Nationalism lacks any coherent normative justification. While this argument gains some plausibility from the general normative weakness of political claims based solely on nationalist ideology, a balanced treatment of the conflict would surely have to examine the normative basis of Unionist counterclaims, since as Archard recognizes it is these that render Nationalist claims problematic in the first place. But he simply excludes this question from his purview: ‘The relevant point here is less how Unionism denies what Nationalism asserts but that this denial helps to constitute the problem of Northern Ireland’ (p. 146). It is difficult to avoid the impression that the unstated assumption of Archard’s approach is that the source of the Northern Ireland problem is the unreasonable claims of Nationalists.

The principal weakness of his argument, however, stems from its counterfactual character. I do not doubt that the ultimate solution to the conflict lies in a scheme of consociational democracy which would secure the legitimate social, political, economic and cultural claims of both communities; and this is indeed what all parties to the 1998 Good Friday Agreement have accepted in principle. The question, though, is whether this can be achieved without some change in the constitutional status of the province. Under social goods, for example, Archard classifies ‘such general, valued attributes as esteem, status and respect’, ‘associated with a variety of practices, activities and associations which are located within civil society, such as employment, education and, perhaps centrally, religion’ (pp. 152–3). But Nationalists have claimed, with considerable justice, that they were effectively denied a fair share of precisely such goods by a constitutional arrangement that guaranteed Unionists a permanent position of political dominance in the province. Thus Archard’s rejection of any alteration in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland, such as some form of joint British and Irish authority over the province, _ab initio_ as ‘concessive to the Nationalist position in ways which Unionists dispute’ (p. 151), is questionable, since any viable solution will have to make some concessions to Nationalist demands. Moreover, it seems to overlook the fact that the provisions of the Good Friday Agreement, if implemented (negotiations between the parties to the Agreement were still in progress at the time of writing), would arguably amount to a change in the constitutional _status quo_ by, among other things, setting up cross-border governmental bodies.

However, this is something that readers of this volume will be able to judge for themselves, since the editors have helpfully included the text of the Agreement as an appendix, and it proves to be an important document in its own right which is surely destined to influence the resolution of inter-communal conflicts beyond the island of Ireland. And it must be conceded that Archard’s essay, notwithstanding its restricted purview, does present an interesting normative perspective on the conflict, and the other essays in the volume can be recommended to students and scholars of nationalism alike.

_Uiversity of Illinois at Chicago_  
_Ciaran Cronin_

_Trois femmes dans des sombres temps: Edith Stein, Hannah Arendt, Simone Weil ou Amor fati, amor mundi_  
_By Sylvie Courtine-Denamy_  

This book is an intelligent reading of the Second World War through the eyes of three Jewish women philosophers. It provides an insight into the women’s
understanding of and reaction to the Nazi regime, and this in turn brings the period back to life. By providing not one but three different accounts of the events, it introduces perspective into the chronological investigation, showing, for example, that it was only six months after Edith Stein had died in Auschwitz, in August 1942, that the existence of such death camps was brought to the attention of an incredulous Hannah Arendt. The book is a study in comparative philosophical biography, with sections devoted to comparative philosophy. Its strength is to bring out what is basic in each of the philosophers’ work, and to relate it both to their individual lives and to their shared experience of the war.

It is the person of Hannah Arendt who is at the centre. Her post-war writings are read against the background of the silence of her two colleagues, who did not survive the war. As the survivor, she speaks for the three, who, despite differences in philosophical outlook, were comparable, even similar, in relation to the war: they were all Jewish women who had chosen philosophy as their study and career; they were all silenced and destined for death by the administrators of the ‘final solution’.

It is not Arendt’s knowledge of the other two which justifies the comparison, even if she is acquainted with them. She refers to Weil in the Human Condition (1958, p. 131) in order to endorse her criticism of Marx. She seems to have known the political philosophy of Weil quite well, and to have drawn inspiration from it. Like Weil, Arendt denounces the fundamental contradiction involved in regarding labour as being on the one hand the essence of man, and on the other an obstacle to be overcome. She also, like Weil, regards labour as being indispensable even to the most mechanized society, in which conspicuous consumption and leisure would not dispense with the necessity of participating in the metabolism of nature (pp. 84–96).

Arendt refers to Stein only in 1963, when, encouraged by Jaspers, she devotes an article to Rolf Hochhuth’s Der Stellvertreter. In it, Stein figures as the German Jewish nun who before the war requested the Pope to devote an Encyclical to the Jewish question, but received only a blessing in return (pp. 206–7). Arendt does not show signs of familiarity with Stein’s philosophy, which is surprising considering their common phenomenological ancestry.

The three philosophers’ different ways of relating to what they have in common remain the focus of the book. They are the subject of a specific analysis in the first part, ‘Les années de formation’ (‘The years of formation’), which treats of their childhood, their choice and critique of their masters, and their understanding of being women and of being Jewish.

All three manifested intellectual gifts already as children. This later meant that they learned to have a critical appreciation of those whom they chose as their masters. Stein departed from Husserl’s understanding of phenomenology because she thought it unfaithful to its own programme of ‘turning towards the things themselves’. On her own account she complemented this programme with scholasticism, which she found in some ways went further. Arendt, happy with Husserl’s world-view, but also wanting to concretize it existentially and politically, rejected the neo-Thomism of Pieper, Maritain and Gilson, and praised what she regarded as its opposite: the existentialism of Sartre, Camus and Merleau-Ponty (pp. 39–40). However, both Heidegger and Jaspers (with both of whom she studied), despite their association with existentialism, were also criticized by her: Heidegger for not regarding Da-sein as sufficiently at home in the world, and Jaspers for thinking that reason arises out of the private sphere of the I and the Thou, and not, as Arendt thought, out of the public sphere of political plurality. Weil alone endorsed the basic tenets of her master Alain’s thought, his pacifism and Christianity, even if she died prepared for battle and without receiving baptism.
Weil is also portrayed as the one who denied her femininity and despised her Jewishness to the point of self-destruction. Stein, on the contrary, is seen as the feminist nun who was denied a career because she was a woman, and was killed because she was a Jew. Arendt, steering a middle course between self-denial and martyrdom, is seen to be puzzled by femininity and Jewishness alike, but to regard both as inescapable facts of the world, to be reckoned with but not to be trapped by.

The next two parts of the book, ‘Quels engagements dans le monde?’ (‘What commitments within the world?’), covering the period between 1933 and 1939, and ‘L’exil’ (‘Exile’), covering the period between 1940 and 1943, are strictly chronological, even as they reach out into the philosophical works of each of the authors to anchor them in the events they lived through. The titles capture yet something more that all three had in common: they were politically committed, and they were forced into exile.

Their political engagements were diverse: Simone Weil was a heterodox Communist or anarchist, and always seemed to travel to the centre of human experience. She actually went to Berlin in 1933 in order to study Nazism, just as she got herself employment at the Renault factory in order to experience for herself the impact of the workers’ conditions. Hannah Arendt laboured herself out of the war as an agnostic Zionist transporting Jewish children to Palestine, and politics remained the focus of her life. Edith Stein, choosing another course of action, became a Carmelite; a commitment she herself likened to the public role of Queen Esther interceding for the Israelites while in exile.

Their exiles also were significantly different. Stein chose it already when she entered the cloister in Cologne in 1933; it was with regret that she fled to another Carmelite convent in the then unoccupied Holland. She would have fled later to Switzerland if time had permitted, but events caught up with her: fleeing was no longer her first priority when she was summoned by the Gestapo in 1942. Arendt was to make exile the permanent condition of her life: she sought and obtained American citizenship in 1951, unwilling to return to a Germany she had so loathed. Weil found it painful to abandon France in May 1942 for New York, and she soon returned to London in the hope of making connections with the French resistance.

Formation, commitment, exile and death. The book abruptly – or aptly – ends with 1943, true to the shape of the lives of the three Jewesses portrayed. Their involvement with the Nazi regime had ended by then – ironically, it did so at the height of Hitler’s power. Arendt, together with her second husband, Heinrich Blücher, had fled France for America in May 1941. Arendt immediately set about writing; she would not stop until her death in December 1975. Her writings all carry the stamp of the war. Edith Stein had been gassed, probably on 9 August 1942, in Auschwitz together with her sister. She never lived to imagine the end of the war, or even the survival of the Jewish race. Simone Weil had died of tuberculosis and self-inflicted starvation in a London sanatorium on 24 August 1943. She – in her equal hatred of Nazism and Jewry – did not quite want to survive either, and she found it unbearable to be away from the France she so loved.

The lives and deaths of these three women both reveal and conceal their deepest philosophical commitments. The subtitle of the book, Amor fati, amor mundi, muses on this: perhaps Arendt did win over fate for love of the world, as she escaped the near fatal ‘final solution’ and survived. Even so, she remained superstitious all her life. And perhaps Weil was stoical enough to love fate more than the world as she pushed towards her death from illness and solidarity. Yet she remained a revolutionary. Stein, however, loved neither fate nor the world, but she could be said to have embraced both in the title of nobility she chose for the order of Carmel: Teresia-Benedicta of the Cross. Her love was of another world.
The book is an absorbing and hugely documented read. Its real loyalty is to Arendt, and the contrast with the other two thinkers somehow serves this purpose. It situates her as the survivor, who is left to recall and commemorate the all-important event which alone accounts for the silence of the other two: The War. The careers of Weil and Stein were prematurely cut off at this point, but for Arendt it was the kick-start of a vocation as a professional political thinker, somehow devoted to commemorate all those who did not survive. This is what makes the book the perfect historical introduction to the work of Hannah Arendt. May it be well read.

National University of Ireland, Maynooth

Mette Lebech

_The Kantian Subject: Sensus Communis, Mimesis, Work of Mourning_

By Tamar Japaridze


The central claim of this work is that Kant’s _Critique of Judgment_ advances an account of the formation of the subject through a process of affective identification. The significance of this claim, as set out by Japaridze in her introduction, is that it locates a distance within the critical corpus from the ‘autonomous subject’ that otherwise joins Kant to the Enlightenment tradition of philosophy. From this dislocation of Kant from the Enlightenment conception of autonomy follows a further dislocation effected by Japaridze within the order of the three Kantian _Critiques_. For Japaridze the stage of the subject’s constitution is logically prior to the process of its division in the first and second _Critiques_ (as respectively a cognitive and a moral subject). Thus she reorders the critical philosophy to place the work which advances an account of the formation of the subject before those which theorize its division. Her argument regarding the significance of the _Critique of Judgment_ within the critical system does not refer to the contents of the other _Critiques_ in any substantial way and draws its detail only from the first part of this work: the _Critique of Aesthetic Judgment_.

Her attention to the aesthetics of the third _Critique_ is timely given recent interest in its place within the Kantian system. Japaridze’s view that this _Critique_ explains the _genesis_ of the subject’s capacity for practical reason is supported by a framework in which she connects Kant to currents in twentieth-century continental philosophy concerning subjectivity and ethics. Hence this book filters many of Kant’s ideas through concepts with either a Freudian or a poststructuralist lineage. ‘Mourning’ and ‘sublimation’ are the key terms in Japaridze’s rephrasing of the Kantian aesthetic attitude, and ‘alterity’ is the value which she ascribes to the ‘ethics’ of the aesthetic subject.

The project of a conjunction between Kant and recent continental philosophy is an interesting one that is pursued by Japaridze in three compact chapters: the first dealing with the place of beauty in the system of Kantian philosophy, the second with the sensus communis and the third with Kant’s appendix on the sublime. Throughout the author’s concern is with the theme of ethics, and in the conclusion she attempts to bring this theme into correspondence with its twentieth-century inflection through the problem of language. Her rather lengthy introduction (by far the longest section of the book) offers a schematic survey of the historical reception of the _Critique of Judgment_ as well as an introduction to some of the Freudian terminology relied on in her own analysis of Kant. However,