Abstract:

Education has been a prominent part of Soviet development assistance. As a re-emerging donor Russia also recognizes its importance and provides its assistance in several ways, including free higher education in Russia to students from developing countries, contributions to the education pooled funds and a few programs being administered via multilateral institutions. Russia is facing various challenges in the area of international development assistance, such as limited institutional capacity for aid delivery, incomplete legal basis, shortage of qualified and experience staff, weakness of development assistance institutions and so on. If unresolved these problems might undermine the effectiveness of Russia’s development effort for the attainment of MDGs and any future development goals.

Keywords: international development assistance in education, Russia, new donors
Introduction

Having both a Soviet development assistance legacy and a recent history of being an aid recipient, striving to follow the DAC model and being a BRICS member at the same time, Russia represents a unique case in changing development assistance architecture. Russia’s role of a re-emerging donor offers the country various opportunities, such as re-entry to the arena of international development cooperation as a reliable partner for development, as well as poses numerous challenges associated with low capacity in development assistance provision, turbulence in the institutional setup of its development aid system, low public awareness of its new role, as well as omnipresent budget austerity coupled with growing aid commitments. To understand Russia’s potential role in contributing to the attainment of the post-2015 development agenda in education, the paper discusses the historical underpinnings of Russia’s development effort, its current education aid programs, and potential limitations of its capacity which, if unresolved, can hamper the effectiveness of Russia’s development assistance in general and in education in particular.

Russia’s development aid: history and current system

Russia has a long history of aid donorship rooted in its Soviet history. Even though Soviet assistance was mostly focused on industrial development and agriculture, education was an important element in its approach. The Soviet Union supported the construction of professional institutes, secondary and vocational schools, as well as invested in local teaching capacity and the provision of educational materials (Takala & Piattoeva, 2012). Human resource development was an integral part of Soviet aid in education and more than a half million students from Asia, Africa and Latin America graduated from Soviet universities and technical schools (Charon-Cardona, 2013). At its peak, during the 1989-1990 academic year, the Soviet Union provided higher education to 180,000 foreign students, many of whom studied at People’s Friendship University (Arefyev, 2012).

The Soviet Union did not have “development workers” as such and there was no higher education specialization in development studies. Instead, specialists in international economic relations were trained in the Soviet Academy of Foreign Trade and were primarily deployed to work in UN organizations; in the late Soviet period, one branch of the academy trained specialists for programmes of Soviet economic and technical assistance abroad (Yatsenko et al, 2010).
The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 interrupted this continuity in training specialists to work abroad, and as Russia became a target of foreign assistance in the 1990s, attention shifted to the domestic situation. Although a Russian Agency for International Cooperation and Development was created by presidential decree in 1992, it was short-lived and served mainly to deal with the remainders of what had once been a network of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, and also to deal with incoming aid to Russia. For a time, Russia’s overseas development assistance activities were effectively moribund.

At the turn of the century, as Russia’s economy was recovering, the rebirth of Russia’s development aid started. At the same, Russia began to be targeted by outside international agencies with programmes to develop its capacity as an international development donor. From 2004 to 2010, the UNDP collaborated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to provide practical assistance in building Russia’s capacity for international development assistance (Levkin, 2012). Russia’s efforts to contribute to international development accelerated after the G8 meeting in 2006 and were followed by the adoption of a Concept on Russia’s Participation in International Development Assistance (hereafter referred to as the Concept) in 2007. Since then, the Concept has served as a kind of guiding charter for Russia’s re-emerging aid programme. The UNDP programme was instrumental in assisting Russian ministry personnel to formulate the principles underlying this concept.

The Concept pays tribute to the G8 as an important forum influencing Russia’s activities in development aid. In terms of geographic priorities, it reinforces the general direction of Russia’s foreign policy and pays special attention to the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), at the same time mentioning all the developing regions of the world. The Concept enumerates various thematic priorities which mostly follow the internationally agreed upon Millennium Development Goals. Education is one of them. Russia would strive to “facilitate access to and quality improvement of education services, first of all, primary and vocational education” (Concept of Russia’s Participation in International Development Assistance, 2007). However in the 2012 National Report on Russian Official Development Assistance (ODA), education is not featured. It is also difficult to estimate what is the proportion of education aid in over Russia’s ODA.

USAID and the World Bank were also involved in capacity-building activities with the Russian government. USAID provided consulting and training on an ad hoc basis in Moscow as well as its Washington, D.C. offices for Russian government officials from 2007 until 2011.
(Korepanov & Komagaeva, 2012). From 2009 to 2011, the World Bank, with funding from DFID, carried out a “Russia as a Donor” initiative, a framework for seminars, trainings and consultations with key Russian ministry personnel, as well as other stakeholders in civil society (Levkin, 2012). By 2012, the Ministry of Finance was able to produce its first “Russian Federation ODA National Report”.

So far Russia has not attained the ODA levels of the Soviet Union but has been steadily increasing its assistance since the turn of the century. In 2002-2003 Russia’s ODA levels were about 50 million USD; by the time Concept was adopted in 2007 they reached 210 million USD and continued to rise, attaining a mid-term goal set in the Concept of 400-500 million USD. Russia’s ODA reached its peak of 785 million USD in 2009 when Russia redirected part of its anti-crisis fund to low income countries via the EurAsEC Anti-crisis Fund. According to OECD data, in 2011 Russia provided 478.99 million USD total ODA, 240 million USD of which was provided bilaterally (OECD stats, 2013). However Russia’s Ministry of Finance assesses Russia’s 2011 ODA at a level of 513 million USD (The Russian Federation ODA, 2012).

According to the Concept, the functions of development assistance are shared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance in consultation with the federal executive authorities. Even though Russia provides more than a half of its assistance bilaterally, there is no development aid agency in the country. An agency within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rossotrudnichestvo (Russian Cooperation), at one time hosted a Department for International Development Cooperation. The Department was short-lived, but before its closure in late 2012 it managed to prepare the documentation and action plans for three projects: school lunches in Armenia; support for school education in Armenia, Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan; and technical-vocational education in the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan. According to the former head of the department, project documentation was ready when the idea for a so-called RusAid emerged and the Department was closed, with the projects supposed to be taken over by a future agency. RusAid gained initial approval from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance in 2012. Nonetheless, it was not established. International development aid functionality continued to be scattered among several Russia’s ministries. This situation is indicative of inconsistency of institutional setup of Russia’s development assistance programme. At the same time, the fact that all three of the projects that have been under development at Rossotrudnichestvo deal with education speak to importance of education to Russia’s aid

1The full name of Rossotrudnichestvo is Federal Agency for Affairs of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation
irrespective of whether it is being administered by the Ministry of Finance or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

At the present time it appears that Rossotrudnichestvo will take on the primary coordinating function for Russia’s future development aid programmes. Up until now, Rossotrudnichestvo’s primary function has been to manage the legacy of Russian cultural centers abroad and promote appreciation for Russian language and culture through exchange programmes. Rossotrudnichestvo is now building, almost from scratch, its own knowledge, expertise and capacity in relation to international development assistance. Rossotrudnichestvo is to revise the current Concept and is supposed to present its new version by the end of 2013. At the same time it seems unlikely that the Ministry of Finance would step aside altogether. Both the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs feature activities in international development cooperation in their government programs up to the year 2020. Lingering tensions between the two ministries recently surfaced in the press and it is yet to be seen if the new institutional setup with the leading role of Rossotrudnichestvo would enable a better environment for effective interagency cooperation or would only deepen existing institutional rivalry.

The evolution of Russia as a new donor is taking place against the backdrop of very low awareness among Russia’s public. Nevertheless most Russians are supportive of development aid, although two-thirds of the respondents in the 2010 Levada-Center public opinion poll commissioned by the World Bank believe that Russia cannot increase its own living standards while simultaneously helping others. The positive attitude towards development assistance was attributed by researchers more to the favourable mood of the respondents, rather than to a solid informed opinion (Levada-Center, 2011). In the short term, low public awareness might be conducive for allowing Russia to increase or sustain its ODA levels during times of domestic austerity; however, in the long term it is hard to expect sustainability of Russia’s ODA levels and predictability of its support if it is not anchored in public support.

**Russia’s development aid in education**

There is no policy or white paper that guides and informs Russia’s ODA in education. Several Ministries and Federal agencies, such as the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education and Science, are engaged in development assistance in education.

Russia provides aid in education in a number of ways. First, it continues the practice from Soviet times of providing free higher education for students from developing and CIS countries.
Then Russia also contributes to the pooled funds for education development assistance and has a few bilateral programs in education.

Russia annually provides 10,000 scholarships for foreign students. In the academic year of 2011-2012 about 40% of such students came from CIS region, while the second largest share was for students from Asia (about 19%), with students from Sub-Saharan Africa accounting for 10%. Most of the foreign students who study in Russia on a federal scholarship choose engineering as their major; however, the ratio of such students, about 20%, declined greatly if compared with their peers during Soviet Union times (more than 50%). Nowadays more students are coming to study economics and management, and medicine (each about 18%). Not all funds available for such scholarships can be considered as ODA as some of the students are from developed countries, for example, from Northern and Western Europe (5.5%) (Arefyev, 2012).

There is no official detailed data that provides a breakdown into sectors and sub-sectors of Russia’s ODA, so it is hard to say whether scholarships for foreign students are fully included in reporting on Russia’s ODA. Interagency coordination in general in the area of foreign students studying in Russia is still challenging; for example, the Ministry of Education and Science and the Federal Migration Service have consistently different numbers for foreign students studying in Russia. Currently under discussion is the idea to delegate authority for selecting foreign students who intend to study in Russia to Rossotrudnichestvo. Since Rossotrudnichestvo is also charged with development assistance, one could expect that such expansion of authority would be beneficial for consistent policy and accounting in the area of higher education relevant to ODA.

According to the 2013 G8 Lough Erne Accountability Report, Russia has provided 83% of its total education ODA to basic education during 2006-2011. This is the best performance among eight donors, with Canada having the second best result of 20%. At the same time, Russia has one of the lowest levels of basic education ODA in absolute terms, just 47 million USD (Lough Erne Accountability Report, 2013). No data on the ratio of basic education ODA to the total education ODA of Russia is available in the Report. This might be due to the recurring issue of Russia’s poor system of national data on ODA.

Russia supports the achievement of Education For All goals by providing contributions to the pooled education development funds such as the Education Program Development Fund (EPDF) and the Global Partnership for Education (GPE, former Fast Track Initiative). Most of the contributions and pledges were associated with Russia’s G8 presidency and were meant to meet its commitments. It is not clear yet whether Russia would participate in further
replenishment of GPE fund. Russia’s potential support for the Education First initiative, the UN Secretary-General’s Global Initiative on Education, is being currently discussed.

Russia school feeding program launched in 2010 in Armenia currently provides lunch to 50,000 students in 750 schools (Ministry of Finance, 2013). Initially food was delivered from Russia, but now it is supposed to be produced locally. Full coverage of all Armenian schools is intended in the coming years. The program, which is being coordinated by the UN World Food Program, is planned to be extended to cover Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and countries of the Deauville Partnership (Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia).

Russia education aid for development (READ) is a flagship program of Russia in education assistance. In October 2008 the READ Trust Fund (32 million USD) was established to be executed by the World Bank. READ provides assistance to Armenia, Angola, Ethiopia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Mozambique, Tajikistan, Vietnam, and Zambia in strengthening their capacity to measure and assess student learning and to use this information to improve teaching and learning (Russia Education Aid for Development Trust Fund, 2011).

Apart from providing scholarships to foreign students, most of Russia’s education aid is either provided to multilateral organizations or is administered by multilateral institutions. At the time the READ program was initiated, the lack of domestic capacity to implement programs and projects in education was understood. As a part of the READ program, several initiatives were created to enhance Russia’s capacity in education development assistance, such as use of the “learning by doing” approach for education assessment tools development, a small grant program for joint teams of experts from Russia and developing countries, an internship program for Russian experts and so on. Functions for Russia’s capacity building in these areas rest within the World Bank’s Moscow office and the Center for International Cooperation in Education Development (CICED), Moscow.

The very choice of education quality assessment as a main theme of the program signals an intention to assist developing countries and to support Russian expertise development at the same time: Russia itself has a limited capacity in education quality assessment. While trying to attain two goals at once, such arrangement also posed some difficulties, as an observation made on Soviet foreign aid is still valid today: “Foreign aid is difficult enough when the giver is a master of the technology involved, but when the giver has not yet solved his own problems the results are likely to be unsatisfactory” (Goldman, 1965, p.357). Notwithstanding the difficulties, efforts to enhance Russia’s capacity in international development education aid have resulted in some tangible outcomes, such as for example the development of Student Achievements
Monitoring (SAM), an assessment tool for subject competencies of primary students. A unique characteristic of SAM is that, besides being developed by Russian experts, it is based on the psychological model of educational process of the prominent Russian scholar L. Vygotsky. The need to enhance Russia’s role in technical cooperation is widely understood and comes along with the rhetoric about the necessity to support international development not only with funding but also with Russia’s know-how to have a full-fledged aid system.

**Russia’s capacity in aid delivery**

To meet its international commitments as well as to contribute to the post-2015 development agenda, Russia’s aid delivery should be effective. The shortfalls in Russia’s national capacity for development assistance delivery might pose serious problems for its effectiveness. While Russia has committed itself to the Paris Declaration principles, the lack of transparency and predictability of its aid hinders proper cooperation, harmonisation of its effort with other donors and alignment with recipient countries. Russia does not take part in the donor coordination institutions even in the CIS region; for example, Russia is not a member of the Joint Country Support Strategy (JCSS) for the Kyrgyz Republic, even though it runs development assistance programs in the country. The issue of recipient country ownership was identified by some experts in Armenia as a potential problem: even though assistance via the READ program has been negotiated at the highest levels of education administration, at the middle or lower levels of education management the program is still poorly known and there is no understanding of why specific modalities of the program were chosen and how it fits into the wider governmental effort to improve education quality.

To redress its limited capacity of aid delivery, Russia mostly relies on joint ventures with major international organisations, such as the World Bank, the UN World Food Programme and the OECD, where funding comes from Russia but aid is administered by the international partner. Russia contributes to numerous specially established Trust Funds of the World Bank.

Since Russia often relies on multilateral institutions even in bilateral aid delivery, sometimes assistance is not associated with Russia as a country of origin. Lack of visibility of Russia’s development aid effort has been more and more often identified as a problem when Russia’s development assistance started being considered not just a duty to fulfil international obligations, but also as a potential source of “soft power”, a concept gaining prominence after its use by Vladimir Putin in his pre-election campaign. Russia is trying to step up bilateral programs...
and to rely more on its own institutional and human capacity. Whether it will succeed or not to a large extent would depend on the availability of qualified and experienced staff.

At the moment, ‘development studies’ as such does not exist in Russia, neither as a formal, recognized subject of study in higher education nor even as concept in and of itself. To date, development studies education as a multidisciplinary entity, as the educational experience of students in this field, remains a distinctly British and, to a degree, European mode of study. It is an educational and sometimes didactic resource of traditional donor countries. Even so, development studies cannot be defined as a distinct academic field and the competing understandings of what it is, or should be for that matter, reflects the diverse and conflicting global interpretations of development itself (Kothari, 2005). It exists in a system of education that is subject to economic rationalisation and increased homogenisation attributable to processes such as the Bologna Declaration. In this context, it poses an important anthropological problem, particularly in the context of emerging and re-emerging donors like Russia: will development studies education develop in tandem with development cooperation programmes in Russia (as it has done in the UK and elsewhere)? What influences will shape the educational experience in this framework? And crucially, how could this impact on development practice?

Although the Soviet Union had foreign aid programmes, the execution of aid projects was not approached through the rubric of ‘development’ as it was conceived in development studies programmes outside of Russia, but rather through the rubric of multilateral diplomacy (Yatsenko et al, 2010). This begs the question: Where will Russia’s capacity to carry out international development assistance/cooperation projects come from? Who will staff the institutional entities responsible for carrying out such projects, and what sort of preparation will those people have?

At the same time, the international “donor establishment”, represented by such global agencies as the World Bank and the UNDP, as well as such national agencies as UK DFID and USAID, have been working since the early 2000s to build Russia’s capacity as a development donor through training, seminars and consultations, with clear intent to influence a particular approach in Russia’s international development assistance activities. One of the most recent manifestations of this ongoing effort has been to target this very issue of teaching development studies in Russia. The World Bank contracted with IDS Sussex to create an “Academic Partnership in Support of Teaching Development Aid Curriculum in Russia”. Twelve Russian academics visited IDS Sussex, where they were mentored by IDS Fellows (a process explicitly identified as “knowledge transfer”) in how to design and produce “curriculum materials for postgraduate programmes and professional development short courses for civil servants working...
in the field of aid and international development”. The output of this effort is a “Course of lectures” in international development assistance in the Russian language, published on the World Bank’s website. The question is: how will these curricular materials be used, and what impact will they have on how professional education in development is conceived in Russia?

The Russia’s government’s initial response, when presented with the results of this effort, was to say that, at present, there is not enough demand in Russia (e.g. in the Russian government) for development professionals to justify establishing a formal degree course in development studies in Russia. So far there is little recognition of the role that could be played by development professionals outside the government, such as scholar-practitioners in think tanks, NGO workers, and businesspeople. Nevertheless it appears that some of the Russian academics who participated in producing the curriculum materials have begun using them in their teaching, in essence “sneaking in” development studies alongside their other related teaching. Moreover, other Russian academics, notably at the Higher School of Economics and the Moscow State Institute for International Relations, have since 2010 been publishing materials that can be similarly used. One way or another, it appears that development studies are creeping into Russian consciousness, and potentially into Russia’s development practice.

Russia faces not only a challenge in its relative lack of development professionals, but also a problem due to the concentration of all development activities in the area of governmental relations, which from time to time turns to international multilaterals. There is no diversity of institutions that Russia can draw from in the field of international development assistance. The field of non-state actors in development assistance in Russia is rather limited and their involvement is inconsistent. The Concept provides for the special role of NGOs in serving as aid delivery channels. However, no data is available on the actual share of NGO-executed projects in the overall volume of Russia’s assistance. There is also no reliable data on the number and nature of non-governmental actors participating in international development assistance in Russia. NGOs do not seem to play any particular sustainable role in Russia’s development aid; they take part in development aid operations on an ad hoc basis, mostly providing analytical support to the ministries or departments that carry out development projects. Some NGOs rely on the assistance of a government agency that serves as one of its founding parties.

Nongovernmental actors working internationally started organizing themselves around the main international forums such as G8, G20 and more recently BRICS. Use of such arenas has enabled Russia’s NGOs to start engaging in active advocacy. A coalition is a favourable mode of self-organization of nongovernmental actors; at the same time, currently such a group is only
involved in discussions of the broader development agenda as it relates to G8, G20 and BRICS and does not collectively represent views on internal issues of Russia’s development assistance architecture. Russia’s NGOs are not numerous and they have to act in the circumstances of limited funding, lack of sustained dialogue with government officials and relative lack of governmental support (Shadrikova, 2010). Most of the NGOs involved in development assistance receive international funding, and many of them represent branches of major international NGOs, such as Oxfam or WWF.

**Conclusion**

Six years after the 2007 Concept has affirmed Russia’s return to the donor’s ‘club’, the future of Russia’s aid is still unclear. A trend of returning to conceptualize international development aid as a domain of foreign policy strategizing has only begun to emerge. At the same time it might signify a divergence from the aid modalities of Russia’s early development assistance that were largely influenced by international actors who tried to ‘develop’ Russia into development donor. It is yet to be seen how Russia would marry its own foreign affairs interests with the international expectations of its role, but what is clear is that education is and will be an integral part of its development assistance.

At the same time there seems to be a lack of a strategizing in the area of education aid. At the moment there is no clear vision of what kind of assistance Russia is trying to render in education, or what might be Russia’s comparative advantage in the education sphere. Russian expertise in education seems to be of interest to the CIS countries as they once shared a similar system and still face comparable challenges. But the issue is whether Russia would find enough qualified people who have both subject specific expertise and knowledge of the development problematic. The lack of qualified staff that is partially associated with the non-existence of development studies; the confinement of development work mostly to the government structures, whose efficiency suffers from poor interagency cooperation; and the absence of a legal foundation seem to be among the most urgent challenges Russia has to resolve in order to contribute effectively to the implementation of the post-2015 agenda.
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