Exclusion through Openness?
A Tentative Anatomy of the Ritual of ‘Migration Debates’

Gavan Titley
National University of Ireland

This article examines ‘migration debates’ in Europe as mediated political rituals. It argues that the consistent meta-commentary within such debates—never regarded as sufficiently ‘open’ or ‘honest’—can be taken as a starting point for exploring the simultaneous trace and disavowal of race and racializing discourses in public debate. It examines the disjuncture between the normative expectations of democratic deliberation and decision-making present in migration debates, and the ways in which migration stands for the transformation of the political conditions on which such normative expectations depend. Under these conditions, ‘debate’ must be approached as having ritual forms of value, and these forms of value are explored in a case study of a short-lived ‘burka debate’ in Ireland in late 2011.

Introduction: Never Ending, Never Open

The ‘migration debate’ is an established political ritual in Western Europe, and, to generalize somewhat in introduction, it is regularly characterized by the expression of frustration. Whenever a debate on migration is called for, or instigated, there is always a dominant sense in which it is never held to be open, or honest, or ‘mature’ enough. Always ongoing, but never open, at best these debates are evaluated by their protagonists as preludes to a better, truer form, foreshadowing the more open, more honest debate that is required, next time. This next time is never far away; perhaps in response to a news story, or a public incident, or an elite utterance or widely publicized piece of research about migrant and minority lives, a politician or public figure will call for a debate about migration. Such a call is frequently accompanied by a form of meta-commentary, that is, a concomitant evaluation of the quality of the public discourse required. Yet the debate inevitably falls short of this threshold of openness and honesty even as it unfurls, and this lack poses the question - how can this recurrent frustration be accounted for? How is it that under conditions of communicative abundance, public discourse on migration is held to
be structured by a communicative lack, or worse, by a series of communicative prohibitions?

A recent illustration is employed to unfold dimensions of this recurrent frustration. Writing in *The Guardian* in June 2010, the Labour leadership candidate Ed Balls linked the failure of his party in the previous month’s general election to, in part, its failure to ‘be honest’ with the electorate on immigration. In an article entitled ‘We were wrong to allow so many eastern Europeans into Britain’, Balls argued that freedom of movement in the post-2004 accession EU had driven down wages,¹ and that ‘as Labour seeks to rebuild trust with the British people, it is important we are honest about what we got wrong’ (Balls, 2010). Referring to resentment in ‘communities ill-prepared to deal with the reality of globalization’, and to the threat of the British National Party and Conservative Party stoking anti-immigrant and anti-Europe sentiments for political gain, Balls argued that the Labour Party needed to concede that its ‘arguments on immigration were not good enough’ (ibid.).

In part, Balls’ article was designed to distance himself from his political mentor, the former Prime Minister Gordon Brown, who had been caught unawares by a television camera, during an election campaign walkabout, describing a member of the public – Gillian Duffy, ‘a Rochdale pensioner, on her way for a loaf of bread’ - as ‘bigoted.’ This ephemeral image was sufficient to create an opportunity to attack Brown as ‘elitist’ and ‘soft’ on migration, an image that Balls, in turn, instrumentalised in his unsuccessful strategy of ‘winning back the trust’ of the British electorate. However, what became known as ‘Bigotgate’ occurred less than two months after a key policy speech by Gordon Brown in late March 2010, where he delivered a message on migration that far exceeded the political scope specified by Balls. Speaking directly to an imagined, migrant audience, Brown warned that ‘To those migrants who think they can get away without making a contribution, without respecting our way of life, without honouring the values that make Britain what it is – I have only one message: you are not welcome’ (Brown concluded with a caution that the debate on migration that should now proceed from his statement should be conducted ‘responsibly’). While Brown’s statement was not uncontroversial, it was also hailed as an important instance of ‘open language’, where ‘...the Labour party no longer equates concerns about immigration with out-and-out racism’ (Collard 2010).

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¹ A factual claim challenged in a subsequent article by Tim Finch, head of migration at the Institute for Public Research, see Anushka Asthana, ‘Ed Balls: Labour’s immigration policy hurt wages of British workers’. *The Observer*, Sunday 6 June 2010. Finch’s view was confirmed by a report issued by the Home Office in early 2012, see Dustmann et al (2012). For a media discussion of this report and contemporary counter-claims, see Williams (2012).
This prevalent expression of frustrated openness begets a critical counter-frustration. Writing about the politics of honesty concerning migration during the 2010 UK General Election, *The Guardian* journalist Gary Younge commented:

There can be no meaningful debate about immigration in Britain (or anywhere else that does not address neoliberal globalization, trade policy, development aid, colonial legacy, the European social fund, the dependency ratio and the low paid. But that is not the debate we have been having. Indeed, it is not a debate we have ever had. It's not accusations of racism that are stopping the conversation, but racism itself. For if there is a liberal elite out there thwarting discussion on immigration, it is doing a very bad job. The tabloids and middle market papers seem to talk about little else, and whenever they play their inflammatory tunes the politicians duly dance' (Younge, 2010).

In his dialectical insistence on the absence of political economy and the politics of race in migration and integration debates, Younge's assessment recalls a profoundly useful set of analytical observations from an earlier era. The 'immigrant', as Étienne Balibar noted, functions as a contested sociological category, but also as a malleable political and racial construct in public discourse. Concomitantly, 'migration debates' are not restricted to an analysis of human movement, and its political-economic impacts, causes and human testimonies. Such rituals are also always 'integration debates', recurring evaluations of the presence and legitimacy of those who continue to occupy the racio-political construct of the migrant, a category understood by Balibar as including 'not all foreigners, and not only foreigners.' This suggestive political definition is drawn from Balibar and Wallerstein's (1991) *Race, Nation, Class*, and specifically from a discussion of what is termed 'crisis racism', that is, the political production of race as a focus of anxiety, one that provides political capital in the form of 'effective thinking upon an illusory object', and that is produced through political spectacle. The invocation of crisis, in their understanding, provides a license for particular forms of speech, and ultimately political action, through the '...crossing of certain thresholds of intolerance [...] which are generally turned on the victims themselves and described as *thresholds of tolerance* (1991: 219, *italics in original*).

Balibar's description of this strategic inversion supports Younge's insistence on the continuing political struggle over what is recognized as racism. His assessment suggests that the latent frustration of migration debates is as much a recognition of limits than an evaluation of limitations; *what if that which cannot be said openly, is also that which, it is recognized, should not be said, but demands to be, in some way, in some code, in some shape?* Thus while the Labour adviser Tim Collard (2010), writing in *The Daily Telegraph*, saw Brown's 'stirring words' concerning those 'not welcome' as a salutary restoration of linguistic and political clarity beyond the 'accusation' of racism, Younge's argument suggests that it is precisely through speech acts that claim a form of honesty that transcends racism, that the 'motility' of racist discourse is extended (see Stoler 1997).
It is this sense of a perpetual lack, of migration and integration debates as realms of discourse in which the truth is held to be regularly obscured or compromised, that is explored in this essay. It sets out key dimensions, or a tentative anatomy, of the political ritual of ‘migration debates’ in western Europe, and does so through heuristic exploration, theoretical development, and by unfolding the ritual nature of migration debates through an extended, contextualized example. Within this tentative framework, it argues that by examining migration debates as spectacular rituals that take place under particular political conditions, the apparent paradox of calls for openness compounding forms of exclusion can be explored. Further, it suggests that paying attention to this ritual is crucial in a conjuncture that displays many of the characteristics of ‘crisis racism’, expressed through a political repertoire which is also transationally derived, and legitimated.

**Normative Traces, Ritual Frustrations**

In advance of these explorations, however, the idea of public debate on migration as a spectacular ‘ritual’ requires careful substantiation. This frustrated commitment to the openness of debate recalls an intrinsic dimension of liberal democracy, whether figured through the idea of civic political participation; the role of the mass media as agents of the public interest and system-level plurality; or the near-emancipatory properties frequently attached to ‘new media’ networks and modes of communicative participation (Jenkins & Thorburn 2004). In other words, this articulation of debate recalls an imaginary of the public sphere, or at least processes of rational deliberation and democratic action. Further, it does so within the context of nation-states, where the democratic public sphere functions normatively as a historical space of increasing integration, integrating individuals to a national society within a sovereign territory, and to what Ghorashi, Eriksen and Alghasi term an imagined ‘...isomorphism between individuals and the nation-state’ (2009: 5). As they contend:

Immigrants seem to challenge this isomorphism within a number of arenas in today’s nation-states. In the field of politics, the increasing number of migrants may stand as a threat to state’s sovereignty, and has been an important issue in political debates. This possible threat is also felt in terms of the cultural positioning of the European self towards the newcomer, a positioning in which the European self is differentiated from the newcomer’s culture and way of being. As a possible threat in the socio-cultural and political context, the newcomers and their participation in various arenas within these societies are particularly under attention and focus; in education, in media representation, in the labour market, in relation to state bureaucracy and so on, there is an overwhelming tendency to regulate and form the coexistence of those originally who belong to here, and those who have battled their ways into the Western world (2009: 6)
While immigrants seem to challenge this 'isomorphism', the call to debate invokes putatively isomorphic structures, and imaginaries, in order to progress towards a political solution to the challenge – of too many migrants, of too many migrants of the wrong kind, or of too much 'challenge' of the wrong kind. It is in this tension that frustration resides, and this section provides a discursive examination of this tension by focusing on the normative assumptions inherent in the 'call' - that public debate facilitates political agency, and that debate on migration informs political decision-making on migration. Is it possible that the 'lack' in migration debates is not simply, or not at all, a question of discursive limitation and a lack of political honesty, and more a reflection of deeper, structural 'lacks'? This section assembles a series of theoretical perspectives on this question, and deploys them to open out the suggestive metaphor of 'isomorphism' as a way of thinking about the drive, and frustration, of debate. On the basis of these readings, it moves towards a counter-reading of migration debates as spectacular rituals.

**Debate that Speaks without Hearing?**

The act of calling for debate - and the meta-commentary on the ideal scope of debate - rely on a presumption of the agency of public deliberation and the responsiveness of democratic procedure, articulated under conditions that would appear to undermine belief in such ideal-type conditions or processes. As Peter Dahlgren (2009) outlines in his assessment of 'democracy in difficult times', the media, and mediated communication, are a prerequisite for shaping the democratic character of society, however both the media landscape and ‘...many of the social, cultural, political and technological conditions for democracy are in transition, and we have to incorporate these realities into our understanding of what democracy can and should be’ (2009: 14).

In effect, Dahlgren’s challenge to 'incorporate' the realities of media industries, networked communications and the increasingly complex transformations of democratic systems towards versions of what Colin Crouch (2004) calls 'post-democracy' is a central problematic of media sociology. In other words, despite widespread recognition of the shifting yet implacable inequalities of communicative power (Castells 2009); the ‘distortions’ that stem from corporate domination, economies of scale and the commodification of information as a public good (Freedman 2008); the paradigmatic importance of news and image management, public relations and 'spin' to political communication (Louw, 2010); the rhizomatic connectivities and networks that traverse and reshape the socio-cultural spaces of geopolitical territories (Appadurai 2006) - visions of the public sphere as an ideal space, or pedagogical aspiration for rational and reasoned communication, continue to resonate.
Definitions of various kinds, descend from Jürgen Habermas’s contested historical reconstruction of the bourgeois public sphere as ‘a domain of our social life where such a thing as public opinion can be formed where citizens...deal with matters of general interest without being subject to coercion...’ (1997: 105). In a contemporary update, Alan McKee describes it as ‘...the virtual space where citizens of a country exchange ideas and discuss issues, in order to reach agreement about ‘matters of general interest’...it’s where each of us finds out what’s happening in our community and what social, cultural and political issues are facing us. It’s where we engage with these issues and add our voices to discussions’ (2005:4-5). Dahlgren, in an earlier publication, sets it out as a realm ‘where information, ideas and debate can circulate in society, and where political opinion can be formed’ (1995: ix).

In the scholarly literature, Habermas’ delineation of the public sphere, its normative implications and historical transformation have been subject to numerous critical assessments: of its gendered foundations and lack of attention to social movements and ‘counter public spheres’; its formal abstraction from embodied and social contexts of dialogue and struggle (Roberts 2004); its implicit acceptance of the ‘bleached weave of first world philosophy’ (Mills 1997) and the broadly governmentalist contention that ‘the public operates as an element of media discourse in that it presents a form of representation that contributes to the exercise and regulation of power’ (Higgins, 2008:1). Nevertheless, and abstracted from the context of Habermas’ encompassing project on communicative action and deliberative democracy (Hesmondalgh & Toynbee 2009), it is consistently read as a normative category against which the political conduct of media and the texture of public discourse can be assessed (Higgins 2008).

Of more importance to this argument is the ways in which this aspirational force and guiding imaginary retains significance as a template for how public debate is explained from within. Peter Singer, for example, in a critique of George W Bush’s appeals to religious reason in presidential speeches that broach questions of bioethics, human sexuality and reproductive rights, appeals to a rarified vision of the liberal ethos of the ‘Founding Fathers’ to argue that while belief is not excluded from the ‘realm of public reason’, those who speak from a position of religious faith should be prepared to restate their arguments in terms that can appeal to those who do not share their system of belief:

Judging that better decisions emerge from open discussion, they (authors of the constitution) created public arenas, like town meetings and the two chambers of Congress, so that political debates could help to build an educated and informed citizenry, and an effective democracy. They did not want adherents of one religion, no matter how large a majority they might be, to impose their beliefs on the remainder (2004: 102).
Singer’s argument is scarcely unaware of the transformative impacts of contemporary communicative conditions. Rather, this historical trajectory is granted a metaphorical power, laying the basis for a normative vision of public conduct and communicative ethics for participating in a democratic process whereby politics is ‘...a kind of public conversation about issues of common concern, with a decision-procedure for reaching temporary closure on these issues when the time for action has come’ (ibid). This conversation is normatively one of citizens progressing, or attempting to progress, towards a consensus on matters of general interest, and in so doing guaranteeing the functional health of democracy, as ‘it is the public sphere which helps keep all other elements of the edifice of democracy in place’ (Jakubowicz 1998: 16).

As against this, there is a strong theoretical contention that the normative traces that sustain this idea of public debate depend on expressive and representative fallacies - that media mediate public opinion, and that public opinion, once represented, informs political representation. Two theoretical positions must suffice, in this context, to unravel these fallacies. Different national contexts have significantly different histories and structures of political communication (Hallin and Mancini 2004). Nevertheless, as Nick Couldry (2010) argues, there is a general argument to be made that the ‘close practical symbiosis of media and politics’ damages politics as a ‘distinctive space of deliberation’. Drawing on Thomas Meyer’s (2001) critique of how media has colonized politics ‘at the production level’, Couldry argues that the different time-cycles and temporal requirements of news production and cycles of political decision-making have merged, yet ‘...in principle, politics – the complex balancing of multiple persons, groups and ends – requires an “extended time horizon” whereas both the technological capacities and the economic dynamics of media tend towards an ever-accelerated cycle of news production and the exchange of news as a commodity’ (2010: 83).

Within the parameters of a limited exposition, it is useful to examine these structuring fallacies through the heuristic critique offered by Jodi Dean in Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies (2009). Reflecting on the global protests, on February 15th 2003, against the Iraq invasion, Dean characterizes the debate on the ethics and legality of war as one conducted in a ‘democracy that speaks without listening’, where

Bush acknowledged...the fact that a message was out there: the protestors had a right to express their opinions. He didn’t actually respond to their message, however. He didn’t treat the words and actions of the protests as sending a message to him that he was in some ways obliged to answer. Rather, he acknowledged the existence of views different from his own’ (2009: 20)
Dean’s argument is interesting because it does not depend on introducing material and symbolic distortion into an ideal image of communicative action and democratic participation. Rather, and taking its cue from the latent romanticism that continues to accompany assessments of the ‘digital revolution’ (Jenkins & Thorburn 2004:9) the argument amplifies the ideal to a state of implosion. ‘Communicative abundance’, and the intensive, incessant circulation of opinion, comment and information elides the conditions for political debate as it ‘occludes the antagonism necessary for politics’ by splintering political energy into continuous, compressed sequences of (minor) issues and events. Thus, ‘the terabytes of commentary and information, then, did not indicate a debate over the war. On the contrary, in the days and weeks prior to the US invasion of Iraq, the antiwar messages morphed into so much circulating content...’ (2009: 21, italics added).

Dean uses this global event to elaborate on how what she terms ‘politics circulating as content’ is increasingly divorced from ‘official politics’, that is, extensive opportunities for debate, from the operation of power in putatively democratic structures, as the density of content facilitated by new communications structures relieves political actors from ‘the obligation to answer embedded in the notion of a message’ (ibid). In referencing the reciprocal aspect of the message, Dean is drawing specifically on the communicative rationality of the Habermasian tradition, but also on the broader normative assumptions internal to the conduct of public debate. In this formulation, openness is a condition frustrated less by limitation than by its absence, as the value of a message is inversely related to the openness of mediated flow. Thus Dean reverses the constitutive terms of communicative action:

Communication in communicative capitalism, then, is not, as Jürgen Habermas would suggest, action oriented towards reaching understanding. In Habermas’s model of communicative action, the use value of a message depends on its orientation. A sender sends a message with the intention that message be received and understood. Any acceptance or rejection of the message depends on this understanding. Understanding is thus a necessary part of the communicative exchange. In communicative capitalism, however, the use value of a message is less important than its exchange value, its contribution to a larger pool, flow, or circulation of content. A contribution need not be understood; it need only be repeated, reproduced, forwarded. Circulation is the setting for the acceptance or rejection of a contribution (2009: 27).

Participating in ‘debate’, under these conditions, may be primarily affective, a structure of feeling rather than a structure of political agency. Evidently, this theorization requires grounded, contextual investigation, and it may be insufficiently sensitive to the limited, tactical and consciously ephemeral strategies wrought by ‘alternative media’, for example, in and through these conditions (see Lievrouw 2011). Nevertheless, it does support a move towards a fuller understanding of why ‘migration debates’, in particular, are better understood as ritual events in
contexts of communicative abundance, but also where other important isomorphic assumptions are disturbed. Dean’s framework raises the question; over and above the content that circulates in debates on migration, what is the message of ‘migration debates’?

**Debate about Migration, Debating through Migration.**

If, as Ghorashi, Eriksen and Alghasi (2009) contend, ‘immigrants seem to challenge... isomorphism within a number of arenas in today’s nation-states’, it is a challenge that is suffused in a cultural and political vocabulary that is always at once descriptive and prescriptive (Welsch 1999). In Shohat and Stam’s assessment, the idea of multiculturalism in migration societies insists on a ‘constitutive heterogeneity’ (2003: 3) that refuses flattening out to foundational, isomorphic constructions of a national ethnos. However, the converse to this also holds. The prefix alone underpins the pronounced sense of multiculturalism as an imposition, as an unwelcome amendment to a pre-existing monoculturalism, and thus ‘...the very idea of multiculturalism, the ideology, disturbs out of proportion to what in fact it may be’ (Elliot and Lemert 2006: 137). Similarly, while ‘diversity’ has emerged as an imaginary for the management of difference beyond what is held to be the essentialist trap of ‘multiculturalism’, ‘talk of diversity’, as Mary Hickman has argued, may be ‘...predicated not on the acceptance of plurality but on the notion of a host who is being subject to diversification’ (2007: 12).

What Hickman, in particular, identifies is a double movement in contemporary public imaginaries of difference governance in the nation-state, towards, on the one hand, a recognition or valuing of human diversity in certain ways and under certain conditions, while at the same time emphasizing that its acceptance remains contingent, and on ‘it’ continuing to be recognized as a good. This contingency becomes a subject of debate when particular dimensions of isomorphism are held to be disturbed; culture as a guarantee of cohesion, homogeneity as the basis for solidarity in the welfare state, shared values as a condition for public life. The contingency of migrants, the lack they come to represent, is most obvious in how Western European integration politics is mediated through idioms conveying threatened and desired states of integration: a recalibrated laïcité in France, ‘community cohesion’ in the UK, ‘standards and values’ in the Netherlands, ‘Leitkultur’ in Germany (Fekete 2009: 62-3). It is in these insistent, isomorphic

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2 Similarly, while the idea of open debate suggests a fidelity, in some way, to the emergence of a truth, or, at the very least, to establishing the empirical facts of a situation, it is evident from a huge body of research that the facts of migration and migrant lives are not only subject to dedicated forms of spin and racial distortion, but that debates on migration are hostage to what de Certeau (1986) calls recited truths, social facts produced and made factual through their circulation. For a hugely useful discussion of the uses of statistics and empirical claims in reporting and public debate, see Finney and Simpson (2009)
imaginaries, articulated at the start of the twenty-first century, that the second major normative ‘lack’ that haunts debate, is manifest.

As William Walters (2004) notes, the image of a coherent national economic and political system, ‘...linked in turn to a social order...in an international order populated by discrete, bounded socio-economic systems’ retains significant purchase. It does so in much the same way as the normative tug of the public sphere, concomitant with the knowledge that the nation-state is now configured in a space of flows, where the ‘business’ of governance involves identifying and tapping productive flows and mobile goods, while, in a porous order, defending ‘insecure societies’ from bad flows, including such human mobilities as the ‘unskilled’ migrant worker, and the resource-drain of asylum-seeking (2004: 244). In other words, under conditions of neoliberal globalization and transnational connectivity, this set of isomorphic assumptions is subject to severe forms of stress. For this reason, as Arjun Appadurai argues, migrants and minorities may function as conduits for framing and exercising socio-political stresses in ways that recall, but extend, Balibar’s reading of the instrumentalities of ‘crisis racism’:

Minorities...are the flashpoint for a series of uncertainties that mediate between everyday life and its fast shifting global backdrop. They create uncertainties about the national self and national citizenship because of their mixed status [...] their movements threaten the policing of borders [...] their lifestyles are easy ways to displace widespread tensions in society, particularly in urban society. Their politics tends to be multi-focal, so they are always sources of anxiety to security states. (2006: 44-5).

The ‘needed but unwelcome’, in Appadurai’s argument, come to mediate an ‘anxiety of incompleteness’, the impossibility of isomorphic coherence. In terms of the themes of this special issue, this is where the ‘securitization’ agenda is at its most acute, particularly in a context where ‘migrants’ are held to embody multiple forms of threat (McGhee 2008). The lack within this process of mediation, however, is that implicit in this dynamic of concentrating and dissipating anxiety is ultimately the recognition that migrants provide screens for projection that inevitably prove to be translucent. In other words, a plausible reading of the frustrated openness of debate is that it fixes the migrant as the embodiment of broader disjuncture, but cannot fully reduce them to it. As Bill Jordan and Franck Duveill (2003) argue, a political focus on immigration cannot indefinitely exclude the wider backdrop of isomorphic disturbance, as:

"immigration" comes to be a term that connotes all the unresolved issues of membership in present-day societies. It mobilizes the resentment of those made insecure by their vulnerabilities to global competition; it taps into rivalries between excluded groups; it links the fate of immobile and impoverished ethnic minority communities with the threat of mobile and resourceful newcomers, seen as further subverting the protections of
citizenship. It allows the politics of nationalism and ‘race’ to be rekindled, and exposes the fragility of liberal democratic institutions (2003: 62).

Thus while migration policy, in the realm of labour market regulation, is profoundly unresponsive to public opinion, attempts to resolve issues of membership through political initiatives on migration are noticeably responsive. As Bryan Fanning argues, ‘...the primary goal of any viable integration project should be to close gaps between “nationals” and “non-nationals” for the sake of future social cohesion (2009: 3). However, in Western Europe, integration projects are structured around the gap between the discursive and the material: integration politics involves extensive, formal and symbolic demands for loyalty and elective homogeneity in public space, while integration regimes organize presence and access to socio-economic rights through stratified systems of entry, status, residence and legitimacy (Kofman 2004, Titley 2012).

In a recent survey of compulsory integration modalities in Europe, Guild, Groenendijk and Carrera (2009) draw attention to the transfer of ‘civic mandatory integration’ from a process of access to national citizenship through naturalisation to integration as the mode of discipline. Highlighting the privatised ‘pre-migration’ integration test pioneered by the Netherlands and adapted by several other countries, they argue that integration has become a border practice, beyond and inside the territorial border, merging entrepreneurial desires for economic utility with managerial concerns regarding cultural compatibility and socio-economic footprints:

In the context of immigration law, integration becomes a tool to control the non-national ‘inside’ the nation-state and even ‘abroad’... Integration functions as another regulatory technique for the state to manage access by the non-national – not to the status of citizen – but to the act of entry, the security of residence, family reunification and protection against expulsion... Integration determines the ‘legality’ or ‘illegality’ of human mobility, and constitutes another frontier to being considered as a ‘legal immigrant’ (2009: 16)

This analysis pinpoints how even the prospective migrant can be subjectivised according to cohering notions derived from idealised, isomorphic projections of the national citizen, without prospect of the formal subjection and legal status of such citizenship. The apparent contradiction between expansive demands for affective and symbolic integration and structured stratification can be resolved with reference to James Tully’s discussion of subjectification (2002). Tully gives the example of what he terms citizenization to argue that practices of governance are also practices of subjectification, in that they create not only subjects classified and organised by legal status, but also through the development of habituated, ‘practical identities’ over time. Neither determining nor over-determined, the field of citizenisation involves ‘...the diverse kind of relational subjectivity one internalizes and negotiates through participation over time, with their range of possible
conduct and individual variation’ (2002: 539–40). In regulating and organising the productive contribution of migrant labour and the manifold risks associated with migrants as ‘disturbances’, integration governance seeks to make access to formal status dependent on engagement with, or satisfactory adoption of, the ‘practical identity’. It produces differentiated and flexible modes of legal subjectification, while delineating acceptable ranges of possible conduct (McGhee 2008) and desirable subject-positions. As the next section discusses, these forms of identification, of those that embody ‘lack’ attempting to narrow the gap, are demanded for display in public space, and through public ritual. That is, ‘debate’ can be read also a technology of subjectification, in its dual sense of constituting and oppressing. In advance of that, a contextual discussion illustrates how shifting media dynamics and the recuperative nationalist formations prevalent under neoliberalism come together in the ritual of ‘debate’.

**Migration Debates as Political Rituals: the Australian Example**

It is this compensatory dimension of political spectacle that Ghassan Hage captures where he argues that ‘migration debates’ are not meant to inform government, but are instead technologies of governance. In his 1998 book *White Nation: Fantasies of Supremacy in a Multicultural Society*, Hage sets out a lucid and also highly particular, contextual reading of multicultural backlash in Australia in the early years of the John Howard government, and at the height of Pauline Hanson and her One Nation party’s popularity. In this book, and also in his 2003’s *Paranoid Nationalism: Searching for Hope in a Shrinking Society*, Hage examines the expression of racialised anxieties in terms – that presage Appadurai’s (2006) critique - of what he sees as the accumulating isomorphic disjunctures of neoliberalism. The neoliberal transfer of care from society to capital involves a kind of trauma – for the national and nationalist citizen it involves a dawning realisation that the motherland no longer cares to nurture, and for the white citizen it involves some level of reckoning with the relative dilution of racial privilege in a globalising political-economy. As a consequence, racialised anxiety involves a form of transference: if the motherland will not nurture, the strong fatherland must secure the borders and with it the previous state of settled affairs (an arrangement that Williams (2004), discussed above, terms *domopolitics*). If whiteness is no longer privileged, it is thus as a result of reverse discrimination (hence multicultural backlash), and must also be recouped through forms of public fantasy.

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promotion of a compensatory cultural nationalism was a crusade against ‘political correctness’, that is, against artificial impositions on projected, if undefined, states of free speech and open debate. Such a structuring trope provides productive affinities for a deregulating media field searching for competitive advantages with regard to an increasingly fragmented audience. As Guy Rundle documents:

The rise of such figures (Howard, Hanson) was accompanied by shifts within the media and popular culture. The Fairfax press, once carrying a range of crusading left-liberal voices, became bland lifestyle progressivist papers, oriented to advertising. Rupert Murdoch’s News Limited papers, no longer needing to curry favour with a Labor government, moved decisively to the centre-right. Commercial radio was developing a new generation of shock jocks, and they occupied an even-larger slice of the schedule. . . . The new shockjocks, and a new style of Right-wing columnist – typified by the rise of Andrew Bolt in the Herald Sun – began to channel the political style of US ‘culture war’ politics, in which the Left were constructed as civilizational wreckers, and immigration and multiculturalism held as politics of national destruction (Rundle 2011).

In a study of what he terms ‘Media governmentality, Howardism and the Hanson effect’, David Nolan (2003) is sympathetic to an argument such as Rundle’s, which locates the affinity with nationalist populism within the profit motive and political opportunism of the commercial media. Nolan also argues that there is a need to move beyond approaches that may become analytically limited by a ‘media-society’ dichotomy that encourages either a moralistic critique of journalistic agency, or a sublimation of this agency to determining professional and industrial structures. It is more useful, Nolan argues, to see journalists as ‘social actors that exercise an agency whose scope may be seen as circumscribed by sociopolitical, organizational and discursive structures rather than determined by them (2003: 1369, italics in original).

Nolan’s theorisation is aimed at understanding how journalists, and journalistic practices critical of Howardism and Hansonism, nevertheless operated within their hegemonic parameters. Journalism’s professional commitment to represent the public involves a constantly negotiated relationship with ‘the public’, imagined and produced in part through these professional practices. As Nolan documents, the constant political representation of Hanson’s politics as representative of the ordinary person presents a dilemma for this expressive commitment, particularly when the interests of the ‘ordinary person’ are produced in a ‘culture war’ logic, and through opposition with the interests and expertise of ‘elites’ (a category which is easily extended to include journalists). Thus while many journalists were politically unsettled by these developments in Australian politics, the framework of representative affinity nevertheless created the conditions for the amplification of Hanson’s profile and Howard’s discursive ploy:
Indeed, while she continued to be represented as both a political extremist and a problematic individual, journalists came to see Hanson as exactly what she claimed to be: a genuine ‘representative of the people’. The centrality of Howard’s personal role in this process cannot be underestimated for, as Prime Minister, he constitutes a key reference point for the definition of what constitutes acceptable public discourse. Howard not only positioned Hanson’s speech as a representation of the sentiments of ‘ordinary Australians’ and the removal of “the pall of censorship on certain issues”, but also contested the suggestion that Hanson’s views could not reasonably be labelled racist... Howard’s suggestion was that politically correct elites had ‘got it wrong’ because racism was self-evidently immoral and the people could, for this reason, not be considered racist. This ultimately led to established understandings of what constitutes racism themselves being undermined. Nowhere was this clearer than where Hanson’s statements themselves were used as the basis for opinion polls... Such polls worked to provide political legitimacy for proposals such as ‘reducing Asian immigration’ simply by presenting them as serious options for which respondents could reasonably grant or refuse support. At the same time, poll results served to provide further support to Hanson’s claims to ‘represent the people’ (2003: 1374).

In this spiral, then, ‘views seen previously as regressively racist’ were increasingly circulated as approaching the status of common sense, and in need of debate given the manifest evidence of opinion polls, and the dangers of being seen to ‘censor’ the frustrations of ordinary people. It is here that Ghassan Hage’s analysis of ritual is of importance. As he notes, the frequency of public debates on the need to control immigration, and to undo what had ‘gone too far’, stood in stark contrast to the global-labour integrationism of federal government policy (1998: 241). Given this disconnect between hegemonic discourse and government practice, migration debates provided a cultural form capable of containing and exploiting these contradictions. As he points out, given that such debates do precisely the opposite of what the lingering normative sense of debate suggests, they should be read as anthropological ritual rather than as democratic process.

Approached beyond the expressive fallacy of media practice, and the representative fallacy of normative democratic assumptions, they can be read as a form of what Hage terms ‘white governmental buzz’: ‘rituals of white empowerment’ that simulate an affective sense of privileged governmental belonging; that restore a felt sense of control over their destiny and the nation; and that allow the presence and lives of migrants to be defined as a white problem inviting majority deliberation on the solutions (1998: 240–243). It is here that Hage’s argument recalls that of Balibar on crisis racism:

Immigration debates and opinion polls are an invitation to judge those who have already immigrated, as well as those who are about to immigrate. Not only is this facilitated through the use of the word ‘migrant’, whose meaning slides freely between the two categories, but also, and inescapably, to pronounce a judgement on the value of migration is to pronounce a judgement on the value of the contribution of existing Third-World looking Australians to the country’s development. It is in the conditions created
by all these discursive effects that a White immigration speak flourishes – a language operating in itself as a technology of problematisation and marginalisation: ‘they should come’, and ‘they shouldn’t’, ‘they have contributed’ and ‘they haven’t’, ‘there are too many’ and ‘there aren’t enough’ [...] it is on such fertile ground that the White Nation fantasy seasonally rejuvenates itself and tried to keep the multicultural real at bay. In this sense, the immigration debate became the main form in which the dialectic of inclusion and exclusion was ritualised and institutionalised in Australia (ibid: 242)

Hage’s work is powerfully suggestive, but as an explicitly anthropological reading, it can be no more than that when it comes to interpreting other contexts. What it provides is an set of analytical possibilities for examining what unfolds in the call for debate; the legitimate speaking positions and forms of speech that are prescribed, and the need to read ‘frustrated openness’ against the political conditions that it simultaneously identifies and disavows. However, as the next section identifies, the unfolding of debate now takes place in an irreducibly transnational space, and the ‘governmental buzz’ of debate now encompasses a repertoire of integration events. The concluding section of this essay takes the theoretical possibilities discussed in this section to analyse a recent, and banal, iteration of a ‘migration debate’ in Ireland.

Reading the Burka Debate

During the slow news days of August 2011, a city councillor in Cork, the Republic of Ireland’s second largest city, proposed a motion to ban burkas, and to give police the powers to order young people to remove the hoods of their hooded tops. Implicitly activating febrile associations of race with class by relating this call to the ‘lessons’ of the riots in London in July 2011, Joe O’Callaghan contended that Ireland should follow France and Belgium in legislating for bans because ‘it is an affront to women to have to be covered from head to toe in a shroud in this day and age. I do not think it is compatible with our modern society and it also gives rise to security issues’ (O’Riordain, 2011). Quoted further in The Irish Times, O’Callaghan continued to deploy metaphors somewhat at odds with his concern for equality, but also defined a very particular speaking position from which to call for a debate:

“Wearing a burka is an affront to women in this day and age and this view has been endorsed by one of our local Muslim leaders in Cork. I fail to accept that anyone with any cop-on would like to wrap themselves in what looks like a curtain all day,” Mr O’Callaghan said...“I knew this would cause controversy but I live in a free country and if I have an opinion I will express it. I’m doing it now because I feel now is the time to address this issue, not in five years’ time,” he said. The councillor said burkas, along with balaclavas and hoodies, have become unacceptable in public places for reasons of “public safety and common sense” following recent riots in London (Roseingrave 2011)
The ephemeral unfolding of this story is of interest to this argument. Following the publication of the story online and in the morning edition of *The Irish Examiner* (daily circulation 50,000 approx) on 19 August, the popular online news site *thejournal.ie* published a summary of the story, accompanied by an online poll which asked, ‘what do you think? (a) I think that the burqa should be banned in Ireland (b) I oppose a ban: women should be allowed to wear the burqa (c) I don’t agree with the burqa but I think a ban is wrong.’ The poll resulted in 137 comments and significant sharing through social media, as well as, presumably, page impressions and thus increased ‘hit rates’ of some commercial value. However, as the first comment under the poll – ‘can we have the option why is *The Journal* giving attention to an ill-informed idiot of a councillor’ – indicates, the status of the poll came in for serious questioning on social media platforms, echoing the critique made by Nolan of how opinion polls and debate threads confer political legitimacy through normalizing ‘calls’ as political options inherently deserving of serious consideration. Thus, on the afternoon of the same day, *thejournal.ie* published a supplementary article entitled ‘Islam Ireland welcomes debate on burqa but government has no plan for ban.’ The article presented the ‘results’ of the online poll as newsworthy statistics, and sourced a reaction from a spokesperson from the Islamic Cultural Centre, who ‘welcomed’ the debate, and argued that ‘the covering of the face is not a religious requirement. It’s not an obligation and that has been verified by the Imam of the Islamic Cultural Centre in Ireland, Hussein Halawa, who is the most senior Islamic figure in Ireland’ (O’Connell 2011). Several radio features and further articles followed until, like a butterfly at the end of summer, the story folded its wings and vanished.

While, in a radio interview, O’Callaghan pointed to the problem of ‘hundreds of thousands of people floating around in burkas’ in the UK, at no point was any specific instance of burka-wearing in Ireland identified, and it is far from clear if any burka-wearing women reside in the country. However, as Hannah Arendt has pointed out, the presence of Jews has never been a pre-condition for anti-Semitism, and the presence of burka-wearers is similarly dispensable in the calling for debate. The lack a social referent – without essentialising the potential presence of such a referent as a locus of legitimacy – suggests that this event must be approached in terms of its mediation. Moreover, this fixation on the burka, and the banal and ephemeral nature of the event, suggests that this incident can be read generically, as saying something about the wider anatomy of ‘migration debates’ that have come to be structured around the identification of such ‘challenges’. In the following short sub-sections I propose a reading of this ‘call’ that draws out the traces and


influences of the genre of debates that have come to the foreground of western European politics, over at least the last decade.

The Burka as a Mobile Object of Aversion

Given its relative or total absence from society in Ireland, how did the burka become the subject of this pressing call to debate, and one which, yet again, demanded a preemption of a ‘lack’, or frustrated openness (for as O’Callaghan warned, he has an opinion, and controversy will not deter him)? What Ghassan Hage terms the ‘dialectic of inclusion and exclusion,’ as a majoritarian ritual, has increasingly come to be wrought in and through a transnational repertoire of aversion. As Carole Stabile and Deepa Kumar have shown, the burka has long operated as a colonial trope, and became a central image in the celebration of the ‘liberation’ of Afghanistan, with what George W Bush described as ‘women of cover’ featuring consistently on the cover of news magazines during 2001 (2005). However, and despite ‘burka’ controversies and head-covering controversies of various kinds spiking across the West over the last decade, it is likely that the specific political capital of the burka in this event stems from its insistent circulation in the aftermath of the French ‘Grand debate on national identity’ inaugurated by President Nicholas Sarkozy and Interior Minister Eric Besson from November 2 2009 to February 2 2010. The debate – featuring a moderated website with numerous debate threads and 350 ‘townhall meetings’ - focused on two questions: ‘what does it mean to be French today?’ And ‘what has immigration contributed to France?’

What is interesting about the French debate is that while some, but not all, on the French left condemned it as a distraction from upcoming elections and as an artificial attempt to stimulate national unity through exclusion, there was no real attempt to obscure this political calculation. In other words, Ghassan Hage’s analysis of ‘governmental buzz’ was explicitly manifest in the mediated, political logic, where the debate was proposed as a chance to re-animate national identity in a context where it is under pressure from immigration, regionalism, and what Eric Besson termed ‘accelerated globalization’. Following the UMP’s poor electoral performance in March 2010, Sarkozy returned to the embers of the debate and argued that its findings made clear that the French people wanted a ban on the burka, regardless of its potential unconstitutionality. As the blogger and journalist Richard Seymour remarked pointedly:

There is only one reason for this: it is the only policy which the majority of French people support which Sarkozy could realistically deliver. He fully intends to press ahead with his policy of attacking the welfare state, cutting public sectors and raising the retirement age. As he’s in the business of inflicting pain, all he can offer is to inflict slightly more of it on France’s large Muslim minority (Seymour 2010)
Beyond the specificity of this political assessment, what is of significance here is the move from debate to a specific form of action, a move that represents an intensification of what Emmanuel Terray described, in discussing the 2004 headscarf law in France, as ‘doffing one’s cap in passing’. Terray understood the impetus for the Stasi commission and the subsequent ban in state schools as stemming from public and political anxiety about socio-cultural exclusion, and gender equality. The problem, he argued, is that in the absence of political will and transformative possibilities, the headscarf functioned totemically, as a ‘ficitive problem that can be solved in terms of discourse and symbols’. The headscarf invokes structural issues at stake in the political context, but they are then bracketed off and political action returns to the substitute, that is, the convergence of anxieties on the bodies and identities of the young women of the ‘dis-integrated’ banlieues. Coming as a ‘brutal affront to national amour-propre’, and ‘powerless before problems that it has not the energy to master, its narcissism wounded, its self-image under assault: confronted with such difficulties, the hysterical community will substitute a fictive problem that can be solved purely in terms of discourse and symbols’ (2004).

The burka ban, which passed in final stage through the French national assembly in June 2011, has a mobilizing drive of a particular intensity in a country where there is such a ‘tight fit between nation and state – culture and institutions’ (Berezin 2009: 245). Further, what Eric Fassin (2010) terms the ‘defence of sexual democracy’ has emerged as a mode of legitimate racialization, whereby the gendered figure of the emancipated subject is claimed as a national virtue, a fully achieved, enlightened dimension of an isomorphism threatened by regressive particularity (2010). For all its contextuality in relation to the shifting intersection between race and laïcité – not to mention the substantive feminist debates that the burka engenders – the burka debate has a generic dimension, mediating the resistant, isomorphic boundaries of the nation through symbolic action, and through the identification of problematic populations that require integration through spectacular action.

This summary of recent French developments is necessary to underline that it was not just the transnationally legitimated object of aversion that the Cork councillor was attempting to translate into a social context, but also this genre of symbolic action. In fact, this genre can be examined further by proposing two broad sub-genres: spectacles of cultural prohibition (burka debates, headscarves, minaret and mosque construction controversies) and spectacles of cultural precondition (integration tests, citizenship tests and ceremony, the prescription of ‘extreme’ opinion, and so forth). Symbolic action proposes a problem, as Terray noted, at the level of discourse and symbolism, and proposes to solve it through restoring a mediated relation between deliberation (debate) and political action (prohibition or precondition). This genre of symbolic action, in effect, formalizes the identification of minorities as ‘flashpoints’, which, as Appadurai contends in an extension of this argument, engenders an ‘emerging repertoire of efforts to produce previously
unrequited levels of certainty about social identity, values, survival and dignity' (2006:7).

However, it is far from clear as to what forms of 'stability' a legitimized aversion to the burka sustains. In his justifications, Joe O Callaghan cited gender equality, and 'security, and common sense' as arguments for seeking a ban. Whether by accident or design, this triple justification maps onto the prime trajectories of aversion that the burka symbolically animates. In these animating processes, the burka functions symbolically as a recursive sign, consistently indexed to a vision of an almost-achieved form of integration. As Eleonore Kofman summarizes, in western Europe, immigration politics focuses on 'selecting those who will be most advantageous to the economy, will fit into a pre-existing national culture, and not disrupt a supposed social and community cohesion' (2005: 463). Yet what Kofman terms 'neo-integrationist agendas' are expressed through - profoundly overlapping and inter-related – paradigms that attempt to set isomorphic certainties through a symbolic rejection of signs such as the 'burka'. The burka may be an alien practice to a 'national culture', or it may disturb a 'national culture' which is increasingly defined in terms of its liberal values and institutions, an achievement which requires a turn to what Phil Triadafilopoulos (2011) terms Schmittian liberalism: the sharp differentiation of 'friends and enemies' based on the assertion of non-negotiable, core liberal values, and which may require protection through coercive state measures (prohibitions and preconditions).

Further, this trajectory overlaps with what Lentin & Tittley (2011) discuss as neoliberal racism, that is, the division of 'diversity' into 'good diversity' and 'bad diversity', where bad diversity is configured as unproductive, potentially conflictual, lacking autonomy, and a willfulness defined by adherence to the collective, a putative refusal not just of the subjectivity of the liberal individual, but also of 'individualization'. As a Danish politician tellingly commented during a short-lived burka debate in 2009: 'if one is at the labour' markets disposal, then one needs to send a signal that one wishes to enter the labour market, and one does not do that if one is covered and wearing a burka' (Lentin & Tittley, 2011: 243). The appeal, in Cork, to a cipher which animates this field of response and reaction suggests that, in this debate, it was more important that a 'call' produces a unifying spectacle predicated on restoring isomorphic certainties, rather than proposing any one settled, coherent imaginary.

**Debating Dis-Integrated Futures**

The call to debate the burka was mediated by a particular, racialized reading of the London riots of 2011, but also by a highly particular, positional reaction; that Ireland still has time to address these 'challenges', but that time is running out. This anxious
gaze to instructive elsewheres illustrates the ways in which ‘migration debates’ are increasingly transnationally networked and derived. In a recent comparative study of multicultural governance in six countries, Augie Fleras (2009) draws attention to the impact of international discourses in ‘hardening European arteries’ towards multiculturalism, immigration and Muslim populations (2009: 194–202). More specifically, Vertovec and Wessendorf have demonstrated how highly stylised rejections of ‘multiculturalism’ across Europe draw on a coherent repertoire of ‘crisis idioms’. Widely recited, they construct multiculturalism as a single doctrine that has fostered separateness, stifled debate, refused common values and denied problems, while facilitating reprehensible cultural practices and providing a fecund habitat for terrorists (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2009: 13–19).

As they argue, ‘since the early 2000s across Europe, the rise, ubiquity, simultaneity and convergence of arguments condemning multiculturalism has been striking’ (ibid: 7). The rehearsal of idioms is frequently organized around a litany of events that are narrated in a temporal sequence that may take on a causal dimension through recitation. They compile a list of events of varying transnational significance, from Paul Schaffer’s article ‘The multicultural drama’ in The Netherlands in 2000, to the riots in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham in 2001; 11 September 2001 in New York and Washington; the murders of Pim Fortuyn and Theo Van Gogh in The Netherlands in 2002 and 2004; David Goodhart’s article ‘Too Diverse?’ in Prospect magazine (2004); the Madrid bombing in 2004; the Jyllands Posten cartoon ‘controversy’ and extended aftermath through late 2005/6; the émeutes in Paris in 2005; and the October 2006 Lancashire Telegraph article where Jack Straw discussed his discomfort in dealing with veiled female constituents.

As a reading of recent history, Vertovec and Wessendorf rightly argue that these ‘portrayals... are demonstrably partial, erroneous, or false’ (ibid). However, identifying a lack of empirical veracity does not address the mediated nature and political significance of these narratives and ‘recited truths’ (de Certeau 1984: 186). As Ron Eyerman has argued, in his study of the coverage of the murder of Theo Van Gogh, occurrences become events through narration and recitation, and

...through a dialectic of actions and interpretations. Actions occur in time and space, events unfold and take shape. An event unfolds and takes shape in the interplay between protagonists, interpreters, and audience, as sense and meaning is attributed and various interpretations compete with each other. As this meaning struggle proceeds various accounts stabilize, with perhaps one achieving some sort of hegemony, but counter interpretations or stories may continue to exist alongside. (2008: 22).

The question this poses, particularly under the communicative conditions discussed, is what allows for the stabilization of such accounts? A key dimension of the process of stabilization is the ways in which mobile signifiers may be
projected onto ‘migrant’ populations in terms circulated from elsewhere: we don’t have these problems, yet, or, we have the same problems now. Yasmin Ibrahim, in discussing the targeting of Muslim populations in Europe, has termed this process disorientalism: the transnational circulation and appropriation of a ‘referential archive’ of associations and images that ‘creates an intertextuality that constantly weaves events as new memories crafting a new temporality to gauge and locate Islam.’ Thus:

Since 9/11 the narrative of Islam has put the focus on Muslim communities in the West. Unlike the Islamic revolution in Iran in the late 1970s and 1980s, this ‘reimagining’ of Islam, narrated as posing a clear and present danger to civilization, has placed Muslim communities in the West under relentless scrutiny. The Muslim intellectual debates and responses emanating from the communities are often seen as being externalised from the conditions of modernity or its incumbent reflexivity. The constant need to respond to events associated with Islam renders immense pressure on these communities to negotiate the sustained moral and social stigmatization in narrating Islam (Ibrahim, 2007: 48)

The burqa debate was facilitated by the ‘call’ to debate future threats that can be assembled through an available archive of references, over and above the presence of agreed social referents. Further, and as Ibrahim suggests, these ‘calls’ have a performative dimension; the mediated debate unfolded, and was validated, when local ‘representatives’ were invited to welcome the debate. This dynamic has been noted internationally: as a pan-European report conducted by the Institute for Race Relations (Fekete 2008) concluded, the circulation of international news in globalized public space is increasingly used to frame domestic discussions and political agendas, creating expectations that minority, and particularly Muslim, communities and community ‘representatives’ will respond, and respond in ways circumscribed as acceptably ‘moderate’ or ‘integrated’ (Fekete 2008: 14-16).

**Conclusion: Debating Debate**

A call for ‘debate’ is a call to concentrate communication power, power that overlaps significantly with socio-political and cultural power in any given public sphere. Under conditions of communicative abundance, the call for debate is a strategy for channeling attention through events that can muster a spike in coverage and controversy. It promises resolute action under conditions that both relativize the possibility of action, but that distract from its absence, until the next time. The recurrent, ritual attraction of ‘migration debates’ lies in the political capital they provide under the broad communicative and political conditions mapped in this article. However it would be too simplistic to read rituals as politically unproductive, or symbolic politics as socially and materially lacking in impact. A striking absence from the debates discussed here are those who are always the subject of debate,
subjectivized in debate, and arguably, subjugated through debate. The call for increased openness rarely focuses on this pronounced form of exclusion, and in so doing, underlines the political processes in play. In seeking to outline a tentative anatomy of migration debates, and in drawing on existing empirical research and theoretical clarification, this essay can be read as a working paper suggesting areas that require further, in-depth, contextual research. However it is also a study of how exclusion is effected not just in plain sight, but under the sign of openness and increased democratic participation.

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