is already a de-dominated behaviour from the Other. This process has an ethical significance and this significance is embodied in the ethical order of the words that are used in this communication. From this point of view, we can see why dialogue is not enough and why we need to seek the dialogue-prior-to-dialogue because two indispensable elements, the Said that is decided from the I and the Saying that speaks towards the Other, are both required to determine the ethical significance of a dialogue.

This means, however, that there is always a ‘time-lag’ between the said and the saying as the said is the precondition for the saying and Saying is the completion and a new start of the Said. This is why Levinas points out that apart from what can be expressed via language, we also need to explore what has not been expressed but still bears ethical significance. This is also ‘a metaphysical depth dimension of language, […] for [a] dialogue in which the interlocutors do not lecture or dominate each other but do each other justice.’\(^\text{15}\)

These three aspects link closely as a circle in Levinas elaboration of the idea of ‘difficult freedom’, which opens up new possibilities, new possibilities that are derived from the self’s response to and responsibility for the Other, achievable in ethical language. This ethical language as discourse can, therefore,

lift itself out of its eternal contest and return to the human lips that speak it, in order to fly from man to man and judge history, instead of remaining a symptom or an effect or a ruse. This is the word of a discourse that begins absolutely in the person in possession of it, and moves towards another who is absolutely separate.\(^\text{16}\)

\(^{14}\) Ibid., p. 30.
\(^{15}\) Ibid., p. 63.
\(^{16}\) DF, p. 207.
Through this absolute separation, the distance between the Other and the self is established, which transfers responsibility as moral consciousness from access to an external being, the Other, by means of language that is both to be given and to give to responsibility and justice.

In a discourse, we will have the speaker, the hearer and the topic of this discourse, and all of the above three essential elements, responsibility, the Other, and language, are found in that very discourse, for, when we speak about something we are always speaking to someone.¹⁷ This depth-dimension of language both implies and represents an ethical transcendence of responsibility between the I and the Other. It shows the self-limitation in the discourse as a responsibility for the Other’s freedom. Responsibility is not a limitation on one’s own freedom or of one’s own freedom because it is the very ethical condition of the existence of that freedom. Freedom shows or reveals itself in a negative way, but the significance of this negation is positive; or, in other words, it is goodness. In Levinas’ words,

no one is good voluntarily [...] because the attachment to the Good precedes the choosing of this Good. [...] The Good is good precisely because it chooses you and grips you before you have had the time to praise your eyes to it.¹⁸

Without locating our freedom in such a paradoxical way, the danger of the possibility of taking our violent and subjective understanding of goodness and justice as real goodness is all to apparent (as history, as Levinas and Bonhoeffer knew all too well knew, demonstrates).

Today, we confront multiple beliefs and we have multiple ways of expressing those beliefs. There are tensions that are derived from this multiplicity. These tensions lie in the conflicts between men, the opposition of the same and the Other, even the opposition in my ego and my super-ego in conscious and unconscious factors (Freud), in ideological and non-ideological factors (Marx), in will to power and will to truth (Nietzsche) in moral discourse. All of these tensions make necessary, again, to reconsider the relationship between freedom and responsibility, especially

¹⁷ De Boer, p. 17.
¹⁸ OB, p. 138, from RGS, p. 6.
from an ethical and linguistic perspective. In order to truly understand the Other’s beliefs, we need to explore, as Levinas remarks, ‘a multiplicity of coherent discourses that embraces them all, which is precisely the universal order.’

This means exploring the identification between an individual’s free expression of truth and the constitution of the universal state. All of this implies that to be responsible is to take the responsibility for the responsibility of the Other; and to speak responsibly is to hear and to answer the language for the language of the Other. All of these would occur and only occur when two flesh and blood human beings meet face-to-face through their vulnerability and morality.

To overlook such vulnerability and morality is to overlook humanity itself. The only way, then, for humankind to find out its own way of understanding the universe, is to look inwards that is, at the same time, a look outwards to realise the inter-connectedness of humanity, language, responsibility and otherness. As T.S. Eliot puts it eloquently, in the second poem from his *Four Quartets*, completed in early 1940 and reflecting on time and disorder within nature when humanity deviates itself from the pursuit of the Divine.

You say I am repeating
Something I have said before. I shall say it again.
Shall I say it again? In order to arrive there,
To arrive where you are, to get from where you are not,
You must go by a way wherein there is no ecstasy.
In order to arrive at what you do not know
You must go by a way which is the way of ignorance.
In order to possess what you do not possess
You must go by the way of dispossession.
In order to arrive at what you are not
You must go through the way in which you are not.
And what you do not know is the only thing you know
And what you own is what you do not own
And where you are is where you are not.

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19 DF, p. 94.
20 See, Ibid.
This bibliography contains a selection of texts that I found most relevant to the topic of this study of the ethical concept of responsibility in the works of Bonhoeffer and Levinas. It is divided into two main parts. Part I gives details of selected primary texts of (i) Karl Barth (ii) Dietrich Bonhoeffer, (ii) Martin Heidegger, and (iii) Emmanuel Levinas. In each entry, the English title and publication details are given first, followed by the German or French title and publication date. Part II gives details of a selection of secondary literature, cited or consulted, that I found most relevant to the topic of this study, in alphabetical order.

PART I: PRIMARY TEXTS

(i) Karl Barth:


*Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century*, trans. by Brain Cozens and John Bowden (London: SCM Press, 2001)


(ii) Dietrich Bonhoeffer:


(iii) Martin Heidegger


The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. by Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988) (Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, 1927)


(iv) Emmanuel Levinas:


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