THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HEIDEGGER’S ANALYSIS OF
DEATH IN HIS ADVANCEMENT OF HUSserL’S IDEA OF
PHENOMENOLOGY TOWARDS THE QUESTION OF THE
MEANING OF BEING IN BEING AND TIME

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Abstract: This article draws attention to the relation between Husserl’s ‘talk of Being’ in the
transcendental reduction in Ideas I (1913) and Heidegger’s re-orientation of Husserl’s idea of
transcendental phenomenology towards ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ and its relation to
dasein in Being and Time (1927). It argues that Heidegger’s selection of ‘death’ as an ‘object’ for
phenomenological elucidation challenges both the confines and the suppositions of Husserl’s ‘talk of
Being’ in the reduction as the sole possibility for transcendental phenomenology. It also argues that
Heidegger’s distinction between ‘authentic’ and ‘inauthentic’ talk about death in Being and Time
radically challenges Husserl’s distinction between ‘authentic and inauthentic thinking’ espoused in
the Logical Investigations (1900–01). This is why Husserl is correct to see, much to his disappointment
and incomprehension, both overt and covert criticisms of his philosophical position in Being and Time
by its author. Yet despite Husserl’s misgivings about Heidegger’s phenomenological credentials, Being
and Time is a work in phenomenology because it is founded in the experience of finitude and it
provides a conception of philosophy that is capable of subsuming Husserl’s reduction under its own
greater conception of transcendental phenomenology as ‘fundamental ontology’.

Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time was edited and published by Edmund Husserl as
volume VIII of his Yearbook for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research in the Spring
of 1927. It was also published, in the same year, as a separate printing by the Max
Niemeyer’s publishing house for phenomenology. Yet despite this close association
with Husserl’s phenomenology agreement about the actual extent and the precise
nature of the influence that Husserl’s phenomenology exercised on Heidegger’s
thinking in Being and Time has not been reached. In his major study of The
Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction, Herbert Spiegelberg, who was
probably the first commentator to raise the question, ‘(H)ow far is Heidegger’s
thinking rightfully to be included in the history of the Phenomenological
Movement?’, remarks that ‘(T)his question [about Heidegger’s thinking], which is of
considerable importance for the present enterprise, was usually not even raised; nor

1 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1962, 2000); Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1927, 1957), also published in Jahrbuch für
references will be to Being and Time, with pagination of the original German text following the
English page reference, separated by a colon, e.g., Being and Time, p. 45:23.

2 There is a debate as to whether the separate edition (‘Sonderdruck’) was published before or after the
and Heidegger: The Making and Unmaking of a Relationship’, in Edmund Husserl, Psychological and
Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger (1927–1931): The
Encyclopaedia Britannica’ Article, The Amsterdam Lectures, Phenomenology and Anthropology’ and Husserl’s
Marginal Notes in ‘Being and Time’ and ‘Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics’, trans. and ed. by Thomas

© Cyril McDonnell, ‘The Significance of Heidegger’s Analysis of Death in His Advancement of Husserl’s
Idea of Phenomenology Towards the Question of the Meaning of Being in Being and Time’, Yearbook of the Irish
is it easy to answer it. Since Spiegelberg made this observation in 1960, there have been several attempts in recent decades to determine the philosophical relation between Husserl and Heidegger. This issue, however, is still a matter of much controversy and confusion. One commentator, for instance, after underscoring the point that ‘Husserl’s phenomenology was of paramount importance for the conception and composition of Being and Time,’ is forced to continue and admit, like so many other commentators, ‘yet it is difficult to say exactly what the nature and scope of his [Husserl’s] influence on Heidegger amounted to in the end.’ Unless both the nature and the scope of Husserl’s influence on Heidegger’s philosophy is determined, however, it will be difficult to substantiate the claim that Husserl’s phenomenology was of paramount importance for the conception and composition of the philosophy of ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ attempted by Heidegger in Being and Time. Husserl himself, after all, in a letter he wrote to Alexander Pfänder on 6 January 1931, informs him that after devoting two months (during the Summer of 1929) to a close reading and serious study of Heidegger’s Being and Time (and of some of his more recent writings) he had arrived at the distressing conclusion [...] philosophically I have nothing to do with this Heideggerian profundity, [...] that Heidegger’s criticism [of my work], both open and veiled, is based upon a gross misunderstanding [of my work]; that he may be involved in the formation of a philosophical system of the kind which I have always considered my life’s work to make forever impossible. Everyone except me has realised this for a long time.


4 Spiegelberg also notes this in the later re-issue of *The Phenomenological Movement*, see, ibid., p. 413, n. 4.


7 Husserl certainly helped Heidegger, on the basis of the publication of *Being and Time* (despite its unfinished nature), to secure the Chair of philosophy at Freiburg University in 1928. The story behind the various drafts and the hurried publication of *Being and Time* is now well documented. See, Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger’s ‘Being and Time’* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

8 For editorial purposes, Husserl had given *Being and Time* a quick read in 1926. The ‘two months’ that Husserl read Heidegger’s *Being and Time* more closely are either July–August or August–September of 1929. See, Sheehan, ‘Husserl and Heidegger: The Making and Unmaking of a Relationship’, p. 29, n. 106.

9 Edmund Husserl, ‘Letter to Alexander Pfänder, January 6, 1931’, in Husserl, *Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger* (1927–1931), p. 482. Husserl was aware of the ‘colossal’ influence that Heidegger was exerting on his students at Marburg University (1924–1928), but he still thought, as Cairns recounts in his meetings with Husserl at Freiburg University in the mid 1920s, that Heidegger ‘was with me [Husserl]’, it was just that ‘I [Husserl] simply could not understand his [Heidegger’s] language’. Dorion Cairns, ‘My Own Life’, in *Phenomenology: Continuation and Criticism, Essays in Memory of Dorion Cairns* ed. by Fred Kersten & Richard Zaner (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), pp. 1–13 (p. 7). In the early to mid-1920s Husserl was often heard to remark to Heidegger: ‘You and I are phenomenology’. Dorion Cairns, *Conversations with Husserl and Fink* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1976), p. 9. It was not until the Summer of 1929 that Husserl fully
Whether Heidegger did misunderstand Husserl’s philosophical project in phenomenology, or not, is not the main concern of this article. The aim of this article, rather, is to shed some much needed light on the influence, if any, that Husserl’s thinking had on Heidegger’s thinking in *Being and Time*. Why it is particularly difficult to achieve an understanding and evaluation of the philosophical influence that Husserl’s thinking had on Heidegger’s thinking needs to be briefly outlined and addressed first.

I

DIFFICULTIES IN UNDERSTANDING THE CONNECTION BETWEEN HEIDEGGER’S THINKING IN *BEING AND TIME* AND HUSSERL’S PHENOMENOLOGY

There are three main reasons why it is hard to ascertain any positive influence Husserl’s phenomenology had on Heidegger’s thinking in *Being and Time*. Firstly, in *Being and Time* Heidegger appears to disagree with the actual content that Husserl had demarcated for phenomenology. As Husserl defines it, phenomenology is primarily the study of consciousness, or, more accurately stated, of the way in which human consciousness is always a consciousness of something, or directed towards something. This is what Husserl means, when he writes in the First Book, *General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology of his Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*, published in 1913, that ‘the name of the problem (der Titelproblem) that encompasses all of phenomenology is [the] intentionality [of consciousness]’. For Heidegger, however, the main topic in phenomenology is not realized just how different, if not antagonistic (as it appeared to him) Heidegger’s conception of phenomenology was to his idea of phenomenology.

10 See Heidegger’s own account of this issue in his autobiographical sketch ‘Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie’, in Martin Heidegger, *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1969), pp. 81–90. Joan Stambaugh translates the title of this essay as ‘My Way to Phenomenology’ in, *On Time and Being* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), pp. 74–82. In this account, however, Heidegger clearly wishes to convey to his readers that his way into phenomenology (in die Phänomenologie), in spite of all the contingencies that first lead him to Husserl’s texts of the *Logical Investigations* (1900–01) in 1909 and to meeting Husserl personally in his workshops at Freiburg University (1919–23), was a way that eventually lead him through (durch) phenomenology to ‘the Question of Being’ (die Seinsfrage). Thus we will refer to and translate the title of this essay as ‘My Way into Phenomenology’. All of the late essays written by Heidegger in the early 1960s and contained in *Zur Sache des Denkens*, ‘Zeit und Sein’ (1962), ‘Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie’ (1963), and ‘Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens’ (1964), address this same issue, in one way or another.

consciousness and its objectivities, but 'the question of the meaning of Being' and its relation to Dasein, by which Heidegger means the awareness of the 'There' (Da) of 'Being' (Sein), and in which I find myself implicated as that-which-is (als Seiende) in Being.\textsuperscript{12}

The second difficulty in ascertaining any direct connection between Husserl's and Heidegger's thinking is that Heidegger appears not only to ignore the content of Husserl's phenomenology but also to reject, in particular, the method of enquiry in phenomenology that Husserl had prescribed. For Husserl, phenomenology, as he understands it, attempts to elicit intuitively verifiable, essential and invariant features of our intentional experiences of consciousness, whatever the latter may be. The method he operates is strictly \textit{eidetic} intuition.\textsuperscript{13} By comparison, for Heidegger phenomenology is not a matter of 'seeing' essential features of our experiences, but of 'hearing' meaning that is deposited and left 'unthought' in reflections on 'Being' in the history of metaphysics and in our daily life. Thus Heidegger's method of philosophizing necessarily involves a \textit{hermeneutic} dimension to his act of retrieving the question of the meaning of Being in philosophy and for phenomenological research that is completely absent from Husserl's eidetic method of enquiry.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{12} See, \textit{Being and Time}, Introduction II, § 7C. The Preliminary Conception of Phenomenology. In normal German, 'Dasein' denotes the existence of anything; hence one can write a book entitled \textit{Vom Dasein des Gottes} (On the Existence of God). Heidegger, however, gives this term a unique meaning in German and it only retains that meaning in the context of his elaboration of what he calls in \textit{Being and Time} 'fundamental ontology', an approach to the meaning of Being that necessarily includes one's self, or, more precisely speaking from Heidegger's point of view, of an awareness of the 'There' of 'Being', and in which I find myself implicated as that-which-is, as part of that question. For Heidegger, then, 'in the question of [the meaning of] Being there is no “circular reasoning” [between Dasein and Sein] [...] [because] Here what is asked about has an essential pertinence to the inquiry itself, and this belongs to the innermost meaning of the question of Being (gehört zum eigensten Sinn der Seinsfrage)' (ibid. p. 28:8).

\textsuperscript{13} See, \textit{Ideas I}, §75. 'Phenomenology As a Descriptive Eidetic Doctrine of Pure Experiences'.

\textsuperscript{14} In a Letter to Roman Ingarden on 2 December, 1929, Husserl quite pointedly remarks about both the content and the method of analysis employed by Heidegger in \textit{Being and Time} that, 'I can not admit his work within the framework of my phenomenology and unfortunately that I also must reject it entirely as regards its method, and in the essentials as regards its content'. Quoted by Sheehan, 'Husserl and Heidegger: The Making and Unmaking of a Relationship', p. 29, and see corresponding n. 110. It was, nonetheless, Heidegger's very style of philosophising and the way in which he practiced his particular version of 'phenomenological seeing' that became part of the allure of his teaching for his students from his earliest days of lecturing at Freiburg (1919–1923) to his later post at Marburg (1924–1928). See, Rüdiger Safranski, \textit{Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil}, trans. by Ewald Osers (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1998), Ch. 6 'Revolution in Germany and The Question of Being' (pp. 89–106), especially Safranski's account of Heidegger's use of the example of perceiving a lectern, where the 'experiencing of' the lectern in terms of 'it worlds' (es \textit{weltet}) 'in Lecture Hall 2 of the University of Freiburg on a grey February day in 1919' (pp. 94–96) becomes a kind of an \textit{enactment} of a perception whereupon, '(L)ooking at the lectern, we can participate in the mystery that we are and that there exists a whole world that gives itself to us' (p. 105). Later in the same lecture-course (War Emergency Semester 1919) Heidegger suggests that Husserl's defence of 'intuition' as the 'principle of all principles' (in §24 of \textit{Ideas I}) is better grasped as 'the understanding intuition, the \textit{hermeneutical} intuition', Heidegger, 'The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview', Part Two Phenomenology as Pre-Theoretical Primordial Science, Ch. 3 Primordial Science as Pre-Theoretical Science, §20 Phenomenological Disclosure of the Sphere of
Thirdly, and perhaps most contentious of all, Heidegger claims that what he attempted to do in Being and Time (notwithstanding its incompleteness) was not only in accord with the principle of phenomenology that Husserl had advocated, but more directly in accord with that principle when compared, in Heidegger’s estimation, to Husserl’s choice after his Logical Investigations (1900–01) to develop phenomenology in the direction of the transcendental idealism of Ideas I (1913) and then after, ‘according to a pattern set by Descartes, Kant and Fichte’. This is an exceedingly complex and intricate self-evaluation by Heidegger of his philosophical relationship to Husserl’s thought because it indicates that his own starting point in philosophy is so intricably bound up with Husserl’s philosophy that it cannot be broached without addressing its point of critical contact with the development of Husserl’s philosophy. Nowhere, alas, does Heidegger provide us with any clear indication regarding where precisely this point of contact between his thinking and Husserl’s lies, except, perhaps, in his well-known and often repeated allusion to the influence of Husserl’s Logical Investigations, and in particular to the distinction that Husserl draws between categorial and sensuous intuition in the Sixth Logical Investigation. Heidegger, in other words, would like to give us the impression that

Lived Experience, c) Hermeneutic Intuition, in Martin Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy, trans. by Ted Sadler (London & New York: Continuum, 2000; 2008), pp. 89–90 (p. 89). Husserl, of course, meant no such thing in his appeal to intuition in the principle of all principles in §24 of Ideas I (1913), he meant ‘eidetic’ intuition as the method of analysis to be employed in the form of ‘phenomenological seeing’ for phenomenology. In his way of doing phenomenology, then, the young Heidegger is already in 1919 heavily under the sway of influence from his reading of Dilthey’s hermeneutic method of enquiry.

15 This is a claim Heidegger makes in his letter to Fr William Richardson in 1962. In full, Heidegger writes: ‘Meanwhile “phenomenology” in Husserl’s sense was elaborated into a distinctive philosophical position according to a pattern set by Descartes, Kant and Fichte. The historicity of thought remained completely foreign to such a position [...] The question of Being, unfolded in Being and Time, parted company with this philosophical position, and that on the basis of what to this day I still consider a more direct adherence (sachgerechteren Festhalten) to the principle of phenomenology’. Heidegger, ‘Preface’/ ‘Vorwort’, in William Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963), pp. vii–xxii (p.xiv–xxv); trans. mod., my emphasis.

16 ‘As I [Heidegger] myself practised phenomenological seeing (phänomenologische Sehen), teaching and learning in Husserl’s proximity after 1919 and at the same time tried out a transformed understanding of Aristotle in a seminar, my interpretation leaned anew towards the Logical Investigations, above all the sixth investigation of the first edition. The distinction which is worked out there between sensuous and categorial intuition revealed itself to me in its scope (in seiner Tragweite) for the determination of [the question of] the manifold meaning of being (der ‘mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden’). Heidegger, ‘My Way into Phenomenology’, p. 78:86. The question regarding the unified sense of being (Sinn des Seins) determining the four meanings of being (Bedeutung des Seienden) that Aristotle identifies is one that Heidegger says he raised about Franz Brentano’s 1862 doctoral dissertation V on der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles, which he received from Konrad Gröber, the pastor of Trinity Church in Constance, in the Summer of 1907 (ibid., p. 74:71). Because neither Aristotle nor Brentano addressed this issue, Heidegger tells us that this led him, almost immediately in his First semester at the Catholic Seminary at Freiburg University in 1909, to seek out Husserl’s Logical Investigation because ‘I [Heidegger] had learned from many references in philosophical periodicals that Husserl’s way of thinking (Husserls Denkenweise) was determined by Franz Brentano’ and ‘[F]rom Husserl’s Logical Investigations I [Heidegger] expected [to receive] a decisive aid in the questions stimulated by Brentano’s dissertation’ (ibid., pp. 74–75:81–82, trans. mod.). Heidegger returns to this distinction between categorial and sensuous intuition in his last seminar at Zähringen in 1973. It has been investigated thoroughly by Jacques Taminiaux in, ‘Heidegger and Husserl’s Logical Investigations. In Remembrance of Heidegger’s Last Seminar (Zähringen, 1973)’, trans. by J. Stephens, Research in Phenomenology, 75 (1977), 58–83. To be fair to Heidegger, he never
he develops an issue that the early Husserl had left ‘unthought’ (ungedacht) in the Sixth Logical Investigation regarding the question of the meaning of Being (and its relation to Dasein), even if it is clear that the Logical Investigations themselves are not concerned about ‘die Seinsfrage’ and its relation to ‘Dasein’ (as Heidegger understands these terms).

We know, nonetheless, what the Logical Investigations are concerned with and what they are not concerned with. They are concerned with the rejection of logical psychologism in volume one (hence Husserl’s depiction of this volume as a Prolegomena) and with the provision that follows, in the subsequent six investigations that comprise volume two, of detailed descriptive-eidetic-psychological analyses that clarify the meaning of the experiences of a normatively-valid logical consciousness as such. The distinction that Husserl makes in the Sixth Logical Investigation maintains that Husserl actually saw ‘the question of Being’ as an issue in the phenomenology of the Logical Investigations (or in any other work by Husserl), but Heidegger does say in the Zähringen Seminar that Husserl ‘brushes’ (p. 58) the ‘question of Being’ in his thinking about the distinction between categorical and sensuous intuition in the Sixth Logical Investigation, making this indication and connection ever more enigmatic.

17 In his 1925 Summer Semester Lecture course at Freiburg University Husserl explicitly draws his students’ attention to the fact that the task of his Logical Investigations (1900–1901), which were ‘the results of my ten years effort’, lay in providing ‘eine Klärung der reinen Idee der Logik im Rückgang auf die im logischen Bewußtsein, im Erlebniszusammenhang logischen Denkens sich vollziehende Sinngebung oder Erkenntnisleistung’. Hua IX, § 3. ‘Aufgabe und Bedeutung der Logischen Untersuchungen’, p. 20; Phenomenological Psychology. Lectures, Summer Semester 1925, p. 22. Regarding the significance of the Logical Investigations for his own development of phenomenology, Husserl calls them ‘a first break-through (ein erster Durchbruch) in the ’Introduction’ to his 1913 publication of Ideas I (p. xviii: 2). In the Foreword to Second German Edition, Logical Investigations, Volume 1, in 1913 Husserl also notes: ‘My Logical Investigations were my “break-through”, not an end (nicht ein Ende), but rather a beginning (ein Anfang).’ Husserl, Logical Investigations, p. 43: Hua XVIII, p. 8. See, also, E. Husserl, Introduction to the Logical Investigations. Draft of a Preface to the Logical Investigations, trans. by Philip J. Bossert and C. H. Peters (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), p. 32. The recent editor of the re-issued Logical Investigations thinks that Husserl was unclear about the ‘breakthrough’ of the Logical Investigations. Cf., Dermot Moran, ‘Introduction’, in E. Husserl, The Shorter Logical Investigations (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. xxx–lxxviii (p. xxxi). He also writes, ‘(T)he Logical Investigations constituted Husserl’s “break-through” into phenomenology, though at the time he was somewhat unclear about the exact nature of this supposed new way of doing philosophy.’ D. Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology (London & New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 124. Heidegger expresses similar sentiments in ‘My Way into Phenomenology’ about Husserl’s lack of clarity surrounding the ‘breakthrough’ of the Logical Investigations. For Husserl, however, the new way of actually doing philosophy (descriptive psychology) in the Logical Investigations — which, it is true to say, only became fully clear to Husserl, on reflection, after he had done it — is doing philosophy as descriptive-eidetic psychology. This clearly and unequivocally marks Husserl’s break-with Brentano’s new science of descriptive psychology and his break-through in descriptive psychology to a descriptive-eidetic science of psychology. This also explains Husserl’s insistence on the point that ‘descriptive psychology’, in the way in which it was understood by Brentano and his followers, does not properly characterize what exactly is happening in the Logical Investigations. Not all commentators agree with themselves, or with Husserl concerning exactly what this breakthrough is. The break-through of the Logical Investigations, nevertheless, is not the break-through to transcendental idealism, this occurs later for Husserl, around 1907–1908 (see, infra, n. 24); it is, rather, the break-through to the acknowledgement of the givenness of intended ideal objects (or essences) to intuition. Cf., however, Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology, ‘Chapter 3 Husserl’s Logical Investigations (1900–1901)’, ‘The six investigations and the “breakthrough” to pure phenomenology’ (pp. 105–109) and ‘Chapter 4 Husserl’s Discovery of the Reduction and Transcendental Phenomenology’ (pp. 124–163), esp. p. 124.

18 At the time of their publication the connection between the two volumes did cause controversy as some had thought that Husserl, because of his descriptive-eidetic-psychological approach in the
between ‘categorial and sensuous intuition’ is of importance to Husserl’s efforts of clarifying the nature of logical propositions and the features of a possible logical consciousness as such. It thus takes its point of departure, as Husserl explicitly states, from a meditation on Kant’s dictum ‘Being is not a real predicate’.

The form-giving flexion Being, whether in its attributive or predicative function, is not fulfilled, as we said, in any percept. We here remember Kant’s dictum: Being is no real predicate. This dictum refers to being qua existence, or to what Herbart called the being of ‘absolute position’, but it can be taken to be not less applicable to predicative and attributive being. In any case it precisely refers to what we are trying to make clear here (was wir hier klarlegen wollen). I can see colour, but not being-coloured. I can feel smoothness, but not being-smooth. I can hear a sound, but not that something is sounding. Being is not in the object [of any possible or actual act of sense knowledge], no part of it, no moment tenating it, no quality or intensity of it, no figure of it or no internal form whatsoever, no constitutive feature of it however conceived. But being is also nothing attaching to an object: as it is no real (reales) internal feature, so also it is no real external feature, and therefore not, in the real sense, a ‘feature’ (kein ‘Merkmal’) at all. For it has nothing to do with the real forms of unity which bind objects [of possible knowledge] into more comprehensive objects, tones into harmonies, things into more comprehensive things or arrangements of things (gardens, streets, the phenomenal external world). Of these real forms of unity the external features of objects, the right and the left, the high and the low, the loud and the soft etc., are founded. Among these anything like an ‘is’ is naturally not to be found.¹⁹

This clarification of the meaning of ‘Being’ re-echoes Kant’s negative thesis, then, that ‘Being’ must not be treated as a real predicate that adds anything to one’s actual understanding or knowledge of anything that is. It is, rather, only in a categorial judgement about a true state-of-affairs, ‘gold is yellow’, that the ‘is’, Husserl notes, is given, but here (this categorical intuition of Being) it is not understood as a predicate of any real object of sensuous intuition (that is, of sense judgment). This, however, is not, at least primarily, Heidegger’s concern at all in Being and Time (or in any of his other work). None of these descriptive-psychological clarifications by Husserl of Kant’s thesis ‘Being is not a real predicate’ can yield any positive clue about why Heidegger raises ‘the question of the meaning of Being’, in the way he does in Being and Time, in relation to ‘Dasein’ and to that being’s understanding of temporality. This clue, then, that Heidegger offers to us to understand the direct philosophical connection between Husserl’s distinction between ‘categorial and sensuous intuition’ and ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ and its relation to Dasein is as fraught with obscurity as it is open to speculative interpretation, notwithstanding the investigative work undertaken by Jacques Taminiaux and others on this very issue.²⁰


²⁰ In ‘My Way into Phenomenology’, Heidegger recalls that when Husserl came to Freiburg University in 1916 to take up the chair in philosophy, there was still a considerable amount of interest in the Logical Investigations (1900–01), particularly in the Sixth Logical Investigation which was out of print. Hence, Heidegger remarks, ‘we — friends and pupils — begged the master [Husserl] again and again to republish the sixth investigation which was then difficult to obtain. True to his
In Husserl’s later celebrated reduction of the natural attitude to the transcendental-phenomenological attitude in *Ideas I* (1913), Husserl does, however, explicitly focus on the issue of the meaning of Being and on our ‘talk of Being’ (*Seinsrede*) in relation to ‘Being as thing’ (*Sein als Ding*) given to one’s own actual consciousness of the world via thing-perception and the meaning of ‘Being as (conscious) experience’ (*Sein als Erlebnis*) given to consciousness via inner perception.21 In this respect, Heidegger is quite correct to see remnants of the modern programme of philosophy, initiated by ‘Descartes, Kant and Fichte’, being carried on by Husserl in the transcendental reduction of *Ideas I*, but this should not detract from the fact that in the transcendental reduction Husserl is both explicitly and directly engaged in clarifying our ‘talk of Being’ (notwithstanding the parameters and confines of that philosophical meditation).22 At any rate, Heidegger himself, in *Being and Time*, claims...
to be advancing Husserl’s later conception of *transcendental* phenomenology towards ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ and its ‘innermost’ (*eigenst*) relationship to *Dasein*’s ‘understanding of Being’ (*Seinsverständnis*). What Heidegger is challenging in *Being and Time*, therefore, is not the cogency of Husserl’s position *per se* in *Ideas I*, but the exclusivity of the version of transcendental phenomenology (*qua* transcendental idealism) that is defended as the *one and only* version of transcendental phenomenology. About Husserl’s concept of transcendental phenomenology (and Scheler’s development of phenomenology), Heidegger remarks that ‘the critical question cannot stop here’. 23 Far from rejecting Husserl’s concept of transcendental phenomenology (or Scheler’s phenomenology), Heidegger, rather, wishes to explore another issue regarding ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ and its relation to *Dasein* as his contribution to transcendental phenomenology in *Being and Time*, even if Husserl himself simply did not (and could not) see this as a continuation of any of his own ideas for transcendental phenomenology.

In the following section of this article, therefore, I wish to draw attention back to Husserl’s transcendental reduction in relation to Heidegger’s subsequent interest in ‘the question of the meaning of Being’. It is, after all, only in the transcendental reduction where the topic of Husserl’s phenomenology is ‘the meaning of Being’. Furthermore, the way Husserl addresses this topic, in the reduction, is new in the history of thought. 24 It can, therefore, only have been sometime after the publication of *Ideas I*, and after his reading of the transcendental reduction in particular, that Heidegger could have seen that there is an issue left ‘forgotten’ or ‘unthought’ concerning ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ in the development of Husserl’s own philosophy, but one that can also become (for him) the central topic in phenomenology and for phenomenological research to address, albeit in a radically new and different direction to the manner in which Husserl addresses this topic in the reduction. 25 Whilst Husserl’s reduction of the natural attitude to the

*Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*, GA Vol. 20, ed. by Petra Jaeger (1979), where he deals specifically (§11) with Husserl’s reduction in *Ideas I* and does not gloss over the fact that the reduction in *Ideas I* radicalizes, in the development of Husserl’s own thought, his earlier Kantian position into some version of post Kantian-transcendental idealism.


24 In his Winter Lecture Course of 1907–1908, Husserl applies, for the first time, descriptive-eidetic analyses to the way in which we understand the meaning of Being as thing given to actual acts of outer perceptual-sense experience and the meaning of Being as (conscious) experience given in reflective, immanent perception, and arrives at conclusions that bring about his ‘conversion’ to transcendental idealism (and which he later (in)famously publishes in *Ideas I* (1913)). Thus it was around 1907–1908 that Husserl recognised a major difference between the ‘rational (descriptive-eidetic) psychology’ of his former position in the *Logical Investigations* and ‘transcendental phenomenology’, and makes a [second] breakthrough in understanding philosophy as ‘transcendental phenomenology’. See, Theodore De Boer, *The Development of Husserl’s Thought*, trans. by Theodore Plantinga (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), p. 323, n. 7.

25 *Being and Time*, ‘Introduction. Exposition of the Question of the Meaning of Being’, p. 2:2: ‘Die genannte Frage ist heute in Vergessenheit gekommen’. Cf., also, Heidegger’s later remarks in ‘The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking’, where he informs his reader, taking his cue from Husserl’s (and Hegel’s) call (*Ruf* to go back ‘to the thing itself’): ‘We have chosen a discussion of the call “to the thing itself” (“zu Sache selbst”) as our guideline (*als Wegweiser*). It was to bring us to the path (*auf den Weg*) which leads us to a determination of the task of thinking at the end of philosophy. […] From the perspective of Hegel and Husserl — and not only from their perspective — the matter of philosophy (*Die Sache der Philosophie*) is subjectivity. It is not the matter as such that is controversial for the call, but rather its presentation (*ihre Darstellung*) by which the matter itself
transcendental-phenomenological attitude has long been recognised as the *crux interpretum* of Husserl’s later position in phenomenology, for us, it must become a *crux interpretum* of Heidegger’s departure from *that position*, though this is seldom recognised, or addressed by commentators and critics of the Husserl-Heidegger philosophical relationship, or indeed one to which Heidegger himself appears to give much (due) notice. It is of importance to see, nonetheless, how Heidegger’s concentration on ‘being-for-death’ calls into question both the confines and the parameters that Husserl set around his ‘talk of Being’ in transcendental reduction and re-opens the question of the meaning of Being in our ‘talk of Being’ from within the reduction itself.

A complicating factor in understanding Heidegger’s analysis of authentic and inauthentic thinking about death in *Being and Time*, however, is that in that analysis Heidegger appears to deploy a distinction that Husserl had made earlier in the Sixth Logical Investigation between ‘authentic and inauthentic thinking’. The theme of authentic and inauthentic existence and the topic of death, of course, are ones that are found discussed outside of Husserlian texts in phenomenology, and more in existentialist writers, poets, religious thinkers, all of whom and in whom Heidegger was well versed throughout his early career in philosophy. The central distinction that Heidegger operates in *Being and Time* between authentically seeing the meaning of one’s own death and inauthentically talking about the death of another human being is not, nevertheless, found in any of the ‘existentialists’ thinkers that Heidegger mentions in *Being and Time*. This distinction is more recognisable against the backdrop of Husserl’s distinction between authentic and inauthentic thinking in the Sixth Logical Investigation; or, at least, so shall I argue in section three of this article. In this final section of our article, therefore, it will be necessary to reconstruct the central features of this distinction and Heidegger’s critique of that distinction that are relevant to an understanding and evaluation of Heidegger’s position in philosophy and phenomenological research. Heidegger’s critique of Husserl’s distinction, nonetheless, amounts in effect to a dismantling of the very foundations of Husserl’s conception of phenomenology that was initially presented in the *Logical Investigations* and developed further by him in the transcendental-phenomenological ontology of the reduction in *Ideas I*. We can thus readily understand why Husserl is correct to see, much to his own disappointment and incomprehension in 1929, both overt and covert criticisms of his own philosophical position in *Being and Time* by its author. This does not mean that Heidegger is not indebted to Husserl’s phenomenology. On the contrary, we will note that though Husserl misunderstands Heidegger’s effort in *Being and Time* as becomes present. [...] The two methods [of Hegel and Husserl] are as different as they could possibly be. But the matter as such, which they are to present, is the same, although it is experienced in different ways. But of what help are these discoveries to us in our attempt to bring the task of thinking to view? They don’t help us at all as long as we do not go beyond a mere discussion of the call and ask what remains unthought (ungedacht) in the call “to the thing itself.” Questioning in this way, we can become aware how something which it is no longer the matter of philosophy to think conceals itself (sich etwas verbirgt) precisely where philosophy has brought its matter (inwiefern gerade dort, wo die Philosophie ihre Sache [... gebraucht hat) to absolute knowledge and to ultimate evidence (ins absolute Wissen und zur letztgültigen Evidenz),’ pp. 55–73 (p. 63–64, 70–71, my emphases).

falling back into the natural attitude, *Being and Time* is a work in phenomenology precisely because it is committed to determining the intelligibility of the meaning of finitude from within the particularity of that experience itself in our ‘talk of Being’ outside of the ‘talk of Being’ that dominates and prescribes the meaning of Being for anyone living in the natural attitude. Heidegger, in other words, elaborates a different conception of transcendental phenomenology to Husserl’s, but it is still a conception of transcendental phenomenology, though it is one that cannot be entered into or retrieved *via* Husserl’s particular transcendental reduction. This, then, is why commentators, like Carman, find it ‘difficult to say exactly what the nature and scope of his [Husserl’s] influence on Heidegger amounted to in the end’, but this is no justification for avoiding addressing this controversial and central issue in Heidegger’s early philosophy.

II  
**Husserl’s ‘Talk of Being’ in *Ideas I* and Heidegger’s ‘Question of the Meaning of Being’ in *Being and Time***

One of the most important and controversial conclusions that Husserl reaches in his reduction of the natural attitude to the transcendental-phenomenological attitude in *Ideas I* is that one’s own actual consciousness can and would continue to exist, even if the entire world of things, including oneself as a being in that world, were annihilated. This, Husserl demonstrates, though enacting his (in)famous ‘world-annihilation repeatable thought-experiment’ in *Ideas I*. And it is this notion of an isolatable, pure, disembodied intentional consciousness that probably came most under attack by the majority of Husserl’s critics and ‘followers’ of his phenomenological conception of philosophy. Heidegger, however, does not deny in *Being and Time* that complete reduction to pure intentional consciousness and its objectivities is a possibility for phenomenology and phenomenological research. He, in fact, acknowledges such a possibility in *Being and Time*; and he had already remarked to his student in his 1925 Summer Semester lecture-course, with respect to Husserl’s discovery of ‘pure consciousness’ in the transcendental reduction, that the ‘difficulty does not concern the determination of the region as such, the characterisation of

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27 Here Heidegger appropriates, at least in part, Dilthey’s stress on ‘hermeneutic retrieval’ as an essential *methodological* concern in any phenomenological approach to the significances of particular life experiences documented in literature. This includes ‘talk of Being’ from a lived point of view, however this has been documented in the history of thought, or in the history of our daily lives. Thus it is not without due regard to Dilthey’s approach that Heidegger explicitly tells his students in his 1925 Summer Semester lecture-course that ‘Dilthey brought with him [by comparison to Husserl, as is evident from the context] an original understanding of phenomenology, and that he influenced it in the direction which concerns us [Heidegger].’ Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, p. 117, my emphasis.


29 Though Heidegger does not tell his reader in *Being and Time* that he is referring to Husserl’s reduction in ‘The Fundamental Consideration’ of *Ideas I*, it is to this very text that Heidegger is alluding when he singles out the apodictic proof of the existence of consciousness in reflective immanent perception and the ‘givenness’ of a ‘reflective awareness of the “I”’, to make the point, as an aside, that ‘this kind of giving (diese Art von Gehung)’ and ‘this insight (diese Einsicht)’ even affords access to a phenomenological problematic in its own right (eigentüdigen), and has in principle (grundsätzliche) the signification of providing a framework (rahmengehende) as a “formal phenomenology of consciousness”.’ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 151:115.
pure consciousness’. Thus Heidegger is not maintaining what Merleau-Ponty famously and later suggested that complete reduction to pure consciousness is impossible because, appealing to Heidegger’s insistence, we exist as ‘being-in-the-world’. Heidegger’s argument against Husserl, rather, is that there is a further possibility, after the reduction has been implemented and enacted, for phenomenology and phenomenological research to concern itself with, namely, ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ and its relation to Dasein. Heidegger, in other words, develops his thinking about ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ after the reduction has been completed. It is of importance, therefore, to give attention to those aspects of Husserl’s transcendental reduction that are relevant to an understanding and evaluation of Heidegger’s departure from that reduction.

Husserl characterises his reduction in Ideas I as a genuine return to ‘talk of Being’. More specifically, the reduction in Ideas I is a comparative meditation on the meaning of ‘Being as thing’ given to outer sense perception and the meaning of ‘Being as (conscious) experience’ given to inner perception. In the reduction, the world is also understood by Husserl as simply the totality of things that can be encountered via outer perceptual-sense experience. From a phenomenological point view, however, it follows that if an individual thing given to outer perceptual-sense experience depends upon the harmony of one’s actual perceptions of that thing for the latter to show itself in its very existence, so, too, by extension, does the entire world of things given to one’s own actual consciousness. Thus the world, in its true manner of being and appearing, turns out to be an intentional correlate of one’s own actual consciousness. If, however, we compare the outer perceptual-sense experience of things given to our actual consciousness with the awareness that is characteristic of an act of reflective, immanent perception of an experience we obtain, Husserl argues, a very different understanding of Being in relation to being as (conscious) experience.

In his analysis of consciousness in Ideas I Husserl makes a very important distinction between acts within consciousness that are transcendentally directed and acts that are immanently directed. Unlike an act of transcendent perception that occurs within consciousness, such as, for instance, an act of recollection, which posits the existence of its object, a remembered item, sometimes correctly and sometimes not so correctly, an act of reflective immanent perception posits knowledge of the existence of its object, the current (conscious) experience, without

30 Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, p. 112, my emphasis.
32 In his well-known and often quoted ‘Preface’ to his Phenomenology of Perception (1945), Merleau-Ponty accepts Husserl’s point (apodictic argument) that the individual thing is relative to the harmony of one’s actual perceptual experiences of that thing, but the existence of the world is not. He can only do this, however, by having a different concept of the ‘world’ to the one that Husserl is talking about in his reduction. For Merleau-Ponty, the world is ‘a background’, a ‘horizon’ against which individual things emerge and fall back into and thus an ‘immense individual against which my experiences unfolds and which dwells at the horizon of my life, just as the noise of a great city forms the background of all that we do there’ (ibid., p. 378, and see, p. 362). It is ‘a closely woven fabric [...] that does not await our judgement before incorporating the most surprising phenomena, or before rejecting the most plausible figments of our imagination’ (ibid., p. x). From this point of view, therefore, it is not surprising that individual things can come into being and go out of being, but the ‘world’ as ‘horizon’ remains inalienable and indubitably posited. Thus, for Merleau-Ponty, ‘(T)here is absolute certainty about the world in general, but not about any thing in particular’ (ibid., p. 344).
any shadow of doubt. It is not necessary, for instance, that a remembered experience exists, but it is necessary that an experience, immanently perceived, exists.33 Though limited strictly to the present, reflective immanent perception, nonetheless, is infallible in guaranteeing its knowledge of the existence (die Existenz) of its object.34

The non-existence of an experience immanently perceived, therefore, is unthinkable, and it is unthinkable ‘not’, as Husserl had already remarked in the Logical Investigations, ‘in the subjective [psychological-factual] sense of an incapacity to represent-things-otherwise, but in the objectively-ideal necessity of an inability-to-be-otherwise.35 In the reflective immanent perception of an experience, what we encounter is not merely factual-assertoric certainty ‘that a psychical act exist’ (as Brentano held in his 1874 study Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint),36 but apodictic certainty regarding knowledge of the existence of an experience.” Husserl draws important implications from this in his famous argument for the ‘absolute’ existence of being as experience (Sein als Erlebnis) in comparison to the ‘relative’ existence of ‘being as thing’ (Sein als Ding) given to outer perceptual-sense experience in his famous ‘reduction’ of the ‘natural attitude’ to the ‘transcendental-phenomenological attitude’, but we can set this aside for the moment. Because Husserl, nonetheless, provides apodictic arguments in support of his phenomenological elucidation of the meaning of ‘Being as thing’ given to outer perceptual-sense experience and the meaning of ‘Being as (conscious) experience’ given to reflective immanent perception, Husserl was convinced that he had not only clarified but answered, once and for all, in and through his philosophical-

33 Thus de Boer remarks, ‘we can see why Husserl distinguishes within the sphere of immanently directed acts between immanent perception and other immanently directed acts such as remembering of an “experience”. It is possible for the remembered experience not to exist. In memory no absolute positing is possible. Only in immanent perception is absolute positing possible.’ The Development of Husserl’s Thought, p. 345.

34 That the very mode of being of that which is given to our experiences is guaranteed on the basis of some identifiable, perceptually-founded act(s) is of crucial importance to Husserl’s idea of a phenomenological philosophy because, otherwise, there would be no justification for any phenomenological approach to experience, as Husserl defines that approach. Not all of Husserl’s so-called followers, however, agreed with Husser on this point. The act of reflective, immanent perception, nonetheless, is of particular importance to Husserl in that it guarantees, apodictically, the very existence of its object, namely, psychical act-experiences and their objects (if they exist).

35 ‘What cannot be thought, cannot be, what cannot be, cannot be thought — this equivalence fixes the differences between the pregnant notion of thinking and the ordinary subjective sense of presentation and thought. […] Wherever therefore the word “can” occurs in conjunction with the pregnant use of “think”, there is a reference, not to a subjective necessity, i.e. to the subjective incapacity-to-represent-things-otherwise, but to the objectively-ideal necessity of an inability-to-be-otherwise.’ Husserl, Logical Investigations, pp. 445–446.

36 Cf., Franz Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, trans. by Antos. C. Rancurell o, D.B. Terrell & Linda L. McAlister (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973; Routledge, 1995), p. 141: ‘(1) in the case of cognition through inner perception, what we perceive is that a psychical act exist’ (my emphasis). And earlier, Brentano writes: ‘(T) or whether or not there are souls, the fact is that there are psychical phenomena [as evidently presented through inner perception].’ Ibid., p. 18–19.

37 ‘Every perception of something immanently perceived guarantees the existence (die Existenz) of its object. If reflective perception is directed towards my experience, I have seized something absolute in itself, the factual being (Dasein [not in Heidegger’s sense of this term]) of which is essentially incapable of being negated, i.e., the insight that it is essentially impossible for it not to exist; it would be a countersense (ein Widersinn, a non-sense) to believe it possible that an experience given in that manner (so gegebenen) does not in truth exist’. Husserl, Ideas I, pp. 96–97:85.
transcendental reduction, the question of the meaning of Being in any of our ‘talk of Being’ (Seinsrede)’ that was relevant to his conception and elaboration of phenomenology as a study of intentional consciousness and its objectivities.\(^{38}\) In this respect, Heidegger is quite correct to point out and stress to his students in his 1925 Summer Semester Lecture Course that with the transcendental reduction ‘the question of [the meaning of] being is thus raised, it is even answered [by Husserl]’.\(^{39}\) It is, however, precisely because ‘the question of [the meaning of] being’ is answered by Husserl that this question, as Heidegger also points out, is ‘no longer’ a question for Husserl.\(^{40}\) It was, nonetheless, for that, a question for Husserl in the transcendental reduction, irrespective of the answer that he unfurled in and through his eidetic analysis of ‘thing-perception’ and of ‘experience immanently perceived’. In this regard, then, we can understand Heidegger’s claim that ‘the question of (the meaning of) Being’ is a question that remains at the core of Husserl’s philosophical considerations and composition of the reduction of the natural attitude to the transcendental-phenomenological attitude. It is also, as Heidegger is well aware of and stresses to his students in his 1925 lecture-course, a question that can be re-enacted and retrievable (wiederholbar), but only in and through the repeatable thought-experiment of the reduction and eidetic analyses. ‘It is the essence of phenomenological investigations’, Heidegger insists, ‘that they cannot be reviewed summarily but in each case must be rehearsed and repeated anew.’\(^{41}\) In this respect,

\(^{38}\) This means, for Heidegger, that the question no longer is a question for Husserl; hence, the question of the meaning of Being in phenomenology becomes ‘un-thought’ in the sense that it becomes undone by Husserl in and through his transcendental reduction.

\(^{39}\) Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, p. 112.

\(^{40}\) My emphasis. See, History of the Concept of Time, esp., Chapter Three ‘The Early Development of Phenomenological Research and the Necessity of a Radical Reflection in and from Itself’. As well as the suppression of the question of the meaning of Being through the reduction, the conclusion of the reduction renders the existing human being ‘no longer regarded in its concrete individuation and its tie to a living being’ (p. 106). Thus, from his analysis of the reduction, Heidegger explicitly concludes two neglects by Husserl at the end of Chapter Three, succinctly captured by the title of his §13 ‘Exposition of the Neglect of the Question of the Sense of Being itself and of the Being of Man in Phenomenology’.

\(^{41}\) Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, p. 26. By focusing on and clarifying the mode of being as thing given to outer perceptual-sense experience and being as (conscious) experience in his ‘talk of Being’ as the only relevant ‘talk of Being’ in his definition of transcendental phenomenology, Husserl missed out entirely on the significance of the meaning of the facticity of ‘Dasein’ in any ‘talk of Being’. It is one of Heidegger’s main bones of contention in this Summer Semester 1925 lecture-course that Husserl’s reduction excludes, a priori, ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ and its relation to ‘Dasein’. Husserl, however, explicitly complains about commentators and critics confusing the transcendental reduction with the eidetic reduction, and believed Heidegger was one of these too. ‘I also note that you too, following the suggestions of Scheler and Heidegger, see me as a Platonist or (which comes down to the same thing) and you confuse the [transcendental] phenomenological reduction with the eidetic reduction. No one seems to think it necessary to read and take seriously what I say about the reduction. [...] I am further way from Platonism and every a prioristic ontologism than any past or present philosophy — incomparably further even than Dilthey,’ Husserl, ‘March 28, 1934 Edmund Husserl to Julius Stenzel (draft)’, in M. Heidegger, Becoming Heidegger. On the Trail of His Occasional Writings, 1910–1927, ed. by Theodore Kisiel and Thomas Sheehan (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007), pp. 414–415. Heidegger, however, does not confuse these two operations in Husserl’s philosophy, but many commentators and critics do, as Husserl notes. The confusion of Husserl’s exceptionally clear and distinct doctrines of descriptive-psychological-eidetic analysis and the transcendental reduction is compounded further by Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s later and highly influential, but highly inaccurate commentary on Husserl’s eidetic reduction and Heidegger’s ‘facticity of Dasein’ as proving the impossibility of complete reduction to
‘the thing itself’ (die Sache selbst) that concerns both Husserl in the reduction and Heidegger (later) in *Being and Time* is the issue of the meaning of Being.

If we follow Husserl in his reduction, we can evidently see, after the reduction is completed, that the very appearing of the world (that is to say, of the totality of things given to outer perceptual-sense experience) in its existence is contingent upon consciousness, whereas one’s actual consciousness is not dependent for its existence on the world. My actual consciousness, in other words, can never depend upon, nor append itself to a material thing (a corporeal body) in order to exist precisely because material things depend upon consciousness to exist. Thus my actual consciousness is the true ‘ontic presupposition’ (Seinsvoraussetzung) of the world for Husserl, and not the material thing of nature as held and hailed in the natural attitude.

In the natural attitude (as Husserl defines it), in perception we assume things to be simply there, lying present-in-stock (vorhanden), with an essential meaning and an independent existence in order for us to come to know what they are via outer perceptual-sense experiences. This very standpoint overlooks, however, the simple phenomenological fact that such things could not and do not appear, in their very mode of being, to my actual consciousness without the harmony of one’s actual intentional experiences of things in and of that world. Consciousness appears first and the world of things appears secondly. This must be understood from a Kantian transcendental point of view, that is to say, consciousness is revealed in and through the reduction as a necessary (pre-)condition for the possibility of the appearing of the world of things in their very being to the actual experiencing subject. After the reduction is completed, therefore, there is no ‘thing in itself’ that is left over or outside of its parameters; or, perhaps more accurately stated, there is no intelligible or sensible talk about that which is in-itself, except, perhaps, about consciousness itself in its being, which is not a thing. Thus, Husserl concludes, ‘the meaning of our talk of being (der gemeine Sinn der Seinsrede) is exactly the opposite of what it ordinarily is (So kehrt sich [...] um).’ Things are not encountered through our acts of outer perceptual-sense experience as hailed and held in the natural attitude; they are constituted, rather, in their very meaning and being, in and through the harmony of one’s actual intentional experiences. Absence of such


42 ‘Over against the positing of the world, which is “contingent” positing, there stands then the positing of my pure Ego and Ego-life which is a “necessary,” absolutely indubitable positing. [...] This is the eidetic law defining this necessity and that contingency.’ (*Ideas I*, pp. 102–103:86) Thus Husserl concludes Chapter Two of Part Two of *Ideas I*, noting that here, ‘(O)ur considerations have now succeeded in reaching a point of culmination’ (ibid.). The rest of what follows is an elaboration of what has been achieved. See, Rudolf Boehm, ‘Husserl’s Concept of the “Absolute”,’ in *The Phenomenology of Husserl, Selected Critical Readings*, trans. and ed. by R. O. Elveton (Seattle: Noesis, 2nd edn, 2000), pp. 164–191 (p. 169).


45 Ibid., p. 100:85. The fact that the entire world of things could only appear to me in its very being through the harmony (Zusammenhang) of my actual consciousness of the world, however, is ‘inconspicuous [unseen] and unheeded’, when one is living in the natural attitude; see, ibid., corresponding n. 215, inserted in Copy D.
harmony of experience would not, nevertheless, lead to nothingness because, from a dialectical point of view, absence of unity implies not nothing but multiplicity, that is, a series of unconnected intentional experiences that do not produce a world — but the experiences would exist. Thus, as the repeatable thought-experiment demonstrates, consciousness (experience itself) would continue to exist as a residuum, even if the entire world of things ‘no longer’ existed for consciousness — such a consciousness would just not be a consciousness of the world as we know it. ‘The existence of a Nature [therefore] cannot be the condition for the existence of consciousness, since Nature itself turns out to be a correlate of consciousness: Nature is only as being constituted in regular concatenations of consciousness.’

Through the reduction, then, Husserl reaches at least part of the conclusion that he has been striving to obtain, namely, that the harmony of the experiences of one’s own actual consciousness is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for the very appearing of a meaningful world (of things) in their very existence given to outer perceptual-sense experience. By comparison to the relative (presumptive) mode of being of the world of things given to acts of outer perceptual-sense experience, consciousness, as revealed in and through Husserl’s famous world-annihilation thought experiment, can exist in its being (so-sein) absolutely as that-which-is (als Seiendes) in itself. This, for Husserl, is beyond doubt; but this can only be seen outside of the standpoint of ‘the natural attitude’ and from inside the standpoint of the ‘transcendental-phenomenological attitude’. This turning away by Husserl from any implicit or explicit natural ‘understanding of Being’ at a fictional metamasis of all ‘natural ontology’, and his turning towards a transcendental-phenomenological ontology — which occurred in Husserl’s thought (around 1907–08) and which took most, if not all, of his early so-called realist-eidetic followers by great surprise and with much dismay — therefore, is of crucial significance to the development of Husserl’s view of philosophy and phenomenological research. This ‘conversion’ in Husserl’s own thought, nonetheless, overcomes not just the naturalization of ideas characteristic of the experiences of a valid logical consciousness as such, but the reification of human consciousness itself.

From this point of view, Ideas I,

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46 Husserl, Ideas I, p. 116: 96. Husserl’s argument would be conclusive, if the relation between things given to outer sense perception and body-perception is identical and one’s own actual embodied (incarnate) consciousness is more than a thing. See, De Boer, The Development of Husserl’s Thought, ‘Paragraph Fifteen. Two Assumptions’, pp. 383–386.

47 The other part is that consciousness can exist without the world (of things), as his repeatable world-annihilation thought-experiment demonstrates.

48 In Volume One of the Logical Investigations (1900) Husserl addresses the dominant trend towards what he later calls in his 1910–1911 Logos article, the ‘naturalisation of idea’. See, Husserl, ‘Philosophy as a Rigorous Science’, in Edmund Husserl, Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, trans. by Quentin Lauer (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 71–147 (p. 80), my emphasis; ‘Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft’, Logos, 1 (1910–1911), 289–341. Husserl’s turn towards transcendental idealism, around 1907–08, however, came as something of a shock and a disappointment to his earlier so-called ‘realist’ philosophers (who interpreted his defence of the existence of essences or the intentionality of outer sense perception as a commitment to ‘realism’). Husserl’s ‘conversion’ to transcendental idealism, however, is perfectly consistent with Husserl’s quest for a presuppositionless starting point in philosophy because it calls into questions presuppositions that he himself had subscribed to earlier in the Logical Investigations, in particular the un-phenomenologically justifiable hypothesis of the natural attitude that things, whether attention is directed towards them or not, have an absolute meaning and existence.
therefore, is a much further radicalization of phenomenology than that that had been reached and achieved by Husserl in the Logical Investigations.\textsuperscript{49}

From the conclusive point of view that Husserl arrives at in the reduction of Ideas I, therefore, we can readily understand why Husserl could not but see any later attempt by Heidegger in Being and Time to ‘raise anew’ the question of the meaning of Being in phenomenology and phenomenological research as an incomprehensible exercise. This, after all, had been accomplished (at least to Husserl’s satisfaction) in and through the transcendental reduction. Furthermore, to address this issue of the meaning of Being in relation to the way in which a human being is ‘a being-in-the-world’, as Heidegger appears to do in Being and Time, would be, from Husserl’s perspective, tantamount to falling back into the ‘natural attitude’ and to a traditional realist-metaphysical way of doing philosophy from within a pre-critical and unphenomenologically defensible natural attitude. Thus Heidegger’s thinking in Being and Time could not but appear to Husserl as an anthropologistic set back to his entire enterprise of advancing a (his) singular new eidetic science of intentional consciousness and its objectivities, after consciousness has been purified of all naturalistic misunderstandings through the intellectually rigorous therapeutic act of transcendental reduction that he had implemented and documented in Ideas I.\textsuperscript{50}

Heidegger’s depiction of the human being as a being-in-the-world in Being and Time, however, is not a fall back into the natural attitude, as Husserl had thought, because in his understanding of the human being as a being-in-the-world, Heidegger relies on Kierkegaard’s view of ‘existence’ where ‘existence’ is to be understood exclusively in the strong existentialist sense of concrete individual human existence. Such ‘existence’ is simply incomparable to the way in which things as objects of outer perceptual-sense experience (such as, trees, ink-pots, moons, monkeys, crowds of fellow human beings even etc.) are presented to human consciousness either within the natural attitude as Husserl defines it or within the transcendental-phenomenological attitude as Husserl’s defines it. The human being, when seen from an existentialist’s point of view, is already outside of the ‘natural attitude’. Analysing and subjecting ‘things’ given to outer sense perception and ‘experiences’ (Erlebnisse) immanently perceived to eidetic analysis and apodictic critique simply jumps over the topic of ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ and its relation to the way a human being exists (in ‘Dasein’). This is why Heidegger remarks in Being and Time, in a veiled but nonetheless direct reference to Husserl’s transcendental reduction in Ideas I, that,

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The question of Dasein’s basic existential character is essentially different from the question of the Being of something lying-present-in-stock (der Frage nach dem Sein eines Vorhandenen). Our everyday environmental experiencing (Das alltägliche umweltliche Erfahren), which remains directed both ontically and onternologically on innerworldly entities (auf das innerweltliche Seiende gerichtet bleibt), is not the sort of thing which can bequeath Dasein in an ontically primordial manner (vermag Dasein nicht ontisch ursprünglich vorzugeben) for ontological analysis (für die ontologische Analyse). In equal manner, the immanent perception of
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{49} There is still much disagreement among commentators and critics of the continuity and legitimacy of Husserl’s development of phenomenology. For a lucid, short and excellent account of this issue, see Theodore de Boer, ‘The Meaning of Husserl’s Idealism in the Light of his Development’, trans. by H. Pietersma, Analecta Husserliana, 2 (1972), 322–332.

\textsuperscript{50} See, Husserl, Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger (1927–1931), esp., The Amsterdam Lectures, ‘Phenomenology and Anthropology’.
experiences fails to provide (Ungleiches mangelt [...] der immanenten Wahrnehmung von Erlebnissen) an ontologically sufficient leading-thread (ein ontologisch zurückerziehender Leitfaden). 51

Here, Heidegger is clearly referring to the twin poles of Husserl's transcendental reduction — inworldly things given to outer (sense) perception and reflective immanent perception of experiences (Erlebnisse) — even though Heidegger does not explicitly reference Husserl's text. This, however, is not a positive rejection of Husserl's position; it is, rather, an acknowledgement that Husserl's particular transcendental-phenomenological approach, from start to finish, and those approaches that take their pre-critical starting point from within the natural attitude and the 'thesis' of the natural attitude focused on inworldly beings, are not the appropriate approaches to 'see' the topic in phenomenology and phenomenological research that catches Heidegger's attention. What Heidegger is clearly implying in this passage, then, is that be simply can find no methodological help in Husserl's particular reduction, and in his 'Seinsrede', focused as it is on clarifying 'the meaning of Being as thing' given to outer sense perception and on 'the meaning of Being as (conscious) experience' given in reflective immanent perception, for the specific task of raising anew the question of the meaning of Being and its relation to the way a human being is aware of its own being (in Dasein). This topic of concern for Heidegger in phenomenology and phenomenological research simply cannot be found in that (Husserl's) way. 52 Hence the issue itself (die Sache selbst) cannot be addressed in the particular phenomenological manner of thinking as elaborated by Husserl in and through the reduction. The methodological task confronting Heidegger, rather, will involve tapping into 'the understanding of Being' that is deposited in Dasein, for the purposes of recovering a lost and forgotten topic in the history of thought in general and in the contemporary development of (Husserlian) phenomenology in particular; namely, 'the question of the meaning of Being' and its relation to 'Dasein'. 53

51 Being and Time, p. 226:181-182, trans. mod., my emphasis. Heidegger also claims that the phenomenon of the 'worldhood of the world' is 'leapt over' (ein Überspringen des Phänomens der Weltlichkeit zusammengeht) in all ontologies (naive or critical), which have unfolded historically in philosophical standpoints that take their cue from reflection on inworldly entities (p. 93:65).

52 The "that-it-is" of facticity never becomes something that we can come across by beholding it (Das Daß der Faktizität wird in einem Anschauen nie vorfindlich). Being and Time, p. 174:135. Nevertheless, Heidegger retorts, 'it is [...] because the "there" (das Da') has already been disclosed in a disposition can immanent reflection come across 'experiences' at all (dass alle immanente Reflexion nur deshalb "Erlebnisse" vorfinden k a u n) (ibid., p. 175:136, my emphasis). That there are 'experiences' and that we can come across these experiences through eine Blickwendung immanent reflective perception is not denied by Heidegger, but this very 'activity' in human intentional consciousness presupposes, in Heidegger's view, a deeper opening (which Heidegger later, famously and metaphorically called die Lichtung) that permits an(y) understanding of Being in Dasein to arrive in the first place. It is this more hidden 'Seinsverständnis' in Dasein' that makes the 'only therefore' (nur deshalb) possible in the possibility of immanent reflection within consciousness, and this, of course, includes reflection on things given to outer (sense) perception. Thus the latter will not lead one in the direction of 'Dasein' either.

53 This is the question that Heidegger is really referring to, when he remarks in the opening line of his Introduction to Sein und Zeit, 'Die genannte Frage ist heute in Vergessenheit gekommen' (p. 21:2). That 'this question', 'die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein', is a not a reference to a desire on the part of the author to engage in a retrieval of classical 'ontology' or of 'metaphysics', is evident from the rest of the entire unfinished study of Sein und Zeit, even though Heidegger does stress at the beginning of his study that the question he is about to address was originally held as a topic of research for Plato and Aristotle, only to fall by the wayside from then on 'als thematische Frage wirklicher Untersuchung' (ibid.).
The originality of Heidegger’s particular argument that ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ must be founded on ‘Dasein’, therefore, can be constructed along the following Husserlian-Kantian lines. Being can be questioned as to its meaning, only if the human being has some understanding of Being itself. As a matter of fact, each and any human being knows that he or she exists, or, as Heidegger puts its, each and every human being ‘als Dasein’ is a being that is disclosed in its very being through such an understanding of Being. Hence Heidegger’s conclusion follows: the question of the meaning of Being will make sense, if and only if grounded in Dasein, that is to say, in an understanding of the ‘There’ (Da) of ‘Being’ (Sein) and in which I find myself implicated as that-which-is (als Seiendes) in Being. We are reminded of Kierkegaard’s point regarding arguing about the existence of anything: ‘I always reason from existence, not towards existence’. Part of Heidegger’s task in Being and Time, and throughout the 1920s, therefore, will be to move Husserl’s ‘talk of Being’ in Ideas I away from intentional consciousness and its objectivities, and towards ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ and its innermost relatedness to the way I understand myself as an existing being in Dasein.

By raising an even more fundamental or basic question in Kantian-Husserlian transcendental phenomenology regarding not merely my ability to reflect on and understand the meaning of Being as thing given to outer perceptual-sense experience and the meaning of Being as (conscious) experience immanently perceived, but on what it is to be a being in being at all for the actual experiencing subject in relation to the meaning of Being itself, Heidegger, therefore, believes that he is furthering Husserl’s idea of transcendental phenomenology to the ‘fundamental ontology’ of Being and Time. And it is precisely because Heidegger wishes to follow a post Kantian-Husserlian phenomenological approach to ‘ontology’ that he is insistent in Being and Time that this issue must be firmly rooted in a legitimating human experience. This, we know, Heidegger (famously) finds in the awareness of the ‘There (Da)’ of ‘Being (Sein)’, and in which I find myself implicated as that-which-is (als Seiendes) in Being, that is to say, ‘Dasein’, as Heidegger understands that term, and in that being’s ‘understanding of Being’. Thinking the relation

55 Since Husserl held only one definition for phenomenology (as an eidetic science of intentional consciousness and its objectivities, after consciousness has been purified via the transcendental reduction), not surprisingly, he could not recognise another definition of phenomenology, such as the one that Heidegger was providing. Thus Husserl could not see Heidegger’s phenomenological credentials.
56 Thomas Sheehan thinks ‘it is a scandal that forty years after the publication of Being and Time Heidegger’s key term Dasein is still usually left in the German’. T. Sheehan, ‘A Paradigm Shift in Heidegger Research’, Continental Philosophy Review, 32 (2001), 1–20 (p. 11). It seems to me, however, that this hesitancy to ‘translate’ Heidegger’s ‘Dasein’ is indicative more of the fact that Heidegger clearly wishes to give a particularly unique meaning to the term itself outside of what its normal meaning in German is, and this is what makes it so difficult not only to ‘translate’ it ‘properly’ into English or into any other language, but to understand it in (normal) German in the first instance. For Heidegger, nevertheless, ‘Dasein’ clearly means exclusively the awareness of the ‘there’ (Da) of ‘Being’ (Sein), and in which I find myself implicated as that-which-is (als Seiendes) among other beings (Seiende) in Being. Thus ‘Dasein’, as Heidegger later says, depicts more of a ‘place’ (ein Ort), metaphorically speaking, than of a self-reflective point. Heidegger, ‘The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics’, in Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, trans. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Meridan, 1956), pp. 206–221; originally composed and published in 1949 as an ‘Introduction’ to the fifth reprint of ‘What is Metaphysics?’ (1929). One cannot ignore the point, nonetheless, that such a
between this (\textit{Dasein}) and ‘the question of the meaning of Being’, Heidegger calls, ‘fundamental ontology’ to distinguish it from Husserl’s transcendental-phenomenological ontology elaborated in \textit{Ideas I}. Whereas Heidegger, therefore, can recognise Husserl’s version of transcendental phenomenology as an exploration of the meaning of Being from a neo-Kantian transcendental-idealistic’s philosophical-phenomenological perspective Husserl cannot recognise Heidegger’s version of transcendental phenomenology as fundamental ontology as a legitimate concern within Husserl’s parameters and definition of post-Kantian transcendental phenomenology.

Heidegger’s position and argument in philosophy and phenomenology in \textit{Being and Time}, nonetheless, is, in many respects, relatively straightforward. It amounts to this: it is only in the particularity of the awareness of one’s own death as a limit-situation (as Jaspers identified) that the entire question of the meaning of Being is re-opened in philosophy and phenomenological research, and within the history of philosophy and metaphysics itself.\textsuperscript{56} Thus it is through his selection and attention to the significance of the meaning of one’s own death that Heidegger believes that he is legitimately advancing a phenomenological conception of philosophy, albeit in a radically new manner, whether Husserl recognised this as phenomenology, or not — and, we know, Husserl did not. From Heidegger’s perspective, nonetheless, he clearly believed in \textit{Being and Time} that the origin of the meaning of the presence of Being as we live it (which is not the tenseless presence of Parmenidean Being) is made possible only in and through the awareness of death. Whilst advancing this phenomenological approach to the issue of the meaning of Being, Heidegger, however, is well aware of the fact that his also challenging the hegemony and basis of all Western metaphysical thinking of Being that takes its origins from Parmenides to Husserl’s eidetic analyses.

That a focus on the experience of death as a sign of temporality and its significance in any ‘talk of (the meaning of) Being’ is central to Heidegger’s elaboration and definition of phenomenology during the 1920s, up to and including the publication of meaning for ‘\textit{Dasein}’ is neither a normal meaning nor a normal usage that any German would subscribe to, before, during or after Heidegger. Thus it is probably best left untranslated, but with the meaning that Heidegger gives to this term kept in mind. For a note on Heidegger’s use of ‘\textit{Dasein}’ and his hyphenated expression of ‘\textit{Da-Sein}’, cf., Richardson, \textit{Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought}, p. 34–35, n. 17.

\textsuperscript{57} In doing this, however, Heidegger reduces and constricts the focus of general metaphysics to \textit{his} particular metaphysics of finitude associated with the ‘to be at all’ of my own being-in-the-world. That things are \textit{at all}, including one’s own being, and other human beings, and other living and non-living beings, requires a different metaphysical possibility for thought, but it is one that Heidegger aprioristically excludes from \textit{his} conception of philosophy. This possibility is one that William Desmond has taken up in his work. See, his \textit{Being and the Between} (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995) and \textit{God and the Between} (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008).

\textsuperscript{58} It is Karl Jaspers whom Heidegger explicitly names and credits in \textit{Being and Time} as the one and only thinker who brought to his attention the crucial point that the anticipation of one’s own death acts as a limit-situation in an individual human being’s ‘understanding of Being’ (in \textit{Dasein}) because this awareness \textit{unites}, from beginning to end, the whole of ‘life-experiences’ of an individual being for that individual human being, \textit{Being and Time}, p. 495, n. vi: 249. See, David Farrell Krell, ‘Toward \textit{Sein} und \textit{Zeit}: Heidegger’s Early [1919] Review of Jaspers’ \textit{Psychologie der Weltanschauungen}, Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 6 (1975), 147–156; reprinted as ‘From Existence to Fundamental Ontology’, in Krell, \textit{Intimations of Mortality} (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1986), pp. 11–26.
Being and Time, then, can hardly be denied. Throughout this time Heidegger is clearly not interested in pursuing either traditional metaphysics or Husserlian descriptive-eidetic-psychology, or Husserlian transcendental-idealistic phenomenology. Of most consequence to Heidegger’s thinking about ‘the meaning of Being’ in relation to Husserl’s ‘talk of Being’ in the reduction is the fact, however, that the significance of the meaning of one’s own death is simply not capable of being approached or elucidated phenomenologically either in terms of ‘Being as thing’ given to outer perceptual-sense experience or in terms of ‘Being as (conscious) experience’ given to reflective immanent perception, the twin pivots of the reduction of the natural attitude to the transcendental-phenomenological attitude in Husserl’s famous ‘talk of Being’ in Ideas I. Not surprisingly, therefore, we do not and cannot find the topic of death or the distinction that Heidegger draws in Being and Time between authentic and inauthentic understandings of death in Husserl’s celebrated philosophical reduction in Ideas I, or in Husserl’s earlier two volumes of Logical Investigations. The topic of death and the concepts of authentic and inauthentic (human) existence, rather, are discussed outside of Husserlian texts in phenomenology and outside of Husserl’s new science of intentional consciousness and by existentialist thinkers, religious mystics, novelists, playwrights and poets, as Heidegger and Husserl well know. St Paul, Luther, Calvin, Kierkegaard, Tolstoy, Jaspers, Dilthey, Simmel and Unger all feature, nonetheless, in Heidegger’s analysis of death in Being and Time. In this regard, it would appear that Husserl’s thinking has no particular part to play in Heidegger’s analysis of death in Being and Time. Yet the main distinction that Heidegger draws between authentic and inauthentic thinking echoes an identical distinction that Husserl makes between ‘authentic and inauthentic thinking’ in the Sixth Logical Investigation. Though Heidegger does not mention this, it seems to me that this distinction between ‘authentic and inauthentic thinking’, elaborated in the Sixth Logical Investigation, sets up the very way in which the topic of death is both approached and laid out in Being and Time, even more so than any of the accounts rendered by existentialist and non-existentialist thinkers.

59 Van Buren notes that Heidegger, in his early lecture-courses on the philosophy of religious life experiences, originally took the theme of ‘death’ as ‘a motto […] from Luther’s Commentary on Genesis, in which he [Luther] describes life as a perpetual versus ad mortem, which Heidegger will translate in his courses and in “Being and Time” as Vorlaufen zum Tode, anticipatory running ahead toward death’. J. Van Buren, ‘Martin Heidegger, Martin Luther’, in Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in His Earliest Thought, ed. by John van Buren and Theodore Kisiel (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), pp. 159–174 (p. 171). As van Buren correctly remarks, however, ‘by this time [of Being and Time (1927)] Heidegger’s Christian theological interests had already been on the wane for a long time’ (ibid., p. 174). The all important focus by Heidegger on ‘Vorlaufen zum Tode’ in Being and Time now lies in the anticipatory awareness in the present of running ahead towards one’s own-death without God and ‘without alibi’, as Sartre would put it; but this means that the theme is taken up by Heidegger without the entire context in which its meaning is developed and elaborated in Christian thinkers. In Heidegger’s estimation, however, the anticipation of one’s own death — and of one’s own death only — gives us direct access to the ‘whole phenomenon of Dasein’. Levinas later calls this analysis by Heidegger into question. See, Levinas, God, Death, and Time, trans. by Bettina Bergo (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000); Dieu, la mort et le temps (Editions Grasses & Fasquelle, 1993).

60 See, Heidegger, History Concept of Time, where the reduction is discussed, and §34 ‘Phenomenological Interpretation of Death as a Phenomenon’.

mentioned (or not mentioned, e.g., Augustine’s reflection on death in Book IV of the *Confessions*) by Heidegger in *Being and Time*. All of the existentialists and religious thinkers that Heidegger mentions in *Being and Time*, nevertheless, turn out to have an ‘inauthentic’ understanding of death in Heidegger’s estimation because they do not understand the difference between talking about death of the other (of a friend, a nephew, a loved one, or in relation to God as the Absolute Other and creator of our being) and seeing the meaning of one’s own death itself — because ‘death *is* just one’s own’, or, at least, so Heidegger believes — 62 as unlocking the significance of the meaning of Being itself. Heidegger, of course, does not construct his analysis of death with specific reference to Husserl’s distinction between ‘authentic and inauthentic thinking’ in *Being and Time*, and I am not suggesting that he either consciously or unconsciously avoided informing his reader of the comparative nature of his analyses in *Being and Time* with Husserl’s distinction. For the purposes of our inquiry and analysis, however, we will reconstruct Heidegger’s analysis philosophically in that fashion in the following and final section of this article.

### III

**Husserl’s Distinction Between Authentic and Inauthentic Thinking in the *Logical Investigations* in Relation to Heidegger’s Analysis of Death in *Being and Time* — A Philosophical Re-Construction**

Towards the end of the Sixth Logical Investigation, Husserl elaborates a distinction between ‘authentic and inauthentic thinking’. 63 By ‘authentic thinking’ Husserl means that form of thinking where the object of the act that is given by such

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62 Ibid., p. 309: ‘Tod *ist* je nur eigener’, *Sein und Zeit*, p. 265. Iain Thomson draws attention to difficulties in translating this sentence into English, in his article ‘Can I Die? Derrida on Heidegger on Death’, *Philosophy Today*, 43 No.1 (1999), 29–42. Thomson remarks, ‘taking *eigen* in the sense of the proper […] then perhaps the most “proper” translation would be: “death is always proprietary” […] (O)r maybe: “death is always only (its) own,” even: “death *is* always only proper”.’ (p. 36). However, none of these translations quite catch the point that Heidegger wishes to make about one’s own death, hence Thomson concludes, ‘with the impropriety of suggesting […] “death is always most/just [one’s] own” (ibid.). That Heidegger takes this statement to be an analytically true statement, however, is evident from the context, which Thomson himself quotes: ‘Holding on to the truth of death — death *is* always most/just [one’s] own — shows another kind of certainty, more primordial than any certainty regarding beings encountered within the world or formal objects; for it is the certainty of being-in-the-world.’ *Being and Time*, p. 309:265, Thomson’s trans.: ‘Das Für-wahr-halten des Todes — Tod *ist* je nur eigener — zeigt eine Andere Art und ist ursprünglicher als jede Gewißheit bezüglich eines innerweltlich begegnenden Seienden oder das formalen Gegestände; denn es ist des In-der-Welt-seins gewiß.’ Again, Heidegger clearly has Husserl’s reduction of the natural standpoint to the transcendental-phenomenological standpoint here in mind, and all the various kinds of epistemological certainties that Husserl’s reduction uncovers through his eidetic analyses of a thing (*Ding*) given to outer perceptual-sense experience and of a (conscious) experience (*Erfahrung*) given in reflective immanent perception, though this is not mentioned by Heidegger, but it is the point of comparison for Heidegger.

thinking is the directly intended object as such, ‘in person’, as it were. ‘In person’ has to be understood in an analogous sense of ordinary perception. Take, for example, one of Husserl’s own examples, the judgment ‘colour implies extension’. Where is the experiential origin of this a priori judgement to be found? For Husserl it is not particular colours, as any empirical judgement about factual colours cannot justify the necessity of an a priori judgment (that if a colour exists it must be extended), but about colour itself as a general object. So, just as particular colours (blues, greens, reds, greeny blues, bluey greens, etc.) are no more mysteriously presented to outer perceptual-sense experience so, too, colour itself (as a universal object and about true judgements can be made) is presented to eidetic ideation ‘in person’, ‘in its living, bodily presence’, ‘so to speak (sozusagen)’, as Husserl puts it in Ideas I. Thanks to the univocal understanding of the intentional object as the intended object of an intentional psychical act-experience, transition between different levels of meaning can be retrieved, but it is the perceptual grasp of the meaning of the intended universal object itself (i.e., colour as a universal object of the experience) that is the phenomenal basis of the a priori judgement. It is such ‘universal objects’, or ‘essences’ as Husserl calls them after the Logical Investigations, that lie as the universal basis of all of the experiences of valid normative logical, ethical, aesthetical consciousness as such.

‘Inauthentic thinking’, by contrast, denotes a mode of thinking that does not present its intended object in a directly intuitive demonstrable fashion, such as, for instance, the description of a bridge in a novel. By comparison to perceptually-founded acts, all linguistic statements about something that is not the object of my direct intuition are categorised by Husserl as inauthentic forms of thinking. Nevertheless, and this is of importance, such linguistic statements do present an object, they are intuitive, but they are symbolically (or signitively) intuitive.

This is Husserl’s expressed commitment to clarifying the meaning of concepts by return to ‘intuition’. It is, perhaps, most clearly articulated Husserl in his famous principle of all principles in Ideas I, but ‘in person’ has to be understood in an analogous sense. See, following note.

Sometimes this ‘principle of all principles’ is taken ‘literally’ by some interpreters as maintaining that Husserl is referring to a living embodied being, but this is to entirely misunderstand and misrepresent his principle. Colour, as a general object, is not regarded by Husserl as a living embodied being. Husserl theory of outer perception of other fellow human beings does leave a lot to be desired, but this has nothing to do with his principle of all principles defended in Ideas I. Husserl had already noted in the Logical Investigations that to deny the reality of ‘colour in general’ (it is not a colour) is not to deny it objectivity, for, colour, as a general object, is given in ‘ideational abstraction’ (Logical Investigations, vol. 1, p. 128). This universal object is the experiential basis or origins that a priori knowledge-claims about colour itself rest.

This is not a defence of, or a return to any form of ‘realism’ (of a Scholastic-Aristotelian or other variety), as some commentators and critics at the time, and still today, wrongly, believe. It is, rather, an advancement of Brentano’s modern descriptive-psychological point of view that takes the direct object of perception to be the intended object of that perception. See, Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874), p. 88. If all intentional objects are intended objects, then Husserl is right to say that all such objects, analytically, refer to acts that intend them. Though Brentano did not spot the implications for correlative-constitutive analysis, this is a development by Husserl of Brentano’s descriptive-psychological ideas, as Husserl repeatedly pointed out.

This is Husserl’s learned this distinction between intuitively fulfilled and unfilled presentations from Brentano, while attending the latter’s lectures on descriptive psychology at Vienna (1884–1886). See, Husserl, ‘Reminiscences of Franz Brentano’, trans. by Linda L. McAlister, in The Philosophy of Brentano, ed. by Linda L. McAlister (London: Duckworth, 1976), pp. 47–55 (p. 49–50).
when I see for myself what it is that is intended by the description (even if this
perception occurs in an act of imagination, as it most often does, such as when one
identifies the bridge that the author was describing while reading his book) the
signifying description becomes in one's awareness intuitively fulfilled. The signitively
intended object is now the directly intended object of intuition, once we have peered
through, as it were, the description to that of which it was a description. This
transition is an experience of consciousness and marks a change in the experience of
the mode of presentation by and to consciousness (from an emptily signified one to
an intuitively fulfilled one). This is a phenomenological fact of consciousness that is
observable in consciousness, or, perhaps more accurately stated, this is a tenet
verifiable from within a purely descriptive-psychological methodological point of
view. In this transitional experience and 'fulfilment' of meaning, nonetheless, Husserl
remarks, the sign drops out (thanks to the univocal understanding of intentional object as the intended object of the act). This is what Heidegger is
alluding to when he draws our attention, in a footnote reference in Being and Time, to
the Logical Investigations and to Husserl's point that the 'descriptive-psychological
thesis that all cognition has “intuition” as its goal, has the temporal meaning that all
cognizing is making present'. Though Heidegger acknowledges the significance
that 'all cognition has such intuition as its goal' as a critical descriptive-psychological
tenet in Husserl's philosophy (and its crucial linkage of the meaning of being in
relation to time cannot be underestimated) Heidegger does continue to intimate that
'(W)hether every science, or even philosophical cognition, aims at a making-present,
need not be decided here'. For Husserl and in his elaboration of his new science of
phenomenology that requires absolute justification (in the intuition of essences), it
is imperative that he aims precisely at making present just such a basis in his new eidetic
science of consciousness and its objectivities. Heidegger, as we shall see, however,
has good reason to doubt whether such a goal can always be reached in all forms of
'science' and 'cognition', especially when Heidegger tries to explain what it is exactly
that is being made-present when one reaches a genuine understanding of seeing the
significance of the meaning of one's own death.

One of the major phenomenological exercises that Heidegger sets for
himself in the writing of Being and Time is to trace the meaning of the concept of
death back to its origins, that is, back to its intuitive presence as a directly intended
object of a legitimating experience. The result of this 'phenomenological exercise' for
Heidegger is this.

68 This distinction in the Logical Investigations between 'adequate and inadequate perception', where
inadequate perceptions [of linguistic descriptions] can, within limits, become adequate perception
must not be confused with the concept of the perception of a physical thing that is, in principle,
incomplete or inadequate, on account of a physical thing's spatial composition admitting further
legitimating outer perceptual-sense perceptions of that thing, that Husserl notes and discusses in his
famous reduction in Ideas I.

69 See, de Boer, The Development of Husserl's Thought, pp. 12–17.

70 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 498, n. xxiii.

71 Ibid.

72 Thus I cannot agree with Sebastian Luft's contention that 'Husserl equivocates' on what Husserl
takes to be 'eidetic' (p. 173, n. 25) in the 'eidetic analysis' that he advances; I entirely agree, however,
with this commentator that Heidegger rejects the possibility of applying such analysis to the facticity
of Dasein — but Heidegger can only do this, as Luft intimates, by advancing Dilthey's hermeneutic
method and not Husserl's method of phenomenological enquiry. See, ibid., n. 19 (p. 172) and n. 39 (p. 175).
Insofar as I am at all, as a matter of (biological) fact, my death is absent. Insofar, however, as I am aware of the fact I am a being-for-death, I am also aware of my entire existence as finite. In this respect, I am aware of my death as something that ‘is just one’s own’. Although my death is something that is never present, the awareness I have of my own death, is nonetheless, something that is always and invariably an integral part of my own existence. My death, in other words, is something that cannot be something that is merely signitively referred to in the awareness that I (might) have of my death. My death, rather, is something with which I have some degree of direct familiarity as an intrinsic feature and reality of my actual existence in Dasein, even if I seldom reflect upon such a fact of (my) life. In sum, my death, although always absent, is, nevertheless, also always somehow implicitly present in my understanding of Being, from both an ontological and an existential-phenomenological perspective.

In setting up and analysing the meaning of my own death as a task for phenomenology and phenomenological research, Heidegger discovers a task whose authentic thinking about its intended object, the anticipatory awareness of one’s own death, can never, in principle, be intuitively fulfilled by what one says about the death of the other. Thus in his construction of his analysis of death around what one says about death and what I can see about my own death, and in his attempt to pursue an authentic line of thinking about one’s own death, Heidegger encounters a phenomenon that challenges the parameters that Husserl had configured around ‘empty-signifying’ and ‘intuitively-fulfilling intuitions’ in the Sixth Logical Investigation. This, in turn, undermines the hegemony of the very distinction between ‘authentic and inauthentic thinking’ that characterises the thinking developed by Husserl in the Logical Investigations. The upshot of Heidegger’s analysis of death in Being and Time, then, is that whereas one can see, authentically, that one’s own death is something that can never be (re)presented, one can talk about death as it is directly intuitively presented (in the death of another) but only inauthentically so.

My death, therefore, when understood as the directly intended object of the intentional activity characteristic of the anticipatory awareness of one’s own death, is an un-objectifiable presence both in its own right and on its own terms. It thus resides outside of any conceivable or possible object of intentional-representational consciousness that I could have, or do actually experience (and must experience in

73 See, supra, n. 62.
74 ‘Yet the factual rarity of anxiety as a phenomenon cannot deprive it of its fitness to take over a methodological function in principle for the existential analytic. On the contrary, the rarity of the phenomenon is an index that Dasein, which for the most part remains concealed from itself in its authenticity because of the way things have been publicly interpreted by the “they”, becomes disclosable in a primordial sense in this basic state-of-mind.’ Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. mod., p. 235:190. Heidegger, in fact, argues even further that we must cultivate this possibility of brooding over one’s own self in anticipation over one’s own death as an existential requirement, rather than engage in ‘idle chatter’ (Gerde) about the death of others (e.g., in reading obituaries). See, Being and Time, p. 306:261. According to Heidegger, nonetheless, one cannot reflect, at will, on the significance of one’s own death; one, rather, has (to wait) to be assailed by the mood of Angst. While in the mood of Angst, nevertheless, Heidegger asserts that one must engage, willingly, in ‘inner brooding over one’s death’, if one is to methodologically analysis the meaning of the phenomenon of one’s own death.
immanent time consciousness as Husserl argues. Levinas, therefore, is correct to point out that it is precisely in relation to Heidegger’s phenomenological analysis of the meaning of one’s own death that Heidegger demonstrates the inapplicability of examining the meaning of death — whether it is the meaning of my own death, or the death of another, as Levinas acutely points out, does not matter — in terms of intentional re-presentifications (Ver-gegenwärtigen). In the very analysis of one’s own death that exhibits the fullness of the time of Dasein to itself, Heidegger, therefore, ‘introduced an element of alterity into his [Heidegger’s] own phenomenological description of time in Being and Time’. This is where a significant, immanent criticism of Heidegger’s thinking can begin, and has been effected by Levinas, but before Levinas implemented his radical critique of Heidegger, Heidegger had already advanced Husserl’s idea of ‘transcendental phenomenology’ in a direction hitherto unheard of in Husserlian phenomenology and in western metaphysics towards the question of the meaning of Being and the significance of the experience of death in our understanding of that question. To be fair to Heidegger, then, assessing Heidegger’s originality and contribution to philosophy and phenomenological research would need to focus on the phenomenological merits and demerits of Heidegger’s hermeneutic retrieval of the significance of the experience of finitude characteristic of human consciousness as a ‘being-for-death’ in the mood of Angst in relation to ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ as documented in Being and Time, Heidegger’s first, albeit incomplete, major publication in philosophy and phenomenological research. This, however, is a task for another day.

Husserl argued that reflection on consciousness is only possible because of the temporal structure of consciousness is capable of extending into the future and past to permit reflection. I think commentators are correct to note that Heidegger does not follow this particular way of understanding time, but this leaves us with the question of what way does Heidegger understand time. See, Lilian Alweiss, ‘Heidegger and the Concept of Time’, History of the Human Sciences, 15 (2002), 117–132.

‘Emmanuel Levinas’, in Richard Kearney, Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), pp. 47–70 (p. 62). Why Heidegger does not prioritise this alterity in his analysis in Being and Time is due to his existentialistic rendering of Dilthey’s triad of experience-understanding-expression where Dasein is concerned about expressing concern about its own being, first and foremost, in whatever it does. The significance of the death of the other, which is of no methodological significance ‘either ontically or ontologically’ to Heidegger (Being and Time, p. 283.239) in his elaboration of ‘the question of the meaning of Being’ is, however, pursued by Levinas in his thought, and by others. See, Jacques Derrida, Aporias, trans. by T. Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993); ‘Apories: Mourir—s’attendre aux limites de la vérité’, in Le Passage des frontières: Auteur du travail de Jacques Derrida (Paris: Editions Galilée, 1993).


This article is a revised version of a paper that I gave at the Irish Philosophical Spring Conference on ‘The Futures of Phenomenology’, held in the National University of Ireland Galway (on 6th March 2010). I would like to thank those present for their discussion on this paper. I would also like to thank very much Haydn Gurmin, Susan Gottlöber and the reviewer for very helpful comments towards improving this article.