THE ROLE OF IRISH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DURING WORLD WAR TWO

by

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IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF M.A.
DEPARTMENT OF MODERN HISTORY,
ST. PATRICK'S COLLEGE,
MAYNOOTH

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August, 1994
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviations</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1 Military Intelligence - An Overview</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2 Combat Intelligence</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3 German Agents in Ireland</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4 G2 Co-operation with Allied Intelligence Services</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I owe a great debt of gratitude to the following people for their help, advice and support during the writing of this thesis.

Firstly to the staff of the Dept. of Modern History, in St. Patrick's College Maynooth. Especially my supervisor, Denise Dunne, for the time and advice she gave me during the year and also Professor RV Comerford for helping to point me in the right direction during the course of my research on many occasions. Further thanks to the following people, Comdt. Peter Young and Capt. Victor Lang, of the Military Archives for their help, advice and patience! Caroline Martin, for the same, as well as for the proofreading and typing of my interview notes. Richard Mossop, for his help with the wordprocessor everytime I did something wrong. Colin Menton for finding those texts when I was not able to. Dr. Eunan O'Halpin for his advice and help in the preliminary stages of this thesis.

Also, thanks to Douglas Gageby and ER "Spike" Marlin. Not only for allowing me to interview them, but also for their continuing support and help during my work. If it was not for them, much of this thesis would not have been written. Also to Eamon de Buitlear for translating and sending me the text of his father's radio interview.

I owe the most thanks and gratitude to my parents, Larry and Ann-B, for their support and help during the last year.
ABBREVIATIONS

CID: Committee Of Imperial Defence.
G2: Irish Military Intelligence.
GC and CS: Government Code and Cypher School.
IIC: Industrial Intelligence Centre.
ISIC: Inter Service Intelligence Committee.
JIC: Joint Intelligence Committee.
JPS: Joint Planning Staff.
MI5: British Domestic Security Agency.
OSS: Office Of Strategic Services.
RAF: Royal Air Force.
SIS: Secret Intelligence Service.
INTRODUCTION

THE ROLE OF IRISH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (G2) DURING WORLD WAR TWO

The object of this thesis is to examine some of the workings of Irish Military Intelligence (G2), during World War Two. In doing so it is hoped that the reader shall grasp something of the role of G2 during the years 1939-45, and evaluate their performance as an intelligence and security agency.

On the third of September, 1939, Britain and France declared war on Germany, following her refusal to withdraw from her invasion of Poland. Europe was for the second time in the twentieth century involved in what was to become a global conflict. Ireland declared her intention of remaining neutral during the conflict.

Ireland's policy of neutrality was not a sudden one, indeed its roots can be discovered in the foundations of the Free State when the new independent Irish government declared its hope to remain neutral. However due to the terms of the Treaty of 1921 Ireland's aspirations towards neutrality may have been somewhat unrealistic. The main impediment for Ireland was the retention of the ports of Cobh, Lough Swilly and Berehaven by the Royal Navy. Which rendered Ireland as a potential base for any conflict that Britain might be involved in.

In 1938, the Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed, bringing about an end to the economic war of the 1930's. One of the highlights of the Agreement was the handing over of the 1921 Treaty Ports to the Irish government, and the withdrawal of all British military personnel from them. One could consider it rather foolhardy of the British to take such an
action with the clouds of war looming in Europe. Indeed Sir Winston Churchill voiced such an opinion. However as Patrick Keatinge states, the surrender of the Treaty Ports, by the British far outweighed any advantage for the British, than if they retained them, as the cost of attempting to hold the ports against a hostile Irish population would be far too difficult and costly.

1938 marked the turning point of Irish neutrality. Before the 1938 agreement, neutrality was just a pipe dream. Despite any good intentions, the British use of the Treaty Ports would have involved Ireland, to some extent, in Britain's future conflicts.

The timing of the agreement was indeed fortuitous, as war broke out the following year. Ireland declared her neutrality. It must be pointed out however that Ireland's geographical, political and economic ties with Britain made Ireland follow a path of "friendly" neutrality towards Britain and her allies. Indeed de Valera once pointed out to the German Ambassador, Hempel, that due to traditional circumstances, Ireland had to show a certain consideration to Britain. As shall be shown in the course of this work, this consideration often made G2's take actions that questioned the traditional view of neutrality.

On the whole, Ireland's policy of neutrality was quite successful. This was despite pressure from the Allies, especially the Americans, to join their side in the war. Ireland was able to remain neutral for a number of reasons, which included among others: that Ireland had just emerged from the economic war and was used to self-sufficiency and thus able to bear the brunt of wartime shortages. Also to quote Ronan Fanning:

"Ireland was a lucky neutral, not least because of geographical accident - again to paraphrase de Gaulle, that

\[1 \text{ Patrick Keatinge, A Place Among The Nations. (Institute of Public Administration, 1978.) p 89} \]

\[2 \text{ ibid, p 88} \]

\[3 \text{ Ireland’s policy of neutrality shall be discussed in more detail in the conclusion of this thesis.} \]
she was an offshore island behind an offshore island - rendered her less vulnerable to invasion by the triumphant German war machine of 1940 than any other European neutral."  

But a further factor that helped to preserve "Irish Neutrality", was the special treatment that they gave and also sometimes received from the Allies. This relationship tends to suggest that Ireland was not an impartial neutral.5

By 1940, German forces were staring with aggressive eyes from the coast of France, across the English Channel, towards the British Isles. Despite the geographical factors the invasion of Ireland was now a realistic threat. The Defence Forces were meant to be one of the premier deterrents against infringements of Irish neutrality and possible invasion. The enlistment of Defence Force personnel was increased, at the height of enlistment in 1942, the regular army numbered 40,000, while the Local Defence Force consisted of 98,000. An Air Corps already existed while the Naval Service was established at the beginning of the war.6 However the latter two were only token forces, and poorly equipped.

Despite these drawbacks the Defence Forces carried out an excellent job. Perhaps the most active, and most successful section of the Defence Forces was Military Intelligence, named in the American style, G2.

G2's roots can be found in the formation of the Irish Free State. It is argued by some that for the IRA during the War of Independence "Intelligence had been its secret weapon".7 Michael Collins' intelligence service managed to intercept mail, telegrams and other

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4 Ronan Fanning, Irish Neutrality- An Historical Overview. (National Committee For The Study Of International Affairs, 21st November, 1980.)

5 This shall be dealt with further in the conclusion and at various points of this thesis.

6 Patrick Keatinge, A Place Among The Nations. (Institute Of Public Administration, 1978.), p 90

communications thanks to a well established system of informants in vital offices, such as the Central Telegraph Office. Collins' Intelligence service was extremely successful and was a great hindrance to the British authorities in Ireland. It was in 1919, that Dan Bryan, later Director of G2, was to first become involved in intelligence work, working in IRA intelligence, along with many other high ranking G2 officers during World War Two.8

With the outbreak of the Civil War, there were several governmental intelligence organisations. One was inherited from the British, being the Detective Division of the Dublin Metropolitan Police, which carried out some intelligence operations. There also existed the Criminal Investigations Department, based in Oriel House. Also, the Protective Officers Corps, the Citizens Defence Force and the army's secret service existed.

Following the Civil War, G2 was to become the premier state security service, and was especially involved in anti-republican operations. They built up a system of informants and agents, both north and south of the border, and had a extensive collection of files, numbering around 25,000 on republican suspects.9 “So far from becoming absorbed in strictly military matters, therefore army intelligence was largely concerned with political affairs”10

But in 1925, a decision proposed by Kevin O'Higgins was enacted in which the Gardai Siochana took over political surveillance, including taking possession of all Military Intelligence's political files, informants and agents. Despite the protests of Military Intelligence they wound down their political role very quickly. The Gardai gradually let the network of agents disappear. The years 1926-38, marked a form of limbo for Military Intelligence, being

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8 Eunan O’Halpin, Intelligence And National Security In Ireland, 1922-45. from (Intelligence And National Security, Vol. 5. Jan, 1990, No.1), p 52. Also See the The Douglas Gageby Interview, 10th of March, 1994 p 1, (The writer interviewed Mr. Gageby who was a junior G2 officer during World War Two.)

9 Eunan O’Halpin, Army, Politics And Society In Independent Ireland, 1923-1945 from Men, Women and War, (Historical Studies XVIII), p 163.

10 ibid
confined only to the collection and analysis of military information.

During these years some attempts were made to reorganise and define the role of G2. In a 1928 Department of Defence memorandum the following organisation was proposed for G2 to be divided up into eight sections, (A) a British Commonwealth affairs section, (B) a Foreign Countries section, (C) a Historical Section, (D) a Topographical Section, (E) a Censorship Section, (F) a Counter-Espionage Section, (G) a Domestic Affairs Section and (F) a Training section.\(^{11}\) It was said that G2 should be responsible for; "Collection, evaluation and distribution of information relating to foreign military systems, governmental policies, war plans etc. to use intelligence against potential enemies".\(^{12}\) Furthermore it suggested that G2 should be responsible for military attaches, visiting foreign officers, communication with Irish officers abroad and press publicity. The Commanding Officer, of G2, was to be responsible for the organisation and maintenance of G2 and liaise with other Irish intelligence services.\(^{13}\) While only a few proposals were adopted at the time, it is possible to note some of the above in the 1939-45 set up of G2.

A similar document called for the set up of a centralised intelligence corps, where personnel with special talents such as interpreting, interrogation, censorship, internal security, etc. should be gathered together in order to pool their resources. It was to be anticipated that this intelligence corps was to be mobilised in time of war, and not to exist in peacetime. These persons were then to relieve full time intelligence staff of their routine duties, in order to allow them to concentrate on more pressing and important affairs.\(^{14}\)

It was in 1938, that G2 was to involve itself again in non military affairs. A warning

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12 ibid

13 Ibid

came from Britain that German Military Intelligence (The Abwehr), were trying to make contact with the IRA. The Irish government appointed G2 to assume a counter espionage role. Following the outbreak of war, G2's role expanded, taking over or being included in much of the security operations of the Irish State, including counter-espionage, foreign intelligence collection, cooperation with foreign security agencies, co-operation with Irish security and intelligence services, supervision of surveillance operations, signals interception and intelligence, anti-IRA operations and press publicity. Col. Liam Archer was the Officer in Command of G2, until his promotion in 1941, when the Director of G2 position was taken over by Col. Dan Bryan, who had been Archer's second in command.

This thesis shall first examine the set up of the British intelligence and American intelligence services. Chapter two shall examine G2's activities in the Combat Intelligence sphere. Chapter three shall look at G2's counter-espionage role in dealing with German agents in Ireland, while chapter four shall study G2 co-operation with allied intelligence agencies. Through this some of the functions of G2 shall be examined and also some understanding of the nature of G2's role during 1939-45 shall be reached.

It was my original intention to write a minor thesis on all the aspects of Irish Military Intelligence during the War. However, despite the best intentions, when faced with the amount of research and time such a work would take, I had to confine my scope to only a few aspects of G2's work during the war. But there are many more topics, such as the ones mentioned above. G2 carried out all of these duties, and are extremely interesting topics to conduct further research into.

Any of the three topics I have dealt with, combat intelligence, counter-espionage and co-operation with Allied intelligence services, could be further researched, I have only dealt with Irish primary sources. Further research using English or even German sources would be able to elaborate even more on the subject matter covered in this thesis.

15 See Chapter Three for further discussion on this subject.
CHAPTER 1

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE- AN OVERVIEW

Military intelligence is an age old tradition. In 1984, the Assistant General Counsel to the CIA, Michael J. Barrett said: "Espionage is the world's second oldest profession and just as honourable as the first."¹ One of the main functions of espionage has been the acquisition of military intelligence. This enables the commanders to understand the type of weaponry the enemy or potential enemy may use; to know the number of troops the enemy has and to have some knowledge of the topographical information of potential battle grounds. Ghengis Khan highly valued military intelligence. His operational plans were based on complex and accurate information, gathered by a large network of spies.²

But what exactly is the definition of military intelligence? How does it work and who operates it? F.H. Hinsley gives a definition of intelligence as:

"an activity which consists essentially of three functions. Information has to be acquired; it has to be analysed and interpreted; and it has to be put into the hands of those who can use it."³

This is a useful definition of the role and function of intelligence as a whole, but what of military intelligence? In 1873, the British War Office re-organised its intelligence branch and instructed it that its role was:


“to collect and classify all possible information relating to the strength, organisation and equipment of foreign armies, to keep themselves acquainted with the progress made by foreign countries in military art and science and to preserve the information in such a form that it can be readily consulted and made available for any purpose for which it may be required”

In 1887 the post of Director of Military Intelligence was created. The Admiralty also was given a similar post, and Naval Intelligence’s role was similar to the above definition of military intelligence except in a naval context.

In order to be able to make a proper appraisal of Irish military intelligence a study of the British intelligence network before the outbreak of World War Two is necessary. Ireland after gaining independence, had adopted the Westminster parliamentary system, the British judicial system, the British civil service system, did it follow a similar precedent in the set up of its intelligence system?

One of the main characteristics of the British intelligence system was that it was divided up into different agencies. In 1900, the Committee of Imperial Intelligence (CID) was established in order to integrate and co-ordinate foreign policy and strategic military appreciations. The CID remained the coordinating body of the intelligence network until close to the outbreak of World War Two. In January 1936, the Chiefs of Staff and the CID approved a plan to form an Inter-Service Intelligence Committee (ISIC), which was to give the intelligence agencies a body in which they could jointly administer and assess intelligence. Despite approval ISIC never took off fully. This was mainly due to funding and also because other intelligence agencies were undergoing new improvements themselves and were not ready to undergo change at the highest level at that time.

4 ibid, p7
5 ibid p7.
6 ibid p35.
ISIC did however start the ball rolling for the establishment of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in June 1936. The function of the JIC was to assist the Joint Planning Staff (JPS) of the Armed Forces with intelligence on all subjects. Its membership consisted of the service intelligence agencies, it was also allowed to co-opt the Industrial Intelligence Centre. Thus the JIC became an established body utilised by all the military intelligence agencies to pool and coordinate their intelligence. Even the non military intelligence agencies, MI5, (the British domestic intelligence service) and the foreign intelligence service, called the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), sometimes turned to the JIC for an opinion on military questions.7

Despite the JIC's success, it was only used as a consulting body to the JPS. They did not call on the JIC for its opinion on routine intelligence, but rather on extraordinary intelligence with which the other agencies could not cope. Neither did the JIC use much initiative and volunteer information without being asked.

Not surprisingly, the developments leading up to the declaration of war did bring about change, with a large re-organisation in June-July, 1939. Not only did the three service agencies send representatives to the JIC but the Foreign Office did as well. It was charged with the following functions; assessing and coordinating the intelligence received from abroad, thus ensuring the government received the most balanced and accurate information upon which they could base decisions, and to coordinate any intelligence that could be required by the Chiefs of Staff or the JPS. Also they were to consider any measures that may improve the workings of the intelligence network.8

But was the establishment of the JIC necessary? The answer is yes. The British intelligence machine was large and sprawling, unlike the Irish Intelligence organisation, which in any case being small, resulted in most intelligence duties being carried out or at least controlled by G2 in Parkgate Street.

7 ibid p36
8 ibid p43.
Now that the actual coordination of British Intelligence has been examined, a survey of the actual intelligence agencies is in order. As discussed above, one of the main problems of the British intelligence network was "...they approached their work with an extreme individualism. The intelligence system in Whitehall was, in effect, divided into intelligence boxes." In military intelligence there were three main service agencies, military intelligence for the army, naval intelligence, and air intelligence for the RAF.

The Foreign Office had control of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). The SIS was responsible for collecting and distributing foreign political intelligence. This was a sound enough policy. However the Foreign Office also insisted on control of all military intelligence collected by military attaches accredited to British embassies. The service departments protested at this state of affairs saying that it was only fair that they should have control over military data. This was a reasonable argument as it is questionable whether a diplomat would have had the training, knowledge or expertise to know what was valuable military intelligence and what was not. As well as the SIS, the Foreign Office also had control of the Government Code and Cypher School (GC and CS). The GC and CS was established in 1919 to study cypher communication used by foreign nations and also to advise the British authorities on the use and security of their own codes. The GC and CS was under the control of the Foreign Office, but the service departments were to provide some personnel. As well as this, the service departments ran interception stations for radio broadcasts and deciphered codes themselves, referring those they could not break to the GC and CS. Due to the positioning of interception stations, the service departments co-operated among each other, for example, the Royal Navy intercepted Italian Airforce communications in the Mediterranean.

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10 Hinsley, *British Intelligence In...*. p8
Economic intelligence was studied by the Industrial Intelligence Centre (IIC). It was established in 1931, and was to study and evaluate all aspects of foreign nations industrial operations.\footnote{Wesley K. Wark, \textit{The Ultimate ...}, p20.}

MI5 was established in 1909. It was to be Britain's domestic security service and was roughly equivalent to the United State's Federal Bureau of Investigation.\footnote{J.C. Masterman, \textit{The Doublecross System}, p vii, (Yale University Press, 1972).} Its functions were counter espionage, counter subversion and counter sabotage in Britain and her overseas territories.\footnote{Nigel West, \textit{MI5}, (Triad Granada, 1983.) p43.} It must be pointed out that while on paper MI5 was a part of the War Office, it was in reality an independent agency, which had direct access to the Prime Minister.\footnote{ibid p46.} During World War Two MI5 was to be the British Intelligence agency to have the most contact with G2. Indeed a special Irish section was established, with Cecil Liddel as its head. He was to have much contact during the war with Dan Bryan, the Director of G2.\footnote{See Chapter Four.}

It must be pointed out that Britain was not the only nation to have a sprawling intelligence network. It was the fashion for intelligence communities to have a number of different agencies. In the words of Knightely, "The spy is as old as history. Intelligence agencies are new."\footnote{Knightely, \textit{The Second Oldest...}, p 3.}

For example, the United States had a number of agencies similar to Britain's. There had been an Office of Naval Intelligence since 1882, a Military Intelligence Department since 1885 and the FBI had been operational - at first as the Bureau of Investigation - since 1910. The Office of the Counsellor to the Department of State had been established in 1927 to be...
a centralised collection and evaluation department. At the outbreak of the war the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was set up under "Wild" Bill Donovan. Its emphasis was to be on foreign operations, placing value on strategic intelligence and psychological warfare, i.e. sabotage. The OSS was to have an official liaison in Ireland during the War.

During World War Two, intelligence operations were divided up into specialised agencies. Military intelligence was more or less confined to collecting and evaluating information on land forces, naval intelligence on sea forces, domestic intelligence to a domestic intelligence agency. This bureaucracy did not help in supplying co-ordinated intelligence to those who needed it most, the political and military leaders, despite the establishment of organisations such as the JIC. It would be reasonable to think that with so many different agencies, at least on some occasions, vital intelligence must have slipped past the coordinators.

Intelligence agencies can inform their leaders with correct information, but the leaders must be prepared to listen. Mistakes can be made by the leader believing that he knows best and ignores the intelligence prepared for him. Hitler was renowned for this.

Intelligence does not just consist of collecting intelligence. As Hinsley points out This is only the beginning. It must be analysed and evaluated, like a jigsaw, in order to see the whole picture.

Intelligence is a vital lifeline for any nation in time of war, in order to receive good intelligence, the nation must have a good intelligence service.

It shall be shown that G2 combined many of the roles of the intelligence agencies discussed above. But it was not purely an intelligence service, it also served in an MI5-like role in being a security service. It was also a small centralised organisation, that ensured

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18 ibid, p210.


20 See Chapter Four.
information was collated together, and not lost or ignored as could happen in a larger agency. Furthermore its role was purely defensive, it did not have to carry out offensive operations abroad, nor run double agents at home, as belligerent intelligence agencies had to. Thus G2 could concentrate its resources into a small group.
CHAPTER 2

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

Combat Intelligence is one of the most important types of intelligence for the military to receive. In order to carry out its duties, be they offensive or defensive, the military must receive an evaluated report on the terrain, obstacles and resistance they might meet. G2 carried out this function for the Irish military.

The following chapter will examine how intelligence was collected by G2 and what did the subject matter recommend? A further study shall be made, examining the German invasion plans for Ireland, analysing their rating as combat intelligence. The topic shall be discussed further, asking the question, were the Irish Defence Forces suitably prepared for such an invasion and was the German threat of invasion a likely scenario?

Combat intelligence on foreign armies concentrated mainly on two countries, the UK and Germany.¹ These two countries were the most likely to invade Ireland. While proof that Germany considered invading Ireland does exist, it is more difficult to prove actual hostile intentions from the British. However, a report given to Frank Aiken, in 1940 hints that the British could have been prepared to invade if circumstances prevailed. The report states that the High Commissioner was told by Lord Caldecote in London:

"...there was no intention in the mind of the British government to take any military or naval action in our territory, unless they were formally asked to do so by the Irish government." But despite this assurance, "...it would not be possible for the British Government to give today a guarantee that in no

¹ Military Information And General Section 1940-41. UCD Archives P 71/29.`
circumstances would they refrain from entering Ireland without an invitation.\^2

G2 issued Intelligence Notes as a means to supply general intelligence information to officers. The notes covered subjects including:" British Army organisation, German Army organisation, Anti-Tank tactics, Anti-Aircraft tactics, obstruction of aerodromes, airborne and parachute troops, etc.\^3 Further Intelligence Notes were issued to higher officers giving an up-to-date situation report Irish defence topics, ie: on the possibility of an invasion and its nature.\^4 Intelligence on the German Army was often obtained from reports published in the United States and the UK, and sometimes "supplemented by occasional other items".\^5 Furthermore The threat of German invasion of Ireland and the UK made for the creation of military liaison officers, between the Irish and English military, and the exchange of information on military matters.\^6 The British were not as forthcoming about intelligence of their own forces and the Irish Army were unable to receive documents on subjects such as war establishments, training notes, army lists, etc. as they had been able to prior to 1939.\^7

One of the above mentioned notes, Intelligence Note No. 19, assessed the use and

\[^2\] Defence Conference, J. Walshe(?) to Frank Aiken, TD. Fri, 9th Aug, 1940. National Archives, D/FA: A24. Also see below, p 38.

\[^3\] Military Information and General Section 1939-45?. UCD Archives P71/28.

\[^4\] ibid

\[^5\] Military Information-Foreign Armies, 1940-41. UCD Archives, P71/29. Also see Duggan, A History, P 208. (One of the "occasional other items" was the G2 officer based in Shannon, as shall be discussed later. Furthermore, See the Douglas Gageby Interview, 10th March, 1994, p 8. Gageby claimed that various items, such as German Army drill books were given to G2 by the Allies.)

\[^6\] Duggan, A History... p 208. Also see Robert Fisk, In Time Of War. (Paladin, 1985) pp 233-236. (Fisk talks of the secret visit to Ireland by Lt. Col Dudley Clarke, a British Staff officer, who engaged with talks with Joe Walshe (the Secretary of the Dept. Of External Affairs), Col. Liam Archer, (then director of G2), and even the Irish Army Chief of Staff, Gen. McKenna, on Anglo-Irish defence matters. Some months earlier Walshe and Archer had met with British Army, Navy and Air-Force officers in London, on a similar mission as above.)

\[^7\] Military Information And General Section, 1940-41. UCD Archives P71/29
tactics of German Airborne Troops. The note covered topics such as how the troops were equipped and armed. An interesting fact can be found in section 4. where it is stated that airborne troops can carry only small arms. They must wait for a further supply drop to receive heavier weapons. "It is reported that in the Norwegian campaign there were many instances where troops landed from aircraft were attacked and dispersed before they were supplied with ammunition from the air or re-enforced ground troops." This would affect a German campaign in Ireland, as it would have been much more difficult to supply German troops in Ireland.

A further group of Intelligence Notes were issued on anti-tank tactics. The tactics described were those used in what could be described mainly as "do-it-yourself anti tank tactics, like the ones used by the Finns in the Russo-Finnish War and by both sides in the Spanish Civil War. These tactics were particularly useful as the Irish army suffered from a severe lack of anti-tank weaponry.\textsuperscript{10}

Intelligence Note No.21, which covers the Russo-Finnish War states that the Finns had a similar problem with their supplies.\textsuperscript{11} Instead they made good use of the natural woody terrain, cutting trees so that their length was one to two metres above the ground.\textsuperscript{12} In regards to Ireland this measure would be impractical as Ireland would not offer enough forested areas to offer proper resistance of this kind. But the Irish situation in the light of a German invasion would have been very similar to the Finnish situation in the winter of 1939-40. The Finnish army was small consisting of 175,000 men against a Russian force of one

\textsuperscript{8} Intelligence Note No 19. "German Airborne Troops", Spring-Summer?, 1940. UCD Archives P71/37.

\textsuperscript{9} ibid

\textsuperscript{10} Duggan, A History..., p 189

\textsuperscript{11} Intelligence Note No. 21, Notes On Anti-Tank Measures, Russo-Finnish War. 2nd of August, 1940. UCD Archives, P71/38.

\textsuperscript{12} ibid
million. They valiantly held off the Russians for many months through their skill and knowledge of the terrain they fought in.\textsuperscript{13}

Another method the Finns used was to construct obstacles with large blocks of granite.\textsuperscript{14} This method would be more applicable for Irish terrain. The Finns also dug pits with their proportions of roughly seven feet deep by twenty feet wide. These pits would then be camouflaged, in the hopes that the enemy tanks would drive into them.\textsuperscript{15} The Finns also made use of Molotov Cocktails.\textsuperscript{16} A Molotov Cocktail was simply a glass bottle filled with petrol and tar. The cocktail's fuse was a lit paraffin soaked rag, when the bottle broke against an object the liquid stuck to the target and ignited.\textsuperscript{17} But as Warner, a lecturer in the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, points out:

"The Molotov Cocktail is most effective when a tank is moving through a built up area, for it can be dropped on to it from close quarters: In the open it is less of a problem to tank crews, for its thrower can seldom get close enough to the objective to use it without drawing attention."\textsuperscript{18}

Despite this fact, the Molotov Cocktail was an easily made weapon and quite successful in both the Russo-Finnish War and the Spanish Civil War.\textsuperscript{19}

Reports from the viewpoint of German tank crews during the invasion of Poland were

\textsuperscript{13} Mark Arnold Forster, \textit{The World at War}, (Thames-Mandarin, 1993), pp 48-51.

\textsuperscript{14} Intelligence Note No. 21, Notes On Anti-Tank Measures, Russo-Finnish War. 2nd of August, 1940. UCD Archives, P71/38.

\textsuperscript{15} ibid

\textsuperscript{16} ibid

\textsuperscript{17} Philip Warner, \textit{Firepower, From Slings To Star Wars}, (Grafton, 1989), p 146.

\textsuperscript{18} ibid

\textsuperscript{19} Intelligence Note No. 22, Anti-Tank Measures, Spanish Civil War, August(?), 1940, UCD Archives, P71/39 and Intelligence Note No. 21, Anti-Tank Measures, Russo-Finnish War, August(?), UCD Archives P71/38.
given in a further intelligence note.\textsuperscript{20} As well as this further anti-tank measures were reported, one being a:"Rail Barrier: this type of barrier is really a variation of the first,"(a tree barrier, similar to the ones used in Finland),"only that iron rails are used instead of tree trunks." Also used was: "An Earthwave Obstacle; this obstacle consists of about two or three, sometimes more, ditches which are continuous across the front."\textsuperscript{21}

Many of the tactics described in these anti-tank Intelligence Notes were suited for the Irish Army. They were case studies of weaker forces defending their territory against a strong foe, with a lack of dedicated anti-tank weapons. Instead, these forces relied on man-made obstacles by which the tank would either be immobilised or it would be easier to use more conventional weapons such as hand grenades, land mines or Molotov Cocktails as they could be concentrated in areas which were more difficult to defend with obstacles.

During the war, the Irish Army followed the advice of the above Intelligence Notes in their use of "Do it Yourself" anti-tank measures. The Great Southern Railway Company undertook orders for 50,000 grenades. One hundred thousand Molotov Cocktails were issued to the army.\textsuperscript{22}

Furthermore, the anti-tank obstacles advocated would also be effective when one considers the words of Warner:

"In spite of its appearance of complete invulnerability, an AFV,"(Armoured Fighting Vehicle, ie, a tank),"is accident prone. It can be immobilised quite independently of enemy action: it can fall off cliffs, sink into mud, fail to climb

\textsuperscript{20} Intelligence Note No. 23 Anti-Tank Measures In The Polish Campaign 25th of July, 1940. UCD Archives P71/40. (Obviously some of these intelligence notes were not published in chronological order.)

\textsuperscript{21} ibid

\textsuperscript{22} Duggan, A History..., p 193. (Hand grenades while not being a "dedicated" anti-tank weapon could be used effectively in anti-tank warfare, see P71/39, which reports on the Spanish Civil War states that hand grenades were tied together in bundles of 5 or 6, and thrown under the tracks of enemy tanks. Also see Warner, From Slings..., p140, in which he states that Molotov Cocktails were made by the thousand by the British Home Guard in 1940.)
beaches, break down through overheating or some other cause, damage a track...even its predecessor in warfare, the horse, would be hard pressed to produce so many reasons for not being able to perform adequately on the battlefield".23

Thus, if a tank could fall prey to so many natural obstacles, man-made ones would certainly have been a formidable foe.

The Irish Army did not dismiss the use of anti-tank weapons. Indeed the army corps of engineers manufactured 5,100 anti-tank mines which were distributed to all commands.24

The value of using anti-tank obstacles and "Do-it-Yourself" weapons was that mines, etc could be used sparingly, which would be vital when one considers the lack of equipment the army suffered.

On 18th November, 1940, Intelligence Note no. 48 was issued. It was a synopsis study of the German invasion of France.25 It covered many areas including the organisation of the higher German command, the use of propaganda and news services by the Germans. It also describes the actions of army corps such as engineers, artillery, infantry, etc. In Section 5 entitled: "Irregular methods of warfare", some examples of "dirty tricks" used by the Germans are cited, one being, "Concealing anti-tank guns in farm carts driven by civilians or troops in civilian clothes". Another states, "Bombing and machine-gunning columns of refugees to cause blocking of roads in rear of the enemy". 26

It also dealt with the Blitzkrieg tactics used by the German forces. For example, in describing the tactics used by German armoured and motorized divisions saying that armoured divisions broke through nodal points in the French lines: "The advance elements

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23 Warner, From Slings..., p 128.


25 Intelligence Note No.48 Lessons To Be Learned From The Success Of The German Army In France, 18th of November, 1940. UCD Archives, P 71/41.

26 ibid
spread out across the road system and pushed on ruthlessly, seeking to increase the area of ground captured without in any way attempting to consolidate it. The Germans relied on speed and surprise to neutralise any enemy counter-measures. This tactic was foreseen by De Gaulle in his work, "Vers l'Armee de Metier", in which he said: "The job of the mechanised army would be to break through the enemy's static defences and then deploy fanwise, to exploit its gains." The Blitzkrieg was carried out as De Gaulle described it would, and as Intelligence Note No. 48 reported and was a useful document in describing the German's methods of warfare.

The use of G2's Intelligence Notes during the war were an excellent and effective way of distributing useful combat intelligence to those who had to receive such intelligence. From these Notes they were able to decide on suitable tactics for fighting a potential invader, in a manner that was, on the whole, applicable to the Irish situation, both in terms of manpower and equipment. While some of the tactics described may not have always suited the Irish situation, they must have been an invaluable tool for an Irish officer during the war years.

On 24th May, 1941, a G2 intelligence officer, Lt. N. Hewett (later promoted to captain) was assigned to the flying boat airport in Foynes on the River Shannon. It was a refuelling point for civilian aircraft flying between England and the USA, and England and Africa. Hewett, and later more officers under his command, took care of security, censorship and G2-Gardai cooperation in Foynes. Another of their duties was to gather information

27 ibid
28 Forster, The World at..., p 61
29 ibid pp 59-76 (Forster gives a good, summarised account of the French Campaign of 1940.)
31 Douglas Gageby said in his interview, that Hewett was stationed permanently in Shannon, while an assistant officer was rotated down to him every 6 to 9 months. See the Douglas Gageby Interview, p 4.
through conversations with passengers coming through the airport.\textsuperscript{32}

Hewett kept an inventory of passengers coming through Shannon. The flights usually came in from Portugal, the UK and the USA. The passengers on these flights often included allied military personnel and other persons involved in the war effort.\textsuperscript{33}

The many military personnel coming through had to wear civilian clothes, as they were on neutral territory\textsuperscript{34}. A journalist, Gertrude Gaffney described a visit she made to the area, where she stopped in a hotel for lunch:

"I was in Limerick in the summer of 1942....At a table down the middle of the room sat at least twenty air pilots, huge weather beaten fellows in all kinds of unconventional garments, while near the door was a man on guard over two big suitcases..

...These were the pilots who pioneered the early flying of war 'planes across the Atlantic from West to East....Daily their machines were flown to Britain and the pilots returned direct to Foynes and Rinneana to get passage back on the clippers. This service was so busy that the flyers had to wait in Limerick for seats in the 'planes, and every hotel was full of them." \textsuperscript{35}

A G2 report declared: "For the ten months since the 1st July to the 30th April, 1943, some 1,650 serving members of the US Armed Forces have passed through Foynes. Practically all of these have been commissioned officers, many of them being of the highest

\textsuperscript{32} Shannon Airport, Foynes. Military Archives, G2/x/757. (Hewett and his officers sent in regular reports of conversations which they thought interesting or useful to G2)

\textsuperscript{33} ibid

\textsuperscript{34} Shannon Airport, Foynes, 26 May, 1942. Military Archives G2/x/757. (Hewett names twenty US army personnel who came through Shannon, many being high ranking officers:"All carried uniform, and some who had no civvies came ashore in their shirtsleeves. Uniforms were hanging up in the plane for all the boatmen to see...Passports show them as civil servants.")

\textsuperscript{35} The Irish Independent, 18/5/1945. I Sketch Your World, by Gertrude Gaffney.
Furthermore, during the month of June 1942, 26 RAF, 16 British Army, 27 Royal Navy, three US Navy and 111 US Army personnel went through Shannon.\textsuperscript{37}

Through this steady flow of allied personnel, Hewett and his team were able to compile an impressive, if indirect, collection of intelligence reports covering aspects such as the progress of the war and conditions on the Continent. Evaluations of the political situation of the war were sometimes reported on. They were also able to gather information on foreign opinions of Ireland at the time.\textsuperscript{38}

On 4th July, 1941, the Viscountess de Jonghe came through Foynes. She was a Belgian national living in France who had escaped from occupied France and was on her way to England to rejoin her husband, a Belgian officer who was serving in the British Army. She described some of the conditions of the time in Vichy France, claiming that there was a shortage of "almost any luxuries". Interestingly enough the report goes on to say that on arrival in England the lady was taken away by the British on suspicion of espionage.\textsuperscript{39}

The same report goes on to claim that following a conversation with Mr. J. Lowenstein, a British national, residing in the USA, says American opinion believed that the Irish government should lease the Treaty-Ports back to the British. He also states that: "Ireland must very soon make her choice, that is, join England and the US or throw in her lot with Germany."\textsuperscript{40} Indeed two years later David Gray, the American Minister to Ireland attempted to pressurise de Valera to enter the war by claiming Ireland was being used as an Axis base, despite the fact that American security representatives in Ireland claimed that

\textsuperscript{36} Shannon Airport, Foynes. 26th April, 1943 to 1st May, 1943. Military Archives G2/X/757.

\textsuperscript{37} Analysis Military Naval & RAF Traffic For Month Of June '42, 29th July 1942. Military Archives, G2/X/0379.

\textsuperscript{38} Examples shall be shown in the following pages.

\textsuperscript{39} Shannon Airport Foynes, 3rd July to 8th July, 1941. Military Archives, G2/X/757.

\textsuperscript{40} ibid
there was no such thing happening in Ireland.41

Mr. Lowenstein, who worked for Vickers-Maxim, the arms firm, went on to give some combat intelligence. He claimed that General Motors in the USA was producing nine trucks per hour, while the Lockheed aircraft company was producing "the world's fastest single seater fighter", giving some specifications and production details.42

On 29th April, 1942 Sir Arthur Street, secretary to the Air Ministry, came through Shannon. Lt. Summerling of G2 conversed with him mainly on the subject of aircraft.43 In the course of the conversation Summerling learned of some of the aircraft being used by both the Allies and the Axis. He stated that the Lysander, an army cooperation aeroplane was being withdrawn from RAF service and being replaced by an aircraft manufactured by the American firm Mustang.44 He also claimed that the new Hurricane fighter plane was to be vastly superior to previous models. On the Axis side, Street is reported as saying that the new version of the Foke-Wulf fighter is not up to the standard of previous models, being only able to reach a speed of 320 mph and was armed with six machine guns and no cannons. Street also showed "a remarkable knowledge" of the Irish Air Corps. However either Summerling or Street were very vague in their details of the conversation.

The G2 team in Foynes were also able to keep abreast of the situation in Germany itself. On 23rd May, 1942, Hewett reported that industrial output in Germany was down because the workers, who were mainly women, were worrying about their men, because of

41 Interview Notes with E.R. "Spike" Marlin p 2, on the 24th of April, 1994. (Mr. Marlin was interviewed by the writer in Dublin, when Mr. Marlin was visiting the city.)

42 ibid


44 The accuracy of this information is somewhat hazy. In Michael Donne’s and Cynthia Fowler’s Per Ardua Ad Astra, Seventy Years Of The RFC & RAF, (Frederick Muller, 1982), (there is no mention of a Mustang army cooperation plane. The only Mustang that the book mentions is the P51 Mustang fighter, an American aircraft used as an escort for bombers over Europe. Perhaps Street was misunderstood by Summerling.)
the growing casualty list. It was later claimed that thanks to falling morale among German, soldiers, especially among veterans of the Russian winter campaign, many were deserting and fleeing to Switzerland. In 1943, gossip was beginning to circulate that Hitler’s popularity was beginning to decline, especially after the Russian victory at Stalingrad. Indeed the Germans had suffered some of its worst casualties and defeats during the winter of 1941-42, in the Russian Campaign due to poor planning, bitterly cold weather and fierce Russian resistance. Thus, it was very likely that morale at home, and definitely morale on the front was at a low ebb. There is some speculation that Hitler’s health was declining as well as his popularity.

German morale declined even further. In 1944, a former internee in Baden-baden, offered the opinion that Germany was on the point of collapse, he claimed that: ".....the German people know the war has already been lost." This was certainly true. The D-Day landings had occurred on 6th June, 1944, and it was obvious that the war was coming to an end. Even more pressing evidence of low morale in Germany was the assassination attempt on Hitler on 20th July, 1944, by high ranking German officers including General Rommel, who believed that Hitler’s defensive tactics were suicidal. Ironically, Hitler used the assassination attempt as a tool to strengthen his position in Germany.

In regards to the D-Day landing, the G2 officers at Shannon were aware that

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46 ibid, 18th October to 24th October 1942.
47 ibid, 7th to 20th of February, 1943.
48 Forster, The World At..., pp 151-168
49 Shannon Airport, Foynes. 7th to 20th of February, 1943. Military Archives, G2/X/757.
50 ibid, 14th July, 1944.
51 Forster, The World At..., P 266.
52 ibid
something big was about to happen. For example, a report made in January-February, 1944 claimed that letters to American employees in Shannon, that had been intercepted, often made reference to the large amount of American military personnel who had left the US for Europe.\textsuperscript{53} In a further report made in February, 1944, it was said that the British Army's 51st and 7th divisions had returned to England from Italy and Africa, but had been told to be fully mobilised by mid-March.\textsuperscript{54} A further review of this period covered in the G2 reports, shows a steady build up of rumours and information, leading up to the D-Day landings.

In some of the later intelligence reports it is possible to see the coming of the end of the war in Europe On 25th February, 1945, a report states that there was an increasing number of civilian passengers being carried by the American airlines,(mostly being English businessmen and English wives of American servicemen going to America to get affairs sorted for their new husbands arrival), it is stated that "Many US soldiers anticipate the war will be over this summer or autumn."\textsuperscript{55} In the same report, an excerpt of a letter from a US naval aviator based in an air station in Florida read: "All the people who are leaving here are listed for the Pacific", suggesting that the American effort was now turning to the Pacific theatre.

The G2 team at Shannon were perhaps one of the most useful independent, collectors of combat intelligence during the war. They not only collected combat information for the army on equipment, campaigns, defensive measures etc, but they also supplied information that would be useful to the government on conditions and opinions of foreign countries. There were no Irish military attaches in Europe. The Dept. of External Affairs would sometimes

\textsuperscript{53} Shannon Airport Foynes, 22nd of January to 12th of February, 1944. Military Archives, G2/x/757.

\textsuperscript{54} ibid, February 12th to 29th, 1944

\textsuperscript{55} ibid, 28th of February, 1945.
receive intelligence reports from its embassies abroad. But the embassy officials were not military personnel. They were not qualified to give an evaluated report on military matters.

G2 in Shannon were a vital set of eyes and ears for foreign combat intelligence. One could conjure up an image of Hewett and his colleagues being professional gossips, in a sense they were. But their gossip was very valuable. It gave the Irish military and government an insight to the progress of the war and the personalities involved in it. Allied military personnel of all nationalities came through Shannon, allowing G2 to build up its own combat intelligence, thus not having to rely on handouts from the Allies.

It could be argued that the intelligence could have been collected from media reports and intelligence co-operation between the Allies, but by doing so G2 would have been collecting it through other sources than their own. Instead they were able to indirectly collect first hand information and question their sources, thus being able to evaluate the reliability of their information, something which would be much more difficult to do through the media, especially with the wartime propaganda machine working. One example being in 1942, when it was reported that a wave of optimism of victory for the Allies in the same year was purposely slipped by the Axis, hoping it would cause despair when it was discovered to be false.

Gertrude Gaffney claimed in her article: "The Shannon must have been one of Britain’s fairy godmothers disguised as a river..." As far as Irish Military Intelligence was concerned, they must have shared the same sentiments. Their intelligence was not always spot on, it could often have been gathered from other sources, such as those mentioned

56 Miscellaneous Correspondence with Col. Liam Archer and Col. Dan Bryan. National Archives, D/FA: A8 and A8(i). (Periodic intelligence reports from Irish diplomats in Europe are included in this file, from time to time.)

57 Shannon Airport, Foynes, 8th of June, 1942. Military Archives, G2/X/757. (this information was taken from a conversation with high ranking US Army officers passing through the Airport.)

above. But it gave G2 its own independent source of information, without which they would have had to rely mainly on Allied information. The G2 team in Shannon gave the Irish Authorities a method by which they could "check-up" on and supplement the intelligence Ireland was already being supplied with.

Ireland's combat intelligence appears to be well prepared. But in the face of an invasion, how well would it stand against the combat intelligence of an invader? In order to discuss this issue, we will now examine the German invasion plans for Ireland and evaluate whether Ireland's intelligence was suitably prepared for a potential invasion. Also we shall examine whether an invasion of Ireland was feasible.

Germany had prepared an invasion plan for Ireland, entitled "Military Geographical Data on Ireland." In 1945 the plans were discovered in a store house of the Institute Cartographique Militaire in Brussels. Irish authorities received some copies through some "unofficial channels" and it is claimed that they even received them during the war. Colm Cox claims that the Irish Authorities received a copy of the plans as early as 1942. In 1946, they received a further copy from an Irish-American soldier, claiming he had found them in Bavaria. In my interview with Douglas Gageby he too confirmed that he had seen these plans as an officer in G2 during the war.

The study was completed, on 30th September, 1940, and was carried out by the General Staff of the Army, Dept. of War Maps and Survey (IV. Mil-Geo.) It consists of two volumes, one text version, describing social and political, but mainly geographical conditions in Ireland. The second volume consists of a text and pictorial publication, showing pictures
taken from both land and air. There is also a collection of maps, showing topographical and industrial details.

The historical section of the first volume gives a very nationalist view of Irish history, discussing the "domination" of Ireland by England. There is also a summary of partition in Ireland and the External Relations Act. Page 14 gives an interesting description of the "Race and Character" of Ireland's inhabitants:

"The Irishman depends on community built on upon the equality of all, but joins to it an extraordinary personal need of independence which degenerates into a lack of discipline and quarrelsomeness and makes larger-political power forming difficult. Untrustworthiness and instability also imputes him."

Obviously the authors were unaware of political dominance at the time by Fianna Fail. It also claims that the main characteristics of the Irish is a lively temperament, good nature, gaiety, eagerness for music and dancing instruction and social entertainment. One begins to wonder whether the plans are for an invasion or a holiday guide book.

The text volume goes on to describe Ireland in sections such as Rosslare-Wexford, The Mountain Country of Cork, The North Eastern Mountain country, The Central Plain East, etc. Each section deals with the configuration of terrain, describing the physical landscape of the section, a description of the transport facilities of the area and a summary of industry and settlement. There is also a military estimate of each area, giving landing possibilities of each area, the location of obstacles and the potential billeting of troops.

But the German plans did not plan to billet troops in Irish houses to any great extent,
as they held a low view of Irish living standards, saying that the Irish population:

"consists, even today, of small tenant farmers who often work quite insufficient
allotments of land under very oppressive conditions...hence poverty was and
still is a general thing... The houses, especially in the West, are often
extremely primitive huts of broken stones with straw roofs and with a few badly
aired and lighted in which large families huddle. The possibilities for billeting
troops are therefore, apart from the larger towns, to be described as bad."66

While Ireland was not as advanced as other European nations during the war, the German
authors seem to have a pre-famine view of Irish domestic conditions.

Section C of the first volume goes on to describe the inland waterways of Ireland and
deals with Ardnacrusha power station in great detail. This is presumably because of the large
amount of Germans who worked on the construction of the station for Siemens.67 Then
there is an index of Irish towns, giving a few facts and figures of each place.68

Volume II gives military geographical data on the South and East coast. It gives a
dedicated commentary on the physical geography of sections, as in the first volume, its main
aim however is to display photographs of Ireland.69

How did the Germans collect this information? It is thought that German
archaeologists visiting Ireland between the wars could have collected this information. Also
German hikers in Ireland, seemed to have been keen photographers, Duggan suggests a
core of them could have been intelligence agents or military personnel.70 Furthermore
Germany used German exchange students in Irish Universities to act as intelligence

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66 Robert Fisk, In Time Of..., p 227. (Quoting from Military Geographical
Data..., p 40)


68 Military Geographical Data...(Text Edition), Section D.

69 Military Geographical Data... (Text and Pictorial Volume.)

70 Duggan, Neutral Ireland..., p 58
gatherers before the war. Douglas Gageby recalled a German Jupp Hoven in rooms in Trinity College, while Gageby was a student, in the late 1930's. Gageby recalled that it was a joke among his friends that Hoven was a spy. He was in fact a German spy. Indeed Hoven did work as a German Abwehr agent, involving himself in Irish affairs during the war.

However the actual combat intelligence of these plans are weak, some of the general information given suffers a similar ailment. The plans claim the West Galway railway was in operation, as was the Lough Corrib passenger ferry, but both had been discontinued in 1933. They had not been use for years and had fallen into disrepair. Dun-Aengus on the Aran Islands in Co. Galway had mysteriously appeared on the islands with the same name, off the coast of Donegal.

With reference to combat intelligence, the text version of the plans devotes only several pages to this subject. On the whole it makes reference only to the geographical details which would affect combat. One being where likely landing sites were placed saying that the landing possibilities: "On all sections of the coast of the Island are satisfactory to excellent...". They did consider some areas unfavourable, such as the central East coast, with the exception of the harbours in the Dublin area which made a landing in this area possible. A number of suitable landing sites were mentioned, these included the Waterford-Wexford district, Galway Bay, Lough Foyle and the Cork-Cobh area. Once again

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72 Enno Stephan, Spies in Ireland, (Four Square, 1965) pp 215-217. (It is alleged that one of the activities that Hoven was involved in during the war was in helping to recruit Irish prisoners of war in Germany, but it was on the whole an unsuccessful scheme.)
73 Cox. Militär Geographische Angaben..., p 84
74 ibid p 94
75 Military Geographical Data..., (Text Volume) p 27
76 ibid
77 ibid
the geographical details are discussed as are the general conditions for billeting and provisions, again they do not sow much hope for German comforts during a prospective campaign here:

"...the equipment and space and hygienic conditions of the farmers’ and fishermen’s homesteads in the interior and in the West often leave much to be desired...In the bog districts of the central depression special attention should be paid to the supply of drinking water."\(^78\)

No mention is made about the Irish Defence Forces except on p 26, of the text volume, which mentions the radio communications set-up of the army and the hand over of the Treaty Ports in 1938. Some information is given on communications routes for the invaders, saying that while the country has quite a good road system, off road travel would be difficult due to physical obstacles such as bogs, vegetation and rocky terrain.\(^79\) It is quite amazing that no reference is made to what sort of opposition the Germans could expect to face. Especially when one considers that the Irish Army had 37,310 permanent members in September 1940.\(^80\) Also the Local Defence Force had over 100,000 members.\(^81\)

In comparison the Irish Army’s geographical data did deal with actual combat intelligence.\(^82\) Coastal Recce Report no. 1, includes the Dublin harbour areas that the German invasion plan mentions. The Irish plan goes into much more detail listing even small harbours such as Colliemore harbour in Dalkey. Landing possibilities are assessed, both for infantry and armoured fighting vehicles. Dublin Bay is seen as a vulnerable position, the

\(^78\) ibid p 28

\(^79\) Military Geographical Data... (Text Volume), p 27.

\(^80\) Duggan. A History..., p 183

\(^81\) Fisk, In Time Of..., p 246. (Fisk does point out that many of these troops were not actually supplied with weapons, due to supply shortages.)

\(^82\) Coastal Recce Reports. (Plans and Operations), 1941-42. Military Archives, CS. 71/2.
report saying that the strand at Merrion and Sandymount are suitable for landings at low water. But the report, unlike the German one, also reports on defensive capabilities, noting the military guard at the Pigeon House and an Anti-Aircraft post in Ringsend. Indeed Dublin Bay had the best air defences, if not a near monopoly, in Ireland during the war, with AA gun placements at locations including Ringsend, Clontarf, Booterstown and the North and South Bull Islands. 83

In the German invasion plans, the Irish Army HQ, based in Parkgate St, and the Garda HQ based in Kilmainham Royal Hospital, are marked on a map with a red cross, denoting a hospital. 84 This would be a serious error for any invader. Furthermore, the Linen Hall Barracks, which is marked as a military establishment, was in fact burnt down in 1916. 85

Dungarvan Bay, in Waterford, considered by the Germans as a likely landing point was also considered likely by the Irish as was Rosslare Strand. 86 A further indication that Ireland was aware of the risk of the Waterford-Wexford area being invaded was the large scale exercise held mainly in Co. Waterford in 1942. 87 English military observers were present at this exercise. 88

As mentioned before, the Germans believed that a landing in the Cork-Cobh area would be possible only in the event of a surprise or friendly landing. But the Germans made

83 Duggan, A History..., pp 189-192
84 Cox, Militar Geographische Angaben..., P93
85 ibid
86 Coastal Recce Reports. (Plans and Operations), 1941-42. Military Archives, CS. 71/2.
87 JP Duggan, A History..., pp 209-211.
88 ibid p 209. (Duggan suggests that the English presence, apart from being there to observe for the purposes of Anglo-Irish military co-operation in the face of a German invasion, was also to discreetly show that while the Irish could competently offer resistance to a German invasion, they could also do so if the invaders were English.)
no mention of the gun batteries left by the British after they abandoned the Treaty Ports.\textsuperscript{89} Nor do they mention the small Naval Service established in 1940, which while only possessing six motor torpedo boats and two gun boats, would have at least offered some resistance to a sea-borne landing.\textsuperscript{90} Also, in the above mentioned exercise in 1942, some manoeuvres were carried out in the Cork-Cobh area.\textsuperscript{91}

So the Germans did have invasion plans for Ireland despite their claims to the contrary. Hempel, the German Minister to Ireland affirmed to the Dept. of External Affairs: "Germany's intention not to violate our neutrality, and above all not to invade Ireland.\textsuperscript{92} But Germany only considered seriously invading Ireland after the fall of France in 1940, mainly as a diversion or as a "back-door" for the invasion of England, in an operation known as Operation Gruen (Green).\textsuperscript{93} German troops did begin waterborne training in amphibious landings for an invasion of Ireland.\textsuperscript{94} But the importance of this invasion was a secondary one, as Operation Gruen was only to use three German divisions, while the planned attack on Britain would have used forty.\textsuperscript{95} Despite this, the invasion training for Operation Gruen did continue in earnest through September until mid-October. The training was scaled down after the postponement of Operation Sealion, which was the German plan for the invasion of Britain.\textsuperscript{96} But in November 1940, rumours began to circulate among the German High Command, of a British invasion of Ireland, and there was another scurry of activity in the

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{89} Cox, \textit{Militar Geographische Angaben...}, p 94-95
\textsuperscript{90} Fisk, \textit{In Time Of...}, p 245
\textsuperscript{91} Duggan, \textit{A History...}, pp 209-211
\textsuperscript{92} J. Walshe(?) to Frank Aiken TD, 9th of August, 1940. National Archives D/FA: A24.
\textsuperscript{94} ibid
\textsuperscript{95} Fisk, \textit{In Time Of...}, p 223
\textsuperscript{96} ibid, p 79
\end{footnotes}
German Army in preparation of another possible German landing, but once again, nothing happened.97 In December, any German plans for an "unfriendly" German invasion were cancelled by Hitler's staff.98

In any case the planned German invasion of September, 1940, was to be an amphibious landing, using two steamships and three small coasters.99 When one considers the might of the Royal Navy and the relative weakness of the German Navy's surface fleet,100 it would have been extremely difficult for the Germans to defend their invasion force on the water, especially if Operation Sealion was also imminent, in which presumably most of the German Naval forces would be involved. Also, the route that the Germans would have taken, most likely around the South coast of England would have given the Royal Navy plenty of time to engage a German force. This route would also have warned and given the Irish Army time to prepare for the invasion. Also the British would have received this warning, and already had plans to intervene in case of a German invasion in Ireland. This plan was known as the "W"-Plan and was to be carried out by the British, with or without the co-operation of the Irish. But it would seem unlikely that Ireland would turn down such help in an invasion situation, especially in the light of the extent of Anglo-Irish co-operation during the war. Also, it had been agreed between the Irish and English authorities that in the event of a German invasion Ireland would call England for help. The British had already been warning Ireland of German aircraft approaching Irish airspace.101 Thus, it is very likely that British intervention would have been welcome in the face of a German invasion. Furthermore,

97 Burdick, "Gruen"... p 79
98 ibid
99 Fisk, In Time Of... p 222
100 Forster, The World At... pp 85-107. Also see Burdick, "Gruen"... p 79. (Burdick claims the Chief of the German Navy, Admiral Raeder informed Hitler that the Germans had ten vessels to the Royal Navy's one hundred. Also unpredictable weather and the lack of surprise would have affected any operations against Ireland.)
101 Fisk, In Time Of... p 236-44

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if the Germans had planned an airborne landing, the RAF, had already proven their worth in the Battle of Britain to intercept slow moving German transport aircraft and it is unlikely that German fighters could have provided effective air cover. 102

In the event of an airborne landing as the Intelligence Note mentioned earlier in this chapter, airborne troops only carried small arms and presumably not a very large cache of ammunition. 103 Thus to receive larger and heavier equipment, such as tanks, transport vehicles, artillery etc, a seaborne landing would have been vital to supply German troops with necessary supplies such as above.

Finally, as discussed above, the Germans did not possess a naval surface power and likewise, the German Army was not used to amphibious warfare. Their campaigns had been fought in Europe on land, thus they were inexperienced and relatively untested in amphibious landings.

Germany did plan to invade Ireland. But it was most likely to be, as previously mentioned, a diversionary attack or possible "back door" into England. Otherwise it is unlikely that Germany would not have paid any attention to Ireland at all. But in any case much of the German's information on Ireland was either outdated, obsolete or just plainly wrong. They made many serious errors, a wounded German trying to seek medical aid in Parkgate St. would have met an unexpected surprise, on discovering a very definite military presence there, likewise a German attack on the Linen Hall Barracks would not meet much opposition at all. In contrast the Irish Army was prepared in its provisions for a German attack, and inevitably, it's intelligence on Ireland was much more detailed and correct. But unlike the

102 ibid, p 83. (Forster quotes Luftwaffe General Adolf Gallande, who said: "...The Luftwaffe was neither trained nor prepared to conduct an independent air war over England...Our range was very limited...over London for example we could only stay ten minutes...This limited range of our fighters acting as escorts was perhaps, the main factor which prevented an effective air offensive against Britain." Thus, if the Luftwaffe was unable to conduct a proper fighter offensive over South-East Britain, it is unlikely they could have over Ireland.)

103 Intelligence Note No. 19 "German Airborne Troops". UCD Archives, P71/37
Germans, G2 also concerned themselves with the sort of opposition the Irish Army could expect and thus in combat intelligence terms were more prepared than the German's were in their combat intelligence on Ireland.

Irish combat intelligence was for defensive purposes. True, the Irish Army was small and would offer limited resistance against an invader. But they would have slowed down the invasion and probably during this period, help would come from England if the invader was an Axis power. Irish combat intelligence told the army which weapons, manpower and tactics were the best to use and similarly what to expect from a potential enemy and what terrain they would be expected to fight in. In general, G2 supplied reasonable combat intelligence during World War Two.
CHAPTER 3

GERMAN AGENTS IN IRELAND

FSL Lyons claimed that during the war "Dublin became like Lisbon, one of the whispering galleries of Europe and a natural centre for intrigue and spying of every kind". Lyons was mistaken. True, Germany did send agents into Ireland, but all bar two, were captured within a few days of their arrival. This was partly the fault of the German agents and their superiors but their capture was also due to the Irish security services, in which G2 had the overall responsibility for counter-espionage.

The following chapter examines the workings of G2 in counter-espionage and also the actual cases of the German agents who attempted to operate here. It will be shown that on the whole they were not here to carry out offensive operations against Ireland but instead hoped: to use the IRA as a fifth column in Britain or Northern Ireland, other agents were sent to establish weather reporting stations in Ireland and finally, some came to use Ireland as a stepping stone into Britain in order to carry out operations there.

In 1938, G2 was given the responsibility to deal with the problem of defence intelligence security. This was after the Department of External Affairs were told by the British,

"...that the espionage activities of Germany extended to Ireland and that these activities affected British, United States and

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2 Defence Security Intelligence, 25 June, 1945, National Archives, D/FA: A8/1
French defence interests.  

As to the validity to this claim it is doubtful that the German’s interests in Ireland at this time would have been a threat to any nation except Ireland and Britain. Ireland was too remote and isolated for German espionage to pose any danger to "United States and French defence interests", until during the actual war.

G2 was selected to take control of counter-espionage. According to a Defence Security Intelligence document, the reasons for this included the fact that most other nations military organisations took care of counter espionage. This was true, as shown in chapter Two, many intelligence agencies were either military or quasi-military. Co-operation with such agencies had to be maintained and the Department of Defence was the most suited to carry out this liaison. This again was true, Ireland sent officers to courses or discussions run by other nations' military establishments. In 1926-27 a special Irish military mission was sent to the US to study the set up and training of their army. Furthermore, in 1926, Gen. McMahon and the then Capt. Dan Bryan, went to the Imperial Conference in London, to attempt to discuss a coastal defence policy. The final reason given was that the Department for Defence had studied this problem and had highlighted its importance.

By the beginning of the war, G2 was firmly at the helm of counter espionage operations. It was during the first years of the war that Germany was to conduct operations in Ireland.

The German intelligence section Abwehr II, specialised in dealing with discontented minority groups, aiming to use them in sabotage activities. The IRA's "S-Plan", a bombing

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3 ibid
4 ibid
5 Duggan, A History...
6 Refer to page 4, in which the 1928, Department of Defence Memorandum recommended that G2 be reorganised, to include a counter espionage section.
7 Stephan, Spies In..., p20
campaign focused on mainland Britain by targeting public utilities, began in January 1939. The Abwehr had already been approached by Helmut Clissman in 1938, who was a German exchange student in Trinity College. He spoke of rumours he had heard of the approaching bombing campaign in England. Ironically he was turned away because the German Foreign Office forbade any dealings with the IRA. The Abwehr overruled this decision once the "S-Plan" campaign begun. There is little or no evidence to show that the Germans gave any actual support to the "S-Plan", as some believed.

With the commencement of the "S-Plan", the Abwehr's interest in the IRA had been whetted. In February, 1939, they sent Oskar C. Pfaus to Ireland, in order to make contact with the IRA. He met with Stephen Hayes, then the Chief of Staff of the IRA. They agreed that the two organisations would co-operate in operations against England. Jim O'Donovan was nominated to be the contact man between the Abwehr in Germany and the IRA. He made several trips to Germany, which on the whole were quite successful, despite one occasion when his wife was strip searched by an over zealous German customs officer! During these meetings, which took place during the latter half of 1939, arrangements were made for the sending of agents to Ireland and the supplying of equipment to the IRA. It was during these months that the ground work for German operations in Ireland was carried out.

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8 Coogan, The IRA. P127
9 Fisk, In Time Of..., p 88
10 ibid
11 ibid
12 ibid. Fisk quotes Gerry Boland, who claims the IRA were receiving aid from Germany by the time of the "S-Plan"
13 Stephan, Spies In..., pp 17-40
14 ibid
15 Duggan, Neutral Ireland..., Pp 60-61
The IRA was to become a serious threat to Ireland, not only because of its German links, but because of the threat it posed to Irish security. The best example being the Phoenix Park Magazine raid on Christmas Eve, 1939. In which the IRA stole a large quantity of firearms and over one million rounds of ammunition.\(^{16}\)

While an examination of G2's involvement in anti-IRA operations is beyond the scope of this work, it is evident that G2 was involved in this sphere, unlike in the previous decade. The evidence to show this includes the fact that G2 used the Department of External Affairs to gather information on IRA suspects and supporters abroad, especially in the US.\(^{17}\)

According to Douglas Gageby, there was a G2 section which carried out Anti-IRA work.\(^{18}\)

The IRA were not the only suspects of G2 to be involved in co-operation with the Germans. The "Friends of Germany", were an Irish right wing group, which supported the Nazis.\(^{19}\) G2 thought that while they did not pose an immediate threat, it was possible that as: "...readymade material for a fifth column, they are always a serious potential danger."\(^{20}\)

Indeed they did not cause any trouble during the war. But "subversives", such as Eoin O'Duffy were suspected to be affiliated with them.\(^{21}\)

But G2 did realise that the threat of IRA-German co-operation existed. "A constant problem is the question of the possibility of co-operation between the IRA and Germany or secret organisations," a G2 report said.\(^{22}\) "The potential danger," it continued, "of such co-operation is infinitely more serious than that of co-operation between Germany and their Irish

\(^{16}\) The Irish Times, Tues, 26 Dec, 1939.

\(^{17}\) IRA Activities, National Archives, D/FA: A12

\(^{18}\) The Douglas Gageby Interview, 10/3/94, P 8. This section was located in the Security Dept. of G2.

\(^{19}\) Counter Espionage, Irish Born Groups, 1940, UCD ARCHIVES P71/30.

\(^{20}\) ibid

\(^{21}\) ibid

\(^{22}\) ibid
friends."

The report went on to allege that the IRA man, Sean Russell, was suspected of being the IRA-German liaison, and that he may possibly be in Germany. Indeed Russell had arrived in Germany in April 1940, from America, as an IRA liaison. This was confirmed in the summer of 1940, when the Irish Legation in Washington DC, stated that they had read a statement claiming Russell was in Germany.

So, the Germans had contacts with a friendly group which they could use to operate in Ireland. The Germans seemed to have the idea that, "England's difficulty", was still Ireland's opportunity. They did not understand that the Irish government did not wish for German interference, as it would endanger its policy of neutrality. Ireland wanted to remain neutral during the war and would not tolerate the activities of German agents which would threaten the balance of neutrality.

Nevertheless Germany sent in their first agent in February, 1940. His name was Ernst Weber-Drohl. He was a chiropractor, but had also been a wrestler in his earlier years. He landed by submarine off the coast of Sligo. His mission was to deliver money and a transmitter to the IRA, but he lost the transmitter while coming ashore. He got to Dublin, and made contact with Jim O'Donovan. Drohl in a letter invited the IRA to send an agent to Germany, to arrange the shipping of arms and equipment to Ireland. The said agent would

23 Stephan, Spies In..., pp 89-98

24 R. Brennan to J. Walshe, 23 Aug 1940, National Archives D/FA: A12. (Russell was to later leave Germany in August 1940, with Frank Ryan, on board a German submarine bound for Ireland. He never reached his destination, dying en route. Ryan abandoned the trip and returned to Germany. Also see Stephan, "Spies in..." pp 145-50)

25 Herman Goertz, 1946. National Archives, D/FA: A 34. (This file, while it primarily deals Herman Goertz, also includes a summary of the German agents' cases, at the time of their deportation hearings at the end of the war.)

26 ibid

27 Stephan, Spies In..., P 67

28 ibid P 72
return with the shipment to Ireland. Perhaps this is one of the reasons that the IRA sent Sean Russell to Germany. The letter also asked the IRA to carry out more missions against military targets, instead of civilian targets.

Weber-Drohl was arrested in Dublin on 24th April, 1940 and was charged with being in contravention of the Aliens Act. When he appeared in court, he offered the defence that he was in Ireland to seek out two children he had fathered on a previous visit to Ireland thirty five years before. He was fined three pounds and released. He was interned three days later by G2. He was released again the following year and worked as a strongman under the name "Atlas the Strong". He was re-interned in August 1942.

It is unsure to what extent G2 was involved in the Weber-Drohl case, or how convinced they were of his status as a bona-fide agent. If they were so convinced why did they allow him to be released from his internment? All other German agents, once caught, were interned for the full duration of the war. But it could also be argued that, they released him to see where he would go and who made contact with.

Weber-Drohl was a German agent. He did succeed in part of his mission, by delivering funds and instructions to the IRA. Despite the fact that this was known. There

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30 The Irish Times, Thursday, April 25, 1940. (His defence argument was backed up.)

31 Stephan, Spies In..., P 75.

32 ibid

33 Herman Goertz, 1946. National Archives, D/FA: A 34. (The end of this file contains an excellent summary of the deportation trials of the German agents in Ireland, giving details of their activities in Ireland.)

34 Jim O’Donovan Papers. National Library, MS. 21, 115. (In The previously quoted letter, Weber-Drohl goes on to say that he had given O’Donovan $14, 450, having kept back $650 for himself as he had lost all his own money.)

35 Herman Goertz, 1946. National Archives, D/FA: A34.
is no reference made to him in the summary of the activities of the counter-espionage section in 1940. One could argue that G2 did not put Weber-Drohl high on their list of dangerous German agents.

The only German "active" agent to remain at large in Ireland for any length of time was Herman Goertz. He was born in 1890, in Lubeck, Germany. He followed in his fathers footsteps and became a lawyer, eventually obtaining a Phd in international law. He had served in the German Airforce during World War One as a flying officer. After that he worked as a solicitor in the United States and Britain, returning to Germany in the early 1930's. He was arrested in England on the 8th November, 1935. He was charged and convicted with three offenses under the Official Secrets Act, all relating to plans and sketches he made of an RAF station in Kent. The conviction was justified. He had indeed come to England to spy on the RAF, as he believed that England was developing a large bomber force. Goertz was wrong in his belief, it was only after the Munich Crisis of 1938, that Britain began to put an emphasis on heavy bombers. He was deported from England in February 1939.

Goertz had contact with Irishmen during the years before the war. While imprisoned in England he met an Irish born, English officer who told him about the 1916 Rising and its aftermath as seen from the Unionist standpoint. He also met IRA prisoners. After his

36 Counter Espionage Section, 1940. UCD Archives P71/30.
37 Herman Goertz. National Archives, D/FA: A34.
38 ibid
39 Nigel West, MIS, pp 114-122 (While West's account of Irish-British co-operation during the war leaves much to be desired, otherwise this work is a very useful history of MIS from 1909-45.)
40 Stephan, Spies In..., P 79
41 Donne & Fowler, Per Ardua Ad Astra..., P77
42 Herman Goertz, National Archives, D/FA: A34.
43 Herman Goertz, Comparison Of Goertz Statement Of 2.10.45 With "Goertz Document Of December 1944". Military Archives, G2/1722.
44 ibid
release and return to Germany he was asked by the German Supreme Command to go on
a mission to Ireland. The purpose of this mission was to make contact with the IRA and
attempt to organise an uprising in Northern Ireland. Goertz claimed that while he had no
intention of co-operating with the IRA in the Irish Free State, but, "At the same time there was
strong belief in military circles that the Eire Government would silently agree to the activities
of the IRA in the Six Counties when the war became intense, and the Magazine raid - an
event mysterious to us - strengthened this view". It is difficult to understand why the
Germans thought that the Irish government would condone operations in the North because
of the Magazine raid. If anything the raid made the Irish security services step up their anti-
IRA operations. The German's once again were demonstrating their incorrectly held belief
that "England's difficulty is Ireland's opportunity".

The German's idea of a Northern Ireland uprising came from a plan made up by a
Dublin man, Liam Gaynor in which he proposed an IRA attack on Northern Ireland supported
by German paratroopers. An IRA supporter Stephen Held, brought the plan, called "Plan
Kathleen" to Germany. After he slipped over the German border when he was on a trip to
Belgium in April, 1940. Goertz claimed he did not meet Held in Germany. But it seems
somewhat illogical that Goertz did not meet the man who came all the way from Ireland with
the plan he hoped to aid. Also, while in Ireland Goertz was to be accommodated and almost
be captured in Held's home. It was quite a coincidence that he was accommodated by the
same man who visited Germany. Goertz did admit to having contact with some Irish nationals

45 ibid
46 ibid
47 Fisk, In Time Of..., pp 348-349
48 Goertz Case. Military Archives, G2/1722.
49 ibid
50 This shall be dealt with in greater detail below.
in Germany, including Francis Stuart, who was a university lecturer at the time.51

Contrary to Goertz's claim under interrogation, that he was not well informed about the IRA.52 It can be seen from above that he was very much informed. Goertz claimed that he never intended to work as a spy or agent, but as a military leader.53 Perhaps this was to be in a role akin to a military adviser. This is substantiated by the fact that he wore a military uniform when being dropped into Ireland.54 If he intended to work as a military leader, and aid in "Plan Kathleen" it would be likely that he would have to be in close cooperation with the IRA and its leaders. So it is very unlikely that he would not have acquainted himself with the integral group of "Plan Kathleen".

On the night of the 5-6 May 1940, Goertz parachuted into Ballivor, Co. Meath.55 He claimed that he had intended to land north of the border in County Tyrone but bad weather prevented him from doing so.56 But once again this claim should be questioned, as it would been somewhat strange for him to land in the North, as he had more contacts in the South, such as Iseult Stuart, Francis Stuart's wife living in Laragh, Co. Wicklow.57 Also the majority of the IRA's leaders were in the South.

Goertz's problems began on descent into Ireland. He lost his radio transmitter, which had been parachuted down separately.57 He decided that he would go south to Co. Wicklow

51 Herman Goertz, Comparison Of Goertz Statement Of 2.10.45 With "Goertz Document Of December 1944". Military Archives, G2/1722.

52 ibid

53 ibid

54 ibid

55 ibid

56 ibid

57 There are numerous account of Goertz's stay in Laragh, but perhaps the best can be found in Enno Stephans, "Spies in Ireland" pp 101-106.

57 Military Archives, G2/1722, Herman Goertz, GOERTZ DOCUMENT 1944 (The following account of Goertz's movements while at large, shall be taken from this document, unless indicated.)
and make contact with Iseult Stuart of Laragh Castle. He walked 120km to Laragh. Stuart took him in and bought him some new clothes. Jim O'Donovan was called to collect him and this he did. O'Donovan brought him to Stephen Held's home in Templeogue. Goertz wrote in his diary that he gave a man whom he did not name, $16,500.

While staying with Held, he met with Stephen Hayes the IRA Chief of Staff. Goertz was very flattering towards him. But Goertz's luck was to turn sour again on the evening of 22 May.

On that evening, for undisclosed reasons the Gardai searched Held's house. They arrested Held, and found some of Goertz's belongings, including some items of clothing, his war medals, documents including questionnaires on Irish harbours, aerodromes, roads and defence forces. A wireless transmitter, (as he lost his presumably the IRA supplied him a replacement), and $20,000. Goertz managed to escaped back to Laragh. He did not stay there long, Stuart herself was arrested on 25th May. Goertz remained on the run until he was captured in December 1941.

A thesis itself could be written on Goertz's activities while on the run between May 1940 to December 1941, but much of this material is not of direct relevance to this thesis. What is of more significance is, was G2 aware of Goertz's presence and activities?

As far as his presence was concerned G2 was very much aware of it. On 13th May 1940, G2 received a statement from the Gardai, given by Christopher O'Reilly of Ballivor, Co.

58 The Irish Times, Saturday 25 May, 1940.


60 The Irish Times, May 27, 1940.

61 Herman Goertz, Summary and Chronology of Goertz Case As At August 1943. Military Archives G2/1722. (Goertz was arrested seemingly by accident at No. 1, Blackheath park in Dublin, when the Gardai were raiding a nearby house. Also see Fisk, "In Time of...", P 358. He says the Gardai found him because when they were raiding the nearby house, they became suspicious of a woman looking at them from a window of No. 1, when they went to investigate, they found Goertz inside.)
Meath. O'Reilly claimed that he met a German parachutist, who asked for directions to Wicklow. He gave a good description of Goertz. Later, on 16th May, 1940, Commdt. RC Daly confirmed that an aircraft did fly over Ballivor and the search was on for a parachutist. On 4th April 1941, G2 in the Curragh Command reported that a German airforce uniform, with spaces for medals, flying suit and map of Athlone and Dublin were found in Carbury Co. Kildare. Then on 10th April, Dan Bryan wrote to Chief-Supt. P. O'Carroll informing him that the medals found previously in Held's house matched with the uniform found in Carbury, and the tunic fitted the description given earlier by O'Reilly. Further evidence comes from an interview with Col. Eamon de Buitlear, who was second in command of G2 after 1941. He claims:

"His (Goertz) orders were relayed in a cypher which nobody could understand and I spent two years working on it while I was with the President, I succeeded in working out the system but I could not figure out its meaning". (De Buitlear was aide de camp to Douglas Hyde between 1938-41.)

So the Army were receiving and attempting to break Goertz's encoded orders while he was on the run.

Goertz was on the run for almost two years. Most other German agents were captured very quickly after their arrival here. Why did Goertz not suffer a similar fate? A supposition which could be made that G2 may have been instructed by higher authorities in Ireland to

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62 Herman Goertz, Landing By Parachute At Ballivor Co. Meath On 5 May 1940, To Arrest At Clontarf. Military Archives, G2/1722. (After his capture Goertz confirmed meeting O'Reilly in the "Goertz Document, 1944")

63 ibid

64 ibid

65 Eamon de Buitlear transcript. (This translated transcript from an extract of an interview given by Col. de Buitlear to Radio na Gaeltachta -Date unknown- Kindly donated to the writer by Col. de Buitlear's son, Eamon de Buitlear.)
"go-softly" in their hunt for Goertz. Goertz landed just at the end of the phoney war, France was to be invaded soon afterwards, and in the following Autumn the Battle of Britain was fought. The Battle of the Atlantic was raging. During the time that Goertz was at large England was in the European theatre more or less on its own.46 Four days after his eventual capture the USA was to join in the war.47 Perhaps the Irish authorities were hedging their bets by turning a blind eye to Goertz’s activities in order to appease Germany in case they won the war. Or in the face of a German victory they could have argued that they turned a blind eye to Goertz’s activities in order to counteract the preference they had shown to the Allies.

There is further circumstantial evidence to back up this supposition. One of the most obvious being, that in time of war, especially in small nation like Ireland strangers are noted. In 1940, G2 wrote;

" At the beginning of the period under review the country was quite unconscious of either espionage or war problems...Developments in the European situation soon afterwards, followed almost immediately by the Held case, led to a complete change in public attitude to suspicion of other incidents that might indicate activities of espionage."48

Another, slightly amusing item to demonstrate how Irish society noticed something was out of the ordinary was when Iseult Stuart bought clothes for Goertz after his first arrival in Laragh. The sales-assistants in the department-store from which Stuart bought the clothes were puzzled why she wanted them, as they knew her husband was in Germany.49

46 Forster, The World At.... (This book gives an excellent step by step account of the period mentioned).

47 The Irish Independent, 4 Dec, 1941. (This newspaper account reports "Parachutist arrested in Dublin", in which he is identified as being Herman Goertz)

48 Counter Espionage Section. UCD Archives, P71/30.

49 Stephan, Spies In..., P 112. Also see The Irish Times, Monday, May 27, 1940.
Even more pressing evidence of G2 allowing Goertz to go free was the contacts he made while free in Ireland. They included high ranking army officers including Major-Gen. Hugo McNeill. It is even claimed by Goertz that these high ranking officers offered to put an airplane at Goertz's disposal, in order for him to return to Germany and try to persuade the High Command, to help bring about an end to partition, he also met with Eoin O'Duffy and with a senator from Wicklow.\textsuperscript{70} On one occasion, Goertz even visited Hempel in the German Legation in Dublin.\textsuperscript{71}

In the final analysis there is no concrete evidence to support the above claim that the authorities allowed him roam the countryside at will and must remain purely a supposition.

In summary, Goertz's primary mission to Ireland was to act as a sort of military adviser to the IRA and as a general military observer. During later interrogation, he inevitably tried to distance himself from the IRA, claiming that he had little knowledge or contact with the IRA. This argument has been shown to be unlikely. But after his arrival in Ireland he became disillusioned with the IRA.\textsuperscript{72} Even still he was not as removed from the IRA as he made to believe. Goertz wrote letters to Jim O'Donovan between the 29th August and 1st October, 1941 giving him radio frequencies to listen to for messages and code definitions. At one stage he even asked O'Donovan for money.\textsuperscript{73} As far as his claim that he was given strict orders not to interfere in the Free State's affairs, one doubts his sincerity when he was involved in actual talks with Irish Army officers and even with an Oireachtas senator.

\textsuperscript{70} Herman Goertz, Goertz Case. Military Archives, G2/1722.

\textsuperscript{71} Duggan, Neutral Ireland.... P 154

\textsuperscript{72} Herman Goertz, Comparison Of Goertz Statement Of 2.10.45 With "Goertz Document Of December 1944". Military Archives, G2/1722. (Also any work on this subject, ie: Enno Stephan, makes reference to the fact that the IRA seemed to do their own thing, despite Germany's request. This combined with splits within the IRA after the "kangaroo trial" held by the IRA against Stephen Hayes, seemed to scare Germany away from co-operation with the IRA.)

\textsuperscript{73} James L. O'Donovan Papers, German agents in Ireland & German contacts with Ireland 1939, Letters of Herman Goertz and E. Weber Drohl. National Library, MS. 21,115.
Other German agents sent to Ireland were not as lucky as Goertz. The only other to remain at large for any length of time was Werner M.B. Unland. He arrived in Ireland on 28th August, 1939. He acquired a residence in Dun Laoghaire with his English born wife. He came under suspicion of espionage shortly after his arrival. A G2 report states:

"Shortly before the inception of Postal Censorship in September 1939, letters were first observed by this branch going to the - Dansk Import and Export Co. P.O. Box 106 Copenhagen, Denmark -. These were highly suspicious in tone, type written, in English, ....that were generally posted in Dun Laoghaire and no address or sender was given. An examination of all the records in the possession of the Branch of aliens in the Dun Laoghaire district led... eventually to one Werner M.B. Unland."

Unland was identified as the sender and was put under Garda surveillance. On the 20th June, 1940 he was instructed in a letter posted from Spain, that he should write to G. Schutz in Spain. This was Gunther Schuetz, who was to come to Ireland as an agent in 1941.

While nothing concrete could be proved against Unland, G2 was convinced that Unland was engaged in "sinister work". When Gunther Schuetz was captured in March, 1941, G2 found a microfilm on him. It had Unland's address on it. With this evidence G2 interned him on the 25 April 1941.

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74 Herman Goertz, 1946. National Archives, D/FA: A34.
75 ibid
76 Germany: Espionage And Related Activities, 1939/40(?) UCD Archives P 71/30.
77 ibid
78 ibid
80 Herman Goertz, 1946. National Archives, D/FA: A34.
It is unsure how active an agent Unland was. His letters, while suspicious, gave no concrete evidence of illegal actions. His letters to Denmark all dealt with doing business in machine tools, bacon and soap, requests for money and references to trips he was about to take to interview, "our Belfast and Northern Ireland clients."

Investigations into Unland, "through many sources have failed to establish the means of his livelihood." Nevertheless, he received a regular allowance of money, at first from Sweden or Holland until the invasion of Europe in Spring, 1940. After that he continued to receive his money from an unknown source. It is most likely that Unland was an "inactive" agent, unlike the other agents sent to Ireland. Unland was probably a "sleeper", maybe sent in to establish a safe house for incoming agents, such as Schuetz. Or his mission could have been to integrate himself into the community and gain its trust, in order to carry out missions at a later date. But despite G2 not being able to prove anything at first, they were aware that Unland was a suspicious character.

Walter Simon, like Goertz was suspected of espionage in England. He was arrested in England in March 1939 and charged and convicted for failing to observe the Aliens Registration Act. While imprisoned he was interrogated by MI5, but he refused to admit he was an Abwehr agent. He was deported back to Germany after he finished his six month sentence. Stephan confirms that Simon did carry out espionage operations in England, one being locating the positions of armament factories and the lay-out of new airfields in Britain.

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81 Germany: Espionage And Related Activities, 1939/40(?) UCD Archives P71/30. (This could have referred to the IRA in the North, but there is no concrete evidence to prove this)

82 Counter Espionage Section, 1940. UCD Archives, P71/30.

83 Herman Goertz, 1946. National Archives, D/FA: A34.

84 West, MIS, p 129

85 Stephan, Spies In..., p 122
His deportation did not end his career as an Abwehr agent. On 12th June, 1940, Simon was landed on the coast of Dingle by a German submarine. His mission was to send weather reports and details of British convoy movements. He first aroused suspicion by waiting for a train at Dingle station, which had been closed for the previous fourteen years.

When he eventually arrived at the nearest working train station, in Tralee, he was put under surveillance by Garda detectives. He was arrested when he arrived in Kingsbridge station in Dublin. It was said that during the journey to Dublin, he consumed too much alcohol and asked his fellow passengers if they were members of the IRA. This was despite the fact he had been ordered, in Germany, not to make contact with the organisation.

Another German agent was Wilhelm Preetz. He was married to an Irish woman, Sally Reynolds of Tuam. He visited Ireland several times between 1937-39. He came to Ireland as a German agent in June 1940. His mission was to broadcast weather reports to Germany in order to help in Luftwaffe bombing raids on England. He was arrested after he indiscreetly told a friend of his radio transmitter which kept at his home in Westland Row, Dublin. After his arrest, the Gardai found and sent to G2 HQ in Parkgate Street: "A suitcase, the dimensions of which fitted a rubber case...contained a very neatly built-in radio receiver/transmitter."

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86 Fisk, In Time Of..., p 149
87 ibid
88 Stephan, Spies In..., pp 119-29
89 Herman Goertz, 1946. National Archives, D/FA: A34.
90 Stephan, Spies In..., P124
91 Herman Goertz, 1946. National Archives, D/FA: A34.
92 Fisk, In Time Of..., P 174
93 Germany: Espionage And Related Activities, 1939/40(?) UCD Archives P71/30.
On 7th July, 1940, two Germans called Tributh and Gartner and an Indian called Obed, were arrested in Cork. They were found to be carrying explosives and detonators. The three had arrived in Ireland on the same day by sail boat from occupied France. They claimed they were en route to England to carry out sabotage missions there. They fully disclaimed any intention to carry out operations in Ireland. This was probably true, as all the other Abwehr agents in Ireland were on missions that did not affect Ireland directly. It would be strange of the Germans to suddenly start a bombing campaign in Ireland. Another point that substantiates their statement is, that Obed as an Indian with his dark skin would have been much more noticeable in Ireland than he would have been in England. Also Obed being Indian was a British subject, and had lived in London between 1920-25 and probably would have had contacts and friends there.

The final agent that Germany was to send to Ireland was Gunther Schuetz. He parachuted into Ireland on the night of 12-13 March, 1941. His mission was to deliver a transmitter to an agent in England. He was to go to Dublin and contact Werner Unland, who was to shelter Schuetz or at least keep the transmitter, until the agent from England collected it.

Schuetz originally intended to land in Naas, but due to a navigational error he was dropped in Ballycullane, Co. Wexford. When he landed he changed into civilian clothes and began to walk towards Wexford, believing he was in Naas and going towards Dublin. He was noticed by several people and shortly after mid-day he was questioned and arrested by local

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94 ibid, Counter Espionage Section, 1940
95 Stephan, Spies in... pp 133-138
96 ibid
97 Counter Espionage Section, 1940. UCD Archives, P71/30.
98 Herman Goertz, 1946. National Archives D/FA: A 34.
100 ibid
After he was captured G2 discovered on Schuetz a microfilm placed on a piece of newspaper, in which Unland’s address and other information on Ireland was stored.

Schuetz was to achieve some later notoriety by escaping from internment in Mountjoy prison on 15th February, 1942. He was at liberty for almost a month and a half. During this period he was harboured by IRA supporters, but on 30th April, 1942 he was recaptured in the home of Cathal Brugha’s widow. His activities while at large were purely concerned with plans to escape to Germany.

Even after G2 had all the German agents behind bars, they still carried on valuable counter-espionage work. By interrogating their prisoners they learned about the methods of the Abwehr.

But also from deciphering Goertz’s code, which he had used to communicate with Germany, G2 gained valuable experience in cryptography. Much of this was done by Cmmdt. Eamon de Buitlear and Dr. Richard Hayes. By doing so they were able to gain a valuable insight into the workings of German codes. The Allied intelligence agencies also received the results of Hayes’ and de Buitlear’s efforts.

Spike Marlin an OSS liaison to Ireland, when speaking once about the presence of German agent’s in Ireland commented: “I assume that Irish intelligence had the place

101 ibid
102 Gunther Schuetz. Military Archives G2/x/703.
103 ibid
104 ibid
105 Col. Eamon Buitlear transcript. (Also the National Library, MS. 22,981-984, Richard Hayes Papers, (Hayes was the director of the National Library, but also worked for G2 during the war. His papers consist mostly of notes of a mathematical nature dealing with the cryptography of the Goertz code and the codes used by the German Legation in Ireland.
106 The Douglas Gageby interview, P 2. (Gageby said that at the end of the war, MI5 brought Hayes to London to thank him for his work during the war.)
buttoned up."\(^{107}\) This is true, but to what extent were G2 responsible for this fortunate state of affairs?

There are a number of other factors that contributed to the situation. One being, that as Ireland is a relatively small community, strangers were noticed more easily. Thus German agents were noticed and reported. This was helped by the fact the Irish were on the look out for agents, especially during the period they operated here, in 1940 and the first half of 1941. To support this further, Marlin states that:

"I spoke to JP Walshe who told me that there were between fifty and a hundred thousand British sympathizers in Eire who were straining at the leash to report anything they heard about German spies."\(^{108}\)

G2 was also aided by the apparent incompetence by German intelligence. They made mistakes, both on their assumptions about Ireland, and their operations here. Gunther Schuetz once said about the Abwher:

"Compared with the Irish or British, the German espionage bosses were really very inexperienced and to a certain extent naive. They had no tradition as England and Ireland had."\(^{109}\)

As well as this the German Foreign service was against operations in Ireland.\(^{110}\) As it was German policy to try not to upset Ireland into joining the Allied side. This disagreement must not have helped agents coming into Ireland.

These factors helped lead to the quick capture of most agents. They were arrested usually by the Gardai, but this does not mean G2 was not involved in the arrest, but G2

\(^{107}\) T. Ryle Dwyer, Strained Relations, P 76

\(^{108}\) Fisk, In Time of..., P530

\(^{109}\) The Sunday Press, June 7, 1970. (Also see following page in which German agents in Britain are discussed.)

\(^{110}\) ibid (Also refer to earlier in this chapter in which it is said that the German Foreign office were against dealings with the IRA.)
numbered between 50-60 members and would not have been able spare the manpower, nor had the level of mobility of the Gardai.\footnote{The Douglas Gageby Interview, P 1 (Gageby confirmed the numbers being 50 in G2 HQ.)}

The two agents who operated in Ireland for any length of time were Unland and Goertz. Unland was not arrested until G2 had evidence against him, there is little evidence to show he was an "active" agent and G2 probably would have arrested him much earlier if there had been.

G2 was not unique in capturing all German Agents on their own territory. The British did this as well and managed to actually run the German agents in England as double agents.\footnote{JC Masterman, The Doublecross System. (This work is the definitive account of the double cross agents used during world war two.)} Unlike Britain, G2 had no need to run double agents as they only had to run defensive operations against Germany.

So, Irish Intelligence was a major factor in preventing German agents operating in Ireland. Through their efforts they demonstrated to the Allies that Ireland would not tolerate any German actions that could endanger Irish or Allied security Thus making the Allies confident that Ireland's neutrality could be trusted\footnote{This shall be proven in the following chapter.}. On the other hand there were also other factors as noted above, that helped G2 execute its duties.

There was one fatality in the saga of the Germans foray into Ireland. After the war the Germans were deported back to home.\footnote{Herman Goertz, 1946. National Archives, D/FA: A34.} Goertz feared that if he returned to Germany he would face reprisals from the socialists in Germany for his right wing activities before the war. He wrote to Maude Ni Bhrian on the 16th of October saying: "I belong to the bodies sentenced at Nuremberg", he claimed that the communists he had fought all his life now led...
Germany.  

He appealed to the Irish government to allow him stay and the matter was even discussed with the American Legation, the Legation Minister David Gray, advocated that Goertz should be deported. Eventually it was decided that he would be, but while waiting to be deported he took his own life in the Aliens Registration Office in Dublin. He was buried in Deansgrange cemetery on the 25 May, 1947. 


CHAPTER 4

G2 CO-OPERATION WITH ALLIED INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

Just before the outbreak of World War Two, de Valera warned the German Legation Minister to Ireland, "that circumstances would compel Ireland to show a certain consideration for Britain."¹ This chapter will examine how G2 showed a consideration, not only to the English security service MI5, but also to the American security service, the OSS.² It shall be seen that in many ways as far as co-operation with the Allied security services went, G2 did not act as a body of a neutral nation, but as an ally of a belligerent side.

The sources for this chapter were difficult to come by. If it was not for the kindness of Douglas Gageby and E.R. "Spike" Marlin, by their allowing me to interview them I would not have been able to write this chapter at all and I am forever in their debt. But through their interviews, and searching through the files in the National Archives and Military Archives, the writer has been able to put together a picture, which indicates that G2 was co-operating with MI5 and the OSS to a very large extent.

A large majority of the co-operation with MI5 was carried out through the work of Cecil Liddell, who was in charge of the "Irish Desk" of MI5 during the war.³ Cecil's brother was Capt. Guy Liddell, who was in charge of MI5's "B-Division", which had responsibility for counter-espionage, counter-sabotage and counter-subversion.⁴ Cecil's "Irish Desk" was a

¹ Keatinge, A Place Among... p 91
² See chapter two, for further information on MI5 and the OSS.
³ Joseph T Carroll, Ireland In The War Years, 1939-45 (David & Charles/ Crane Russak, 1975) p 35.
⁴ West, MI5, p 27-28. (Guy Liddell's work in MI5, is referred to many times in this book.)
section of Guy's "B-Division".5

The writer found no direct files in the Military or National Archives, relating to co-operation between Liddell and G2, but there is a large amount of communications from the United Kingdom Representative to Eire to the Dept. of External Affairs in which Liddell relayed messages to Dan Bryan. One example being a letter written to FH Boland of the Dept. of External Affairs, from WC Harkinson of the United Kingdom Representative's Office. It reads:

"My dear Boland,

We have just received a telegram containing the following message for Bryan from Liddell.

    Shall be in Belfast this week. Could come to Dublin, Saturday morning train if you consider convenient and desirable. Must return via Belfast, Monday at latest

You will no doubt be good enough to arrange for the message to be passed on to Bryan and let me know what reply he would like sent."6

Many of these communications are very cryptic in their wording, and I have been unable to locate any direct communications between G2 and MI5. But logical reason suggests there must be. It is possible that some might be found in the Public Records Office in Kew, England, but it is beyond the scope of this thesis's resources to investigate such a possibility. But let us examine one particular case study, which shows the extent of co-operation G2 had with MI5.

In a similar letter to the above, from the UK Representative's Office to Boland, the

5 ibid, p 31

6 UK Representatives Office, (WC Harkinson) to FH Boland, 15th June, 1943. Security Correspondence With GB And The USA, 1942-51. National Archives, D/FA: A60. (There are frequent communications such as these throughout the file, as there are in D/FA: A12, IRA Activities in which information is passed on IRA suspects.)
Dept. of External Affairs was asked to send the following message from Liddell to Dan Bryan:

"With reference to your G2/3824, 29/12 and 30/12, Page and self delighted to come over when you think a suitable stage of interrogation has been reached. (My underlining), but should be glad of as much notice as convenient. Information about cyphers and device of great interest. Your preliminary report on radio indicates it may be of a type not hitherto known here..."\(^7\)

A further communication was sent on the 24th of January, 1944, which stated:

"Reference to my P.F. 64491/B.1.H of 15/1/44 and your G2/3824 of 18/1/44. Note on fighter 3 gives a strong indication O'Reilly had microphotographic list on clothes or equipment. Subject your views think Page and self could usefully come over Friday or latest Monday. On hearing from you will advise you routeing and time."\(^8\)

In fact "fighter 3" was probably a typographical error and should have read, cipher 3.

A final communication on this subject in the A60 file was sent on 26th January, 1944, in which Boland was asked to inform Bryan that Liddell was:

"Very interested about list. Page and self will arrive Wednesday 2nd Feb. evening on 5:43 from Belfast...Reserve rooms Hibernian."\(^9\)

File G2/3824, is the G2 file on John Francis O'Reilly.\(^{10}\) O'Reilly had been in the

\(^7\) ibid, UK Representative’s Office, (signature indecipherable), to FH Boland, 3rd of January, 1944.

\(^8\) ibid, UK Representative’s Office, (signature indecipherable), to FH Boland, 24 January, 1944.

\(^9\) ibid, UK Representative’s Office, (N. Ricker(? ) ), to FH Boland, 26th of January, 1944. (Liddell seemed to be a frequent visitor to the Hibernian Hotel, for in an earlier communication, in D/FA: A60, on the 17th of June, 1943, the UK Representative’s office were asked to inform Boland, to tell Bryan. That Liddell was unable to get a room in the Hibernian and would instead be staying in the Shelbourne.)

\(^{10}\) O'Reilly, John F., Brendon Villa, Killkee, Co. Clare.Military Archives, G2/3824. (While O'Reilly was a German agent, he was not dealt with in the previous chapter, as that chapter examined the work of German-born agents, not Irish agents used by the Germans.)
Channel Island's when they were occupied by the Germans, after which he worked as a propaganda broadcaster in Germany.\textsuperscript{11} He broadcasted under the pseudonym of "Pat O'Brien", and like other Irish broadcasters in Germany at the time, attempted through commentaries, to sway Irish opinion towards Germany.\textsuperscript{12}

On 12th December, 1943, John F. O'Reilly parachuted from a German plane over Kilkee, Co. Clare, his home town.\textsuperscript{13} He was traced by a local Garda sergeant to his parents home. In a later interview he said he had parachuted into Ireland for he believed if he went by other means he may have had to pass through England and could have been detained there because of his broadcasting activities.\textsuperscript{14} On 19th December the Gardai at Kilkee seized wireless transmitting equipment which O'Reilly had brought with him, consisting of:

"(1) An A/C mains operated wireless transmitter and receiver. (2) A battery operated wireless telegraph transmitter and receiver."\textsuperscript{15}

By 21st December O'Reilly was imprisoned in Arbour Hill and was being interrogated by G2, he was linked with J. Kenny, who parachuted from the same plane and into the same area as O'Reilly.\textsuperscript{16}

O'Reilly originally claimed that his mission was to work with Scottish and Welsh

\textsuperscript{11} Military Archives, G2/3208, O'Reilly, Luke, Pte., Brendan Villa, Kilkee, Co. Clare. (Luke was John's brother and was a member of the Irish Army based in the Southern Command. Due to his brothers broadcasts from Germany, the Southern Command G2 section were asked to keep Luke under observation.)

\textsuperscript{12} Fisk, In Time of..., pp 374-75. Also see G2/3208, Dan Bryan to Officer in Command G2, Sthn. Command, 15th of December, 1941.

\textsuperscript{13} HJ Nagle, to the Commissioner "C", 17th of December, 1943. Military Archives G2/3824.

\textsuperscript{14} ibid

\textsuperscript{15} ibid, Chief Supt. O'Carroll to Mr. Cussen, Chief Telegraph Censor, 18th of June 1944.

\textsuperscript{16} ibid, Crime Branch Section 3, 3rd of December 1943. (Kenny was arrested after landing as he had broken his leg after his jump. See Enno Stephan, Spies in Ireland, p 257.)
nationalist groups in Britain, in an attempt to utilise them for sabotage operations there.\textsuperscript{17} But he was to later claim, after the war, that his mission was to carry out an espionage mission in England and to report on any developments in the preparations for the Allied invasion of Europe.\textsuperscript{18}

In July 1944, O'Reilly escaped from Arbour Hill, and returned to his home in Kilkee, but was denounced after three days by his father who diligently invested for his son, the £500 reward he had received, for aiding in his capture.\textsuperscript{19} Interestingly enough, John F. O'Reilly's father had also been the man to arrest Roger Casement in 1916, when he was a member of the RIC.\textsuperscript{20}

But what of the information from the G2/3824 file, that Liddell says he had received from Bryan, in the above communications? The writer was able to find a number of documents written on 18th January, 1944.

One is a document entitled, "Calls Heard During Test of O'Reilly Battery Receiving Set." The document claims:

"Further watch has been maintained on the spot frequencies indicated on the O'Reilly battery receiver. Only two suspicious calls were made on the higher frequency...There is nothing to confirm that either of these stations had any connection with O'Reilly's activities except that they were calling on the frequency corresponding to that marked on the receiver. The station AFQ previously mentioned as operating on the lower frequency was observed again

\textsuperscript{17} ibid, Interview with John Francis O'Reilly On 24.4.'44.

\textsuperscript{18} Stephan, Spies in..., p 257. (Stephan takes his information from a series of articles that O'Reilly wrote for the "Sunday Dispatch", in the summer of 1952, entitled "I was a Spy in Ireland"). Also see Fisk, In Time Of..., p 375.

\textsuperscript{19} Fisk, In Time Of..., p 375.

\textsuperscript{20} Letter from J. Dawson, Garda Supt., 12th of November, 1940. Military Archives, G2/3208.
calling between 19:00 and 19:30 hours GMT on several nights.\footnote{Calls Heard During Test Of O'Reilly Battery Receiving Set. 18th of January, 1944. Military Archives, G2/3824.}

The second document written on that date was a report on an interrogation session on O'Reilly's activities in the Channel Islands and Germany.\footnote{Notes on O'Reilly's Activities in the Channel Islands and Germany (Contd.). 18th of January, 1944. Military Archives, G2/3824} O'Reilly was hedgy with his answers and often refused to comment on some questions that he was asked. For example he refused to name persons with whom he was associated in Bremen, or members of the "underground movement" whom he was to contact in Britain.\footnote{ibid} He did give some information on Kenny, saying that his mission was to maintain and repair the transmitter sets.\footnote{ibid.} He also said that he saw Frank Ryan in Berlin, but when O'Reilly greeted Ryan told him that he did not know O'Reilly, despite O'Reilly claiming this was untrue.\footnote{ibid.} Ryan was to die in a German submarine bound for Ireland, as discussed in the previous chapter.

There is no document written on the 18th about "fighter 3". But on 10th February, 1944, a note was written, explaining how "O'Reilly's No. 3 Cipher", was decoded.\footnote{Note on O'Reilly No. 3 Cipher, 10th of February, 1944. Military Archives, G2/3824.} The note stated:

"This cipher is based on a microphotographic list containing 400 five figure groups arranged in ten number columns with 2 figure groups opposite each line of ten five-figure groups."\footnote{ibid}

The rest of the note goes into more detail on the set up of the code.

As can be seen at least from the O'Reilly case, G2 was sending MI5 a large amount
of information. But not only were they sending a belligerent security service information, it also seems that they were allowing MI5 come over to interview an enemy agent captured and imprisoned on Irish soil.28

Another piece of evidence to show that the Irish and British intelligence services were co-operating can be found in a document concerning interception of radio signals transmitted from Ireland.29 The document states that following a transmission from Wexford, intercepted in England shows that:

"Radio signals in general can only be heard within a very few miles from their source...or at a considerable distance depending on the frequency employed...In general an illicit station in Eire will not be heard by the Eire intercept services. It follows that to make reasonably sure that no undetected signals are sent out from Eire to other countries the co-operation of an outside intercepting service is necessary. For signals likely to be used by agents contacting such countries as France, Belgium, Holland or Germany, the signals will generally be audible in some part of Great Britain. What is suggested is as follows.

(i) That Eire and Great Britain should exchange information on suspicious signals heard either country so that the network of the intercepting services can be widened to catch signal emanating from Eire..."30

Thereby demonstrating that Ireland and Britain were co-operating in the field of signals intelligence.

Nigel West claims in "MI5" that: "The one European capital to remain closed to all

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28 See pp 67-68


30 ibid
British intelligence services throughout the war was Dublin. West goes further to say that any contact Liddell did have with G2, taught him that he "could rely on virtually no exchange of opinions or information." His general assessment of Anglo-Irish intelligence co-operation should be questioned. As can be seen from the few examples that I have shown, co-operation seems to have been carried out to a great extent. Indeed Dr. Richard Hayes worked hand in hand with British cryptographers on Abwehr code during 1940-43. As previously mentioned in an earlier chapter, MI5 were so impressed with Hayes's work they entertained him in London for a week, after the war to thank him for his work, and possibly to pick his brains a little. Furthermore, O'Halpin claims that relations between Liddell and Bryan, "were buttressed by regular parcels of Irish brisket, spiced beef and turkey, were particularly good, even at times when neither could be entirely frank in their dealings."

Some British spies were captured in Ireland. One example being Maj. Edward Reed Byass, a British Army officer, based in Northern Ireland. He was found to be gathering information in Mullingar, which he claimed was in the case the British Army having to come down South, in order to aid Ireland in the case of a German invasion. Furthermore, there must have been some English ex-patriots in Ireland, who acted as informers for the British. But if this was so, they were not trained intelligence gatherers, and would not have been able to supply the "inside information", that G2 was able to give the British.

To summarise the extent of co-operation between MI5 and G2 in the words of Cecil Liddell's writing to Dan Bryan in 1945:

31 West, MI5, p 394
32 ibid, p 403.
33 O'Halpin, Intelligence and Security..., p71
34 Douglas Gageby Interview, p2
35 O'Halpin, Intelligence and Security..., p 68.
36 Case of Major Edward Reed Byas, British Officer, 1940. National Archives D/FA: A5.
"I have been & still am working on a note of the work of the past six years", 
and "am always coming across instances of your kind help and co-operation"
which showed, "more than ever how much I owe to you & your staff"37

The Americans also had an interest in Ireland. In December 1941, Robert Patterson 
was sent to Ireland by the American Government on a fact finding mission to Ireland.38 He 
was very critical of Irish neutrality and believed that Ireland was a considerable security risk 
for the Allies.39

The newly formed United States, Office of Strategic Services sent two agents to 
Ireland in order to report on what was happening there, they were assigned to the Secret 
Intelligence Branch, which was the branch charged with gathering information through 
clandestine means.40

Spike Marlin was the OSS agent-in-charge. His official cover was as a "special 
assistant" to David Gray, the American Minister to Ireland.41 Marlin was recruited by Whitney 
Sheperdson, chief of the British Empire branch of the OSS. His wife had been a fellow 
graduate of Marlin's in Trinity College Dublin.42

The second agent sent was Roland Blenner-Hasset. He was educated at Harvard, but 
was Irish born with Kerry roots.43 His mission was to investigate Patterson's earlier reports 
that the Tralee area was "the hot spot of German activity".44 Thus Blenner-Hasset was

37 O’Halpin, Intelligence And Security..., p 77
38 T. Ryle Dwyer, Strained Relations. Ireland At Peace And The USA At War 
39 ibid, p69-70.
40 ibid, p 71.
41 ibid
42 Letter written to the author by ER Marlin, on 18th July, 1994.
43 ibid, p 3
44 ibid p3. (Also see Dwyer, Strained Relations..., p 69, for his report 
on Tralee.)
based in Tralee. But after four months he requested a transfer out of Ireland, as he claimed that there was nothing to report and besides, his cover was blown from the beginning, as the local people quickly guessed he was an American agent.\textsuperscript{45} He returned to the USA at his own request.

Marlin admits that he himself was not very clever about keeping his cover and his true mission to Ireland was quickly guessed by the Irish authorities.\textsuperscript{46} But despite both men being uncovered so quickly, no move was made to expel them.

This occurrence was tightened through a lunch in the home of Joe Walshe, with Marlin and David Bruce (head of the OSS in Europe). In which it was agreed that "frank collaboration on security matters" would take place. David Gray was appraised of the situation.\textsuperscript{47} Indeed Blenner-Hasset was allowed to have the same diplomatic privileges that Marlin already had, as a member of the American Legation.\textsuperscript{48} However Marlin is unsure of the validity of this claim.\textsuperscript{49}

Marlin quickly took a similar view to Blenner-Hasset's, and believed that Ireland's security was tight.\textsuperscript{50} But this made his relationship with Gray very tenuous, as Gray wanted to hear that spies were everywhere. In many ways he wanted Marlin to leave Ireland in order to stop co-operation and good relations with the Irish Intelligence authorities.\textsuperscript{51}

In the event a compromise was reached: Marlin would transfer to the London office

\textsuperscript{45} ibid
\textsuperscript{46} ibid. (Also see T Ryle Dwyer, \textit{Strained Relations...}, p 72, in which he claims that the Irish authorities uncovered material sent by Marlin in the ordinary mail.)
\textsuperscript{47} Letter written to the author by ER Marlin, 18th July, 1994.
\textsuperscript{48} Dwyer, \textit{Strained Relations...}, p 72.
\textsuperscript{49} Letter written to the author by ER Marlin, received on 18th July, 1994.
\textsuperscript{50} ER Marlin Interview, p 2
\textsuperscript{51} ibid.
of the OSS where he would maintain contact with Col. Dan Bryan, through John Belton of the Irish Legation in London. This contact was supplemented by periodic visits to Dublin. This arrangement took place in the Spring of 1943. David Gray was kept informed of subsequent developments.52

This was very evident at the time of Gray's American note, in which he said that by the Irish government allowing the Axis to maintain legations in Dublin, Irish neutrality:

"...operated and continues to operate in favour of the Axis powers...Axis agents enjoy almost unrestricted opportunity for bringing military information of vital importance from Great Britain and Northern Ireland into Ireland and from there transmitting it by various routes and methods to Germany...We request therefore, that the Irish government take appropriate steps for the recall of the German and Japanese representatives in Ireland."53

Marlin had no idea of the pending American Note, until after it was published, which in any case went against his opinion that Ireland was not being used as an axis espionage base.54

Following the American Note, as discussed above, Marlin moved to London, at his own request. As he felt he could become more involved in the war effort from there. He returned to Washington DC in June 1944, with his wife and five children.55

Following the American Note, Joe Walshe, (the Secretary of The Department of External Affairs) proposed a security conference with the OSS and MI5.56 The American side consisted of Marlin and Hubert Will (the head of OSS Counter-Intelligence in Europe).57

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52 Letter written to author by ER Marlin, received on 18th July, 1994.
53 Gray's American Note, from Dwyer, Strained Relations..., pp 124-126.
54 ER Marlin Interview, p 2
55 Letter written to author by ER Marlin, received on 18th July, 1994.
56 ibid
57 ibid
They met with Col. Bryan and Supt. O'Carroll of the Gardai. Marlin was told to co-operate with G2, as Gray wrote shortly after the meeting:

"Marlin is to the effect that during the six weeks he is to remain here engaged in co-operation with your Intelligence on a report which will make clear what is desirable and possible in the way of mutual co-operation." But in the same letter, one can see a hint of how Gray felt about Marlin's co-operation, when he says, "If anything untoward should arise...I shall not be responsible for Mr. Marlin, nor what he may send in our diplomatic pouch". This line tends to suggest Gray did not look kindly on intelligence co-operation.

The OSS did not seem to share Gray's views. In a meeting between an Irish official and Marlin along with two of his superiors, he told Mr. X, (who Marlin identified to the author as Hubert Will).

"...very frankly what we felt about we felt about Mr. Grey and he agreed with me that some new channel of communication was essential if Ireland's friendship was to be preserved intact for the United States."

Furthermore Mr. X said that:

"...he regretted very much that our relations should have been clouded by recent mishandling on the American side...Nobody there seemed to have a

58 Dwyer, Strained Relations.... p 90


60 ibid

61 Restrictions On Communications Between Ireland And Great Britain, 1944 And Suspension of Steamshiping Service, 1944., Report to An Taoiseach, Minister for External Affairs, Monday, 3rd of April, 1944. National Archives, D/FA: A59. (The writer of this report, refers to a meeting between Marlin and two of his chiefs, sadly neither of these chiefs are mentioned by name, but are referred to as Mr. X, and a "military colleague").

62 Letter written to author by ER Marlin, received on 18th July, 1994.

63 ibid.
complete knowledge of American relations with Ireland, and they certainly did not seem to know how close our relations with the American intelligence people had been."\textsuperscript{64}

The Irish representative then expressed the Taoiseach's desire;

"To eliminate all sources of friction in the future and your readiness to be even more helpful in the sphere of Intelligence during the critical months ahead, and we should be glad to have a suitable person in Dublin for that purpose...Both Mr. X and his military colleague agreed that such a step was desirable."\textsuperscript{65}

Marlin claimed, "I know G2 gave us a lot of information", and at a working level he had no problem with Dan Bryan, indeed they remained good friends after the war.\textsuperscript{66} One particular item Marlin remembers was that Bryan told him the number of IRA men imprisoned or interned in Ireland, a figure under 3,000, which Marlin stated was a major factor in convincing him that Ireland's security was secure.\textsuperscript{67} Furthermore, Marlin received G2 reports on radio interceptions, submarine and aeroplane sightings, the names and addresses of people in America to whom German nationals in Ireland were corresponding and files on German spies captured in Ireland.\textsuperscript{68} Indeed the material that the OSS received was so voluminous the organisation had to prepare an index card on each individual mentioned in the reports, which eventually amounted to over 4,000 names.\textsuperscript{69} But unlike Liddell, he did not have any direct contact with the German agents caught in Ireland.\textsuperscript{70} Marlin claims that Dan

\textsuperscript{64} ibid
\textsuperscript{65} ibid
\textsuperscript{66} ER Marlin Interview, p 4.
\textsuperscript{67} ibid.
\textsuperscript{68} Dwyer, \textit{Strained Relations}..., pp 90-91.
\textsuperscript{69} ibid, p 91.
\textsuperscript{70} ER Marlin Interview, p 1. (Re: Liddell came to Ireland to interview O'Reilly.)
Bryan never asked him for information, and he reckoned the information flow was a one way stream.\(^{71}\)

Dwyer was told by Carter Nicholas, who was the head of the "Irish Desk" in the OSS that he and Marlin persuaded Joe Walshe to supply him with reports from Irish diplomats based in Europe.\(^{72}\) It is said these notes included extracts from Irish diplomatic reports, and that Marlin even supplied questions to Walshe, who in turn forwarded them to the diplomats, and their answers were then sent to Marlin, via Walshe.\(^{73}\) However Marlin, in a conversation with myself, said that he knew of such a plan, but to his knowledge it never really took off. Furthermore he denied ever giving Walshe questions to give to his diplomats, or receiving diplomatic reports.\(^{74}\) So, this claim of Nicholas's that Irish diplomats were used as effectual agents for a belligerent nation, is doubtful, especially when the stated "go-between", denies any involvement in the scheme.

In June, 1944, Marlin returned to the United States and Ed. Lawler became the new OSS liaison with G2.\(^{75}\) Unlike Marlin who belonged to the secret intelligence branch of the OSS, Lawler was attached to the X2 branch, which was responsible for counter-espionage.\(^{76}\) In one of Lawler's first meetings in Ireland, he met Joe Walshe. Accompanying Lawler was

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\(^{71}\) ibid, p 4. (G2 received some combat intelligence from the Allies, as discussed in chapter 2. Also in the Gageby interview, p 8, Gageby says he saw scrapings of intelligence items from the Americans and other armies. Also see National Archives, D/FA: A10, Office of the British Representative, Miscellaneous Correspondence, in which there is also some low level intelligence written to the Department of External Affairs, from the British Representative's office, giving warnings on items such as axis sabotage of ships docked in harbours, etc.)

\(^{72}\) Dwyer, Strained Relations..., p 95. Also see "The Irish Times", American Note Episode Was Misunderstood Abroad, by T Ryle Dwyer, 15th March, 1994.

\(^{73}\) ibid.

\(^{74}\) Telephone Conversation with ER Marlin, on the 17th of June 1994.

\(^{75}\) ER Marlin to Joe Walshe, 21st of June, 1944. National Archives, D/FA: A60.

\(^{76}\) Dwyer, Strained Relations..., p 96.
the Head of the OSS counter espionage branch in Europe, Hubert Will. During the course of the conversation, Marlin was praised for his accomplishments in Ireland;

"With regard to Mr. Marlin I wanted to say this much, but for his patriotism in the interests of America and his complete understanding of this country, the liaison between our security officials would never have been established...Our talks, which never purported to official or semi-official, on either side, eventually led to the visit of Colonel Bruce to this country and to the initiation of the new relationship."78

Lawler stated that he had been given "100 percent co-operation" while acting as the OSS security liaison.79

One example of this "100 percent co-operation", was the case of German U-boat, U.260.80 On the 12th March, 1945, two red flares were seen nine miles southwest of Gaileyhead, Co.Clare. Twenty minutes later, eleven German submariners arrived at the lookout point at Gaileyhead.81 A rescue operation set out to search for the remaining crew, finding all thirty nine of them in liferafts four mile south of Glandmore Harbour.82

On the 13th of March, Mr. MC Scully found two large containers washed ashore from the submarine. He handed them in to the Army, Douglas Gageby then a young Lieutenant in G2, was sent down to Collins Barracks in Cork, to bring the containers back to Dublin.83 Gageby said that the containers were watertight, and had been screwed down by the

78 ibid
79 Dwyer, Strained Relations. p 96.
81 ibid, Unit Journal, 12th of March 1945, Chief of Staffs Office.
82 ibid, Col. Dan Bryan to the Minister for Defence, 14th of March, 1945.
83 ibid, Maj. JPO O’Connell to CSO i/c, Dublin, 15th of March, 1945.
Germans, thus the documents were perfectly preserved.\textsuperscript{84} The documents consisted of German code books, technical manuals log books, maps and charts.\textsuperscript{85} These documents would have been very useful for any enemy to get their hands on. Gageby can recall one episode in the submarine's log, in which the vessel was approaching Southampton, when it was detected, but instead of going away it hid by resting close to Southampton Harbour, while the Allied ships dropped their depth charges further out to sea.\textsuperscript{86}

Gageby brought these documents to Dublin. A conference was held in which Gageby spoke about the documents, to Col. Liam Archer, then the Assistant Chief of Staff, and various other high ranking officers.\textsuperscript{87} Gageby claims he was told rather cryptically by Richard Hayes (who was also present), "That's the last you or I will ever see of those".\textsuperscript{88}

Some years after the war, Dan Bryan introduced Gageby to Ed Lawler.\textsuperscript{89} Lawler jokingly claimed that he had almost been killed thanks to Gageby. Because he had had to fly in a small plane, to bring the submarine documents from Dublin, to the Allied HQ in England.\textsuperscript{90}

As can be seen from the few case studies above G2 actively co-operated with Allied intelligence agencies, almost to the point of being an ally itself. This was a very different situation compared to how German intelligence agents were treated.\textsuperscript{91}

\textsuperscript{84} Douglas Gageby Interview, p 2
\textsuperscript{85} List of Documents belonging to U.260, April 1945. Military Archives, G2/X/1388.
\textsuperscript{86} Douglas Gageby Interview, p 2.
\textsuperscript{87} ibid.
\textsuperscript{88} ibid, p 3.
\textsuperscript{89} ibid.
\textsuperscript{90} ibid.
\textsuperscript{91} See chapter 3.
operation with the Allies, is perhaps one of the most striking examples of how Irish neutrality was not impartial, but very heavily biased towards the Allies.

While supplying information about German agents, etc. could be construed as a policy to ensure the Allies were that Ireland's security was tight, and that Irish neutrality was not a threat to them. The case of the German U-boat, went far beyond G2's "call of duty", as this U-boat's documents in no way affected Irish security, but would have been only of interest to the Allies.

This chapter has only skimmed the surface of Allied intelligence co-operation. It is a difficult topic to research, I have found no memos or documents directly from G2, demonstrating to any extent that the organisation had much dealings with the OSS or MI5, but there is sufficient evidence, even in this chapter, to show that there was a high and quite intensive level of intelligence co-operation between Ireland and the Allies.

Even some high ranking G2 officers during the war may not have realised or acknowledged the extent of co-operation. Maj. Florrie O'Donohue, who during the war was a G2 officer in Cork, wrote to Dan Bryan in 1962, commenting on an article in "The People", newspaper:

"...The best thing to do is to ignore them. I know that doing so allows the main theme of these articles go unchallenged-viz, that our neutrality was a complete bluff and that our intelligence activity was directed against the Germans only, and I see the force of the argument that there was no use in saying we had an impartial intelligence service if we cannot demonstrate it. Unless we were free to tell the whole story, or most of it anyway sufficient to prove the nature of its actual work, I do not think it would be possible to make a convincing reply."92

92 Florrie O'Donohue to Dan Bryan, 13th of February, 1962. UCD Archives, P71/124 (i).
This statement is quite interesting, either O'Donohue did not know what was going on in the co-operation sphere, or he preferred not to believe it. Indeed Gageby offered a possible explanation to O'Donahue's letter, saying that many of G2's senior officers fought in the War of Independence, and had no love for Britain, and therefore did not like the idea of helping their old enemy.93

Perhaps this reason is why there seems to be more concrete written evidence of G2-OSS co-operation, than there is with MI5 co-operation. Gageby put forward the belief that perhaps the British considered it easier to use the Americans to get information, as Anglo-Irish relations during the 1930's were not exactly harmonious.94

When it became possible to tell the story of Irish Intelligence, it can be seen that G2 was not completely impartial. The main aim of this co-operation was primarily to show the Allies that Ireland's security was tight. They did so. But in the process they developed a close relationship that went far beyond the bounds of a standard policy of neutrality, or even non-belligerent impartiality.

93 Douglas Gageby Interview, p 4.

94 ibid, p 7. (Also see ER Marlin Interview, p 3. During the interview with Marlin he claimed there was an opposite English view. When he recounted the only time he met Cecil Liddell while on a visit to Belfast. Liddell expressed the view that the USA should keep out of the Irish Intelligence scene, as it was not in America's sphere of influence, and the only tie she had with Ireland was a traditional one. I myself would argue that while this tie was only traditional, the Irish were probably more inclined to deal with the Americans.)
CONCLUSION

G2 was a competent intelligence agency but their good work was partly due to a number of extenuating circumstances. One of the most noticeable of these circumstances was that G2 operated on a defensive basis. This was unlike other intelligence agencies, such as MI6, the OSS and the Abwehr, who had to carry out offensive operations against their enemies.

Unlike other intelligence agencies, G2 worked only in a domestic sphere. They did not have to carry out any operations on foreign soil, as other intelligence agencies had to, such as the Abwher’s operations in Ireland. The only foreign intelligence gathering that G2 did was from diplomatic reports from the Department of External Affairs, through the intelligence officers in Shannon and through intelligence reports from the Allies. But G2 did not have to use agents, informants or any other information gathering means, in foreign nations to gather this intelligence, and had no need for a foreign intelligence service like Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service.

Also, G2 was a small, centralised organisation. It combined the roles of counter-espionage, combat intelligence, counter-terrorism, economic intelligence, etc. all into one small intelligence and security service. As mentioned in chapter one other nations had larger, sprawling intelligence services, which were specialised and compartmentalised in their functions. Naturally enough, information must have slipped through this network. For example a counter-espionage service may receive economic intelligence, but as this is not their speciality, they would ignore the information, which could have been very important for the economic intelligence service. This division of services can lead to rivalry between services, and this will sometimes can result in one service disregarding the advice of another.

G2’s main threat was from Germany. But this threat was not too severe. German intelligence on Ireland was not good. They very much had "a pigs in the parlour" attitude to
Irish society, and as has been demonstrated, often their geographical intelligence was often out of date or inaccurate. They seemed to have no idea of Irish military matters. For a while they tried to use the IRA as a sort of fifth column, but the IRA were too undisciplined for them.

The threat of German invasion was only a realistic one for a short period during the Autumn of 1941, and even then, it is doubtful the invasion would have been successful, had it been launched.

German agents sent to Ireland were unsuccessful. This was due in part to the incompetence of the agents themselves, but also thanks to the misconceptions and ill-planned ideas of their superiors in Germany.

But one of the greatest aids to G2 was its close relationship with the British and American intelligence services. As discussed, much of G2’s combat intelligence, radio intercepts, warnings of aircraft approaching Irish airspace, etc. came from Allied sources. Likewise G2 supplied information to the Allies, such as cryptography intelligence, information from captured German agents and information on the IRA. Indeed, G2 established formal links with the OSS and MI5. This was a completely opposite to the policy that G2 took with the German intelligence services.

This co-operation is one of the most interesting of G2’s functions, and is a very important factor in the current debate on how neutral was "neutral Ireland"?

Irish neutrality was not a strict, ingrained, constitutional policy, as one would find in a nation such as Switzerland. Instead it was more a tool to help establish Irish independence. De Valera’s Fianna Fail government had been trying to establish full Irish independence, through constitutional means, since their assumption of power in 1932. But there was no mention of neutrality in the 1937 Constitution, instead it is only said that Dail Eireann has the power to declare war:

"War shall not be declared and the State shall not participate in any war save
with the assent of Dail Eireann.  

Fanning also agrees that de Valera's emphasis was on Irish sovereignty, not neutrality.

The surrender of the Treaty Ports in the 1938, allowed Ireland to be able to realistically stay out of a British war, if it desired to. Thus the Dail was able to declare itself neutral at the outbreak of World War Two. This neutrality was in reality only an extension of de Valera's policy of proving and attaining Ireland's independence.

But de Valera did believe that Irish independence relied on British independence and vice-versa. As early as 1920 he stated:

"An independent Ireland would see its own independence in jeopardy the moment it saw the independence of Britain seriously threatened. Mutual self interest would make the people of these two islands, if both independent the closest possible allies in a moment of real national danger to either."

But this "mutual self interest was also tied into trade. In 1939, the Irish Department of Industry an Commerce warned:

"If war should break out we are very largely at the mercy of other countries and particularly of the United Kingdom in respect of our external trade, and that the economic activities of this country could in such circumstances be completely paralysed"

This claim that Ireland relied on Britain, (Which indirectly included her allies), can be seen from the following statistics. In 1939, 71.0% of Irish imports came from Britain and her Allies, in 1942 the figure was 82.6%, while in 1945 it was 73.4%. On the exports side, in 1939, 95.0% of Irish exports went to Britain and the Allies, in 1942 it was 99.9%, and in 1945 it was

95 Bunreacht na hEireann (Constitution of Ireland), Article 28.3.1
96 Fanning, Irish Neutrality..., p 30.
97 Fanning, Irish Neutrality..., p 28
Thus Ireland's security was not only linked with Britain and her allies, but also her economic existence was tied with them as well. Likewise, Ireland was Britain's "backyard", and thus her security was strongly tied in with Ireland's, much as Central America's security is linked to the United States.

G2 co-operated with the Allies to firstly show that Irish independence and neutrality was not a threat to them, to do this G2 in many ways, "bent over backwards" in this co-operation role. Furthermore, Ireland's geographical, political and economical ties were tied in with the allies. Finally Allied and Irish security were reciprocally tied with each other.

Ireland was not a true neutral. Even Salmon's quote of JM Smylie's, that: "Eire was non belligerent...but she was never neutral in the generally accepted term", should be questioned. As in many ways G2's intelligence co-operation with the Allies almost made Ireland, at least in the intelligence sphere, a belligerent nation itself.

In summary, G2 was a competent intelligence and security service. In some areas, such as cryptography it did some outstanding work, thanks mainly to Dr. Richard Hayes. Their duties at the beginning of the war were greatly expanded, and they were able to adapt to these changes, and became the premier intelligence and security service in Ireland. Many of their duties involved either working with or, receiving and giving information to or from the Allies. In this role they were instrumental in proving that Irish "neutrality" was not a threat to the Allies. In the process, this "neutrality" was a major paving stone in the path to full independence, culminating in the Republic of Ireland Act in 1949. Whether they realised or not, G2 during the war was one of the main guardians of Ireland's foundling independence. At the same time they provide an effective and professional intelligence and security service.

99 ibid, p 149.

100 ibid, p 120
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