WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM EDITH STEIN’S PHILOSOPHY OF WOMAN?

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Abstract: This article addresses the question proposed in the title by describing the place of the philosophy of woman within the whole of Stein’s philosophy and by discussing the place of gender within Stein’s philosophical anthropology in particular. Some typical differences of the sexes as perceived by Stein are outlined and discussed in order to reflect on what answer to give to the question raised.

I

INTRODUCTION

Being a woman, as well as being a man, presents individuals with a task they share with only half of humanity. Because it is a task that probably essentially involves a relationship with those whose task it precisely is not, and also, accidentally so to speak, can free up incomparable creativity to the point of bringing children into the world, it is accompanied by joys and sorrows the depths of which stir every human heart and often break them. Whether the misbalance in existing reflections on gender, allowing for a disproportionate amount of reflection on woman compared to reflections on what it is to be a man, in itself bears a message about reality, or, indeed, is a misrepresentation of it, lies beyond the scope of these remarks. It remains that Stein’s reflections on woman in fact also contains a philosophy of (male) man, although both remain somewhat embryonic, and also sometimes marked by not being worked out in the same philosophical depth as the rest of her philosophical anthropology.

To answer the question proposed in the title, I wish in the following to describe the place of the philosophy of woman within the context of the whole of Stein’s philosophy of woman and to show where this place is related to the central theme of her philosophical anthropology. These reflections on Stein’s philosophy of woman are by no means the only account of her philosophical anthropology, but they can at least provide insight into the place of the different aspects and questions within her whole philosophy of woman, as well as their relationship to her whole philosophical anthropology.

1 This paper was originally given to the Newman Society in UCD under the title ‘female identity’ in the context of a man’s reflection (Tom Finnegan) on ‘male identity’, on 11 February 2009.
2 Edith Stein, Woman, trans. by Freda Mary Oben, Collected Works of Edith Stein II (Washington: ICS Publications, 1996). This work does not accurately reflect the texts assembled in the critical edition in Edith Stein Gesamtausgabe, Herder, vol. 13, which forms the basis for the present study. Sarah Borden’s, ‘Edith Stein’s Understanding of Woman’, International Philosophical Quarterly, (46, 2006), 171–90, explains in detail how the two volumes relate. Stein’s work on woman, however, must be read in the context not only of the contemporary lectures on education reprinted in Bildung und Entfaltung der Individualität (ESGA vol. 16) but also in the context of the later concluding lectures from her time at the Marianum: Der Aufbau der menschlichen Person and Was ist der Mensch?, respectively vol. 14 and 15 in ESGA. Unfortunately, these important works are not yet translated into English.

Stein’s philosophy (Section II). This will lead us to discuss the place of gender within the human person as Stein presents it in her early and later philosophical anthropology (Section III) and also the typical differences of the sexes as portrayed by Stein (Section IV). We shall then finally be in a position to ask some questions regarding Stein’s understanding of gender in its theological dimensions (Section V), which, although we may not be able to answer them fully, may serve as an opening of the field — in case we are in need of such a one to supplement the one we inevitably have ourselves by virtue of the task with which our gender confronts us. We shall conclude by reflecting on what to learn from Stein on these issues.

II

THE PLACE OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF WOMAN WITHIN THE WHOLE OF STEIN’S PHILOSOPHY

Stein wrote about woman because she was asked to, not so much because she had an urge to do so. She did so at a time when she was working towards re-establishing a career in philosophy, after having left it aside to teach German and Latin in the gymnasium for girls run by the Dominican nuns in Speyer. Requests for talks kept coming, and Stein kept answering these requests: in doing so she reached a very large public by means of a popular style of thought otherwise uncharacteristic of her. She never wrote a book on the topic, nor did gender figure prominently in her more substantial lectures on philosophical anthropology published as the Structure of the Human Person. Stein’s ‘philosophy of woman’ is thus a prominent topic in her circumstantial writings — but it is not in any way her most substantial contribution to philosophy, as one can sometimes be led to think by superficial acquaintance with the scholarship surrounding Stein’s writings.

Her career as a lecturer on the issue took off in particular after she had given her ‘The Ethos of Women’s Professions’ in Salzburg on 1 September 1930, at a meeting of the Association of Catholic Academics, the first of the annual ‘Salzburgerwochen’ (a very well established institution still in existence). For this occasion she had first been offered to address the more fundamental topic of ‘the Ethos of Christian Professions’, something she said she accepted only because ‘that topic particularly attracted’ her. ‘But then the people in Salzburg decided it was essential to address the women’s theme separately, so I consented to change’: Dietrich von Hildebrandt took over the other topic, and this process had given her food for thought. She ended her talk in Salzburg in the following manner:

I would like to raise a question that comes to mind again and again: the convention program clearly designates the various kinds of professions (the doctor, the priest, etc.). What need was there for a special category of women’s professions? Besides, why are there such frequent discussions on women’s professions but hardly any on men’s professions? Is not man like woman aware of the coexistence and potential conflict between individual tendencies and masculine tendencies? Is it not also true of man that his nature is or should be a co-determining factor for the selection and formation of his vocation? Furthermore, do we not also here find the opposition

3 See, supra, n. 2.
5 Ibid.
between fallen and redeemed nature? I believe it would be very beneficial if at some time these questions would be considered seriously and thoroughly. For a wholesome collaboration of the sexes in professional life will be possible only if both achieve a calm and objective awareness of their nature and draw practical conclusions from it.⁵

The circumstantial nature of Stein’s work on woman, (ESGA 13 contains 10 more or less substantial articles on the topic, most of them solicited as a result of this first one), makes us look towards the motivation that existed among the public for asking her to deal with this particular topic. A brief glance on the times in which these lectures were solicited reveals that two weeks after her first lecture on the ‘woman-question’, on September 14 1930, 18.3 % of the votes were secured by the Nazi party during an election for the German Reichstag (107 deputies). The Nazi understanding that women had to play a role primarily in the home and as child bearers, which, to judge from this result, had a significant amount of subscribers, together with the depression of 1929 issuing in massive unemployment figures, conspired to create an atmosphere where the question of women’s professions, after the great victories of the women’s movement in the first and second decade of the twentieth century, again became a real question. It was in fact this question Stein was asked to address by her public, and she therefore rightly understood her lectures about woman as addressing a political question, ‘eine brennende Gegenwartfrage’⁷.

It was for Stein not only the reductionist Nazi subordination of women to the service of men in the private sphere, but also the competing ‘Bolchevist’ ideal of empty equality of all human beings reduced to their force of labour that needed correction. What was needed in order to counteract both, and respond to the quest they grew from, was the education of the whole, real human person, so that all, men and women alike, could reach their full human potential. To Stein the question of the education and professions of women highlighted the much more important question of the reality of the human being: the human being could not be a mere result of social factors shaping it arbitrarily for purposes that had nothing to do with its own being: conceiving it as such would create the highly instable possibility of totalitarian exploitation, as indeed it in fact did. Gender, because it forms part of the concrete reality of the human being, thus provided an opportunity to argue that this reality would have to be taken into consideration and find an expression through the education and work offered for the development of the human being by society.

To Stein this reality meant first and foremost that women should be allowed to be educated by women (most education of girls in Germany were at the time in the hands of male teachers), so that women’s potential as women could be reached, given the teachers’ function as role model and their personal experience of living the life of a woman. That such education of the whole person (inclusive of gender and not despite it) was the best defence against both ideologies rests on the fact that each of these ideologies in their own way denied the particular being and value of the human being as such and of women in particular, instead understanding the being and value of human beings to rely on race, power, society or the force of labour. Education of the whole human being meant an affirmation of the dignity,

⁷ ESGA 13, p. 1.
person, humanity, gender and individuality of every human individual, i.e., also of women; and a challenge to the body, soul and personality of the individual. Since Stein in several cases was asked to address the woman question in particular, a question she saw as reflecting this deeper political and moral problem, she addressed that question specifically, but always in a manner that pointed to the larger one of the education of the human person for its own good, the good of society, and for an eternal destiny.

Stein had always been interested in the human person, its relationship to its fellows, to communities, to the state and to religion. The philosophical anthropology developed in her early explicitly phenomenological period (On the Problem of Empathy, Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities, An Investigation Concerning the State and Introduction to Philosophy) gave her a foundation for the lectures on woman. The popular nature of these latter, however, means that they contain less sustained philosophical analysis and as a consequence make concessions to general opinion, which for the sake of brevity and political efficacy no doubt were necessary and indicated. For these reasons, perhaps, these lectures also made her famous, they were hotly debated and contested and are still widely read, probably because they are easy to read, much easier than Stein’s substantial contributions to philosophy. They also give a rounded insight into a topic that is both highly personal and highly context-dependent. When Stein again obtained a foothold in academic work, she abandoned the topic, and in its place trod the systematic development of a Christian education theory based on a philosophical anthropology informed by her Catholic faith, a topic much closer to the centre of her natural interests.

Should we understand the lectures on woman as being opportunistic, therefore? That is probably stretching the argument too far: Stein seized the opportunities handed to her with the intent of engaging fulltime in academic work again. And she brought her political perspicacity to bear on the question, which she addressed in a highly reflective manner still accessible to the non-philosopher. Her characteristic wisdom and profundity, however, also gleams through the style of thought, and reveals an earnest courage to put herself on the line in the concrete situation that was the fatally overheated social climate of Germany in the thirties.

III
THE PLACE OF GENDER
WITHIN THE HUMAN PERSON

Let us thus, before we look closer at her understanding of female and male identity in these lectures, move to address the question of the role of gender within her philosophical anthropology, which forms the philosophical context of her well-known public appearances.

From her early works to the later twin-works The Structure of the Human Person and What is the Human Being Stein’s development as a philosopher is that of a phenomenologist primarily interested in constitutional issues (i.e. how we come to identify our experience as we do), who under the influence of classical and medieval philosophy, particularly Aristotle and Aquinas, turn her attention increasingly towards eidetics, i.e. towards the essential structures of the objects experienced and

8 ESGA 5, 6, 7 and 8.
9 ESGA 14 and 15
of experiences as such. There is, therefore, a strict correlation — one might even say convertibility — between her early phenomenology, prolonging Husserl’s, and her late philosophy, often characterised as ‘Scholastic’. Whether the latter description is accurate, or not, is immaterial in this context (this depends on how one defines Scholasticism); what matters is that we are talking about a philosophical anthropology thought through in two complementary and convertible modes. The first mode unfolds amidst a conscious assessment of the complex web of social construction,\(^{10}\) the second mode is supported by the teachings of the Catholic Church (understood by Stein to occupy a privileged place in the web of social construction because of its relation to Jesus Christ). The place of gender in the early and in the later anthropology reflects this convertibility.

In *On the Problem of Empathy* (1916) Stein uses the word ‘type’ to designate *that as which* the ‘I’ sees itself, in so far as it sees itself as of the same kind as the ‘you’.\(^{11}\) This type is not fixed, but can be varied, even at will, in the same way as eidetic variation involves willfully re-imagining the entity under investigation in order to assess its limits. I am thus able to conceive myself as fulfilling various types; ‘person’, ‘human individual’, ‘woman’, ‘lecturer’, ‘member of the Irish Philosophical Society’, each of which captures me under a certain aspect. I can indeed also see myself as ‘animal’ or ‘thing’, which captures still more abstract aspects of me. In Stein’s early work the ‘type’ is that according to which I interpret the experience of ‘you’ and ‘I’ as equivalent or analogous, and hence the means by which my world as socially constructed is constituted as objective. The type or types I take to be mine define who co-constitutes my world. Woman and man are thus types according to which I constitute myself in the world and according to which I compile and compare my experience from and with others of the same type. It is normal and rational to think that the types of ‘woman’ and ‘man’ fit into the more general type of the human being or person (since the species of human beings comprise two sexes), but normality or rationality are both normative for constitution, and nothing can force constitution if it isn’t occurring or thought to ought to occur. This means that although constitution inclusive of the two genders is normal and seen as such, it may not occur. What may occur in stead could rely on one type, rather than another, so that the human implicitly is reduced to one of the genders.\(^{12}\) What the content of the types of man and woman are, however, apart from them being possible forms according to which the I can identify itself, is not made clear in Stein’s early work. A means of distinguishing them from ‘social types’ (which she later will explore) seems absent: ‘age, sex, occupation, station, nationality, generation’ are all considered ‘general experiential structures to which the individual is subordinate’, and in fact distinguished by their pertaining to the

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11 III, 5, in particular (b).

spiritual realm as distinct from the natural realm. Such experiential structures may erect boundaries: ‘I cannot fulfil what conflicts with my own experiential structure. But I can still have it given in the manner of empty representation.’ This means that if I identify with a type that excludes another (as ‘man’ and ‘woman’ might), I will have to put imagination to work to emptily represent that which ‘my’ type excludes. As experiential structure also is the presupposition for the formation of communities, my ‘type’ also determines the types of communities to which I can belong.

16 years later, in *The Structure of the Human Person* (1932), Stein does distinguish between social types and the inborn predispositions that are ultimately shaping the person from within his or her self-constitution. She sees the inborn types as being those of the human, the gender, the specific and the individual, so that these types discovered in each individual are fundamental to the social types, which in turn reform what is already formed. Education, in other words, does not invent the human being: it forms it in accordance with a pre-established individual programme, visible and intuitable in the individual human being whose humanity, gender, specificity and individuality gives him or her concrete dimensions. She tentatively calls gender a part-species (*Teilspecies*), in which individuals find themselves from birth. But then she says the following:

Also the male and the female gender (*männliche und weibliche Eigenart*) is something that first must unfold to actuality in the course of life; that happens again under the influence of the environment, and so is, in all later stages of development, that which meets us and which could be designated as the ‘manly’ or the ‘womanly’, probably a social type, in which what is determined by ‘the environment’ and the ‘specificity’ fundamental to the social formation are very difficult to distinguish. (Thus is explained the quarrel over whether male and female gender are specific differences, i.e., fundamental to social formation, or whether they are only typical, i.e., results of social formation.)

‘Man’ and ‘woman’ are in other words types, the natural foundation of which is lost in constitution, as this happens against the background of the spiritual achievements we call culture. We thus only know what it is now, and how it matters now, and that only provisionally and in so far as it really matters; we can never know how it ‘originally’ was or is in ‘its purity’ as such purity does not and never did exist.

**IV**

**The Typical Differences as Perceived by Stein**

This point must be kept in mind when we read the slightly earlier popular lectures on woman. It justifies the view that these lectures must be seen as a political intervention, indeed as Stein’s most consciously political intervention, her strategic

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13 *On the Problem of Empathy*, IV, 7 (b). That means they are spiritual realities, not natural ones as indeed all concepts are: products of a spiritual process, meant to understand natural reality.

14 Ibid.

15 *Philosophy of Ps. And the Hum.*, II, 4, (a)


17 Ibid., own translation.
attempt to counteract the influence of Nazism on what she regarded the most holy of tasks: education. That gender is both presupposed for its social interpretation and a result of it means that any theorising about it is observation as much as it is proposal. From this stems the difficulty of talking about the subject.

The double basic difference between the sexes that Stein most often returns to, and thus both observes and proposes to observe, is that of men being primarily focussed on the factual (Sachliches) in a life that develops specific talents (or one specific talent) to the point of excellence at the expense of other talents and a sense of the wholeness of the person, while women focus primarily on the personal and have an urge towards developing the entire person (in themselves and in others) in a harmonious manner. Thus she will, for example, say the following in her ‘Woman’s Value in National Life’ (14 April 1928, given to the association of women teachers in Bayern):

Man appears more objective: it is natural for him to dedicate his faculties to a discipline (be it mathematics or technology, a trade or business management) and thereby to subject himself to the precepts of this discipline. Woman’s attitude is personal; and this has several meanings: in one instance she is happily involved with her total being in what she does; then she has particular interest for the living, concrete person, and indeed, as much for her own personal life and personal affairs as for those of other persons.

Through submission to a discipline, man easily experiences a one-sided development. In woman, there lives a natural drive towards totality and self-containment. And, again, this drive has a twofold direction: she herself would like to become a complete human being, one who is fully developed in every way; and she would like to help others to become so, and by all means, she would like to do justice to the complete human being wherever she has to deal with persons.18

The flipside to these positive characteristics of both sexes are certain exaggerations, which Stein attributes to the fall described in Genesis forming part of the Christian faith. For the man this flipside is an exaggeration of the objective attitude: a tendency to dominate and bring not only his own forces but also those of his surroundings, and in particular those of his wife, to serve his particular purpose (the purpose which he himself also serves), which often is too small or too particular for the human beings involved to flourish. This purpose, indeed, does not make any sense if it were not because it was dictated by the further purpose of the flourishing of the human person. The result of his drive towards objectivity, efficiency and domination is thus often instrumentalisation.

For the woman the flipside is an overemphasis of the personal. This can take the form of an exaggerated interest in the self, its moods, desires and tastes; it can also take the form of curiosity, the exaggerated (but superficial) interest in everything personal pertaining to the other (gossip); and it can finally take the form of domination, in which case it mostly happens by means of manipulation: emotional or motivational.

Excess of interest in both her own and in the other’s personality merge in feminine surrender, the urge to lose herself completely in a human being; but in so doing,
she does justice neither to self nor to the humanity of the other, and at the same
time, becomes unfit for exercising other duties.\(^{19}\)

The final, and most lethal (to herself) flipside of woman’s specificity is thus her
tendency to surrender herself completely in love, to another human being. If this
other human being is a man who displays the flipside of the male, he will encourage
the surrender in order to dominate, and the characteristic disaster of many human
relationships thus spins out of control.

Although Stein does not propose a ‘cure’ for the masculine overemphasis
on the objective, except the reflection on its value, we might feel free to think it
would involve the conscious exercise of empathy and involvement in all areas where
a personal attitude is particularly called for: childrearing, understanding of personal
relationships, seeing things from other people’s perspectives, and thus gaining an
understanding of the particular role (and indeed of the particularity of the pursuit)
that one’s own task has in a greater whole.

Stein does, however, propose a cure for the feminine overemphasis on the
personal (and given the political scope of the lectures, we cannot be too surprised):

A good natural method for this [overemphasis] is thoroughly objective work. Every work, no matter of what kind, whether housework, a trade, science or
anything else, necessitates submitting to the laws of the matter concerned; the
whole person, thoughts, just as all moods and dispositions, must be made
subordinate to the work. And whoever has learned this, has become objective, has
lost something of the hyper-individuality and has attained a definite freedom of
self; at the same time she has attained an inner depth — she has attained a basis of
self-control.\(^{20}\)

V
QUESTIONS TO AND ABOUT STEIN’S
UNDERSTANDING OF GENDER

Stein admits of a ‘certain precedence’ of man over woman, which she bases on her
understanding of Catholic doctrine.\(^{21}\) She claims this precedence stems from two
facts: that man was created before woman and that Christ became a man, born of a
woman. Both of these arguments are defective, however, as the fact that the animals
were created before man does not make them superior, and as God might have
chosen the least favoured to shame the stronger. But there is little doubt that the
arguments were regarded as valid in Stein’s surroundings, and that the signal she
sends by using them secures (in principle) the backing of Theologians, Christians,
Nazis and Conservatives alike, to whom this certain precedence was the backbone
of the known world order. Stein was not a revolutionary — she was much too
cautious about sudden social changes for that (women had only obtained the vote
in 1919, three years after she defended her doctoral dissertation, and she was now
observing how many women contributed towards bringing the Nazis to power).
Moreover, Stein had a message — that of the importance of education, education

\(^{19}\) Woman, p. 257, translation adapted.
\(^{20}\) Woman, p. 257.
Woman, p. 61, 65. See also, ‘Probleme der neueren Mädchenbildung’, Die Frau, p. 175.
of the whole person, man and woman as concrete individuals and gendered human beings exposed to each other and to each other’s opinions about each other — and she had to try by this message to preserve the possibility of adequate education in the future, even by the means of providing arguments relying for their validity on popular acclaim.

She balanced this precedence against a certain superiority of women over men as regards the ability to be united with God: she claimed women’s capacity for surrender prepared them particularly well for this union.\(^{22}\) Here again, the Christian heritage provides us with arguments to the contrary: the surrender of Christ, the man, to the Father’s will is surely no less valid than that of Mary’s, although it may engage a certain type of sexual imagination less well. It also is not of less consequence for the one involved: Christ gave his body \textit{for us}, much like a mother, as indeed mother Julian says. In the process he was destroyed and died \textit{for us}, and rose by the ontological miracle of Trinitarian love, again \textit{for us}. On his surrender we all depend.

It remains a fact, perhaps, that Stein attempted, in these her most political interventions, to catch the prevalent imagination, however marred, and make it work towards a goal that in the circumstances may well have been regarded by Stein as justifying the means: the goal of education, the education of both sexes by both sexes, as human persons and human beings, the eternal destiny of which far outweigh their importance as gendered beings.

It is interesting to note that in Stein’s theological anthropology, which assembles all the dogmatic declarations that can elucidate the question of the book’s title: \textit{What is the Human Being?}, gender plays no role at all: Stein seems to have been unable (or unwilling?) to find any dogmatic declarations about the issues.\(^{23}\)

What thus is at the forefront of the public imagination that engaged her to speak on the topic of women’s identity, and men’s, recedes to total insignificance when engaging the more profound reflections, also at the dogmatic level. Although this may be surprising, it also seems to set us free for the reflections needed on our common humanity. Stein responded to what she was asked to do, and took her listeners beyond the ‘\textit{brennende Gegenwartfrage}’ to a depth where the Spirit is equally available to all.

VI

CONCLUSION

It seems to me that what we can learn from Stein’s philosophy of woman (and man) is first and foremost that gender remains a feature of the concrete real human person, but that this person’s importance far outweighs the importance of gender. Gender is in some sense a transitory focus, a changing type that allows for the building of individuality and occupies a definite place in the structure of the

\(^{22}\) E.g. \textit{Die Frau}, p. 77. She also, and perhaps more importantly, regarded the relation between mother and child as the purest of human relationships, their archetype. The mother is superior, of course, only in the sense that she is not superior, and her relation with her children relies precisely on this enabling putting herself at their disposal. That there can be precedence in putting oneself last also is the message of the Gospel.

\(^{23}\) \textit{Was ist der Mensch?} ESGA vol. 15 is a dogmatic anthropology commenting on Denzinger, i.e., dogmatic declarations from close to 2000 years of Church history, all relating to who or what the human being is. See also, Beate Beckman’s introduction to this work.
individual human person. As a focus, however, it remains indispensable to do justice to the concrete nature of the human being. Its significance, nevertheless, must remain subordinate to that of the human being and that of the person, which alone constitute types that allow for the formation of the whole human being. This again may mean that we in fact cannot know exactly what it is to be a man, or to be a woman: both express the relational dimension of the human being, its standing in relation to something other than itself, but it is not a relation that ultimately can be completely understood in its specificity because it has no fixed content independent of cultural interpretation of its symbolic value. If it has some content along the lines given by Stein: the high versus the whole development, the objective versus the personal attitude, both of these polarities seem to tend to serve the purpose of correcting, rather than to justifying concrete development along these lines, and indeed to halt the development of attitudes that ultimately are detrimental to the human person as such, whether as such or as living in community with others. In this way the outlining of the differences is helpful: it is the attempt to reduce the individual characteristics of the human being to its gender specificity, or let gender expectations determine how we allow individuality to develop that is unhelpful at least to some, and therefore not of benefit to all. That social roles are in need of negotiation at all times is justified by the fact that the ultimate reasons for the justifiability of the outcome of these negotiations can only be the common good which is a good for all and every individual. We live to learn about that, it seems.

In so far as gender in fact is a type that does not allow for the identification of the whole human being it is no coincidence that Stein does not engage the issues of sexual difference in her substantial philosophical works: it is because what can be said about it cannot find an expression that does not simply have the purpose of correcting the spin induced by not being one with the other as much as is necessary for the spiritual union of love; the eternal destiny of human beings. That gender is a circumstantial issue, however, does not mean that it is without political importance to address it, and that this is required whenever the opposition between the sexes is so disturbed as to inflame the imagination of whole peoples and stir them into stereotypical action, in a manner that inevitably is destructive since it falls short of enabling the education and development of the whole of the human person. Much talking is needed for us to redress each other. It does not mean either that surrender is not what we all have to learn from each other in order to live in Christ, broken as bread for the world. It just means that our imagination, so often informed by sexuality, must be broken along with us in order to set tenderness free.