CHAPTER THIRTEEN

RE-RACIALISING THE IRISH STATE THROUGH THE CENSUS, CITIZENSHIP, AND LANGUAGE

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This chapter analyses contemporary processes of racialisation within the state in the Republic of Ireland through an examination of three empirical examples: the introduction of a racial/ethnic census question on the Irish census, changes in Irish citizenship laws and changes in Irish language requirements for application to the An Garda Síochána, the national police force.

Recent state theories have demonstrated that modern states are racial in their constitution and operation (Coldberg 2002) and the Irish racial state is no exception (Garner 2004). However, the examples analysed here illustrate that by no means is there a consistent “logic” to state racialisation in Ireland and that the outcomes of each of these programmatic state policies highlights contradictory racial projects in the process of Irish state racialisation. In the case of the census, the “ethnic” question appears to reinscribe racial meanings in Ireland by using technologies of the state to categorise and quantify people along “racial” (visible minority status) lines. The recent changes in Irish citizenship laws to remove *jus solis* (becoming a citizen by being born in Ireland) as a basis for bestowing Irish citizenship distils Irishness as based primarily on *jus sanguinis* or ancestry, which is often assumed to be linked to biological bloodlines and hence “race.” The change in the Irish language requirement to apply to be a member of the Irish police force signals a loosening of the link between Irishness and cultural practices such as language. By examining the Irish racial state through its racial/ethnic categories, citizenship laws and language requirements, this chapter illustrates how the Irish racial state is re-racialising itself in different and sometimes contradictory ways.
Race, Racialisation and the Racial State

There has been ongoing debate in the social sciences about the fact that race is not a sound scientific concept (e.g., Ali 2004; Gilroy 2000; Murji and Solomos 2005), and some have suggested that to use the concept "race" in social science research is racist in its reification of the concept of race. For many authors, the solution is to bracket "race" as a concept, but then to proceed to use it in studies of racialisation (Murji and Solomos 2005). John Martin and King-To Yeung discuss this catch-22 ontological position with reference to race. They write,

There is an old Zen koan in which the master ShuZen Osbo held up his staff before his disciples and said, "You monks! If you call this a staff, you oppose its reality. If you do not call it a staff, you ignore the fact. Tell me monks, what will you call it?" The discomfort felt by the monks, who had to choose between denying their insight into the fundamental oneness of the universe and making the absurd counterfactual denial of self-evident fact, is also felt by many sociologists when it comes to race (Martin and Yeung 2003: 521).

We don’t want to use the concept for fear of reifying it, but to ignore its role in social life would be denying the obvious. For example, just because the French state does not collect racial and ethnic data does not mean that they do not racially profile racial minority groups in France or that their state is not racialised.

Just because the French government does not formally articulate such a taxonomy does not mean that the French do not use such a taxonomic system. Few in France are confused by what is meant when Le Pen and his followers cry out ‘France for the French’ (Duster 2002: 551).

As Duster claims,

The major task before us is to be vigilant about how and when the concept of race is used and for what purposes, not to advocate a categorical renunciation that, under certain circumstances, redounds benefits of entrenched racial stratification (Duster 2002: 551).

One way to do this has been to focus not on the concept of race, but instead upon the social construction of race, the process through which the concept is given power and meaning in social life, or, in other words, racialisation. Racialisation has become the dominant framework for understanding the process of creating racial meanings, helping social scientists to understand how racial meanings become embedded in ideology and discourse (Murji and Solomos 2005). But the process of racialisation, based on race, is also problematic. Racial ideas are often used and embedded in social institutions in ways that perpetuate privilege for certain groups over others.

These institutions included not only the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, business interests, trade unions and the mass media, etc., but also political movements within the minorities. Just as they can all be seen as contributing to race making, so in some measure they have contributed to race unmaking. It is a complicated story (Banton 2005: 59).

Perhaps the place to see most clearly the process of racial meanings becoming embedded is in the formation of the modern state. In his seminal book The Racial State (2002), David Theo Goldberg offers an impressively detailed analysis of how modern states are by definition racial:

The sociocultural embeddedness of race—its forms and contents, modes and effects of routinisation and penetration into state formation and order—has been basic to fashioning the personality of the modern state (Goldberg 2002: 246).

While race and racialisation are strongly determined by the state, they are not solely the terrain of the state and can bleed into other realms of social life not controlled or shaped directly by the state.

...Race is ultimately uncontrollable by state formation. There is always the possibility for race to be mobilized as a counter-history, as counter-performativities and counter-practices to prevailing state design, though the social space for racial counter-performance is invariably contained and restrained (Goldberg 2002: 247).

Therefore, the state, for Goldberg, can be more strongly or more weakly racial. In lagging behind other modern states in terms of racial technologies like racial census categories, the Irish state may still be forming its racial position and indeed may be more flexible or even provide a possibility for the counter-practices that Goldberg speaks of in its racial formation.

Omi and Winant (1994) understand the racialisation of the state as a more processual element in their theory of racial formation by illustrating exactly how racial meanings are embedded and perpetuated through the institutionalisation of race in state institutions and how state composition, policies and discourses perpetuate certain sets of racial meanings. They point out that “the state is composed of its institutions, the policies they carry out, the conditions and rules, which support and justify them, and the social relations in which they are embedded” (Omi and Winant 1994: 83).

However, the state is not a monolithic organism. Various parts of the state may not work together to support some overall racial ideology or claim and in
some cases may even contradict each other. There may be hegemonic notions of race, which get perpetuated clearly over time, but it would be unrealistic to see the state as having just one racial ideology, agenda or policy. Rattansi reminds us that,

...it is a mistake to treat the state as monolithic. Different ministries and departments of state are charged with carrying out specific governmental tasks and in the process develop relatively autonomous interests, are subject to relatively separate sets of pressures, and have to compete with other branches of state for financial resources (Rattansi 2001: 284).

So while the state may have various racial projects in operation at any one time, and may or may not have a consistent racial ideology, which it articulates at every turn,

The state is a central player in racial matters. The modern state carries out racial classification, surveillance, and punishment of the population; it distributes resources along racial lines; it simultaneously facilitates and obstructs racial discrimination; and it is both structured and challenged by political mobilization along racial lines (Winant 2004: 3).

In their analyses of the gendering of the state, feminist theorists have critiqued the ways in which the state subordinates women in its composition, policies, legal/bureaucratic norms, modes of institution building and notions of citizenship to find that, “The state is not simply an abstract, macro-level structure; it is also a complex of concrete institutions with which women interact in direct and immediate ways” (Haney 1996: 759). The state then strongly structures the experiences of not only women, but people of colour as well as containing the contradictions and “institutional frictions” mentioned above (Orren and Skowronek 1994: 321). Feminist analyses of the state have reiterated this multiplicity in the state to better understand the state, not only as a monolithic macro-level structure, but also as a “network of differentiated institutions, layered with conflicting and competing messages about gender” (Haney 1996: 759). In doing so, Haney and others (e.g. Orloff 1993) have refocused analyses of the state on the role of resistance within the state by women themselves as well as constraining discourses and policies created by gendered states. Closer analyses of different “arms” of the state, such as the legal, judicial and welfare branches of the state, entailed different approaches to the gender regimes, which took different gendered forms and formats perpetuated throughout the state (Haney 2000: 641).

Much can be learned from feminist state theory, which could be applied to racial state theories. The ethnic differentiation of the category “women” can be glossed over or homogenised in some of these feminist critiques of state theory. Nira Yuval-Davis (1997) argues that this can elide the category of “woman,” which does not consider the significant differences among and between women who actually are defined by and interact with the state. This can lead to a reification of the concept of gender in the state, which doesn’t also recognise the racialisation of women in diverse ways. This is an age-old tension. The state then prioritises not only gendered, but racialised projects promoted by powerful social actors with certain outcomes in mind.

The different levels at which racial projects operate within different branches of the state may contain different social actors, processes, ideologies and forms which result in very different social effects based on the understanding of race which is embedded in them. Clearly, the state may also play a strong role in structuring the experiences of people of colour (through immigration, citizenship and work policies), guiding the discourse on race, and providing a backdrop to racially bureaucratic policies in, for example, the legal and judicial spheres. By bringing the state back in to theories of race and racialisation much can be learned about how states “work” empirically on race. Theoretically, this chapter tries to stretch state theories to account for how states are not monolithic, but made up of sets of concrete institutions, which can and are often contradictory in terms of racial ideology.

Irish Racial State

The state in the Republic of Ireland is no stranger to racialisation. Even though “racialised others” (Garner 2004; Fanning 2002) such as Jews and Travellers have been present over a long period of time, racial state theorising is relatively new in Ireland. The formation of the nation state in 1922 was subtly infused with racial meanings, which prioritised white, Catholic Irish definitions over others (Garner 2004). Promoting the Irish language was a major way of trying to ethnicise the Free State as stamped clearly “Irish”: “…it was possible to choose one’s language in a way in which it was not possible to choose one’s religion: to choose Irish was to make a conscious commitment to the Irish nation” (Tovey et al 1989: 19). The nationalist movement and the push for independence clearly “coloured” the racialisation of the Irish state as white and Catholic since its inception (Fanning 2002). In its contemporary guise, this politically constructed imaginary homogeneity of the Irish state is challenged by socio-economic change, the weakening of the church, emigration/in migration and globalisation.

The Irish state today is clearly struggling to redefine itself and how it will increasingly deal with the arrival of more diverse ethnic, religious and linguistic groups. Analyses of the Irish State and its racial antecedents argue that the Irish
racial state is moving from being racialised to being racist (Lentin 2003; 2004a). The presence of migrant mothers and their “Irish Born Children” now ineligible for citizenship, “subverts traditional understandings of citizenship and the ‘nation’ dragging Irish modernity kicking and screaming into the chaos of the post-modern” (Lentin 2003: 301). Lentin examines one of the clearest discourses produced by the state, that of integration and harmonisation:

The state-spawned language of harmonisation, integration, management, and mainstreaming in policy recommendations regarding migrant labour is part of the construction of homogeneity as ‘heterogeneity in denial’ on the one hand and of a multicultural discourse of ‘racelessness’ denoting a shift from biologically driven racism to culturalist conceptions of race on the other. The Irish racial state, while promoting racelessness, is always about its own white (Christian, settled) superiority. While declaring its commitment to equality, care and interculturalism – the Irish version of racelessness – the Irish racial state has already begun deporting migrant parents whose applications for residency on the ground of having an Irish citizen child have failed, together with their Irish citizen children (Lentin 2004a: 4).

The case of the change in citizenship laws may actually illustrate a backward slide from cultural understandings of who can be Irish (i.e. if you are born here and live here all your life you are Irish) to biological (ancestral) understandings of who is Irish. The contradictions in the Irish state are clear; we can “KNOW Racism” (the National Anti-Racism Awareness Programme) and try to eliminate racial prejudice through sport and the like at the same time that we are deporting the most vulnerable of the vulnerable in asylum seeking children. Lentin’s theorising of the Irish racial state gives us scope to examine the inherent contradictions of empirical racial projects in Irish state racialisation.

In order to better understand how the Irish racial state negotiates these contradictions in the contemporary era, and the process of state racialisation in the Irish context, I now analyse three cases of racial projects within the state. I argue that the Irish state has become more rigid in terms of citizenship and enumeration during the current period of rapid economic growth and prosperity. At the same time, the state has also expanded or showed signs of expanding its notions of Irishness in its approach to ethnic diversity in the police force. However, this expansion of the Irish racial state has happened only to some and along certain lines.

**Census**

There has been a census in Ireland since the establishment of the Free State in 1922, but the form of the census has changed over time. The collection of racial data is controversial — the state’s right to classify and categorise is a form of social control to dictate the terms and terrain on which race and racial meaning will be constructed, embedded and used. Many sociologists such as David Theo Goldberg, (2002) and Alana Lentn (2004) have used Michel Foucault’s (1991) analysis of governmentality to understand the micro technologies of the state, such as the census, used to normalise governmentality as part of a conceptualisation of racial or racialised meaning (Rattansi 2005). Most clearly in other countries and eras, the census has been used to rank and order people to accord or deny them certain rights (King-O’Riain, 2005). The Irish state has the capacity for “monitoring and controlling through a series of technologies the nation’s biological life” (Lentin 2004b: 1). Clearly, the establishment of racial categories in Ireland could mean that they are conceived for and set out to control and punish ethnic minorities, even though racial/ethnic categories have been used in the US and UK also to promote civil rights and legal claims to prove institutional “racial” discrimination.

In order to reflect the changing demographics in Ireland, the Irish Census has added new questions about income, live births, and racial/ethnic backgrounds. The census has long had a question about nationality, but in the late 1990s it was decided that perhaps enumeration along racial/ethnic lines was needed. The move to add a racial/ethnic question on the census was less controversial than one would have thought; in fact the question on live births provoked by far the strongest response and was dropped. After proposing a format of the question and pilot testing it in 1999, the government rejected the chance to add it onto the census in 2000 (King-O’Riain, 2005). The census question was so “sensitive” in part because there is a distinct absence of legally binding racial and ethnic categories despite the articulations of such categories in Ireland’s equality legislation.

Ethno-racial categories could become crucial to proving instances, if recorded, of discrimination, but that will only be possible based on the categories themselves. It is a field fraught with potential power struggles because it sets the terms of racialisation. In the lead up to the 2006 census, the Central Statistics Office (CSO) responsible for the census, pilot tested a new “ethnic” question (Report of the 2004 Census Pilot Survey 2004) and the government agreed to add the following question to the 2006 census as illustrated below:

What is your ethnic or cultural background?
Choose ONE section from A to D, then tick the appropriate box to indicate your cultural background.

A. White
   __________
B. Black
C. Irish
D. Other
discrimination both individually, but also institutionally. “Employing racial
categories may lead to a presupposition of their non-problematic reality... But
ignoring them may lead to a denial of crucial aspects of lived experience”
(Martin and Yeung 2003: 539).

Whether we agree or not with the right of the Irish state to ask people to
classify and categorise themselves through the census, we should proceed
with caution and be vigilant about who is collecting the statistics, along which
lines and to what purpose they are being used. The census is not neutral nor does it
have the power to dictate the entire conversation about racial equality in Ireland.
“Formal taxonomic equality will only be meaningful if it is sustained by more
equitable social and political practices...” (Hattam 2005: 69).

The state-sponsored racial/ethnic agenda seems to be focused on the tracking
of possible racial discrimination in the current racial/ethnic question on
the census. The “rights” discourse employed by the Equality Authority and the
NCCIR which dominates the form, is a reactive discourse, arguing that to claim
rights because of discrimination you need categories to monitor the denial of
those rights. These categories are defined in part by those who perpetrate racist acts.
Therefore, “other black” is a category because state authorities anticipate
having black people face racial, not ethnic, discrimination. Black Irish people
are perhaps ethnically Irish, but that is not the basis of their anticipated
discrimination. It is the colour of their skin which state authorities think may make
them “visible minorities” and vulnerable to discrimination. The
ontological catch-22 of speaking of race here is difficult to predict. Can we undo
racism by having no categories? If we have the categories, aren’t we just
anticipating racist acts and reifying them in advance along racial lines by having
racial categories? I would argue that we need the categories, if and only if they
do indeed capture the basis of race discrimination. Without them, we will have
no way to know the scope of racial discrimination in institutional settings, but this
has to happen with a vigilant eye on how the data is collected and used.

Citizenship

A second way that states racialise is through their citizenship policies which
define who will “be of the nation” with the rights concomitant with that status.
For many states, citizenship is dependent upon ancestry and “prior” connection
with the nation state. Prior to 2004 (and since the establishment of the state in
1922), Irish citizenship was accorded either through ancestry or through birth
i.e. being born in Ireland or having an Irish grandparent made one an Irish
citizen. The Irish state was clearly racialising when it changed the constitution
in the Citizenship Referendum in June 2004, which formed the basis of the Irish
Nationality and Citizenship Bill 2004:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this constitution, a person born in the
island of Ireland, which includes its islands and seas, who does not have, at the
time of his or her birth at least one parent who is an Irish citizen or entitled to be
an Irish citizen is not entitled to Irish citizenship or nationality, unless otherwise
provided by law (Irish Nationality and Citizenship Bill 2004).

The fact that the referendum passed with the support of nearly 80 per cent of
those who voted demonstrates the attitudes towards people assumed to be “non-
Irish nationals” in Ireland. The campaign was influenced in the media by the
portrayal of “Irish born children” with migrant parents versus “Irish children”,
with the former racialised as undeserving of citizenship rights over the latter. In
June 2004, the Citizenship Referendum led to increased restrictions on “non-
nationals” and created a racialised two-tier system where jus sanguinis, or
ancestry, hence race, becomes the basis and prime criterion for being an Irish
citizen. This gives citizenship priority to third generation Irish Americans who
are possibly far removed with no connections at all with Ireland over “Irish
Born Children” (often of colour) born and raised in Ireland. The racial
distillation of Irishness (read here as whiteness) will be purified through these
policies and perpetuate the state’s obsession with rules of descent, i.e. race. The
ethnic (racial) census categories in the Republic of Ireland are developing within
a context of increasing legal and political efforts to control immigration
(citizenship) and at the same time to extend racial/ethnic rights and equality
(through the census). The census allows for an ethnic concept of Irishness to be
combined with different races and promotes a “rights” agenda. The citizenship
law however, narrows ethnic and racial Irishness and excludes large numbers of
people on “racial” grounds.

The questioning of Irish homogeneity as the “old Catholic nationalist Irish
identity” was “disappearing anyway, as part of a process that had already
gathered an unstoppable momentum long before significant numbers of
immigrants started to arrive” (O’Toole 2005). The fear over what this would
mean for Irish society was clearly articulated in the passage of the citizenship
bill. Summarising this fear, Kevin Myers, a provocative Irish Times columnist,

The economist Jim Power of Friends First says Ireland must attract 300,000
migrant workers in the next ten years if we are to achieve our “growth potential”,
whatever that means. With dependents, that could be around a million people. So
how are we going to cope with the consequences of such a large influx? Should
we not, in the longer term, be more modest in our expectations of “growth
potential” and more ambitious in the creation of social harmony? (Myers 2005).

The economic argument gets conflated with a cultural one and is part of the
framing of the issue as a zero-sum game for Irish people. The assumption that
the bodies of non-nationals threaten social harmony was arguably one reason
why people voted to limit citizenship to those who culturally had a “right” to be
here. It was clear that the Citizenship Referendum for some distilled Irishness
among racial lines and in doing so, “encouraged those with racist tendencies”
(Siggins 2004). The referendum was “just another twist in the incapable anxiety
of a state seeking to regulate the bodies of its citizens, and most often those,
including women, asylum seekers and refugees, whose bodies are at once
vulnerable and threatening” (Graham 2004).

Irishness has also become narrowed racially with the less publicised change
in the rules for post-nuptial citizenship. Until November 2005, spouses of Irish
citizens were given Irish citizenship after a period of three years of marriage,
regardless of residency. They could become Irish citizens and reside anywhere
in the world as long as they were married to an Irish citizen. The change in the
rules means that Irish citizenship will only be available to spouses of Irish
citizens married three years or more and residing in Ireland (Department of
citizen and his/her children (passing Irishness through ancestry) are Irish
citizens, but the non-Irish spouses are not if they do not reside within the state.
Irishness through marriage is now limited by residence.

It is clear that the referendum result creates a two-tiered system of
citizenship, those with full rights as Irish people, and those who happen to be
born here or are here for other reasons (assumed to be nefarious), who, though
not considered Irish, can vote in local elections, access social welfare (after
proving themselves by living here for two years), and pay taxes to the Irish
state.

Language

After independence, language has played a strong role in defining the Irish
state as clearly “Irish” and not “English”. The rationale was to have the first
official language of the state be Irish and to try to re-establish Irish as the
primary language. The idea was that if one chose to interact with the state (fill
out state forms, work as a civil servant, or testify in the court of law), one could
and should be able to do so through the “national language” of Irish. The EU
recognition of Irish as an official and working language from January 1, 2007
has strengthened the use of Irish in Brussels as well as in Ireland (Directorate-
General for Translation EU 2005). Language then has been a field of battle for
Irish identity within the state. This was a racially contradictory position as
O’Toole writes,
In one context, they (the Irish) were pushed towards a desire to be seen as part of 'the white race', which also included the English. In another, they were pulling against that very notion, attempting to establish through the revival of the Irish language, the creation of national literature and the codification of national sports, a distinct identity in which the possession of a white skin was not in itself a unifying factor sufficiently strong to over-ride difference of culture, religion, and race (O’Toole, 2000: 22, emphasis added).

This appears to be a strongly ethnic conception of the nation and was able to accommodate some difference within it. The role of the Irish language embedded in all state institutions gave Irish a status as the state’s first official language of the state. However, according to Tovey et al.,

the new state did not seriously try to live its own life through the language, or to undertake the heroic efforts, which would have been necessary had it genuinely attempted to fulfil the Gaelic League Programme. The linguistic and cultural revolution through popular participation which, had been begun by the League, became rationalised and bureaucratised by the state through formal and technical means (Tovey et al. 1989).

Writing in 1989, Tovey et al argued that the state had played a huge role in developing, maintaining and determining what it means to be Irish through many means including the Irish language, but that this was waning. “The role of the state in maintaining Irish ethnic identity—like the role of the Irish language—has become more symbolic and ritualistic than dynamic” (Tovey et al. 1989: 26).

In the past in order to apply to the Garda Síochána, applicants had to be proficient in the Irish language, which was linked to the requirement that all defendants had rights to be heard in court in either Irish or English. In practice, it was difficult for those who had not been educated in Ireland where Irish is a required subject throughout primary and secondary education, to pass the Irish language proficiency test.

In 2005, in response to falling numbers of recruits and, arguably, to Ireland’s new, multi-ethnicity, it was proposed to change the language requirement for entry into the Irish police force (An Garda Síochána) and do away with the requirement that all applicants have proficient Irish upon entry. This change needs to be seen within analyses of the Irish state as a major shift in the link between the Irish language (if only symbolic) embedded in the state and what it means for “Irishness” racially. The change in October 2005, to allow applicants to have English and one other language and take up the study of Irish within training at the Garda College signalled a significant change in the understanding the Irish state as unitary in requiring Irish language capacity of all its workers and law enforcers. Linguistically homogenous states are not unusual, but the link of nationality to notions of the nation and citizenship figured largely in the rationale given by the Minister for Justice, Michael McDowell, for the change in language requirements, when he said he was recommending the change in part because “...the demand for proficiency in the Irish language could be seen as ‘practical discrimination’” (Breaking News 2004).

The Sinn Fein political party responded that the proposal was an “insult to Irish speakers”. Sinn Fein Donegal Councillor Pearse Doherty said that “the Department of Justice has consistently acted in deliberate breach of this provision and if they go ahead with their hair-brained proposal the result is that members of the gardaí will be unable to work effectively in many communities across the state” (Breaking News 2004). The rationale given by the Department of Justice was that the relaxation of the rules would achieve a force “more representative of multi-cultural society” (Breaking News 2004). The discourse of anti-racism and multiculturalism was clearly being enfolded into the state by actors in the Department of Justice to rationalise the opening up of the criteria for membership in the gardaí.

From within the force, the Association of Garda Sergeants and Inspectors (AGSI) had mixed reactions, but in the end voted in favour of keeping the language requirement. Sergeant Padraig Dolan from the Galway West Division said he had no objection to recruits from new ethnic communities “...but let them learn the ways of our Irish society, the ways of our Irish culture and community and have at least the minimum respect and support for our own native language” (Breaking News 2005a, emphasis added). It is clear that the assumption was that all these new recruits would also be new to the country, which probably won’t actually be the case, since the rules also stipulate that one must be legally resident in Ireland for five years or more to apply. The assumption that ethnic minorities applying to the force are not Irish culturally or an integrated part of the community serves to make them “perpetual foreigners” regardless of how long they have been here. In reality, many who attended the information session when the rule actually did get changed have been in Ireland for many years. Tovey et al’s 1989 argument that the support for the Irish language was waning as a sign of lack of confidence cannot be substantiated anymore as Ireland has found confidence economically, politically and socially alongside an increasing visibility for the Irish language at the international, particularly EU level.

Others at the AGSI meeting felt that An Garda Síochána needed to become more multicultural. Sergeant Liam Tighe of the Garda National Immigration Bureau said he was concerned that the motion (to support the Irish language requirement) would be seen as exclusive. “We should be inclusive because we have to police the entire country not just the Irish speakers” (Breaking News
In fact, the majority of the nation would not need or possibly want to interact with the state through its police force in Irish. It is fairly clear that the need to "hold on to" the Irish language is not primarily for practical reasons such as being able to use it in court if a defendant wishes or in the course of policing, but instead for culturally nostalgic and principled reasons (one should be able to speak Irish in all state interactions if desired). Most who speak Irish are assumed to be Irish and therefore "white." Another reason perhaps is to lower the barrier for cross border exchange of police with Northern Ireland so that An Garda Síochána can recruit from the Police Service of Northern Ireland without a language requirement to stand in the way of Northern recruits.

The assumption (and fear for some) is that opening up the Irish language requirement signals a loss of culture and identity for the force, but also for Irish state and society. This is racialised in the nuanced assumptions of the ethnic minority recruits as "new" and "not of the Irish culture." Key to this assumption is that one who is linguistically able to "not speak" Irish means one who probably will speak another "foreign" language instead. Foreigners who speak other languages are clearly "not Irish" and therefore cannot be expected to speak Irish. Those who speak Irish thus are racialised as Irish and therefore white.

The problem with assumptions that connect language to race is that "non-national" or "foreign" police officers are assumed to be better able to "police their own". One sergeant was quoted as saying,

With them (new people) comes an awful lot of good, but also there are, among some of these communities, some criminal elements. And we have to incorporate good people from these communities into the Garda Síochána to help us keep track of the bad that comes too (Breaking News 2005b).

The assumption is that the "foreign" language capability that these "new" minority police would bring would only be useful in policing the bad element in their own communities. This is confusing given that there are no strong ethnic enclaves, villages, or even towns within Ireland where minority police could be sent. The NCCRI, the state funded advisory group on racism, made clear that this may not be the case:

In respect of the provision of service it is to be welcomed that the Garda have already made clear that officers from minority ethnic groups are not being recruited with the purpose of policing their own communities, but will be generally deployed in line with the guidelines already laid down within the force (Watt 2005: 4).

In October 2005, with the support of the NCCRI and as a way to meet the goals of the National Action Plan Against Racism, the Garda recruitment began with a series of workshops to give information and encourage applications from ethnic minorities and legally resident "non-nationals" into the force. This move was presented through the discourse of multiculturalism, but the Minister insisted that:

...the Irish will continue to have an important place in An Garda Síochána....This initiative clearly shows the commitment of the Government and An Garda Síochána to effective policing in a more diverse society (Department of Justice 2005: 1).

The rhetoric of a multicultural and anti-racist society is re-appropriated from anti-racist groups outside of the state and turned on its head to increase minority representations in the police force and some might point out, converge towards a homogenous (English language based) culture.

...the equation of one language with one culture was endowed with political significance: a linguistically united community ('nation') when tied to a territory, could claim to deserve a state of its own (Gal and Irvine 1995: 968).

The state has a language, which reflects the nation and its people. Only as we have seen, it reflects only certain people (those with the right ancestry) and assumes that they have the language as part of the authenticity that helps them to make claims to be members of the "nation". Ireland is a particularly interesting example, where Irish is not a "living" language for many (the majority do not claim that they speak it or are proficient in it: in 2004, the CSO estimated that approximately 1.5 million people in the Republic of Ireland indicated that they were Irish speaking with over 2 million saying that they were not), even though it is taught, by law, through the primary and secondary school curriculum. The opening up of the "state" through language policies could be read as a move to broaden the racial state to incorporate not only different languages, but also the different (diverse) people that speak those languages who now reside in Ireland. However, as the nation becomes more linguistically diverse, English seems to become even more dominant as the global language. In fact, it is the presence of Ireland as an English speaking country that has contributed in part to increased migration and hence ethnic and racial diversity, which calls the Irish language requirements into question.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the racial projects of racial/ethnic census enumeration, changing citizenship and Irish language requirements in the Irish state illustrate that the Irish racial state is not monolithic or even coordinated.
Different racial projects have different discourses of race attached to them, created through them, and the implications in policy and practice are different. At times these conflicting projects operate through the same body, the Department of Justice, and even with the same actor, the Minister for Justice, but in different ways.

In the case of the census, racial and ethnic meanings are used to categorise members of the nation along racial/ethnic lines avowedly in order to track possible discrimination. The census uses a mode of racialised ethnicity (i.e. racial meta-categories with ethnic enumerators underneath), which is self-enumerated and has mutually exclusive categories in order to make claims for rights. The citizenship law changes narrow the basis of citizenship removing post nuptial and residential bases and making ancestry the hegemonic way to be an Irish citizen. This distillation of Irishness re-emphasises the racial (blood quantum and some might say, biological) element of national belonging. In the example of the change in the requirement for Irish language proficiency in An Garda Síochána, it appears to be a move to incorporate linguistic (seen also as ethnic or racial) difference into the police force. The mode of racialisation here is through language and the assumption that non-nationals don’t speak Irish or understand Irish culture. In some sense, this reinforces the equation of language with cultural identity, which is racialised white within Ireland.

These three racial projects within the Irish state vary greatly in their modes, discourses, and outcomes. The three examples illustrate the complexities of these different racial projects within the state and point to the increasing flexibility of the state to create a possibility of multiple racialisations, which may include room for a possibility of counter-practices and counter-hegemonic notions of race held by racialised and ethnic minority groups themselves which are multiple, flexible, and context driven.

Notes

1 The KNOW National Anti-Racism Awareness Programme was a three year programme which “aimed to contribute to creating the conditions for building an inclusive and intercultural society in Ireland, where racism was addressed and cultural diversity valued.” It was followed by the 2005 National Action Plan Against Racism, which has not really been implemented to date, http://www.knowracism.ie/.


3 The information on the evolution of the racial/ethnic question on the census in the Republic of Ireland was done as a part of a larger project on the process through which census questions evolve. I conducted interviews with CSO officials, examined documents of census makers (both historical and contemporary) in the UK and on the island of Ireland to better understand this process. Most census documentation can be found at: http://www.cso.ie/census/. For more information see King-O’Riain, Rebecca Chiyoko (2005) Stating Your Race: Adding Ethnic Census Categories in the Republic of Ireland (available on request from the author).

4 The Gaelic League or Conradh na Gaeilge was founded in 1893, by Douglas Hyde and his friends to encourage the traditional Irish language. The league’s aims were to first, preserve Irish as the national language of the country, and extend its use as the spoken tongue; and second, the study and publication of existing Gaelic literature, and the cultivation of a modern literature in Irish. They also supported the development of Irish traditional music and Gaelic athletics. http://www.usna.edu/EnglishDept/liv/gaelic.htm

References


