THE TASK AND SIGNIFICANCE OF PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTION ON THE RELATION OF THE FINITE TO THE INFINITE AFTER KANT, IN HUSSERL, HEIDEGGER, AND SCHLEIERMACHER

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Abstract: This article addresses the issue of both the task and significance of philosophical reflection on the relation of the finite to the infinite after Kant, with particular reference to Husserl, Heidegger and Schleiermacher. It argues that (1) whilst both Husserl and Heidegger, in their respective phenomenological philosophies of experience, do philosophize in the wake of the Kantian critique of traditional metaphysics, there is, however, (2) a rich source of untapped potential for critically assessing and contesting both Husserl and Heidegger’s respective philosophies of experience and their competing conceptions of ‘first philosophy’ (as infinite reflection on essences in ‘intentional consciousness’ or as the search for a ‘fundamental ontology’ grounded in finitude) in Schleiermacher’s earlier recognition and reflections on the relation of the finite to the infinite in ‘religious self-consciousness’ which, in turn, enables an advancement of philosophical reflection on the relation of the finite to the infinite after Husserl, after Heidegger, and after Kant too.

INTRODUCTION

Though Kant is, perhaps, most famous for his demolition of all arguments for the existence of God and for, in particular, his rejection of the epistemological legitimacy of any purported knowledge-claims about the existence of God, philosophical speculation on the nature of the relation of the finite to the infinite after Kant was far from dampened; it intensified, rather, as is evidenced in the writings of so many of his immediate followers and successors of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, such as, for instance, in Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and Kierkegaard.1 This particular task of reflection on the relation between the existence of a human being’s consciousness of that being’s self and the existence of God was silenced, however, quite definitively in two of the most influential

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1 Kant was not unaware himself of the significance which his own particular religious belief played in his own intellectual motivation for determining the limits to human knowledge in his Critique of Pure Reason, for, as he explicitly informs his reader in the 1787 Preface to the second edition of his Critique, ‘I had to deny knowledge [of the existence of God] in order to make room for faith [in God].’ Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), BXXX, p. 117. It is of course true, as many commentators point out, that the theory of knowledge which Kant elaborates and defends in the Critique excludes in itself the legitimacy of philosophical reflection on topics addressed in traditional metaphysics, such as, for instance, the existence of God, the question of the continued existence of the human soul after death and the possibility of life with God in the next life, but not all commentators give due attention to either the religious reasons motivating Kant’s attack on transcendental arguments in metaphysics for the existence of God or the issue of what role and significance religious faith plays in Kant’s entire approach to both philosophy and religion.

phenomenological philosophies of human experience that were elaborated in the early decades of the 20th century, first by Husserl in the First Book of Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy (published in 1913) and then, secondly, by Heidegger in Being and Time (1927), both of whom, nevertheless, claiming steadfast adherence, despite major differences in their respective conceptions of phenomenology, to the manner of thinking inspired by Kant. In what follows, I would like to argue that whilst both Husserl and Heidegger do philosophize in the wake of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Schleiermacher’s earlier recognition and reflections on the relation of the finite to the infinite in ‘religious self-consciousness’ contains possibilities for a radical critical evaluation of both Husserl and Heidegger’s respective understandings of ‘first philosophy’ and their respective post-Kantian phenomenological philosophies of experience.

This article, then, addresses the issue of the task and significance of philosophical reflection on the relation of the finite to the infinite after Kant, in Husserl, Heidegger and Schleiermacher. It is divided into three sections. The first section focuses attention on the philosophical reasons that Husserl gives in Ideas I (1913) for his exclusion of the question of the existence of God and of the relation of God to human self-consciousness in his establishment of phenomenology as an infinite task of reflection on the essential features of intentional consciousness and its objectivities. The second section examines Heidegger’s implicit critique in Being


4 Though Kant’s provision of formidable logical, metaphysical and epistemological arguments against any attempt to prove God’s existence are well known, and re-iterated by commentators and his followers, his expressly religious reasons receive much less attention, or are simply left out of consideration. These religious reasons, nonetheless, are of central significance to his entire effort in the Critique of securing a content for reason itself outside of these religious reasons announced in the Preface to the second edition. This is as true for atheistic followers of Kant, as much as it is of his theistic followers (e.g. Kierkegaard), for, as Husserl acutely notes, in line with Kant, ‘(T)he idea of God is a necessary limiting concept in epistemological considerations, and an indispensable index to the construction of certain limiting concepts which not even the [post-Kantian] philosophizing atheist [or theist] can do without’. Ideas I, p. 187:147, n. 17. That Kant’s position supports atheistic conceptions of philosophy, however, cannot be denied either. See, Gordon E. Michalson, Kant and the Problem of God (Oxford and Maklen, MA: Blackwell, 1999). Thanks to the reviewer for this latter reference.

and Time (1927) of that infinite task, and his famous attempt to think the finite from within the particular experience of finitude itself. Why this is a continuation of Husserlian phenomenology — even if Husserl himself came to the conclusion that, as it appeared to him, it was not, but, on the contrary, a complete rejection of everything that his idea of phenomenology stood for — needs to be understood first, before any proper evaluation of Heidegger’s position in philosophy in general and in phenomenology in particular can be undertaken. In the third and final section of this article, I would like to return briefly to Schleiermacher’s previous attempt, in the early decades of the nineteenth century, to think the finite and the infinite together in what he calls ‘immediate religious self-consciousness’ in his essay On Religion: Addresses in Response to its Cultured Despisers (1799–1800; 1806; 1821)7 and with some reference to his work The Christian Faith (1821–22, 1830–31).8 Schleiermacher’s position is of both historical and philosophical pertinence to our concerns for two distinct but related reasons. Firstly, it breaks the embargo that some believed Kant had both successfully and conclusively put on the legitimacy of any philosophical reflection on the significance of the relation of the self to the existence of God, after the publication of his Critique. Secondly, it re-opens the task and significance of philosophical reflection on the relation of the finite to the infinite in human experience that had been silenced by Husserl and Heidegger in their respective post-Kantian philosophical phenomenologies. We can of course, as Kant and his followers maintain, try to order our experiences and seek to find order in those experiences, but we cannot call our experiences to order. If, therefore, there is an experience of the infinite that is not called to order, but which is there to be found in human experience itself, then that too, contrary to what Husserl and Heidegger stipulate, must form at least an essential part of a post-Kantian holds, but there are many versions, interpretations and disputes still surrounding both the meaning and the validity of this tenet. For an extensive and meticulous examination of this theme, from its first appearance in Husserl’s thought in his earliest writings up to and including Ideas I, see Theodore De Boer’s excellent study, The Development of Husserl’s Thought, trans. by Theodore Plantinga (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978).

6 Whereas many at the time in the 1920s were well aware of Heidegger’s attack on Husserl’s idea of phenomenology, it took Husserl a considerable amount of time to realise just how antagonistic Heidegger’s conception of phenomenology was to his own, for, as he tells Alexander Pfänder, in a letter which he wrote to him on January 6 1931, ‘(I)n order to come to a clear-headed and definitive position on Heideggerean philosophy, I devoted two months to studying Being and Time, as well as his more recent writings. I arrived at the distressing conclusion that philosophically I have nothing to do with this Heideggerean profundity, with this brilliant unscientific genius; that Heidegger’s criticism [of my work], both open and veiled, is based upon a gross misunderstanding [of my work]; that he may be involved in the formation of a philosophical system of the kind which I have always considered my life’s work to make forever impossible. Everyone except me has realised this for a long time.’ Edmund Husserl, ‘Letter to Alexander Pfänder, January 6, 1931’, in Edmund Husserl, Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger (1927–1931): The ‘Encyclopaedia Britannica’ Article, The Amsterdam Lectures, Phenomenology and Anthropology and Husserl’s Marginal Notes in ‘Being and Time’ and ‘Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics’, trans. and ed. by Thomas Sheehan & Richard E. Palmer (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Press, 1997), p. 482. We cannot infer from this, nonetheless, that Husserl’s philosophy did not have a significant influence on Heidegger’s thinking, but the relation of Husserl’s manner of thinking to Heidegger’s philosophy is exceedingly complex, intricate and controversial, and outside the limits of this present article to address in detail.


phenomenological conception of philosophy that finds its locus in the experiencing subject. In this regard, Schleiermacher’s thinking, which likewise unfurls in the wake of the Kantian critique, contains a rich source of untapped potential for critically assessing the limits that are set on philosophy and phenomenology not only by Husserl and Heidegger but by Kant too; or, at least, so shall I argue in this article.  

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Husserl’s Exclusion of ‘God’ from First Philosophy and His Definition of Phenomenology as a Task of Infinite Reflection on Human Experience  

In Ideas I Husserl draws attention to the incorrigible fact that in the immanent perception of an experience, we have apodictic certainty regarding knowledge of the

9 Husserl was interested in exploring all aspects and dimensions of human experience, including ethical and religious experience, and had, in fact, appointed Adolf Reinach as his phenomenologist of religion in this regard, but Reinach died unexpectedly near the front lines in the First World War in 1917. Theodore Kisiel notes that in June of 1918 Husserl gave Heidegger access to Reinach’s fragments on the phenomenology of religion (prepared by Edith Stein, then Husserl’s assistant), which were composed by Reinach shortly before his death (The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time) (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 75). Husserl, therefore, saw Heidegger as the person ‘to fill the gap left by Reinach’s death’, and, 1918 thus marks the year in which Husserl draws closer to Heidegger […] which ended in his [Husserl’s] nomination of Heidegger as his “phenomenologist of religion” (letter to Heidegger on September 10’ (ibid.). In this long letter that he wrote to Heidegger in 1918, Husserl draws Heidegger’s attention to Rudolf Otto’s book on The Idea of the Holy, ‘which in fact is an attempt at a phenomenology of a person’s consciousness of God’, only to hint to Heidegger that he believes that Heidegger would do a much better job than Otto at pursuing this line in phenomenology and phenomenological research. September 10, 1918: Edmund Husserl to Martin Heidegger’, in Martin Heidegger, Becoming Heidegger: On the Trail of His Occasional Writings, 1910–1927, ed. by Theodore Kisiel and Thomas Sheehan (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007), pp. 359–363 (360). The origins of Otto’s ideas can be found in Schleiermacher’s work. Heidegger was already acquainted with Schleiermacher’s work and was able to recite, almost verbatim, Schleiermacher’s Second Speech: On the Essence of Religion from his On Religion: Speeches to its Cultural Despisers, in his ‘impromptu talk’ to Heinrich Ochsner, in August 1917. See editors’ comments in Becoming Heidegger, ‘On Schleiermacher’s Second Speech, “On the Essence of Religion”’, pp. 86–88, and cf., p. 471, n. 1. See, also, Kisiel, Genesis, pp. 88–89, and pp. 112–15.  

10 Though reared a Roman Catholic, sometime between 1917 and 1919 Heidegger relinquished his affiliation to what he called ‘the system of Catholicism’ (Kisiel, Genesis, p. 114), and began to associate his interests in philosophy more in line with thinkers from protestant background (e.g., Kant, Kierkegaard, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Dilthey). See, Hugo Ott, Martin Heidegger: A Political Life, trans. by Allan Blunden (London: Fontana Press, 1993), esp., Part Two The Struggle with the Faith of My Birth, The Break with the ‘System of Catholicism’, pp. 106–121. Heidegger's reading of Schleiermacher around this time (1917 and ff.) would certainly shown Heidegger not only an alternative approach and different way to Husserl and to Kant but also a more positive option, after Kant, of pursuing philosophy of religious experience. Cf., Sean J. McGrath, The Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy: Phenomenology for the Godforsaken (Washington: Catholic University Press of America, 2006), p. 127, n.13; ‘as early as 1917, Heidegger had reversed his 1916 position on the symbiosis of Scholasticism and mysticism’ (ibid., p. 121); see, also, Heidegger’s inclusion of Schleiermacher in his 1919 lecture-courses (ibid., p. 131) and Heidegger’s note in 1917, ‘Zu Schleiermachers zweiter Rede: Über das Wesen der Religion’ (ibid., p. 142). Why Heidegger, therefore, rejects entirely Schleiermacher’s attempt to think the finite and the infinite together that is deposited in religious experience and documented in the major religions of the world (McGrath, p. 143), and instead seeks to think the finite from within the experience of the finite alone in Being and Time, seems to me to be of major significance warranting critical philosophical attention.
existence of that experience. The non-existence of an experience immanently perceived is unthinkable, and it is unthinkable, for Husserl, ‘not in the subjective [psychological-factual] sense of an incapacity to represent-things-otherwise, but in the objectively-ideal necessity of an inability-to-be-otherwise.’

Unlike an act of transcendent perception that occurs within consciousness, such as, for instance, an act of memory, which posits the existence of its object (a remembered item, for example) sometimes correctly and sometimes not so correctly, an act of immanent perception posits knowledge of the existence of its object, the current (conscious) experience (Sein als Erlebnis), without any shadow of doubt. Though limited strictly to the present, reflective immanent perception, nonetheless, is infallible in its guarantee of knowledge of the existence (die Existenz) of its object.

This implies, however, that for Husserl there is present in a reflective immanent perception an identifiable but discernible intuitive difference between the experience as lived and the experience as reflected upon, even though these two parts form one concrete cogitatio and one indissoluble unity inherent in that perception. ‘Talking about the experiencing of ‘a rejoicing at a course of theoretical thought which goes on freely and fruitfully’ — here, as is evident from the context, Husserl is thinking of the delight that one takes in the discovery of an objective truth, such as, for instance, the truth of a mathematical proposition or of a mathematical theorem, the gaudium de veritate of Augustine — Husserl remarks, ‘we have the possibility of effecting a reflection on the reflection which objectivates the latter [= the reflective immanent perception] and of thus making even more effectively clear the difference between a rejoicing which is lived (erlebter) but not regarded, and a regarded (erblickter) rejoicing.’

The first reflection on the rejoicing',

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11 ‘Every perception of something immanently perceived guarantees the existence (die Existenz) of its object. If reflective experience is directed towards my experience, I have seized something absolute in itself, the factual being (Daen [not in Heidegger’s sense of this term]) of which is essentially incapable of being negated, i.e., the insight that it is essentially impossible for it not to exist; it would be a countersense (ein Widersinn, a non-sense) to believe it possible that an experience given in that manner (so gegeben) does not in truth exist.’ Husserl, Ideas I, pp. 96–97:85.


13 That the very mode of being of that which is given to our experiences is guaranteed on the basis of some identifiable, perceptually-founded act(s) is of crucial importance to Husserl’s idea of a phenomenological philosophy because, otherwise, there would be no justification for any phenomenological approach to experience, as Husserl defines that approach. Not all of Husserl’s so-called followers, however, agreed with Husserl on this point. The act of reflective, immanent perception, nonetheless, is of primary importance to Husserl in that it guarantees, apodictically, the very existence of its object, namely, psychical-act experiences and their objects (if they exist).

14 The perception of the experience in immanent perception and the experience itself are, therefore, non-independent parts of that particular experience. In this instance, as de Boer comments, ‘(T)he perception cannot be isolated from its object; it is a non-independent aspect of this unity’ (p. 333).

15 Husserl, Ideas I, p. 176:146. Following Descartes, Locke, Hume and Brentano (the descriptive psychologist), Husserl regards access to one’s own consciousness as peculiarly direct and certain (in
Husserl notes, ‘finds it as actually present now, but not [Husserl emphasizes] as only now beginning. [Rather,] It is there as continuing [as Husserl also emphasizes] to endure, as already lived before, just not looked at.’

Three things are of note here. Firstly, for Husserl, the ability of consciousness to engage in reflection on its own experiences does not bring such experiences into existence — their esse is not their percipi, as Berkeley would put it; for Husserl, rather, experiences are there, and exist, whether reflected upon, or not, and whether seen, or not. Secondly, Husserl is well aware of the fact that experiences are the kinds of things that cannot but be lived and cannot but be lived now, continuing in time, whether they are reflected upon, or not. Thirdly, and this is of most significance to Husserl, in any actual enactment of a reflective, immanent perception of an experience, a direct experiential understanding of ‘the living now of the experience (das lebendige Jetzt des Erlebnisses)’ is ‘retrievable (wiederholbar)’ and entertained by and in human consciousness itself.

It thus follows for Husserl that experiences are not inherently ‘phenomena’ at all because they are not being seen automatically or concomitantly all the time in consciousness, as Brentano and his doctrine of ‘inner perception’, following Locke’s
hypothesis, would have us believe. On the contrary, more often than not experiences are not seen (for what they are), nor reflected upon; they are, rather, simply lived through (er-lebt). Experiences, nonetheless, are always, in principle, ‘ready to be perceived’ either in a glance of ‘straightforward reflection’ or in ‘reflective immanent perception’ (which is what Husserl is really thinking of in particular, in his famous argument of the reduction of the natural attitude to the transcendental-phenomenological attitude). Unlike experiences that are in principle ready to be perceived, however, reflection on things given to outer perceptual-sense experience ‘is possible only in the “background field” of my perception, which actually makes up only a small part of the ‘world around me’ (Unwelt)’. Thus, for Husserl, ‘the rest [of the world around me]’, as de Boer points out, ‘is only perceivable via a long chain of perceptions.’

Husserl notes, however, that the knowledge we can have of the unity pertaining to an act of reflective immanent perception and its object is distinctly different to the kind of knowledge that we also can have of the unity that characterizes ‘the stream of experiences’ for reflection. This is of pivotal importance both to Husserl’s line of argument and to his establishment of his conception of phenomenology. It is thus important not to confuse, or to mix up these two different kinds of unities in consciousness; otherwise, Husserl may appear to be somewhat less than clear than he evidently is and be accused of being somewhat confused regarding this matter himself which he evidently is not.

20 Husserl’s main criticism of Brentano’s and Locke’s view of concomitant perceptions of psychical-act experiences is that there is simply no evidence in our experience to support such a theory. See Husserl’s explicit critique of Locke and Brentano’s understanding and definition of ‘consciousness as the perception of what goes on in a man’s own mind’, in the 1913 Appendix to the re-issue of the Logical Investigations, ‘External and Internal Perception: Physical and Psychical Phenomena’, pp. 852–869; Hua Band XIX/2, Beilage, ‘Äußere und innere Wahrnehmung. Physische und psychische Phänomene’, pp. 751–775.

21 ‘Every single experience, e.g., an experience of joy, can begin as well as end and hence delimit its duration. But the stream of experiences [for reflection] cannot begin and end. […] Belonging of necessity to this [ability of consciousness to reflect upon experiences] is the possibility (which, as we know, is no empty logical possibility) that the Ego directs its regard to this experience and seizes upon the experience [in reflective immanent perception] as actually existing or as enduring in phenomenological time [of the actual experience].’ Ideas I, §81. Phenomenological Time and Consciousness of Time,’ p. 194:164.

22 De Boer, p. 337.

23 Ibid. The transcendence of the stream of experiences for reflection, therefore, is entirely different to the kind of transcendence that characterizes the mode of being of a thing given to acts of outer perceptual-sense experience. ‘Husserl’, as de Boer also remarks, ‘already had made this point a number of times’ (ibid.).


25 In Ideas I, Husserl also famously compares the ‘outer sense perception’ of a thing to the ‘immanent perception’ of an experience. Because a thing is spatial in essence, given in adumbration and through perspectival variations, the perception of a thing is always, in principle, incomplete and open to further legitimating experiences of the same kind, that is to say, of outer perceptual-sense experiences of the thing itself. By comparison, the ‘immanent perception’ of a currently lived experience is always, in principle, complete because it is not given through perspectival variations, or in adumbration, but absolutely. Husserl does not compare (or confuse) the incompleteness characteristic of thing-perception to the incompleteness characteristic of the idea of the infinity of reflection on acts, as one commentator suggests, when she comments, ‘(I)n immanent experience we are faced with an incompleteness that does not occlude the co-appearance of that which appears in its failure to appear, which in turn is fully present [i.e. the idea of infinity of such acts for reflection...
Though experiences are ‘ready to be perceived’, in any act of reflective immanent perception the whole ‘stream of experiences’ of course cannot be known, for it is never perceived as a whole. The past and future parts of the stream are always unknown — and, ‘in this sense’, as Husserl remarks, ‘transcendent’. Yet it is precisely because we can never in principle embrace the whole stream of experience as a direct object of knowledge and thereby intuit its unity in an act of reflection that we have therein an insight into this never-ending possibility as such. We can then see that reflection on ‘the stream of experiences’ would continue endlessly, for ‘the stream of experience [for reflection] cannot begin and end’. By comparison to the beginning and the end of an experience as lived, then, ‘[reflection on] the stream of experiences [as knowable items of knowledge] cannot [in principle] begin and end’. It thus follows that recognition of the finiteness of the knowledge of an experience in an act of reflective immanent perception presupposes insight into the ideal-regulative possibility of infinite reflection on the content of that finite experience itself. In other words, we can justifiably deduce from the very finiteness of the knowledge of an experience, immanently perceived, the idea of the unity, totality and infinity of reflection on the existence of such experiences (if, and when they exist) for possible knowledge-claims. This transcendental deduction of the idea of the unity, totality and infinity of reflection on one’s actual experiences by the intellectual (and not sense) imagination, Husserl assumes his Kantian readers will readily understand. Concerning the unity of the stream of experiences for reflection, Husserl writes and stresses, ‘(W)e do not seize upon it as we do [the unity of] a single experience [in reflective, immanent perception] but in the manner of an idea in the Kantian sense.

No matter how infinite in principle reflection on individual actual experiences ideally is, items of knowledge gained by means of reflection on the particularity of the facticity of individual experiences themselves does not and cannot lead to any science of such experiences, so argues Husserl. Reflection can only be scientific if general truths about the facticity of such experiences are obtainable and communicable for that science. If philosophy is a science — and for Husserl, following Brentano, philosophy is a science, or it is nothing at all — it must arrive at general truths about the facticity of such experiences that are unified and unifiable for that science. Such general truths, however, cannot be empirical generalisations about matters of fact because all knowledge-claims pertaining to matters of fact, so Husserl argues, again following Brentano, are the purview and transcendentally deduced]. In [reflective] immanent experience the infinite fulfilled stream of intentions is fully present despite the incompleteness of the adumbrating nature of lived experiences [i.e., that are characteristic of outer sense perceptions of things]’. Lilian Alweiss, The Unclaimed World: A Challenge to Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2003), §20. Limitations of Idea I, pp. 32–33 (p. 32). The deduction, on the basis of the recognition of the finiteness of any given act of reflection on an experience, of the idea of the infinity for reflection on experiences by the transcendental (intellectual, and not sense) imagination is of critical significance to Husserl’s definition of ‘the infinite task’ of phenomenology. Husserl appears to have been either greatly misunderstood or not understood at all in relation to this basic in his philosophy.

28 Ideas I, 163:194.
29 Ibid., p. 197:166.
provenance of the natural sciences — and philosophy is not a natural science — but *eidetic*-general truths about that which cannot be otherwise, i.e., *eidetic*-ontological laws pertaining to (lived) experiences are obtainable. Only a descriptive-*eidetic* manner of reflection can realize the possibility of philosophy as a *universal* science that is rigorously and phenomenologically legitimated. It will be, therefore, a strict *methodological* requirement for Husserl, in the elaboration of his idea of a new descriptive-*eidetic*-phenomenological science of experiences, to seek out only those universally determinable, essential features of experiences themselves, ignoring whatever contingencies there are pertaining to the facticity, temporality, historicity and idiosyncrasies of such experiences. This is why Husserl is led to the conclusion that phenomenology, in his eyes, can be defined as an *eidetic* science of intentional consciousness and its objectivities, after (human) consciousness has been purified of all naturalistic interpretations *via* the celebrated, intellectually-therapeutic measure of transcendental reduction.

One of the central linchpins of Husserl’s establishment of his version of Kantian transcendental idealism in *Ideas I*, nevertheless, is the actual ‘ontic’ experience of a reflective, immanent perception. This particular experience yields a legitimate phenomenal basis upon which Husserl’s transcendental *deduction* of the idea, in Kant’s sense, of the infinity of reflective acts on experiences within inner reflection rests. No such similar, transcendental deduction, Husserl notes against Kant and against anyone else living in the natural attitude, is phenomenologically justifiable in relation to things given to outer perceptual-sense experience simply because things given to outer perceptual-sense experience can always, in principle, turn out to be other than what they actually are for the experiencing subject; but an

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32 ‘The study of the stream of experiences is, for its part, carried on in variety of peculiarly structured reflective acts which themselves also belong to the stream of experiences and which, in corresponding reflections at a higher level, can be made the Objects of phenomenological analyses. This is because their analyses is fundamental to a universal phenomenology and to the methodological insight quite indispensable to it (unauthetische methodologische Einsicht),’ *Ideas I*, p. 177:147. This marks Husserl’s major *methodological* advancement of Brentano’s idea of descriptive psychology (which, following Hume, finds its basis solely on individual inner perceptions) to a descriptive-*eidetic* science, though Husserl is quite right to note that Brentano (who denied the existence of any such fictional entities as ‘essences’) could not see this as the fruition of his own ideas. See, Husserl, ‘Reminiscences of Franz Brentano’, p. 50, and *Ideas I*, pp. xx:3–4.

experience immanently perceived cannot not exist and cannot not exist in the manner of its appearing to my actual consciousness. No act of outer perceptual-sense experience guarantees necessarily the existence of its object to consciousness. A thing, because it is spatial in essence, is given, instead, to outer perceptual-sense experience one-sidedly, in adumbration, and from perspective variations. Each and any actual act of outer perceptual-sense experience of a thing points of necessity to further ‘legitimating (ausweisende) experience’ of the same genus (Gattung). In principle, therefore, an act of outer perceptual-sense experience of a thing is, in essence, incomplete. It thus follows that the thing that is actually given to an actual act of outer perceptual-sense experience could turn out to be other than what it is in the bow (the way) of its appearing in its very existence to one’s own actual consciousness. In point of fact, the actual thing itself as given, from a phenomenological point of view, could always turn out not to exist at all (any longer), if the harmony (Zusammenhang) of one’s intentional experiences fail. From a phenomenological point of view, then, the harmony of one’s own actual experiences is a necessary pre-condition for the very appearing of the mode of being as thing (Sein als Ding) in its very existence to one’s own consciousness. Thus the meaning of our talk of being (der gemeine Sinn der Seinsrede), Husserl concludes, ‘is exactly the opposite of what it ordinarily is (kehrt sich [...] um). Things do not exist


35 See, Ideas I, §§42. Being as Consciousness and Being as Reality. Essentially Necessary Difference Between Modes of Intuition; and, §§44 Merely Phenomenal Being of Something Transcendent and Absolute Being of Something Immanent.

36 See Ideas I, §§47. The Natural World as a Correlate of Consciousness. See, also, de Boer, pp. 335–39.

37 See, Ideas I, §§43. The Clarification of a Fundamental Error; and, §§44 Merely Phenomenal Being of Something Transcendent and Absolute Being of Something Immanent.

38 In a letter to Dilthey’s nephew, Georg Misch, in 1929, Husserl both draws attention to and reiterates his defense of ‘the essential correlation between consciousness and being’ in §47 of Ideas I, and remarks that, ‘[L]ikewise, the ‘relativity of nature’ does not refer to an infinite succession of relations between natural objects within the general unity of nature. Rather, it refers (again, constitutively) to the fact that nature-as-such qua experienced, both the nature of sense perception and the nature of natural science (which both we and the scientist take as always simply in being and valid as being), is relative to the current constitutive subjectivity (intersubjectivity, a community of researchers in the specific historical time). I myself understood that at this point I had already abandoned any absolute being of nature (and any absolutely valid natural laws). I further understood […] [in my 1910–11 Logos article, ‘Philosophy as Rigorous Science’] phenomenology as a radical and universal humanistic science,’ in a far more radical way that Dilthey did, due to the [transcendental] phenomenological reduction (which I first explicitly addressed in my lectures of 1907) — whereas Dilthey stuck to the historical humanistic sciences, and consequently to the already given world, and to anthropology. That is what Heidegger [in Husserl’s estimation] also does in his brilliant book [Being and Time], which abandons my method of constitutive phenomenology,’ Husserl, ‘August 3, 1929: Edmund Husserl to Georg Misch’, in Heidegger, Becoming Heidegger, p. 397.

39 Ideas I, p. 112f.94, trans. mod.: ‘So kehrt sich der gemeine Sinn der Seinsrede um.’ Husserl continues, stressing the difference between the meaning of Being as thing (Sein als Ding) and the meaning of Being as (conscious) experience (Sein als Erlebnis): ‘The being which is first for us is second in itself; i.e. it is what it is, only in ‘relation’ to the first. […] Reality, the reality of the physical thing taken singly and the reality of the whole world, lacks self-sufficiency in virtue of its essence (in our strict sense of the word). Reality is not something absolute which becomes tied secondarily to something else; rather, in the absolute sense, it is nothing at all; it has no ‘absolute essence’ whatever; it has the essentiality of something which, of necessity, is only intentional, only an object of
first in order for them be perceived, or known, or grasped in whatever way they are, as we assume in the natural attitude, rather consciousness exists first as the transcendental ground of their very being. And this is what Husserl’s famous reduction ‘lays bare’. Consciousness cannot be founded in a thing, or be considered part of a thing because the existence of the latter is dependent upon the existence of consciousness itself.

Part of the main task that Husserl set for himself in Part Two: The Considerations Fundamental to Phenomenology of Ideas I, that houses Husserl’s (in)famous ‘reduction’, therefore, is to provide an argument that would demonstrate apodictically that the mode of being of (conscious) experience (Sein als Erlebnis) cannot, in principle, be reduced in its examination to the mode of being of a thing (Sein als Ding) that is given to outer perceptual-sense experience. If such naturalism in the form of the reification of consciousness was not refuted, this would sound, in Husserl’s (correct) estimation, the death-knell of all considerations and reflections on the significance of specific human consciousness, and that, for Husserl (but unlike Heidegger of Being and Time) includes not only logical and aesthetical consciousness but religious-ethical consciousness as well. Yet the specific task of Ideas I is to overcome the prevailing absolutization of nature and the naturalization of consciousness and its objectivities. This is why the question of the existence and the transcendence of God must be excluded from the conception of ‘first philosophy’ that Husserl defends in that study. Since establishing ‘the absolute sphere [of pure intentional consciousness] peculiar to phenomenology’ is the main goal of the ‘fundamental meditation’, Husserl remarks that ‘our immediate aim is not theology, but phenomenology, however important the latter may be for the former’.

Whilst Husserl, then, clearly recognizes that phenomenology could be of importance to theology, Husserl does not entertain whether some conception of theology or of religious thinking could be of importance to phenomenology, or not. Theology or religious thinking, as Husserl recognizes, is simply not part of Husserl’s definition of what constitutes phenomenology as ‘first philosophy’. Ultimately,
therefore, there is no ‘porosity’ (to use William Desmond’s term) admitted between religious consciousness and theoretical-philosophical consciousness by Husserl, though the legitimacy of religious experience and religious thought is certainly not denied by Husserl. The latter, rather, he assumes in his very definition and meditation of transcendental phenomenology as first philosophy, but it is placed outside of that definition of philosophy as ‘first philosophy’, just as Kant had done earlier in his definition of transcendental philosophy. As Husserl acutely notes, following Kant, ‘(T)he idea of God is a necessary limiting concept in epistemological considerations, and an indispensable index to the construction of certain limiting concepts which not even the [post-Kantian] philosophizing atheist [or theist] can do without.’

Once it is granted, however, that the non-existence of the entire world of things given to actual outer perceptual-sense experiences is entirely thinkable, from an apodictic-phenomenological point of view, it follows that no legitimate transcendental deduction of an infinity of reflective acts on the outer perceptual-sense experience (i.e., on sense judgment) of such ‘things’ in their appearing to one’s actual consciousness is justifiable, no matter how ‘natural’ this may appear to anyone living in the ‘natural attitude’. By comparison, an act of reflective, immanent perception directly grasps its object. The possibility that the experience currently reflected upon does not exist is an eidetic-ontological impossibility. An act of reflective immanent perception guarantees necessarily the existence of its object to my actual consciousness. In truth, we know apodictically that an experience given

44 William Desmond, God and the Between (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008) p. 35, 331, 340. For a recent attempt to see religious experience as something that is sui generis, and thus as something that is amenable to philosophical-phenomenological analysis along Husserlian lines, however, see Anthony Steinbock’s study, Phenomenology and Mysticism: The Verticality of Religious Experience (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007).

45 Ideas I, 187:147, n. 17. See, supra, n. 4, and our comment on the significance of this.

46 This is what Husserl means by his repeatable, ‘world-annihilation thought experiment’, because the world, as Husserl understands it, is simply the totality of things that is given and can be given to one’s own actual consciousness via acts of outer perceptual sense-experience.

47 This applies to the natural scientist as well, of course. That reflection on things given to outer perceptual-sense experience is, from a regulative point of view, infinite cannot be doubted; but we cannot, therefore, legitimately infer from this that such natural science is either moving closer to or further way from the truth of things in themselves. For the natural scientist, then, this regulative ideal is purely procedural and still based, from Husserl’s point of view, on the naive (pre-critical and fictional) hypothesis that in perception things are there, whether attention is directed towards them, or not.

48 This is the major difference between the position adopted in Logical Investigations and in Ideas I. In the Logical Investigations the experiences of a valid, logical consciousness as such is the only concern in the descriptive-psychological clarification of the eidos of valid logical acts of reasoning. To include features of one’s natural, empirical consciousness would lead to naturalism in the form of logical psychology, which Husserl had already refuted in the First Volume of the Logical Investigations. As Husserl remarks in the Introduction to Part One of the Second Volume of the German Editions of his Logical Investigations, descriptive-eidetic clarifications can abstract from the existence of any reader ‘whose existence (like one’s own) is not therefore presupposed by the content of one’s investigations’ (§7). In Ideas I, however, Husserl begins with actual consciousness of the world about us, taking the thing (Sein als Ding) given to outer perceptual-sense experience as one of pivotal points of departure for his analyses and, for the other, the experience of reflection, that is, the ability of one’s own actual consciousness to reflect upon itself in immanent perception (Sein als Erlebnis). See, Ideas I, §38. Reflections on Acts. Perception of Something Immanent and of Something Transcendent.’
in reflective immanent perception exists. It is thus consciousness, and not things, which in the natural attitude we (pre-)suppose in perception to be simply there and present (vorhanden), whether attention is directed towards them or not, that is the first and foremost reality for philosophy and phenomenology to investigate. Overcoming this very (hypo-)thesis of the natural attitude, therefore, is of crucial importance to the development of Husserl's thought and to his elaboration of phenomenology as a rigorous, radical new science of intentional consciousness and its objectivities.

There is, nevertheless, one major discernible difference to which Husserl draws our attention between an experience that is reflected upon in immanent perception and an experience that is either lived and not reflected upon or an experience that is reflected upon as part of the endless stream of experiences for knowledge, and that is, in immanent perception ‘a consciousness of the living now of the experience (in der das lebendige Jetzt des Erlebnisses)’ is present as such (and hidden from any other forms of inner or outer reflection). In other words, apodictic insight into the existence of an experience that is reached in reflective immanent perception points of phenomenological necessity to some perception of time, or more precisely, of temporality in the very being of one’s own, actual, finite consciously lived experiences, whether reflected upon or not, and however infinite, in principle, reflection on one’s own finite experiences is, as Husserl, following Kant, correctly transcendentally deduces. And here, I suggest, is where Heidegger steps in to out-step Husserl, most controversially, in the advancement of an alternative definition and alternative conception of phenomenology, one that is committed precisely to the task of thinking the temporality of the finiteness of such experiences themselves, something that even Kant himself, according to Heidegger, shied away from, but one about which Heidegger is equally adamant that must be addressed both in the wake and from within the constraints, but in the spirit of the Kantian critique.  

49 ‘The first and only person who has gone any stretch of the way towards investigating the dimension of Temporality or has even let himself be drawn hither by the coercion of the phenomena themselves is Kant. […] Kant himself was aware that he was venturing into an area of obscurity. […] Here Kant [in his Critique of Pure Reason] shrinks back, as it were, in the face of something that must be brought to light as a theme and a principle if the expression ‘Being’ is to have any demonstrable meaning. In the end, those very phenomena which will be exhibited under the heading of ‘Temporality’ in our analysis, are precisely those most covert judgements of the ‘common reason’ for which Kant says it is the ‘business of philosophers’ to provide an analytic. […] At the same time we shall show why Kant could never achieve an insight into the problematic of Temporality. There were two things that stood in his way: in the first place, he altogether neglected the problem of Being; and, in connection with this, he failed to provide an ontology with Dasein as its theme or (to put this in Kantian language) to give a preliminary ontological analytic of the subjectivity of the subject.’ Being and Time, 45:23–24. For Kant, however, space and time only come into play, epistemologically, when we are presented with the sensible manifold — but not any conceptualization of space and time can do the job for Kant; rather, it is really the conceptualization of space and time in ‘above all mathematical physics (what Kant calls ‘pure natural science’) that exemplifies the application of the categories [of our understanding] to objects of experience’. Michael Friedman, A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger (Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 2000), p. 32. Furthermore, because space and time are necessary pre-conditions of our actual experience they cannot be objects of actual experiences, i.e., Kant does not regard them as ‘phenomena’. This is the reason, perhaps, why Kant, in Heidegger’s estimation, did not and could not address the phenomenological problem of temporality of those acts themselves, or of human existence either. Friedman notes, however, that Heidegger ‘later explicitly “extracted” his reading [of Kant] as an “over-interpretation” in the preface to the third (1963) and fourth (1973) editions [of Heidegger’s Kantbuch, 1929]. A Parting of the Ways,
words, wants to be more Kantian than Kant himself, and more Husserlian than Husserl himself, and, indeed, more Kantian than each and any of his fellow Kantians of the day, as his famous dispute with Ernst Cassirer at Davos in 1929 demonstrates.50

II
HEIDEGGER ON THE TASK OF THINKING
FINITUDE AFTER KANT

Reminiscing about his ‘first awkward attempts to penetrate into philosophy’, Heidegger recounts the story in his autobiographical sketch ‘My Way into Phenomenology’ (1963) of when he tried to read Brentano’s doctoral study Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles (1862), which he had received from Konrad Gröber, the pastor of Trinity Church in Constance, in the Summer of 1907.51 Heidegger was only seventeen at the time when he first attempted to read this text. It is not surprising, therefore, that, at first, he found Brentano’s dissertation difficult to understand, but the more he read and re-read this text in the years to follow the more the following quandary, he recalls, emerged for him. If Aristotle operates with four quite distinct meanings (Bedeutungen) in his reflections on ‘that which is’ (das Seiende) — in terms of Being as property (Sein als Eigenschaft); Being as possibility and actuality (Sein als Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit); Being as truth (Sein als Wahrheit); and Being as schema of the categories (Sein als Schema der Kategorien) — what, then, is the general understanding of the meaning of Being itself (Sinn von Sein) from which Aristotle operates and to which he subscribes? From where do all of these several senses of that-which-is in Being derive their designations?52 Heidegger tells us that he could not find any answer to this question in Brentano’s dissertation, but went in search, almost immediately, of Husserl’s

p. 61, n. 75. It is only in Husserl’s account of ‘immanent perception’ that there is a direct, albeit implicit, perceptual understanding of the temporality of human lived experiences, and it is this basis to Husserl’s version of Kantian transcendental idealism that Heidegger wishes to think more radically than Husserl did or than Kant could.

50 See Friedman’s excellent book, already referred to above, on this debate, A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger.

51 See, Martin Heidegger, ‘My Way into Phenomenology’, in Heidegger, On Time and Being, trans. by Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 74; original publication, ‘Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie’ in Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1969), 81. Stambaugh translates the title of Heidegger’s essay ‘Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie’ as ‘My Way to Phenomenology’. In this essay, however, Heidegger clearly wishes to convey to his readers that his way into phenomenology (in die Phänomenologie), in spite of all the contingencies that lead him to Husserl’s texts and to meeting Husserl personally in his workshops at Freiburg University (1919–1923), was a way that eventually lead him through (durch) phenomenology to ‘the Being-Question’, however controversial that matter for thought (zur Sache des Denkens) may appear to Husserl (and his followers). We will refer to this essay, therefore, as, ‘My Way into Phenomenology’. All of these essays written by Heidegger and contained in Zur Sache des Denkens: ‘Zeit und Sein’ (1962), ‘Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie’ (1963), and ‘Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens’ (1964), address this same issue of what Husserl left ‘unthought’ (ungedacht), in one way or another.

52 Brentano devotes a separate chapter to each of these four meanings of being in his doctoral dissertation, though it is of importance to point out that Brentano’s dissertation itself does not address the particular question that Heidegger himself seeks to address. The one that Heidegger wishes to address is directed towards the determination of the understanding of the meaning of Being (Sinn von Sein).
Logical Investigations from the University’s library, in the very first semester when he entered the Theological Seminary at Freiburg in 1909, because ‘I had learned from many references in philosophical periodicals that Husserl’s way of thinking (Husserls Denkweise) was determined by Franz Brentano.’ Thus, Heidegger informs us, ‘both volumes of Husserl’s Logical Investigations lay on my desk in the theological seminary ever since my first semester there.’ What Heidegger does not mention (or recall), nevertheless, is that he would have learned from the articles in the journals he read in 1909 and from his reading of the Logical Investigations themselves in the years to follow that Husserl’s thought was not determined at all by Brentano, the Aristotelian-Thomistic commentator, but by the later Brentano of the Vienna period (1874–1894), that is to say, by Brentano the modern inspired (Cartesian-Lockean-Humean) descriptive psychologist. In light of this, it is not that surprising that Heidegger tells us that his efforts aimed at achieving ‘a decisive aid in the questions stimulated by Brentano’s dissertation’, which he ‘expected [to receive] from Husserl’s Logical Investigations’, turned out to be, at least initially, ‘in vain’.

In this autobiographical sketch, however, Heidegger notes that his interest in Husserl’s Logical Investigations stayed with him for many years to follow, throughout the time he spent when he undertook doctoral research into problems and issues around meaning and logic in medieval philosophy, and when he became Husserl’s assistant lecturer in philosophy at Freiburg (1918–1923). A glance, indeed, at some of the titles of the lecture-courses and seminars that Heidegger gave, first at Freiburg and then at Marburg (1923–28), indicates his continued interest not only in Husserl’s Logical Investigations but also in Husserl’s Ideas I. Throughout this entire time —


54 Ibid.

55 ‘My Way into Phenomenology’, p. 75:82. Heidegger says it was Husserl’s Sixth Logical Investigation, and in particular the distinction worked out in the Investigation between ‘categorial and sensuous intuition’ that played a decisive role in engendering a positive influence on his ‘path of thinking’ (Der Denkweg) about ‘the Being-question’ (die Seinsfrage). The Sixth Logical Investigation is, in fact, a phenomenological enquiry into and a meditation on Kant’s thesis ‘Being is not a real predicate’. See, Husserl, Logical Investigations, Logical Investigation No. VI, esp., § 43, pp. 780–781. If Heidegger is correct about this, this means, therefore, that it is an advancement of post-Kantian reflection on the meaning of Being that is more decisive in Heidegger’s ‘path of thinking’ about ‘the Being-question’ than any pre-Kantian reflection in metaphysics. Husserl’s Ideas I also has a very significant influence on Heidegger’s thinking, but he seems to be either not aware of it or to play it down. From both a historical and a philosophical perspective, nonetheless, Heidegger offers an alternative to Husserl’s (idealist) version of transcendental phenomenology, a position Husserl had not reached in the Logical Investigations.

from his earliest students days of theology and philosophy to his early lecturing days in philosophy at Freiburg University and Marburg University — Heidegger informs us elsewhere, however, that he also was interested in works written by Dilthey, Kierkegaard, Augustine, Nietzsche, Jaspers and engaged in phenomenological readings of Aristotle’s texts and of other texts by many more authors.\textsuperscript{57} Besides Husserl’s texts in phenomenology, texts by these other authors too figure in his lecture-course and seminars throughout this period. It was, nevertheless, under the weight of influence from his voracious readings of works by Dilthey, Kierkegaard, Augustine, Nietzsche and Jaspers, that Heidegger re-interprets the experiencing of the ‘living now’ that Husserl had identified in the enactment of ‘[reflective] immanent perception’ in Ideas I as something that is itself founded in (or, at least indicative of) an immediate, pre-reflective implicit knowledge of radical temporality in the understanding of one’s own very being-in-the-world.\textsuperscript{58} That is to say, throughout the 1920s, the concept of the experiencing of the ‘living now’ that Husserl had identified in reflective, immanent perception in Ideas I is considered by Heidegger as something that is experienced, first and foremost, in one’s own entire, individually lived, existentially rooted, historical being-in-the-world, and not just, as it is and was for Husserl in Ideas I in terms of a retrievable, explicit, incorrigible knowledge-claim concerning the existence of an isolatable, individually wrapped, atomistically captured and mentally abstracted ‘consciously lived experience (Erlebnis),’ however apodictically certain and synchronically (but non-diachronically) connected in time such immanent perception must be. Thus the main point that Heidegger wishes to argue for in Being and Time is that ‘something like [the meaning of] Being’, in all its radical temporality, and however unconceptualised, lies present and vaguely understood by each and every one of us in any ‘talk of Being’ (Seinsrede) about anything that one actually experiences, such as, for instance, in statements like, ‘the sky is blue’, ‘I am happy’, and so forth.\textsuperscript{59} Retrieving the sedimented meaning of this

\textsuperscript{57} In 1957, Heidegger recalls: What the exciting years between 1910 and 1914 meant for me cannot be adequately expressed; I can only indicate it by a selective enumeration: the second, significantly enlarged edition of Nietzsche’s The Will to Power, the works of Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky in translation, the awakening interest in Hegel and Schelling, Rilke’s works and Trakl’s poems, Dilthey’s Collected Writings, Heidegger, A Recollection (1957), in Heidegger: The Man and Thinker, ed. by Thomas Sheehan (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, Inc, 1981), pp. 21–22 (p. 22).


\textsuperscript{59} According to Heidegger, ‘[The meaning of] Being can be something unconceptualised (unbegriﬀen), but it is never completely incoprehensible (es ist nie völlig unverstanden)’ (Being and Time, p. 228/183). This is what lies behind Heidegger’s earlier remarks in the Introduction to Being and Time, when he makes the point: ‘In all cognitions and statements, in every comportment to that which is (zu
experience of temporal resonance residing in this activity and in this expression of the meaning of Being, ‘those most covert judgements of the “common reason”’, as Heidegger emphasizes in Being and Time, quoting Kant, is ‘the business of philosophers’.60

Strictly speaking, however, this is not Kant speaking. This sounds, rather, like the neo-Kantian Dilthey speaking. In Dilthey’s well-known triad, human experience (Erlebnis) contains implicitly some form of understanding (Verstehen) which, in turn, is completed and raised to a higher level of meaning in expression (Ausdruck). This is borne out in the experience of language itself and is derived from the experience of language and, as such, is confirmed in the reading and in the interpreting of words, whether written or spoken. For, what else do we do, when reading a poem, or hearing a play, or trying to understand a philosophical idea, but to tap into the deposited meaning expressed and left ‘unthought’ (ungedacht) in the text of the author (and left ‘unthought’ by the author of the text).61 A raid upon the experience of language is always an interpretive raid upon something articulated, something thought and something understood, however partially expressed and incompletely understood such meaning is and must be. This methodological priority and necessity for ‘hermeneutics’ in the task of retrieving and understanding the meaning of any experience Dilthey of course learned from Schleiermacher. In fact, Dilthey’s defence of the hermeneutic-triadic unity of ‘experience-understanding-expression’ is so internalised by Heidegger that Heidegger can see and discern meanings in words that neither Dilthey himself, nor any other German, nor any other etymologist, either before or after Heidegger could because the very term ‘Da-sein’ itself (whether hyphenated by Heidegger, or not) as Heidegger now understands this word, will be the linguistic expression of the awareness of ‘the There’ (Da) of ‘Being’ (Sein), and in which I find myself implicated ‘as that-which-is’ (als Seiendes) in being and as a being that has some implicit ‘understanding of Being’ (Seinsverständnis) as an integral note of that very being’s mode of being-in-the-world, and all of this as a matter of fact, that is to say, as a fact of lived experience: Da-sein. And so, in direct contra-distinction to Dilthey’s methodological historical-hermeneutic stress that our self-understanding today is bound up with historical knowledge of others in the past and that such historical knowledge of human self-understanding is never completed in principle but always partially unfolding in the


60 Being and Time, p. 45:23–24; but, see, supra, n. 49, and our comments on this ‘over reading’ of Kant by Heidegger.

61 Thus Schleiermacher’s challenging principle of hermeneutics: that one must try to understand the author better than himself. Heidegger seems to be adhering methodologically to this principle, in some significant sense, throughout his encounter with the texts of philosophers that he read and in the very way in which he does phenomenology. Not all authors understand their work better than their critics, but most do. Yet Schleiermacher’s injunction is to understand the work of the author better than the author himself, and that requires not reading into an author’s text what is not there and reading what is not there but determinative for the author’s thoughts accurately. It seems to me that Heidegger is often guilty of reading into an author’s text ideas that are not there, but it is outside of the limits of this article to elaborate.
context of the whole of one's own historically lived experience, Heidegger can insist, with the help of Kierkegaard, on singling out the methodological significance of 'brooding over one's own death' (in the mood of Angst) in attesting to the understanding that I have of the implicit temporality of the whole of one's own, actual, individual human existence (in Dasein) as such.

Heidegger's Kierkegaardian-existentialistic rendering of Dilthey's thesis of Erlebnis-Verstehen-Ausdruck is probably best captured in the following famous definition of the temporality of one's own existence (in Dasein) that Heidegger gives in Being and Time, when he writes:

In such Being-towards-its-end, Dasein exists in a way which is authentically whole as that entity which it can be when 'thrown into death'. This entity does not have an end at which it just stops, but it exists finitely (existiert endlich). The authentic future is temporalized primarily by that temporality which makes up the meaning of anticipatory resoluteness: it thus reveals itself as finite (als endliche) [...] In our thesis that temporality is primordially finite, we are not disputing that 'time goes on'; we are simply holding fast to the phenomenal character of primordial temporality — a character which shows itself in what is projected in Dasein's primordial existential projecting.62

That 'time goes on', both irrespective and outside of my concern for my own finitude in existence, and that history goes on likewise, irrespective and outside of my concern for my own finitude in existence, does not seem to figure critically in Heidegger's thinking at all.63 At any rate, the 'understanding of Being', which Heidegger acknowledges that extends equally to and includes the world, oneself and one's fellow human being, over time and in time, throughout history and in history, as Dilthey argued, ultimately, however, as Heidegger now argues, recoils back into the concern that one has for one's own being in terms of what 'goes about' (es geht um) for that individual being in the very understanding of Being that is 'expressed' by that being's being in Dasein.64 If you were a Darwinian or a Nietzschean, you would have to say that, for Heidegger, self-preservation or the exercise of one's own individual will-to-power is what fundamentally drives an individual human being's way of existing as 'a self' in Dasein.65

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63 This responsibility before (devant), for (pour) and to (à) the other (l'autre) does feature, however, in Levinas's profound critique of Heidegger's existentialistic rendering of both Kierkegaard and Dilthey's concerns. See, E. Levinas, Unforeseen History, tr. by Nidra Poller (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2004); Les Imprévis du Histoire (Éditions Fata Morgana, 1994). For Levinas's remarks on Kierkegaard's relation to Heidegger, see his short essay contained in this collection, ‘Letter Concerning Jean Wahl’, pp. 67–70.
64 ‘Dasein is a being which does not just occur among other beings. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact it is a being in whose being this being itself is what goes about.' Being and Time, 32:12, trans. modified: ‘Das Dasein ist ein Seiendes, das nicht nur unter anderem Seienden vorkommt. Es ist vielmehr dadurch ontisch ausgezeichnet, daß es diesem Seienden in seinem Sein um dieses Sein selbst geht.’ The Being (of Dasein) is that which is at stake for every such being.’ Being and Time, p. 67–42, trans. mod.: ‘Das Sein ist es, darum es diesem Seienden je selbst geht.’
Whatever about the nature and extent of the influences that the considerations of Dilthey, Kierkegaard, Augustine, Jaspers, and Nietzsche had on Heidegger’s establishment of his new concept of ‘Dasein’, Heidegger does believe that in his specific analysis of ‘authentic selfhood’ — which he explicitly argues in *Being and Time* is disclosed and only disclosed in the anticipatory awareness in the present of one’s self running headlong for one’s own death in the future (*Vorlaufen zum Tode*) in the mood of *Angst* — he is thinking finitude from within the limits of the experience of finitude itself, therein, in his estimation, guaranteeing his membership of the club of post-Kantian phenomenological philosophers (and of the atheistic, existential-phenomenological variety of that club at that). 66 Does not a limit recognised as a limit, however, point, in that very recognition, to what is outside of that limit, and to that which is outside of that limit and necessarily so?

Heidegger does remark in *Being and Time* that his analysis of human existence in *Dasein* pertains to this side of the grave only, and that it centres on one’s own understanding of Being and on the concern of that being’s understanding of being-in-the-world as announced in the anticipatory awareness of that being’s own death in *Dasein*. 67 This leaves untouched but acknowledged and thought, however implicitly so, at least three things, namely: (1) the significance of the existence of the understanding of others in their life experiences; 68 (2) the significance of the existence of that which lies beyond the grave; and (3) the significance of the existence of that which lies beyond the comprehension of the innermost finitude of one’s own being-in-the-world. All of these are equally thought in my experience of the very existence (in Heidegger’s sense) of my own finitude in the world and in my experience of the very existence (not in Heidegger’s sense) of others, myself and the world.

We cannot of course expect Heidegger to engage in a hermeneutic retrieval of the significances of the meaning of these experiences that he has left ‘unthought’ in his own analysis and thinking of finitude from within the experience of finitude itself in *Being and Time*, but we can; and I suggest that we can with the help of and in the direction of Schleiermacher’s particular reflections on ‘religious self-consciousness’, for, as Schleiermacher remarks in his *On Religion: Addresses in Response to its Cultured Critics*, ‘(O)f course, it is an illusion to seek the infinite precisely outside of the finite, to seek the opposite outside that to which it is opposed.’ 69 Schleiermacher’s directive, rather, is to think the existence of the infinite inside of that to which it is opposed; that is to say, the task is to begin with our experience of the existence of the infinite in relation to our experience of the existence of the finite in our experiential recognition of the finite. This invitation for thought begins with experience and in experience, and neither denies nor affirms the existence of a determinate infinite being outside of human experience of finitude. In fact, misunderstanding the relation of the finite to the infinite in the latter manner,

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67 See, *Being and Time*, §49. How the Existential Analysis of Death is Distinguished from Other Possible Interpretations of this Phenomenon*, pp. 290–293 (p. 292); 246–249 (248).

68 Thus the existence of the understanding of others can call into question the existence of my understanding of the ‘there of Being’, and in which I find myself implicated as that-which-is among fellow human beings in the world, as Levinas was later to argue. This has profound ethical implications too.

as Schleiermacher also notes in *On Religion*, calls not for a rejection but for a clarification of the proper understanding of the relation of the finite to the infinite.\(^7\)

Whilst Kant, therefore, correctly drew attention to the illicit move in any ontological form of argumentation that runs from the idea of an infinite being to the existence of such an infinite being, this leaves both *unaddressed* and *unthought* the significance of the experience of the existence of the finite itself in relation to the existence of the infinite itself, as expressed and documented in religious experience. Kant himself, after all, does not and cannot deny the significance of such religious belief to his own critical standpoint in philosophy for the entire enterprise of his *Critique of Pure Reason* is engendered by it, for, as he informs his reader in the 1789 Preface to the Second Edition of this *Critique*, ‘I had, therefore, to remove *knowledge* [of the existence of God], in order to make room for *belief* [in God]’ (B. xxx).

Kant, Husserl and Heidegger, then, have at least this much all in common, they side-step the implicit significance of philosophical reflection on the relation of the experience of the self, as existing, in relation to the experience of the infinite, as existing, in their determination and demarcation of ‘first philosophy’. It is, therefore, to Schleiermacher’s explicit task of thinking the finite and infinite together, after Kant, as a possible critique of Husserl and Heidegger’s respective philosophies of experiences, and of Kant’s position too, that I now turn.

III

**SCHLEIERMACHER ON THE TASK OF THINKING THE FINITE AND THE INFINITE TOGETHER, AFTER KANT**

Husserl is quite right to note that reflection on any of our lived experiences as objects of finite knowledge-claims presupposes the ideal-regulative-possibility of reflecting infinitely on the content of such experiences, and that this is not an experience of the infinite as documented in religious experience, but a feature of our human understanding, just as Kant had argued. And Heidegger is quite right to insist, following Husserl, that reflection on the finiteness of our experiences is phenomenologically grounded in a perception of the temporality of finite experiences themselves. If, however, Heidegger stresses reflection on the latter as a *methodological* requirement in phenomenology, he can only do so by rejecting outright Husserl’s definition of phenomenology as an eidetic science of intentional consciousness and its objectivities that specifically excludes such philosophical speculation, and by appropriating instead a *hermeneutic* possibility that Dilthey, following Schleiermacher, saw in reflecting on the significances of individual experiences themselves that find their meaning in the experiences themselves for each and any human being’s actual understanding of themselves in relation to the totality of that individual’s life experiences as expressed in poetry, language and thought. Drawing as much on Plato and Augustine’s efforts to understand their own particular life experiences, as on his own life experiences, Schleiermacher remarks in *The Christian Faith*,

\(^7\) Schleiermacher would have been thoroughly aware of St John, the evangelist, stylistic use of the misunderstanding in his writings in communicating the teachings of Jesus as initial misunderstanding invites clarification as to interpreting its proper meaning and its proper understanding, not rejection (e.g., the story of the woman at the well misunderstanding Jesus’ request to wash her feet).
In the first place, it is everybody’s experience that there are moments in which all thinking and willing retreat behind a self-consciousness of one form or another; but, in the second place, that at times this same form of self-consciousness persists unaltered during a series of diverse acts of thinking and willing, taking up no relation to these, and thus not being in the proper sense even an accompaniment of them. Thus joy and sorrow — those mental phases which are always so important in the realm of religion — are genuine states of feeling [...]; whereas the self-approval and self-reproach, apart from their subsequently passing into joy and sorrow, belong themselves rather to the objective self-consciousness of a self, as results from analytic contemplation.71

The Heideggerean contemplative self in the mood of Angst that reproaches its ‘self’ as ‘an improper self’ precisely because that self can only think of its self as an accompanying ‘I think’ that is already an ‘I’ that is destined for death, therein annulling any grandeur of ontological ownership that such a ‘self’ may have assumed and acquired outside of the mood of Angst, and that very same self that approves of itself as ‘a proper self’ in the ‘I’ that wills of its self in the mood of Angst to be that finite self, for its self, in itself, in anticipatory openness for its own death, come what may and ‘without alibi’, as Sartre puts it, is a result of what Schleiermacher terms above, ‘analytic contemplation’; that is to say, such reflection within Angst belongs to a one-sided manner of thinking on experience that accompanies objective self-consciousness of a self. This manner of thinking, alas, does not disclose any truth of the matter pertaining to one’s own subjective self-consciousness of a self, which, as one commentator puts it, is a ‘higher centre of consciousness whereby we both remember and desire, and feel guilt or pride at what “I” have done or been’.72 This ‘I’ is not a mere accompaniment to a series of incidents in my physical bodily life, or in my mental life as Plato noted, but as Gerard Watson succinctly puts it, ‘a connecting thread’ wherein the unity and continuity of responsibility and accountability for the ‘I’ is given.73 This ‘I’, nonetheless, is hidden from the ‘I think’ and the ‘I will’ that accompanies the objectified self in Angst, or, indeed, that accompanies any objectified self in any other kind of intellectual or wilful representation, such as, Hume’s ‘self’ as ‘a bundle or collection of different perceptions’,74 or Kant’s ‘I think’ as ‘an analytic unity of apperception’.75 Yet it is this overlooked ‘I’, as Plato taught us to see, ‘that provides the unity or continuity in personality and so gives meaning to what is otherwise a psychic and physical hotch-potch’.76 And it is this deeper and fixed ‘I’ that

73 Watson, pp. 36–37.
75 See, Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B133–4n. For Schleiermacher, both Kant’s ‘I think’ qua ‘analytic unity of apperception’ that is constitutive of logical universality (see, §16 of the B edition Transcendental Deduction of the Categories), as much as Hume’s famously empirically deduced ‘self’ as ‘a bundle of different perceptions’, as much as Heidegger’s thinking about ‘the proper self in the mood of Angst, would be products of objective self consciousness, overlooking what Plato originally spotted about the ‘I’.
76 Watson, p. 37.
experiences joy and sorrow in its day to day living and that experiences its self as embedded in a world wherein everything is indissolubly interconnected that also experiences its self in causal dependence upon that which is higher than that self in its world. It is this experience of the existence of subjective self-consciousness in relation to the existence of the infinite that Schleiermacher wishes to draw our attention to and identify as the experiential origins, par excellence, of ‘immediate religious self-consciousness’.

Drawing attention to the feeling of piety that forms an integral part of the dimension of experience that is characteristic of an individual’s ‘immediate religious self-consciousness’, Schleiermacher remarks,

The common element in all howsoever expressions of piety, by which these are conjointly distinguished from all other feelings, or in other words, the self-identical essence of piety is this: the consciousness of being absolutely dependent, or, which is the same thing, of being in relation with God.

What is of significance here is that this consciousness of being absolutely dependent can only be felt and known within particular human experiences as such in ‘immediate religious self-consciousness’. Yet this particular feeling of innermost joy that is found in the discovery of the knowledge of the truth of one’s own existence residing in dependence on the existence of a higher and highest being that can only be a higher and highest Good, ‘carries with it’, as Joseph McBride acutely points out, and as Augustine discovered against his own will, ‘that it is God, the unmeasured measure or the measureless measure of all measures and not man himself who is the measure of man.’ And if this is the case, then thinking the relation of the finite and the infinite in this direction, with Augustine and Schleiermacher, will be a thinking that goes back to the roots of those philosophies of experience elaborated by Kant, Husserl and Heidegger, but as their ‘norm and critical standard’ precisely because ‘the feeling of absolute dependence’ is not a religious dogma, nor a theological proposition, nor an abstract ahistorical theoretical construction, but, as Terence Tice observes, ‘(F)undamentally [...] an experience of being utterly dependent, of being interconnected with the whole of the entire created and sustained process of nature, including the history of human beings, in and through which God’s grace is made manifest.

77 This concurs with Husserl’s requirement that such causal dependence between God and the existence of one’s own actual consciousness ‘naturally does not have the sense of a physical-causal reason’ and that God as an Absolute would ‘be an “absolute” in the sense totally different from that which consciousness is an absolute [as defined in and through the transcendental reduction] [...] just as it would be something transcendent in a sense totally different from that in which world is something transcendent [to the harmony of one’s own outer perceptual-sense experiences]’. Husserl, Ideas I, §58. The Transcendence, God, Excluded’, pp. 133–134:110–111 (p. 134:111).
78 See, Terence Tice, Schleiermacher (Nashville: Abingdon, 2006), p. 27.
80 This is because ‘no thinking or acting [for Schleiermacher] is affect-free or can be rightly conceived as unaffected by feelings of some kind’. Tice, p. 26.
81 Joseph McBride, Albert Camus: Philosopher and Littérature (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1992), pp. 38–339. If one is unable to find a ‘good’ (bonum) in the nature of things given to our actual experiences, then it goes without saying that one will not be able to find either a higher or highest Good (summum Bonum) either.
82 Tice, pp. 27–28.
From this, it follows, then, that the particular experience of absolute dependence on the ‘grace’ of God, however that ‘idea of God’ is to be interpreted and expressed historically in documented evidence about ‘the word of God’, will require not a new science of experience but a renewed and renewable hermeneutic retrieval of its significance in and for human historical self-understanding. This, however, can only be conducted from within the particular experience and conditioning of immediate religious self-consciousness of ‘the [critical] word of God’ itself, as Schleiermacher remarks. This applies to anyone living in the wake of the Kantian critique, and that extends to and includes not only Husserl and Heidegger but also Kant himself. As a member of the Protestant faith, Kant, after all, throughout his critical reflections, held firm to his religious conviction that it is through ‘faith alone that we see God’s face’. In this respect, Kant must take reassurance — and re-assurance is an epistemological term — from St John the Evangelist’s remarks that those who lived after Jesus Christ, and believed in his life, death and resurrection, are not in any way at a disadvantaged or compromised by not being present at the time of his life, death, and resurrection, for, as St John the beloved discipline notes, there were many who saw Jesus, and did not believe, even after the resurrection appearances (as recounted in the story of doubting Thomas). Viewed in this light, it is not an irrefragable item of knowledge about the life, death and resurrection (i.e., facticity) of Jesus Christ that counts for Kant, but the testimony of the written word of the Old and New Testaments and faith in ‘the word of God’ that is Kant’s first and final court of appeal. This is why outside of faith in the word of God, we have no way of knowing, according to Kant, whether the God we believe in exists, or not. And this is why, for Kant, inside the realm of personal faith in God, the same ‘objective uncertainty’ (as Kierkegaard later expresses it) in relation to (demonstrable) knowledge of the existence of God equally holds. In other words, for Kant, as a man of faith, the non-existence of God must be a real possibility, and not just a merely formal-logical possibility containing nothing self-referentially inconsistent for anyone to assert the proposition ‘God does not exist’, in order for belief, as Kant understands it, to be what it is, belief in God. From this, it clearly follows for Kant that if we believe in God, we cannot know in any apodictic manner that God exists. This is why Kant is quite correct to impress and to stress to his readers in the 1787 Preface to the second edition of his Critique of Pure Reason, that he had to remove apodictic knowledge-claims in relation to the existence of God ‘in order to make room for belief in the existence of God’ (a belief that his moral argument for the existence of God renders highly equivocal). This, however, is an expressly religious reason, on Kant’s part, for curtailing any path of thinking that would lead to an inappropriate manner of thinking, philosophically or theologically, about the existence of God in relation to the experiencing subject. This leaves unthought (ungenacht), nonetheless, the task of doing just that, appropriately: thinking (philosophically or theologically) the existence of God in relation to the existence of

83 ‘If, however, word and idea are always originally one, and the term “God” therefore presupposes an idea, then we shall simply say that this idea, which is nothing more than an expression of the feeling of absolute dependence, is the most direct reflection upon it and the most original idea with which we are here concerned, and is quite independent of original knowledge (properly so called), and conditioned only by our feeling of absolute dependence.’ Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, p. 17.

84 I would like to thank the reviewer of my article for drawing my attention to this significant equivocity in Kant’s treatment of historical religions (especially those claiming revelation).
the self, just as Schleiermacher had argued. That there is a particular religious experience and religious reasoning concerning the existence of the self in relation to the existence of God in the identity of the human self in religious self-consciousness underpinning Kantian epistemology, Husserlian phenomenology, and Heideggerean thinking on finitude, therefore, cannot be doubted. The task, however, is to think this and its significance both after Kant and against Kant, after Husserl and against Husserl, after Heidegger and against Heidegger.

85 That there is also a legitimate form of religious thinking, after Kant, as evidenced in the writings of Kierkegaard, is something that cannot be doubted, nor written out of the history of thought, as it is by Heidegger, in his three footnote references to Kierkegaard’s thought in *Being and Time.*

86 This article is a revised version of a paper that I first prepared for and gave at a Conference on theme of ‘The Grandeur of Reason,’ held in Rome (3 Sept. 2008), under the auspices of The Centre of Theology and Philosophy, University of Nottingham, U.K., and which I later re-worked and read at the Irish Philosophical Society’s 2009 Autumn Conference, held in St Malachy’s College, Belfast, Northern Ireland (24 October). I would like to thank Dr Fáinche Ryan and Dr Janet Soskice for their follow-up discussion on this paper in Rome and the participants at the Irish Philosophical Society’s Conference for their questions in Belfast. I would also like to thank Haydn Gurm and Denise Ryan, postgraduate students of the National University of Ireland, Maynooth, for reading drafts of this paper and giving me their comments. Any misunderstanding of the topic, of course, is entirely my own.