Husserl and Stein
Edited by Richard Feist and William Sweet
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Husserl and Stein is a collection of essays relating to these two thinkers. The individual essays are mostly of very good quality, highlighting aspects which are often left underdeveloped: Husserl’s relations to his colleagues in mathematics and to his assistant Stein, as well as problems in Stein’s philosophy. The book sheds interesting light on early phenomenology and on the problems that spurred its development.

The introduction by Feist and Sweet is well structured and informative: it outlines the shape of the volume and presents its scope.

Rolf George’s ‘Brentano and Intentionality’ opens up the collection by striking a note suggesting that phenomenology’s ‘grandfather’ contributed an outline of the problems of political and social philosophy which were dealt with by Stein, and later by Husserl, as highlighted later in the collection. The chapter discusses the relationship between Aristotle and Brentano, and underlines the latter’s anti-Kantianism, something that would be reflected more in Stein than in Husserl.

Anoop Gupta’s article about James, Husserl, Gödel and Quine is so brief that the case it makes for a naturalist understanding of intuition seems more like a statement than an argument. Nevertheless, the synthetic rapprochement of the four authors is inspiring, even though it is not exactly thorough.

Richard Holmes’ treatment of the relationship between transcendental and human subjectivity on the model of the theory of relativity (according to which a photon only determines itself to be in one place rather than in another for the eyes of the onlooker) is illustrative, but suffers somewhat from not treating the problem of intersubjectivity.

René Jagnow’s discussion of a material or intuitive geometry aided by a Husserlian understanding of Wesensschau and defending the viewpoint that ‘Euclid’s geometry is a priori at least in one sense, namely in that it is a special case of the more general Riemannian space with constant curvature’ is instructive. As it situates Husserl’s thought in its natural surroundings, it contributes to the volume’s picture of Husserl as a philosopher of mathematics.

Richard Feist’s chapter on ‘Reductions and Relativity’ continues to emphasize this aspect. It discusses Weyl’s alignment with phenomenology and hence the interpretation of relativity theory along its lines. It is argued that despite the fact that Weyl’s work contains only scattered philosophical statements, Weyl is in fact a fairly consistent metaphysical thinker. In turn, Husserl’s influence on Weyl makes us approach phenomenology again as a discipline closely connected to physics, and
providing, at least in the case of Weyl, explanatory support for this discipline.

David L. Thompson questions the reality of appearance and draws a helpful parallel between Husserl’s and Dennett’s views on this, while keeping the aims of their respective projects appropriately apart. The chapter contains memorable formulations of the phenomenological project and useful insights regarding its relationship with ontology.

Judy Miles’ comments on Stein’s theory of empathy are surprising in that she insists that Stein regards empathy as ‘projection’. Perhaps Miles is drawing on her interest in De Beauvoir and Sartre, as Stein’s own conception, even in Miles’ rendering, does not make use of this vocabulary. Miles is in fact arguing against a feminist critique of the view that empathy could be ‘projection’, and her reading of Stein is relevant to her argument only in so far as it supports her thesis that ‘projection’ is a perfectly feminine thing to do. Stein’s understanding of empathy as the experience of foreign experience neither brings the other into the self (as Nol Neddings, Miles’ opponent, would have empathy do) nor projects the self into the other (as Miles contends empathy should). But Miles is right in underlining that Stein’s concept of empathy leaves the other other, without need for either annihilating her or absorbing him. She is also right in drawing interesting parallels with Quine’s understanding of empathy as a basic prerogative for the learning of language; it is a pity that this parallel is left undeveloped.

Ernest McCullough’s version of Stein’s theory of intersubjectivity is happily at odds with Miles’, as McCullough points out a number of areas where Stein’s theory of empathy has significance for her development as a philosopher and for her entire work. The chapter unfolds as a symmetrical treatment of Husserl on metaphysics, consciousness and empathy, on the one hand, and of Stein on empathy, consciousness and metaphysics on the other. It raises a number of important issues (the relationship between the subjective and intersubjective perspective and the relationship of both of these to other accounts of objectivity in the history of philosophy), without, however, addressing either of these systematically. Something for another occasion, perhaps.

With Marianne Sawicki’s ‘The Humane Community: Husserl versus Stein’ we arrive at the heart of the promise made by the book’s title: the relationship between Husserl and Stein. Sawicki shows convincingly how Husserl’s excursions into social philosophy (in his Kaizo-articles) presuppose the more extensive investigations of Stein (in Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities and An Investigation concerning the State). She points to the often-neglected source of inspiration that Stein constituted for Husserl, especially as regards the philosophy of intersubjectivity and affiliated areas. Sawicki also shows how Stein’s idea of shared experience (the sharing of values in particular) is the basis of community, the State being a by-product of this communal constituting activity. As ethics is a form of shared motivation, it cannot be restricted to a particular race or group, but
can be shared by anyone capable of experiencing the same type of motivation. Thus communities cannot be closed to one another definitively, although of course hostility may exist between them.

Chantal Beauvais’s chapter crowns the collection. She questions the later Stein’s relationship to Husserlian phenomenology and argues that *Finite and Eternal Being* strikes a middle course between Husserlian transcendentalism and Heideggerian fundamental ontology. Her insistence on Scotistic and Heideggerian aspects of the work is thought-provoking, as Stein’s later work is often regarded as Thomistic. Beauvais’s explanation of Stein’s position in the debate concerning Christian philosophy is likewise enlightening: Beauvais intimates how Stein perceives Christian philosophy as the only way of arriving at the radical foundation which Husserl intended phenomenology to provide, and how she replaces the scholastic analogy of being with an analogy of persons, so as to found ontology upon intersubjectivity. Beauvais has here set a standard for studies of *Finite and Eternal Being*, challenging others to read it as a work of modern philosophy informed by postmodern insights, instead of as a work of medievalist philosophy.

Thus the collection is worthwhile reading for all with an interest in Husserl and Stein, their relationship being profoundly determining for the development of each. Although the articles differ in scope, length, focus and awareness, the collection provides a fresh approach, paying serious attention to an important topic.

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*Archytas of Tarentum: Pythagorean, Philosopher and Mathematician King*  
By Carl A. Huffman  

Archytas of Taras or Tarentum was an outstanding philosopher within the Pythagorean continuum. He was also a mathematician, a theorist of music, a statesman, and a leader of his city in war. His name therefore is to be found in textbooks of early Greek thought, and it is all the more remarkable that a book-length treatment of his life and work has hitherto been lacking. The deficiency has now been set aright by Professor Huffman of DePaul University – let it be stated at once that we have here a work distinguished by careful reasoning and meticulous philology.

Archytas wrote in the Doric dialect. Also in Doric were large numbers of Pseudo-Pythagorean texts; it has been a persistent problem to separate genuinely Archytan wording from the mass of pseudopigraphic matter, but,