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BELLIGERENT INTERNMENT; 1939 - 1945

by

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Philip M. Cunningham B.A.

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ABBREVIATIONS

C.P.       Camp Personnel

F.O.       Flight Officer

Ma. CCB    Military Archives, Cathal Brugha Barracks

O.C.C.C.   Officer Commanding, Curragh Command

P.O.       Pilot Officer

P.M.       Provost Marshal
The history of the Curragh stretches as far back as man can remember. Its vast openness attracted people to gather there in large numbers where access was easy and the terrain inviting. Its pre-Christian function was that of host site for the Aonach Life Festival. The Aonach lasted several days and served as meeting place for those who publicised laws, performed funeral rites, bartered goods, solemnised marriages and where all contemporary forms of sports and contests were engaged. The many Raths and forts to be found on the plains date from this period. The Hill of Allen (Ain :ain), just north of the Curragh is said to have been the assembly of the Fianna in the Third century A.D., while in the year 480 A.D., S.t. Bridget, Kildare's patron saint was granted the land of the Curragh after her legendary cloak covered the area.

Being a territory devoid of anything in the way of hills or mountains, the Curragh's page-like plains witnessed the passing of many military conflicts. From feuding Irish chieftains to the Danish wars of the Tenth Century, the plains proved to be excellent in the deployment of armies for both sides. The 1641 Rebellion and the 'Wars of the Confederation' saw considerable military activity on and about the Curragh area as Royalist and Confederate armies fought back and forth for the castles and fortifications scattered over the plains. During the Jacobite Wars the Curragh was chosen by Richard Talbot, Earl of Tyrconnell as the place to prepare his army for the cause of James II.

A temporary camp created in the years prior to the 1798
Rebellion served to hold the Irish Militia. It grew to a size of six cavalry regiments. The rebellion itself passed over the Curragh with the towns of Kilcullen, Clane and Prosperous being occupied by the Irish, and a rebel encampment on the plains being the scene of the 'Gibbet Rath Massacre'. In 1804 the possibility of a French invasion saw an increase in the militia activities throughout Ireland. On the Curragh a new camp was open and held 13,000 troops. Over the next few years it was to continue as a military installation. In 1805 six divisions were encamped there and in 1808 thirteen regiments assembled at the camp.

It was the Crimean War (1853-56), which led to the construction of the first permanent camp. Construction began on 18 March 1855 and was built to hold 10,000 soldiers. As they were constructed the huts were occupied. Ten squares, each designed to hold 1,000 soldiers, were arranged to accommodate the separation of regiments in discipline, drilling, policing, assembly, parole and fire precautions. The layout of the camp was east to west, each square lettered 'A' to 'K' not using the letter 'J'. 'A lines' was nearest Kildare town while 'K lines' was nearest the site of the present golf club. Although these squares are no longer there the area 'K lines' is still recognised by that name and constituted the area where the site of the belligerent internment camps were situated.

With peace established between Britain and Russia, the immediate objectives for which the camp was established ceased to exist. However as a training camp its value was maintained as the extensive plains afforded ample manoeuvre room for infantry, artillery and cavalry. The years that followed saw the assembly of large numbers of troops on the Curragh during the Summer months.

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1 It was here that 350 unarmed Irish soldiers were mercilessly slain while treaty negotiations were being conducted.
Work began reconstructing the camp about 1894 and started at the western side of the old site and progressed east. When completed the camp consisted of seven new barracks and some of the more permanent buildings from the 1855 camp. The Curragh Camp was now a permanent camp of brick. Each new barracks was named; Ponsonby (Plunkett), Stewart (Connolly), Beresford (Ceant), A.S.C. (Clarke), Engineer (MacDermott), Gough (MacDonnagh) and Keane (Pearse). The names in brackets are the names more recently given to the barracks' under Irish military control. The next page in the camps history was the 'Curragh Mutiny' in 1914 where British officers commanding the regiments stationed at the camp refused to comply to the order to move against the Ulster Volunteers if called upon to do so by the government.

In 1921 a 'Rath Camp' was constructed to hold twelve to fifteen hundred Irish Volunteer prisoners. April 1921 saw the first draft of prisoners about 100 arrive at the camp. It continued to function in this way until the signing of the Anglo Irish Treaty of 1922 when those who didn't manage to escape were released. On 16 May 1922 the Curragh Camp was officially handed over to the newly formed Irish Army. The time was set at 10pm, and as the British rear guard marched out the Irish advance guard marched toward the camp. In total 500 Irish troops now occupied what once used to hold more than 20,000 soldiers. At 12 noon that same day Lieutenant-general O'Connell hoisted the Tri-Colour on the water tower. An era was over while one had just begun. Approximately eighteen years later the current military camp was extended to cater for another group of prisoners, not of an Irish war, or a war involving Irish armies, but the belligerent forces of World War Two. In October 1940 six Germans and one Briton had been imprisoned at the Curragh Camp, and through the following five years the camp was to intern and hold military personnel from both Axis and Allied military personnel.
At 4.45 am September 1 1939, Germany invaded Poland. On the same day Ireland proclaimed her neutrality. What followed was the rape of most of Western Europe beginning with the invasion of The Low Countries, The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg on 10 May. By the end of the month German armed forces had already occupied northern France when they began the 'Battle of France', June 5, 1940. With Dunkirk looking to French men like desertion by their British allies, and the preceding shock of the Blitzkreig, the following defence of France was sporadic and inefficient. Italy had already entered the war on the 10th, and after taking the offensive on the 20th, made modest advances in the south. On June 21 a peace delegation met with Hitler, while the following day, June 22, the armistice was concluded and signed.

With the end of hostilities between France and Germany on June 25, 1940 the only active enemy of the Reich was Britain. Still now Hitler expected the British to succumb to his rhetoric and show of military strength. However Churchill was not going to let it happen. 'Operation Sealion' (Seelowe), the code name for the invasion of Great Britain, made on 5 June was to follow the destruction of the RAF which was to officially start on 13 August 1940, but had been raging since the first day of bombing, July 10. The ruin of the RAF did not happen as hoped as on the 15 September, 'Battle of Britain Day'. With heavy loses inflicted the Luftwaffe scaled down its operations, Hitler called of 'Operation Sealion indefinitely on October 12, and on the 31st of the month the Battle of Britain was over with a total of 915 RAF and 1,733 Luftwaffe planes destroyed.

The 'Blitz started on September 7, 1940, coinciding with the 'Battle of Britain', and continued with the strategic bombing of the major industrial centres of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Many airmen were to die in both battles. Some were successful, surviving their mission and returned home, and some were forced to abandon their planes.
crash landing or parachuting onto foreign territory. Of these a number were to land on Irish Free State soil, a neutral country were airmen from both sides were to be interned.
Ireland's policy of neutrality during the 'Emergency' was one of 'Friendly Neutrality' towards the Allied powers, and certain aspects concerning this unwritten policy were practised on the subjects of this thesis; the Belligerent internees. In examining this subject I wish to draw the complexities of such a policy by discussing Swedish neutrality, a contrasting example to that of Ireland, Sweden being a friendly neutral towards the Axis powers.

Sweden, throughout the war, tried to adhere to a policy of neutrality, though not always successfully. After the failure to exert an inter-Scandinavian alliance\(^1\) Sweden relied on herself and her own defences in the realm of foreign politics. She had supported Finland during the first Russo-Finnish War in the winter of 1939, sending more than 8,000 volunteers, 85 anti-tank guns, 112 field guns, 104 anti-aircraft guns, 500 machine guns and 80,000 rifles and corresponding ammunition.\(^2\) The new Swedish coalition which had come into being in December 1939 had agreed on not making a declaration of neutrality in the Russo-Finish conflict so as not to reduce her ability to help Finland. However her foreign policy was to remain one of a non-belligerent status with its aim to keep Sweden out of aggressive international conflicts.

"It had two essential objectives: to prevent any fresh armed interventions by the Great Powers and to promote an end of the Russo-Finnish

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\(^2\) World War II. ed. Brigadier Peter Young, DSO, MC, MA. i. chapter 5, p. 65.
war, thereby restoring peace to the North and, to that extent, reducing the risk of Great Power intervention.\(^3\)

The Western Powers of Britain and France had wanted to exploit the war in Finland to interfere with Germany's supplies of iron-ore and to open a new front against the Reich, they were prevented from doing so by Swedish intervention in the war for its speedy conclusion and the joint declaration by Norway and Sweden against the moves for fear of German retaliations. "...the moment British or French troops set foot on Swedish soil, Germany will instantly intervene."\(^4\) Sweden's foreign policy during the Winter War under Christian Günther, Foreign Minister had succeeded in preserving the peace and integrity of the country.

During Germany's Norwegian campaign beginning 9 April 1940,\(^5\) Sweden refused to allow her infrastructure to be used to alleviate the pressure on the German forces in Norway especially at Narvik.\(^6\) This refusal to allow the transit of war material ensued in a "...war of nerves"\(^7\) between both governments. It is important to note however that Sweden also refused to openly export arms to Norway during their crisis, though in fact doing so in limited numbers.\(^8\) Throughout the campaign Swedish sovereignty was infringed upon by German aircraft and as well as strong protests being made thirty nine aircraft were forced down over Sweden. Though war material was denied transit Red Cross Aid was permitted on humanitarian grounds. Germany had feared that Allied operations in Scandinavia would cut of the potential strategic aerial and

\(^3\) W.M. Carlgren, *Swedish Foreign Policy During the Second World War* (Stockholm 1973, English translation 1977). p.28

\(^4\) W.M. Carlgren, p.50. Adolf Hitler on Sweden allowing the Allies move war material to aid Finland. March 1940.

\(^5\) Part of 'Operation Weser' which included the invasion of Denmark, 9 April 1940.

\(^6\) In response to the invasion of Norway where the German army occupied all major coastal towns including Oslo, Britain had planned to cut the German forces in two at Trondheim in the centre of the country. When this failed they concentrated their main force at Narvik, an important port town essential to Germany for the export of Scandinavian iron-ore, the northern most point of the German invasion, retaking it on the 28 May 1940. By 7 June the Allies had retreated, the situation in France dictating the move.

\(^7\) W.M. Carlgren, p. 68.

\(^8\) A. & V. Toynbee, ed. p.184.
naval approaches of Norway therefore hindering German expansion into the Atlantic. Grand-Admiral Raeder of the German Navy had presented to Hitler the possibility of procuring naval bases in Denmark and Norway, thus improving their own strategic situation by peaceful means or by force if necessary. It was noted by the German high command that Norway's coastal defences were considerably weak and the action of the HMS Cossack⁹ had posed the questioning of possible British intervention in the area and their subsequent success due to the lack of Norwegian resistance. If so the Royal Navy and Air Force would command the entire North Sea, cutting the Atlantic off from the Germans and threatening the Baltic.¹⁰ Also it was appreciated by the Allies that two-thirds of Germany's iron ore was imported from Scandinavia and it was argued that if the "iron route" was cut off Germany would be forced to capitulate. This was a possibility recognised by Germany and Hitler subsequently authorised the invasion of Norway and Denmark.¹¹ Allied operations in Norway in response to the German invasion; the mining of her territorial waters and occupation of her ports, was an attempt to intensify the war against the enemy and frustrate the exportation of ore from Narvik.¹² Sweden was not of strategic importance and was ignored by the conflict because it was not of great importance in the strategies of the opposing powers.

At the end of the campaign, Scandinavia was now under the direct influence of the Nazi regime. Germany's primary interest in Sweden during it was for her to maintain her policy of neutrality and abstention from interfering in Germany's occupation of Norway and Denmark. Why Hitler didn't invade Sweden was a testimonial to his reliance on her iron-ore exports and his need not

⁹ While anchored in Jössing Fjord the supply ship Altmark was boarded by the crew of HMS Cossack a destroyer, who liberated 300 British seamen on 16 February 1940. This action highlighted the inherent weakness in Norwegian coastal defences while it let the Belligerent forces manoeuvre at will in their territorial waters.
¹⁰ World War II. ed. Brigadier Peter Young, i. chapter 6, p. 71-72
¹¹ It must be noted that Denmark had signed a non-aggression pact with Germany thus literally allowing Hitler the right to occupy without resistance. Once occupied the Danes maintained their rights and a form of Home Rule under the Nazi Order.
¹² W.M. Carlgren., p59.
to disrupt them in view of Germany's invasion of the west. In 1936 Germany had imported 72.6% of Sweden's total iron ore exports and was ever more reliant on this source as the Allied blockade intensified.\textsuperscript{13} Also the occupation of Sweden's neighbours cut her off from the possibility of direct Allied assistance, rendering her helpless and susceptible to German influences. More importantly, Russia had declared that Swedish neutrality was in her interest and Hitler wanted to maintain the USSR as a friendly neutral for the time being.\textsuperscript{14} Sweden, during this period lived in fear of invasion. Britain and her allies had promised not to use Swedish territory against Germany without the consent of her people, and while Hitler promised not to invade nothing could detract from the fact that his armed forces had violated the neutrality of five neutral countries in the space of one month without any preliminary warning.\textsuperscript{15}

Sweden was now hemmed in and vulnerable to Nazi influence and many requests were made by the Germans for the use of the Swedish infrastructure to further their war efforts. Concessions made by Sweden to Germany during the remainder of the war were quite numerous and blatant. In July 1940, the Swedes had given permission to the Germans to move troops on leave via their rail network through Sweden. Also, limited numbers of troops were allowed to be moved from Trondheim to Narvik through Swedish territory; known then as "horseshoe traffic".\textsuperscript{16} During the first half of 1941 approximately 35,000 men were transported across Swedish territory per month. With the out break of the Russo-German war, 22 June 1941 a more far-reaching concession was requested. The vast German troop deployment was to dominate Swedish foreign policy. The Swedish government was aware of the problems facing their

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{13} ibid. p.10.
\item \textsuperscript{14} Stephen F. Hampson, Plight of the Neutrals; Europe and America 1940. History of the Second World War, (Purnell 1966) i p.278-280
\item \textsuperscript{15} On 10 May 1940 Hitler launched Lieutenant-General Erich von Manstein revised Blitzkrieg of the original 'Plan Yellow', the invasion of Western Europe. This involved the invasion of Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg and France. Luxembourg was over-run within a day; Holland capitulated on 15 May; Belgium unconditional surrender came on 28 May; German troops entered Paris on 14 June and France signs the armistice with Germany on June 22.
\item \textsuperscript{16} W. M. Carlgren, p.70. A.& V. Toynbee, ed. p. 184.
\end{itemize}
own existence and had to seriously consider the implications of refusal. It got to the extent that King Gustaf V, it was said, threatened to abdicate if the terms of the German requests were not met.\textsuperscript{17} The concessions requested were presented by Karl Schnurre to The Foreign Minister Günther Christian on the 22\textsuperscript{nd} and were as follows. The transit of one German division from Oslo to Finland and subsequent transport of war supplies be accommodated on Swedish railway. That single engine aircraft would be allowed to fly over Swedish territory and those who came down would not be interned nor have their aircraft impounded. Also that minefields be laid according to defence procedures of the Navy; that German traffic inside Swedish territorial waters be protected by the Swedish Navy and that German naval units sheltering inside their territorial waters or within their harbours not be interned. If the demands were refused it would be seen as an unfriendly act and jeopardise further relations. Thus,

"Without actually entering the war, Sweden should interpret her neutrality to Germany's advantage."\textsuperscript{18}

Sweden was completely surrounded by German troops and entirely dependent upon Germany and her allies for trade. The Allies were not happy, believing that neutrality could not be stretched like this, yet America, Britain and the USSR, despite making formal objections were understanding of Sweden's position and those decisions made, questionable to her neutrality.

The neutrality which Sweden managed to retain was in fact both precarious and questionable, being dominated by Germany for much of the war. Ireland's period of neutrality was on the other hand dominated by Britain and the USA. When England went to war so too did Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Canada, Australia New Zealand, India, South Africa and a host of other Commonwealth countries. Ireland did not, the only Commonwealth country not to do so. Yet she managed to stay out of the conflict though her economy,

\textsuperscript{17} W. M. Carlgren, p. 116.
\textsuperscript{18} \textit{ibid.} p. 115.
geography, and cultural ties with Great Britain dictated differently; a master stroke of international politics and diplomacy considering the implications. DeValera believed that by asserting Irish neutrality her independence as a sovereign state was also enhanced. The failure of the League of Nations and the lack of motivation by the great powers to move on the issues of small countries led him to believe that isolation was Ireland's only choice. The day the war broke out the Emergency Powers Act was put in place and Ireland declared her neutrality. The army was mobilised, censorship imposed and hundreds of members of the IRA were interned. A state of 'Emergency was declared for the duration of the war and Ireland was very much left at the mercy of the belligerents.

Ireland managed to sit out the war with relative ease due mainly to her economical defence policy. At the outset the Irish army numbered 630 officer, 1,412 N.C.O.s and 5,452 enlisted men. In the reserves there were 194 officers, 544 N.C.O.s and 4,328 enlisted men. The navy and airforce were too small to count for anything in the way of a tactical threat to an invader, while equipment was scarce. Irish government expenditure rose 33% during the war while Swedish government expenditure increased by 150%. As a proportion of Gross Domestic Product, Swedish public expenditure increased by approximately 40%; Irish figures fell by 20%. Defence as a proportion of this expenditure was 20% In the event of an invasion Ireland would have paid the price for a policy of "...half armed neutrality".

Economically Ireland was reliant on Britain. Had Britain discontinued all coal and petrol supplies, Ireland would have been reduced to a

19 The remaining constitutional link Ireland had with Britain was the later's control over the appointment of diplomats and the conclusion of international agreements, as provided by the External Relations Act which was retained by the Constitution of 1937. Toynbee, ed.; Constance Howard, p. 231.
20 ibid. p. 238.
wilderness in three months.\textsuperscript{24} Belligerency was not an option for the Irish Government. It was DeValera's firm belief that a small country such as Ireland would be hurt in a major conflict. Also, it was important that the Irish had the right to choose whether or not to go to war. If they did not have this right they were not really independent.\textsuperscript{25} Even when Churchill loosely offered, "...a nation once again" DeValera declined, non-participation being more important than dissolving partition. Winston Churchill's attitude to Irish neutrality was some what negative. He had stated that; "Legally I believe they [Ireland] are at war, but skulking."\textsuperscript{26} The general British view on Irish neutrality was a cultural and political shock considering the history they both shared and the daunting future that lay ahead for Europe should Hitler ultimately succeed.

Germany was concerned that Britain would coerce Ireland into the war but Irish officials were sure that Irish-American opinion would ensure that this would not happen. However, David Gray, American Ambassador, saw Irish neutrality and independence as fantasy. The reasons being; Ireland depended on Britain for their economic stability and political freedom and without Britain, Germany would have already conquered another neutral country. Indeed, DeValera believed that as long as Britain stayed in the war Ireland could maintain her policy, and that there was little danger of a German invasion as long as they held out. The German policy for Ireland was directed at keeping her neutral for as long as she wanted.\textsuperscript{27} This was supported by the German minister in Ireland, Dr. Edward Hempel who believed that "...neutrality had visibly strengthened Irish National self consciousness".\textsuperscript{28} The only real threat to Ireland's neutrality was a desperate Britain, strangled by a successful U-boat blockade and suffering at the hands of a dominant Luftwaffe inevitably

\textsuperscript{24} Bernard Share, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{26} Churchill to Lord Halifax, 22 October 1939. ibid. p. 6.
\textsuperscript{28} Bernard Share, p. 27.
increasing the Allies' need for Irish air space, air fields and Irish ports. DeValera assured the British that he had "great sympathy" for them and wished to help. He knew he could not and hence did not keep Ireland strictly neutral and therefore his goal was to maintain neutrality yet help the Allies within the limits to the full extent possible. Ireland in fact never stopped helping the Commonwealth to which she belonged thus earning her title, 'Friendly Neutral'.

The Irish intelligence agency, G2 performed very impressively during the war. They maintained a continuous line of communication with her British counterpart over such issues as the IRA and their relationship with Germany throughout the war. The Irish Coast Watching Service reported the movements of belligerent naval and air forces, sending them via Allied code to the British Intelligence in Northern Ireland. The British were also permitted to station armed tugs at Cobh, Bearhaven and Galway for air-sea rescue. It was also agreed that Irish Shipping, set up as a result of the war, would only charter neutral shipping space through Britain so as not to compete in this vital life line. As well as the concessions, the Irish Government didn't object to the seizing of seven Irish registered oil tankers. Most of Ireland's petroleum needs were imported through Britain anyway. During the Blitz of Summer 1940, more than 2000 Britons were evacuated to Ireland. The traffic went both ways with many Irish finding war-time work in British factories and a great number of Irish men joining the British army. So many in fact that it was suggested that Irish Regiments be created. Yet it would have made questionable the nature of Irish neutrality, however many of those who did fight earned a place in the rolls of honour. The Irish Army collaborated closely with the Allies with the aim of

29 The crisis over the demand for the ports was a long and prolonged one encompassing both Britain and the USA. Although they would have helped it would have taken a large number of troops to procure had the Irish decided to resist and more to defend. The fact though that the Allies had Northern Ireland reduced the importance of the Southern ports and therefore actually added in securing Ireland's neutrality.

30 Maffey, memo of conversations with DeValera, 14 September 1939. (Cab. 66/2 Public Records Office GB.) ibid. p. 4.

31 J. P. Duggan, Neutral Ireland and the Third Reich. p.196.

32 Stephen F. Hampson; P. 279.
extensive co-operation in the event of a German invasion. It wasn't until after the war that news of several high ranking military officials were considered for US Army service decorations. Again unacceptable due to the nature of Ireland's foreign policy. Of note is the fact that during the build up to D-Day the government confiscated the radio transmitter from the German Legation, an act purely benevolent to the Allies.

Of greater significance was the collusion between both the British and Irish Governments concerning the Allied air crews and their planes, crashed on Irish soil. The questions were flying. The British accepted internment from the outset, appreciating that more Germans would be interned than RAF personnel. The Americans were not happy with the arrangement yet no USAF personnel were interned. But the Irish Government was concerned about Irish citizens and those with Irish ancestry becoming interned; what was to be done with them?
CHAPTER THREE

THE BELLIGERENT INTERNEE

Once landed and arrested, the Belligerent POW was brought to one or other of the internment camps on the Curragh. Depending on his nationality the internee was sent to G-Camp if he was German, and B-Camp if he was British. Both camps were opened 31st August and 17 October 1940 respectively and were located adjacent to the existing military camp on the Curragh, in the area known as 'K-Lines', next to the Curragh golf course. In all 163 British, American and German military aircraft crashed in Ireland during the war. Of the 830 crew members aboard, 607 survived, 223 died. Out of 106 incidents involving 478 RAF personnel crash-landing in Ireland 182 were killed, 12 went missing and 45 were interned. The remainder, 239 along with 260 USAAF personnel, were either aloud to take off again if the situation was favourable or they were handed back at the border. (275 American airmen landed in Ireland; fifteen died).\(^1\)

While interned the internees had easy and ample access to their diplomatic officers in Dublin. David Gray was the American Minister instrumental in keeping American pilots out of the internment camp, Sir John Maffey, the British Minister who described Irish policy as "an always difficult and often generous interpretation of neutrality"; John D. Kearney, Canadian High Commissioner and Dr. Edward Hempel, Germany's minister. All played a part in the game of neutrality, keeping the Irish authorities on their toes if they

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\(^1\) Records held in Military Archives, Cathal Brugha Barracks.
thought one side was getting more attention than the other.

Although a Neutral territory, Ireland never completely stopped aiding her British neighbours. This included the swapping of intelligence information, obliging in confiscating the German Legation's radio transmitter and the training of Irish soldiers in British commando procedures. Also, during the Blitz more than 2,000 Britons were evacuated to Ireland. Under the rules of neutrality, crashed pilots had to be interned by the neutral power for the duration of the war. In September 1939, the Irish Government was by no means certain about their obligations to Belligerent powers, however, allowing the taking off of downed Allied planes from had been discrete Government policy from the beginning of the war. The Air Corps had in services three full-time salvage crews in action and aided any Allied aircraft in taking off, even as far as repairing it. Those not so lucky to fly their planes out were escorted to the Border and handed over with their damaged aircraft. The British and Allied camp, (B-Camp), on the Curragh was open on October 17, 1940 and was done so to maintain the facade of strict 50-50 neutrality. As mentioned earlier the camp, at its peak held forty five internees including Polish, French, Canadian and New Zealander pilots. There was also an American in the service of the RAF held at the Curragh. He was a Lieutenant Wolfe who was one of the twelve allied internees who succeeded in escaping. During their stay they were treated as the Germans internees were, however during the year 1942/43 they were gradually moved from the Curragh Camp to the military installation at Gormanston and subsequently released via the border to the allies by August 1943.

At first DeValera didn't know what exactly to do with those British pilots who may crash land on Irish soil. It was a daunting predicament as it was possible for members of the RAF to have family links with Ireland thus making it an embarrassing situation for the government if it ever occurred.3 Also there

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3 There were ten pilots of Irish Nationality serving in the RAF, while many more had ancestral
was concern over the reaction of the British and Allied governments to internment of the belligerents in Ireland. However, the British government had in fact accepted unconditional internment on the bases that it would operate in their favour. It was expected that more Germans would be interned and their material impounded.\textsuperscript{4} There was however more Allied incidents as the following information shows:

**BRITISH AIRCRAFT PERMITTED TO DEPART**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flying boats</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twin engine</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four engine</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Seventeen other machines were salvaged and returned together with fifty others partially salvaged, making a total of 94 British aircraft released including pilots. The remainder of the 106 aircraft were unrecoverable.

**AMERICAN AIRCRAFT PERMITTED TO DEPART**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Four engine</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twin engine</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A further twenty one part or fully salvaged aircraft were handed over, bringing to a total of 39 American aircraft released including pilots.\textsuperscript{5}

On 15 August 1943 Dr. Edward Hempel, German minister in Ireland officially complained that the Irish were not adhering to their policy of

\textsuperscript{4} T. Ryle Dwyer, p. 77.

strict neutrality. The basis of his argument was the fact that the Irish Government was releasing the above airmen. The Irish government though had implemented the policy of differentiating between those aircraft which were on non-operational flights and those on active duty. Only those that had been on combat missions, observational patrols, meteorological missions, etc. were to be interned. Hempel found these distinctions hard to swallow yet appreciated the geographical situation which bound Ireland to Britain and prevented the Irish authorities from giving the Germans the same treatment. Yet he believed that Irish neutrality was "...only in earnest about neutrality when it was directed against the Third Reich". It must be noted here that where the situation favoured the Allies in Ireland it suited the Axis in Sweden. Both their policies dictated a friendly neutral attitude towards their neighbours and was mainly due to geography and the pressure exacted upon the two countries. Regardless of how blatant Swe len's neutrality was stretched, Ireland was determined to uphold its own. Interned were forty-five RAF personnel of various nationality. They were the 'window dressing' of DeValera's policy of neutrality.

The first German airmen to land in the Free State early in August 1940 were Oberlieutenant Kurt Mollenhauer and his crew of a Focke Wolf 200, Condor. They had been on a meteorological observational mission over the Atlantic when their plane was forced to land in Co. Kerry. In the following five years a total of 54 Luftwaffe officers were to be interned in Ireland following incidents similar to the fates that befell those in the following extracts:

"Corporal Hans Bell, Lance Corporal Kurt Kych [and others] of the German air force came down on Faha Mountains, Co. Kerry on 20 August, 1940. They were detained by Gardai and later handed over to military by Clohane Gardai."

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6 J.P. Duggan, Neutral Ireland and the Third Reich, Gill and Macmillian 1985. p.220.
7 ibid.
"Forced landing at Ballysisteen, Bunnahon, Kill, Co. Waterford about 1918 hrs, on the evening of 01/04/41. Lieutenant Heinz, Lieutenant Fleischmann, Sergeant-major Lorra, Corporal Glensen and Corporal Jaeger were apprehended by a member of the Coastal Watch Service, [C.W.S.], assisted by a member of the local Security Force. Taken to Waterford and then to Curragh where they were admitted to Internment Camp at 0600 hrs on 07/04/41."9

One hundred and sixty four of the seamen came from a major sea battle in the Bay of Biscay, 27 December 1943, between eleven German torpedo boats and destroyers escorting a blockade runner and some British warships. The Germans lost two motor torpedo boats and a destroyer and the crew members were picked up by the S.S. Kerrlogue. Two of the crew died on their way to Ireland. U-266 VIII class was immobilised by a Sunderland and after the captain, (Kaptaen-Lieutenant Klaus Becker), had destroyed the sub, the crew, forty eight of them launched life boats and landed on the Irish coast on March 11, 1945.10

The German camp (G-Camp), was established on 31 August 1940, and eventually contained 54 Luftwaffe officers and 210 German sailors. One internee, Oberlieutenant Konrad Neymeyr escaped and was recaptured later at sea by the British Navy.11 Oberfeldwebel Max Hohans was returned home because of extensive injuries received in a plane crash. The camp was surrounded by a series of fourteen foot high fences, consisting of thickly coiled barbed wire suspended on poles six feet apart and overlooked by four elevated machine gun posts. Both 'G' and 'B' camps were separated by two high mounds of dirt with a corrugated iron fence in between. The internees were billeted in spacious six room huts, raised two feet

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9 Extracts from a file on the reports of the circumstances of arrest and internment of Belligerent Forces. The Provost Marshal's Office; PM 781.
11 C / 229 A. Part II. Escape of Neymeyr, 21 January 1942. Also C.P. 850.
above ground to prevent tunnelling; this did not deter them though. There were two enlisted men to a room and each officer entitled to his own room. Each camp had two ante-rooms equipped with comfortable chairs, tables, bookshelves and fireplaces, provided for the leisure hours of the officers and the sergeants. Each of the rooms were well heated, and the food was of good quality and plentiful. Choice of food was improved when the internees started harvesting from their own gardens. Also in each camp there was a fully stocked bar where the inmates could procure spirits, beers and soft drinks for a reasonable price. Actually while the war drove up the price of drink around the country the price in the camp remained relatively low.

There were extensive recreational and sporting facilities in the camp. The men were allowed to make use of the army swimming pool, squash courts and playing fields. Gym equipment was also available, along with boxing facilities, equipment for cricket, tennis, table tennis, soccer, rugby and basketball. Internee teams often played in friendly competition with Irish army teams and nearby tennis and golf clubs had internee members. Pilot Officer Wolfe was a member of the local hunt and rode with them on many occasions.

Camp rules were lenient with the internees receiving their full pay from home, free to have bank accounts and being allowed to wear civilian clothes. The internees were subjected to a generous parole system which was more so a gentlemen's agreement than a prison parole. Signing out in the morning no matter where they were going, they were due back at a pre-ordained time. Although punctuality was often rampant, only one internee actually completely abused his parole privilege to escape. Fraternising with the civilian population was a common occurrence. The parole area was within the triangular area formed by Kilcullen, Kildare and Newbridge. All internees had free entrance to the Curragh and Punchestown race courses and were regular patrons to the Curragh cinema. Dances were
regular in the surrounding towns of the parole perimeter and were frequented by the internees. Once monthly they were permitted to travel to Dublin for a maximum of twenty four hours; later on this privilege was increased to once a week.

The following pages contain the rules and regulations for the Belligerent camps.
EIRE

EMERGENCY POWERS (NO. 20) ORDER, 1940, DETENTION (MEMBERS OF BELLIGERENT ARMED FORCES) DIRECTORS, 1941

I, Oscar Traynor, Minister for Defence, in exercise of the powers conferred on me by article 3 of the Emergency Powers (no. 20) order, 1940 (Statutory Rules and Orders no. 2 of 1940), and of every and any other powers me in this behalf enabling, hereby give the following directions:

Short Title. 1. These Directions may be cited as the Emergency Powers (No. 20) Order, 1940, Detention (members of Belligerent Armed forces) Directions, 1941

Definitions 2. In these Directions:

(i) the expression "the Order" means the Emergency powers (no. 20) Order, 1940

(ii) the expression "the Adjutant General" means the Adjutant General of the Defence forces;

(iii) the expression "the Commandant " means officer of the Defence Forces appointed by the Adjutant General to command and administer any of the places set out in Appendix 1 hereto, and include any officer for the time being authorised on behalf of the Commandant;

(i v) the word "internee" means any member of the armed forces of any of the countries engaged in the present war detained pursuant to the Order and the word "internment " shall be construed accordingly:

(v) the expression "prohibited article" means any article not authorised by these Directions or by permission of the commandant to be in the possession of an internee

Places of detention 3. (i) The camps and other places in which internees maybe detained are those set out in appendix 1 to these Directions and are hereinafter referred to as "camps". Provided, however, that subsequent to being taken
into custody, an internee, awaiting removal to a camp, in transfer from one camp to another camp, may be temporarily detained in any Garda Siochana Station, military camp, barracks or post.

(ii) There will be separate cantonments within camps for internees of each of the principal belligerent countries and their allies.

**Infirmary**

4. An infirmary or proper place for the reception of sick internees shall be provided.

**Staff**

5. The commandant shall be assisted by a medical officer and such other staff as may be provided.

**Searching**

6. Every internee shall be searched on being taken into custody and any military equipment, papers, etc. as well as personal effects will be taken over by the military authorities. Personal effects will be returned to the internees as early as possible after examination. military equipment, papers, etc., will not be returned.

**Records of measurements and other particulars.**

7. The name, home address, next of kin, religious denomination, age, height, weight, features, particular marks, regimental number, rank, unit, general appearance and such other measurements and particulars as may be required in regard to an internee shall, upon his admission, be recorded in such manner as may be directed.

**Bureau of Information**

8. The Commandant shall furnish, through the usual channels, to the Bureau of Information established pursuant to the international Convention (Geneva), 1929, Article 77, the information and particulars required under Part 1 of the Terms of reference of the Bureau of Investigation.

**Medical examination admission**

9. Every internee shall, as soon as possible after his admission, separately examined by the medical officer who shall record the state of health of the internee and such other particulars as may be directed.

**Guarding**

10. Every precaution shall be taken to prevent the escape of internees. Inspections at night will, however, be carried out as unobtrusively as possible.
**Parole.**

11. Daily parole may be given for the purpose of recreation, exercises, visits to cinemas, proceeding to Church.

In all such cases an escort will accompany the internees in the interests of both the military authorities and the internees themselves.

**Conditions.**

12. the following conditions will be observed by the internees, while on parole:

(1) They will not take any action which will assist them to escape from the camp or discuss or make arrangements with any person or persons on the question of such escape.

(2) They will not carry out any reconnaissance with a view to escape.

(3) They will not post any letters or give any letters to any person to post.

(4) They will not study any matter of military importance or take any action which may be detrimental to the interest of Eire.

(5) They will observe any restrictions imposed as to the area and time prescribed for exercise and visits.

(6) The area of petrol will include Newbridge, Kildare and Kilcullen. Internees will not proceed outside the area of parole without the specific permission obtained from the commandant.

(7) Private houses will not be visited except with the specific permission of the commandant.

(8) An hotel or restaurant in each town will be specified as the only place which internees may visit for the purpose of partaking of refreshments.

(9) The maximum period of parole at any one time will be three hours or, in the case of visits to the cinema at Newbridge, or Kildare, four hours.

(10) Internees will wear mufti while on parole.
(11) A form of parole as follows will be signed by each internee:-

"I hereby promise to observe the conditions of parole laid down in paragraph 12 of the Detention (members of Belligerent Armed Forces)Directions 1941, made by the Minister for Defence and to return to the camp not later than.........................

Special Parole

13. Special night parole not exceeding 12 hours to enable married internees to visit their wives may be granted by the Command officer Commanding them as he thinks fit. When such special parole is granted the parole will be spent in a specified hotel or house within the parole area.

Exercise.

14. Facilities will be made available, at the discretion of the Recreation and Commandant, for such pursuits by internees, within the Hobbies cantonments, as gardening, basket ball, etc., and for indoor games and amusements. Materials to enable internees to pursue hobbies or play games may be received as presents or be purchased on behalf of the internees subject to approval and examination by the Commandant. No expense to public funds may accrue in implementing this direction.

Visits to
Diplomatic
Representatives

15. Internees will be allowed one visit each month to their Diplomatic Representatives in Dublin, on the understanding that on such occasions only members of the diplomatic staffs and their families will be present.

Telephone Calls
to Diplomatic
Representatives

16. Internees will be allowed to telephone their diplomatic representatives on matters of importance with the concurrence of the Commandant.

Visits by
Diplomatic
Representatives

17. Diplomatic Representatives will be allowed to visit internees as often as they desire. Prior notification of the intention to visit internees will be given to the Department of Defence through the Department of External Affairs.
18. Visits by internees to clergymen living within the Curragh Camp will be allowed at the discretion of the Commandant.

19. Each internee will be allowed one visit per week limited to one hour. The visit will take place within cantonment and will be subject to the usual supervision.

20. There will be no limitation on the number of letters which may be written or received by internees. All letters must pass the commandant and be subject to censorship by him.

21. All necessary facilities will be granted to internees in this regard.

22. Parcels and presents may be brought by visitors or sent through the Irish Red Cross Society to internees. In either case they will be subject to examination by the Correspondent.

23. The maximum amount of money which may be held by internees is £3.00 in the case of Officers and £2.00 in the case of N.C.O.s. and men. Cash in excess of these amounts must be surrendered to the Commandant. If the amount surrendered by either group of internees exceeds £100., bank accounts will be opened in the names of the Commandant and the senior internee officer of the group. If the amount surrendered is less than £100. it may be held by the Commandant in his personal custody. Cheque books in respect of internees' private bank accounts will be held in the custody of the Commandant.

24. Clothing and footwear may be supplied to internees from Army stocks.

25. (i) Rations on the sole issuable to soldiers of the Forces may be supplied to all internees.

(ii) British internee officers will discharge the accounts for all food, clothing, etc., supplied to them.
Accounts

26. Accounts in respect of issues of food, fuel, clothing, etc. will be rendered monthly to the Secretary, Department of Defence.

Cleanliness

27. Internees will be required to keep their quarters clean and tidy. Orderlies for internees of officer rank will be supplied from the N.C.O. and other rank internees.

Requests Complaints etc.

28. The intermediary between internees and the Commandant will be the senior internee officer of each group.

Health and Medical Treatment

29. (1) Each camp shall possess an infirmary. If necessary, isolation establishments shall be reserved for internees suffering from infectious and contagious diseases. Medical inspections of internees shall be arranged once a fortnight in order to supervise the general state of health and cleanliness, and to detect infectious and contagious diseases. The clothing of internees shall, at the same time be examined and steps taken to insure the destruction of vermin.

(2) The Commandants duties in regard to the health of internees shall be:-

(i) the commandant shall, without delay, call the attention of the medical officer to any internee whose state of mind or body appears to require attention, and shall as far as possible carry into effect the written recommendations of the medical officer for the alteration of the treatment of any such internee or for the supply of any additional articles to internee on medical grounds;

(ii) the commandant shall cause to be furnished to the medical officer daily a list of the internees reporting sick in the camp;

(iii) the Commandant shall carry into effect the written recommendations of the medical officer for separating from any other internee any internee labouring or suspected of labouring under any infectious, contagious or mental
disease, and shall immediately take steps as may be necessary to prevent the spread of any contagious or infectious disease;

(iv) the commandant shall notify to the chaplain the case of an internee whose life is in danger, or whose state of health in mind or body appears to require his attention;

(v) the Commandant shall, on demand by an internee who has been medically treated give such an internee an official statement indicating the nature and duration of his illness and the treatment received;

(vi) the Commandant shall furnish, through the usual channels, to the adjutant General particulars of any internees who become seriously ill or dies

(3) The medical officer's duties in regard to the health of internees shall be;-

(i) the medical Officer shall have the general care of the health of the internees and shall report to the Commandant any circumstance connected with the camp or the treatment of the internee which at any time appears to him to require consideration on medical grounds;

(ii) the medical officer shall every day see such internees as complain of illnesses reporting to the Commandant in writing their fitness or otherwise. He shall daily visit the sick in the infirmary at such times as may be necessary. He shall attend at once on receiving information of the serious illness of any internee.

(iii) the medical officer shall once every day or more visit any internee to whom his attention is specially directed;

(iv) the medical officer shall frequently examine the washing places, baths, and other provision for purposes of cleanliness of sanitation, and see whether they are in efficient working order and report at once to the Commandant any defect or insufficiency therein;
(v) the Medical Officer shall frequently inspect the food of the internees, cooked and uncooked, and shall report to the Commandant as to the quality of the provisions, and any sufficiency of clothing bedding, any deficiency in the quality or defect in the quality of the water or any other cause which may effect the health of the internee;

(vi) the medical officer shall record day by day an account of the state of every sick internee, the name of the disease, a description of the medicines, diet and any other treatment which he orders for such internees;

(vii) the medical officer report in writing to the commandant the case of any internee to which he thinks necessary on medical grounds to call attention and shall make such recommendations as he deems needful for the alteration of the treatment of the internee or for the supply to him of additional articles;

(viii) the medical officer shall give notice to the Commandant and the chaplain when the sickness of the internee appears to him to assume an aspect of danger;

(ix) the medical officer shall keep a journal, a medical history sheet in the case of every internee and such other documents and records as may be required or may be free from time to time be directed by the adjutant general

(x) the medical officer shall keep such statistical records and furnish such returnees relative to the health and medical treatment of internees and to the sanitary condition of the camp buildings as may be required

(xi) the medical officer shall report periodically and from time to time as may be required on the general health and sanitary condition of the establishment, the health of other internees, and in reference to any other points upon which he may be required to report

(xii) the medical officer shall forthwith on the death of any internees either in his journal the following particulars vis; at what time the diseased was taken ill, when the illness was first communicated to the medical officer the nature of the disease when the internee died and an
Withdrawal of Privileges

Breaches of discipline, camp regulations and condition of parole on the part of internees will be met by the withdrawal of privilege at the discretion of the Commandant. Particulars of such withdrawals will be communicated without delay to the Adjutant General.

Given under my hand this day of 1941.

MINISTER OF DEFENCE.
CHAPTER FOUR

OCCUPYING THE GERMANS

1. TURF CUTTING

In the struggle to keep the internees occupied, the option of employment in the area of turf cutting was made available to them. While progressing through a miscellaneous file I came across various letters and documents pertaining to the implementation of local work in this area in the Spring of 1942. The first correspondence was from the Provost Marshal's office in the Department of Defence written by Colonel F.J. Henry 31 March 1942.

"I am directed by the Adjutant General to state that the German Minister has informed the Department of External Affairs that the German N.C.O. Internees at the Curragh are anxious if possible, to obtain employment or some work such as turf cutting. He has stated that a turf cutting scheme is about to commence within their parole area at Newbridge and that the internees would like to be employed there. They are anxious to own some money as issue of extra rations from army stores has ceased at the request of their own authorities and they want to supplement the army rations out of their own pocket."\(^1\)

Colonel Henry also said that as long as the employment of the internees was confined to the parole area and that they could not make any contacts, and that there was no additional danger of escape, employment was possible. Also

\(^1\) Letter to the officer commanding, Curragh Command from Colonel F. J. Henry, 31 March 1942.
noted was the fact that while working they would be on parole and would have to go through the usual procedures of signing out and in. In a return correspondence from Officer Commanding, Curragh Command, Colonel T. McNally, there were no objections. "The matter had been discussed with Kaptaen Mollenhauer who deserves to see the conditions under which his men have to work before he agrees." Colonel McNally didn't think that such a request should be accepted, stating that; "......if conditions are good enough for Irish workers, they are good enough for the workers of any other country." 

It was also said that N.C.O.s and privates should only work three days per week, divided into two groups to cover a six day week. These men were also to be advised that they would only be barrow men, as they had no experience in cutting turf.

"I have discussed the project with the local Turf Board representatives but they could not command themselves to any opinion on the subject and referred me to their H.Q. in Dublin. I interviewed Senator Cummins with the object of ascertaining local labour views. He could not give me anything definite, but said he would consult his superiors. I ascertained that the turf men engaged are not in any labour organisation, but it is presumed that an effort will be made with this object in view." 

On 11 May, a letter was sent to the Curragh From the Turf Development Board stating that they were prepared to put the Germans to work in the bog;

"Our chief engineer has spoken to the leader of the internees and has told him we would be prepared to employ them as workmen at the rates prevailing on the job at Newbridge. It would have to be clearly understood that they would come to us

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2 Letter from Colonel T. McNally to the Provost Marshal's office, 13 April 1942.
3 ibid.
4 ibid.
under exactly the same discipline as our own workers. It is being arranged that if they report to a Mr. Lee at Newbridge, he will put them to work."5

Mr. Maguire had been to the camp to discuss the employing of German internees with Kaptaen Mollenhauer on May 8th. He gave details of the possible areas of employment, but that they were in the end up to the authorities to consider. It was also mentioned that the men would begin by repairing roads for which they would be paid 8d. per hour and would work from 08:30 to 17:00 hours with three quarters of an hour for lunch.

"Kaptaen Mollenhauer was dissatisfied with the rate of pay, but Mr. Maguire said that he would first have to see what the men could do and grade them accordingly to their abilities at a later stage when it may be possible to put them on turf cutting."6

Other aspects were discussed, including insurance, to which there was no concrete answer except that all employees were insured. In a brief letter dated 26 May 1942 from the Commandant of the German camp to O.C.C.C., it was stated that on 25 May, twelve N.C.O.s commenced work on the turf scheme in Newbridge. This form of employment was to be continued throughout the period of internment and was always optional. It was not greatly loved by the German internees but as their army pay was bi-monthly and the army supplies basic, the chance for extra money, rations and an occupation was not easily passed up.

2. EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

Throughout internment classes were provided for the internees to avail of to improve their academic or technical skills. It was a known fact that

5 Letter from the Turf Development Board to the Curragh Command, 11 March 1942.
6 ibid.
only the German internees would avail of these services as the Allied prisoners only saw doing so as giving up. Their wait for freedom wasn't as long as that for the German internees. A memorandum on educational facilities for the German internees dated 2 March 1945 discussed the main problems present in catering for this area. The arrival of two months pay in March 1945 was to be the last from a quickly disintegrating Reich. As this was so, mentioned was the introduction of technical classes to improve the internee's chances for employment once repatriated after the war. Most of the Germans, being either Luftwaffe or Naval officers, had already experience in the technical field of their former employment, so this would be a chance to further their 'education'.

The meeting with which the document referred to was held late in February 1945, and was attended by representatives of the Departments of Education, External Affairs and Defence. Discussed were the implications of and situation facing them with the collapse of the Third Reich. Understood was the fact that most of the last instalment of pay went to clearing debts incurred during the last cycle. Their Government Minister, Dr. Hempel, of the German Legation was anxious that the internees should be kept occupied; if not, they may turn to theft as an alternative.7 It was agreed that once it was in season the internees could get work cutting Turf, as was the case in previous years, but that was quite a while away.

Mr. Boland who was present for the Department of Education said that;

".....the matter had been discussed with the Taoiseach who had directed that the question of organising the educational courses should be discussed with the Department of Education and the Departments of Defence."8

A number of lecturers had come forward and offered their services in the giving

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7 Memorandum on the Educational Facilities for German Internees, 2 March 1942.
8 ibid.
of lecture the internees. However, one problem remained in that not all Germans spoke English or spoke it well enough to comprehend the lectures in the various subjects. It was then decided that English Lectures would resume to rectify this problem.

The cost of such classes was priced on the basis of the cost of classes held by National school teacher Mr. McCormach in 1942.

"As the German Legation is in such a difficult financial position at the moment, the Department of External affairs feels that the cost of the English lessons should be met by State funds."  

This was argued on the basis that most other Neutral countries in the same situation as Ireland took it upon themselves to fund the education of their internees, with the intention of being refunded by the Belligerent governments in question as soon as the war was over. The English classes were then given the go ahead at ten hours a week until the turf cutting season started and then at a reduced scale.

Also pointed out was that needed were exercise books and other necessities to hold the classes. This was resolved by the suggestion that credit of fifteen or twenty pounds might be open to the internees at one of the Educational firms to procure such items that might be needed. A black board would be supplied from army stores. After the turf cutting season it was discussed that those internees interested would attend classes in elementary and advanced mathematics, dynamics and magnetism, etc.. Hence it was necessary for the Germans to speak English as no German speaking teachers in these subjects could be found.

There were a number of internees at the time studying in colleges in Dublin, namely UCD, and it was questioned as to how they would survive in the city without their pay and army rations with which they used to live on. In

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9 ibid.
the present conditions, that is the stoppage of their pay, it was felt that they could no longer keep up their studies.

"The Legation is asking members of the colony to maintain the internees in their own homes as an alternative to subscribing to the cost of living expenses in Dublin, .....this will not operate in every case, however, and the question arise of a contribution being requested from State funds, [Also to be refunded], so as to enable the internees to continue their lectures until the of the present academic year, at least."\textsuperscript{10}

This was to be discussed further between the Department of External Affairs and An Taoiseach and was to be raised again with the Department of Defence, if it was thought necessary.

Mr. Boland enquired whether there were any workshops in the Curragh Camp to put the internees to work for themselves making toys furniture and other such items. The question was dropped as it was not known whether the availability of materials such as wood and metal were to be made available. Also;

"The German Minister would prefer the internees to be engaged in some individual wage earning work such as turf cutting, rather than co-operative work such as toy making as the latter leads to quarrels in connection with the division of the proceeds."\textsuperscript{11}

All matters were due for further discussions, and all Departments promised to communicate with each other on related matters. The first step, however was for the Department of Defence which was to commence on organising the English classes.

3. EMPLOYMENT

\textsuperscript{10} ibid.
\textsuperscript{11} ibid.
In continuing with the program of development in educational and employment skills, the Irish authorities began to consider extending the existing opportunities open to the internees. Apart from being kept busy and as the German Government could no longer be held responsible for the payment of their soldiers, the internees needed to be able to supplement their rations by buying additional stock and had to have money for social events. Most important of all though, was the fact that a paying job of one's own choice would maintain morale at a satisfactory level, and create a sense of pride and worth in the face of the fall of their homeland. These German internees then began a campaign-like endeavour in applying for permanent work outside the parole area of Kildare, Kilcullen and Newbridge and all over Ireland.

In a letter from F.J. Henry, Provost Marshal, to the Adjutant General, 23 April, 1945, the situation was described as follows;

"For sometime past the camp staff at the belligerent Internee’s Camp have observed internees on parole early each morning in increasing numbers, and from subsequent enquiries it appears that internee and being employed locally on casual labour. From files submitted to Command Officer Commanding by G.2. Curragh, [the Irish Intelligence Agency] it was obvious that internees had been making applications for employment in various places in the country. None of their applications were submitted to the camp authorities in accordance with camp standing orders."12

As a consequence, unauthorised employment was stopped at once while a list of internees was submitted as application for permission to follow up job offers and to go in search of permanent work. Morale was good that April considering the concluding events in Europe, but the Germans, with the general

12 Letter from Colonel F. J. Henry, Provost Marshal, to the Adjutant General, 23 April 1945.
feeling that the war was over were all anxious for employment. They did not like
the bog work or turf cutting. The majority were desirous to stay in Ireland after
internment, to live and work here, but were not adverse to going to England if
possible.

As a result of further investigation, Colonel J. Flynn compiled a
letter of all events up to the date 24 April, 1945, including details on all
activities of all the Germans. Colonel Flynn continued;

"Recently, as a result of information reaching the Officer
Commanding from the Chief Staff Officer, G.2. Branch, it became
clear that internees were using the post contrary to parole
requirements for the purpose of seeking employment in various parts of
the country. It was known that some fifteen internees had received
offers of work from various places as follows:
  Cork - Four with proprietors.
  Tullamore - Two with building firms.
  Dublin - Five, two of which are in gardening
  Dundalk - One in photography. And casuals in
  other places.
This was a clear breach of the camp standing orders, paragraph twenty of
which reads as follows:

  20. EMPLOYMENT
Internees are not permitted to canvas or accept private employment
without the consent of the appropriate authority, which must be sought
through the camp Commandant."\textsuperscript{13}

Throughout the military hierarchy from the Curragh to the Provost
Marshal and to the Department of Defence, all were active over the problem
of employing the internees, as they were eager for work anywhere in the
country. With the stoppage of pay and the defeat of Germany, many felt that
there were no prospects at home and therefore clamoured for work here. The
vast majority were not desirous for manual work as they were qualified with

\textsuperscript{13} Letter from Colonel J. Flynn to Provost Marshal, 24 April 1945.
technical skills, being members of the Luftwaffe and German Navy. Some were successful in obtaining casual work outside the camp. The authorities always counted on work facilities within the camp and turf cutting to keep the internees occupied. They were now faced with the drive and determination of those Germans in an attempt to regain some of their lost self-respect and pride. By the end of May it was under sincere consideration to allow the internees to take up employment outside the camp and surrounding parole perimeter.

On 31 May, 1945, a questionnaire was prepared and sent to the internees interested in working around the country, to fill out. However, the process was not fast enough for the Germans, and in a letter dated 13 June, '45, from Commandant James Guiney, of No.1 Internment camp to the O.C.C.C., he reported the reactions of the anxious inmates to the hold up:

"Sir, I beg to report that a general parade of the other ranks, German internees was held this morning in the compound at 06:35 hours. Hauptmann Bendt spoke to all present in German. I subsequently found, through enquires that he instructed all to go and procure permanent employment to the extent of going outside the parole area and in the event of securing the same, they were at liberty to leave the camp. Some of them asked Hauptmann Bendt if they could get long parole to go outside the parole areas to negotiate suitable employment. He appears to have promised that he would fix them up."14

In a second letter from the Commandant Guiney to the O.C.C.C., he wrote of a conversation he had with Hauptmann Bendt on what had happened on the 13th. The German officer had had an interview with a Mr. Boland, Secretary to the head of the Department of External affairs on 11 June and was instructed to:

".....get the internees who have had promise of work to arrange with

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14 Letter from Commandant J. Guiney to officer commanding, Curragh Command, 13 June 1945.
their prospective employers to communicate with the Department of Industry and Commerce the fact that they are willing to employ one or more internees, as the case may be, and by so doing, no Irish labour would be displaced."15

Mr. Boland had arranged with the Dept. of Defence that a conditional release would be organised for the internees following the completion of the above arrangements. A letter from Kaptaen-lieutenant Quendenfeldt to the Department of Defence through the Camp Commandant states as follows:

"The Dept of Industry and Commerce has granted a labour permit for Oberfeldwebel Karl Macht to work as a mechanic of knitting machines in the Malbay Manufacturing Co. Ltd, Miltown Malbay, Co. Clare. So I ask the Dept of Defence to give the permission that he Macht may take up his employment."16

The Minister of Defence had, at first ordered to hold back all permits until a secure and co-ordinated policy between all three departments concerned had been introduced. By 30 July, the above request was passed on with no action against necessary.

15 Letter from Commandant J. Guiney to officer commanding, Curragh Command, 14 June 1945.
16 Letter from Kaptaen-lieutenant Quendenfeldt to the Department of Defence, 29 July 1945.
CHAPTER FIVE

PAROLE

Once interned, the prisoner was subject to restrictions of liberty and freedom. In Ireland there was a very civilised system of parole that allowed the prisoners to leave the camp and visit local areas during the day, provided they returned of course. Since it was the military duty of internees to escape nobody could leave the camp without first signing an agreement not to escape. They had first to apply through their own commanding officer, who, on their behalf would send a written request to the camp commander of authorisation. If authorised, the internee was then allowed to leave the camp by first, signing out giving the time of departure and place of destination. On returning they again had to sign the parole book and the time of their return. "...thus . code of honour prevented them from trying to escape while on parole." In certain circumstances special parole would be requested, usually involving overnight stays or late parole hours in the parole area or outside it. As for normal parole the procedure was the same, except it wasn't always granted. The following example should illustrate what one had to go through to obtain an extended parole.

Dated the 24 May 1945, the first letter is in response to a request made by Oberlieutenant Scherrett to Kaptaen Lieutenant Quendenfeldt. It follows;

"Sir,

I ask you to get Permission for a long leave to Dublin
for Oberlieutenant Scherrett from Wednesday 04/07/'45, until Friday

1 John Clive, Broken Wings, (Dublin 1979). p....
06/07/'45, 23:00hrs. Oberlieutenant Scherrett has an appointment with the dental surgeon, Dr. Kevin J. Keenan,....."²

This letter was then sent on to the Camp Commandant, John Guiney, who subsequently forwarded a copy of the request with a report on the officer in question to the Officer Commanding, (O.C.C.C.).

".....Oberlieutenant Scherrett has not honoured his parole obligations and has been absent one hour and ten minutes on 17/02/'45; fifty minutes on 10/05/'45; one hour and ten minutes on 13/06/'45. I do not recommend the granting of extended parole to Oberlieutenant Scherrett."³

In this instance the report did not refer to the dental appointment, but a local dance the Lieutenant wanted to attend. Regarding his application for the appointment and based on the above report, the Commandant concluded;

".....I may mention that Mr. Leo P. Masterson, B.D.S., attends at No.1 'B' Internment Camp on the Monday of each week. Mr. Masterson is officially appointed to give dental treatment to German internees at No.1 'B' Camp and is paid from public funds for the work. I do not therefore recommend Oberlieutenant Scherrett's application to visit Mr. Keenan."⁴

That the Adjutant, Curragh Command, M. Gibben informed the Camp Commandant that Scherrett's parole application to go to the local dance was not granted; the reasons being that he had not honoured his previous obligations and had no reasonable explanation for his lateness. This was in effect a withdrawal of his local parole extension and therefore terminated his application to attend the Dublin dentist. This did not deter Scherrett, as on July 3rd 1945, he wrote a report himself to go to 'the highest authority possible. His plea was thus;

² Letter from Kaptaen-lieutenant Quendenfeldt to officer commanding, Curragh Command, 24 May 1945.
³ Letter from Camp Commandant, J. Guiney to officer commanding, Curragh Command, 22 June 1945.
⁴ ibid.
"The duty officer, Captain Roache informed me on 2 July that my application for staying in Dublin from the 4th to the 6th July for dental treatment was turned down with the remark that there was a local dentist whom I could consult. On behalf of this I have to state the following.

In the Autumn of 1944 I consulted the army dentist in the Curragh Camp in order to get a bridge repaired which I had since eight years and which was broken. He informed me that he could not do it because he had only permission to make bridges when seven or more teeth are missing. After consulting the medical officer in our camp, Captain O'Neill, I decided to go to a dentist in Dublin in order to get my teeth repaired. Since half a year I am in dental treatment of J. Keenan...., the cost I have paid myself.

So I ask you once more for permission for the 4th to the 6th of July or three other following days as soon as possible as the dentist requires three days for finishing the bridge, and he asked me to come to town the three following days mentioned above. By my staying in town I would save two bus fares (14/-)."5

Scherrett’s report was recommended by Quendenfeldt and was handed on accordingly. Permission was hence granted from 07:00hrs, 31 July to 23:59hrs, 2 August. The urgency in Scherrett’s requests could have possibly been due to the fact that the Germans were shortly due to be repatriated.

While in hospital it requested by an internee that he should not have signed out on parole as he was still under detention there being a guard outside his room. It was pointed out to him that had he or anyone not signed out on parole in such a case there would be a risk of temptation to feign serious illness and when a suitable opportunity arose effect his escape. Many complaints were made about the system as it was expected to be what it in fact wasn’t. The curtailment of parole was a common form of punishment for internees so as to

5 Letter from Oberlieutenant Scherrett to officer commanding, Curragh Command, 3 July 1945.
send home a point made by the commandant. If parole was breached constantly by a number of internees and their commanding officer wasn't prepared to do anything about it, it was not uncommon to have parole stopped for a period. The Germans were frequenters at this and although the Irish authorities were adverse to creating any disturbances in the German camp they didn't hold back when disallowing parole. The Allied prisoners being prone to escaping were to fall foul to this form of punishment as well on occasion. A point brought up by the senior German officer, Mollenhauer was the accusation that internees were being watched by detectives while on parole. A point neither proven nor disproven. But the most common complaint of all was the size of the parole area. It was too small and trips to Dublin were too few.

With such a liberal parole system it was not uncommon for members of both belligerent powers to meet outside of the camp in a social setting. More often than not they would ignore each other, but on occasion there would be tension and conflicts. A Polish internee was attacked by two Germans on one occasion while several Allied internees chased and attacked two Germans. Reports of all incidents were made and those guilty were reprimanded.

In the months of April and May 1945 there arose a most severe disturbance within the camp arising from the issue of parole. What resulted was the near destruction of the fabrique of society which had prevailed in the camp during the period, and the collapse of the German chain of command. A letter from Colonel John Flynn to the Minister of Defence. June 5 1945, stated;

"Sir,

I have the honour to set here under particulars of recent difficulties with belligerent Internees in the Curragh Camp regarding which I made verbal report some days ago. On the 19th instant, Colonel Powell, Officer Commanding, Curragh Command was called upon by Reverend Father Doyle, Parish
Priest Naas, who stated that the Catholic internees in the German camp were being victimised.⁶

Father Doyle then continued to give an account of events involving the internee officers and the enlisted internees.

According to Father Doyle, a Private Emmerich was prevented from leaving the camp on Easter Sunday because it was known to Kaptaen-Lieutenant Quendenfeldt, German Commanding Officer, That he was due to attend a religious service in Naas. A parade was held that Sunday morning on Quendenfeldt’s orders.

".....with the express purpose of preventing German internees from attending their religious duties. During this parade the Senior Internee Officer referred to Irish Officers and Catholic Priests in a disrespectful manner."⁷

So alleged Father Doyle, who also stated that the previous methods of control, that is the recognition of rank on longer existed and that the Irish Government were going to have to deal with the problem soon. He pointed out that Quendenfeldt was an extreme anti-Catholic and that he, Father Doyle would take this matter to higher Church Authorities in the defence of the German Catholics.

During the conversation it was also mentioned that along with the above grievances there were others that included the return of a comrade in a solitary prison and the mismanagement of funds in the camp. Due to lack of information available on the prisoner, I cannot give an account of what happened, but regarding the mismanagement of money, it was believed that the officers were putting profits made in their mess aside for their own personal use. At this stage I must note that all Father Doyle’s information came from one biased source, internee Private Emmerich; a fellow Catholic.

Following this discussion with Father Doyle, Colonel Powell then carried out his own investigation into the matter. In doing so he found

⁶ Letter from Col. John Flynn to the Minister of Defence, 5 June 1945.
⁷ ibid.
that on 30 April an application of parole was made by Emmerich through Kaptaen-Lieutenant Quendenfeldt to the Curragh Command, asking for a long leave of four days. Emmerich had received an invitation from Father Doyle to come to Naas to participate in the Choir during Easter. Investigating this further through the Gardai in Naas, Colonel Powell was confirmed this and was satisfied that Father Doyle was interested in the internee on a purely religious basis. Probably why he put up such a vigorous defence for the private when corresponding with the Colonel and why he attacked the German Commanding Officer in the manner in which he did.

It was decided on receipt of the parole application that any duties Emmerich was to give to the choir could be completed within the ordinary parole hours each day. Emmerich's parole would have taken into account the time it would take to journey there and back, and he would have been allocated enough time to carry out his duty. Emmerich, however was not satisfied. Having failed to secure his four day special parole he went to see Quendenfeldt and told him that the Officer Commanding, Curragh Command (O.C.C.C.) was anxious that he should go to Naas and carry out the request of Father Doyle. Quendenfeldt discussed this with the O.C.C.C. and discovered that Emmerich had lied and as a consequence, the private was confined to camp on Easter Sunday; a disciplinary measure against subordination and devoid of any religious motives.

The contentious Easter Sunday parade held by Quendenfeldt started at 10:00 hours and finished at 10:37 hours, giving the internees enough time to get to their respective masses. What Quendenfeldt wanted to do was drill them on the importance of fulfilling their parole obligations. They had been defaulting in this respect and it was possible that they might lose this privilege altogether. As it was difficult to get all of them together due to many of them being of the camp during the week, Sunday was seen as the
most appropriate time. It just so happened that Emmerich had been confined to camp on this day. Also;

"....in discussing this [Emmerich] tried to drive home very forcibly that the parade was held in order to prevent the men from attending to their religious duties." 8

Such was not the case, as at 10:40 hours the men were free to leave the camp in time for local mass.

Emmerich's statements can have very little credibility, stated Colonel Flynn, as his conduct since internment was not satisfactory. Including assault and theft among the civilian population, Emmerich was responsible for the loss of over £70 worth of camp property. He has also been a habitual absentee over a period of one year on his parole record, with his longest period, 9 hours 30 minutes resulting in his punishment by his own officers. This accounted for the enmity towards Quendenfeldt.

"On the 20th instant, the Command officer Commanding granted Kaptaen-Lieutenant Quendenfeldt and Kaptaen Bendt an interview at which the former stated that the N.C.O. internees no longer recognised the authority of their officers, that he, Quendenfeldt would now relinquish control and that all officers desired to be removed from the camp as they felt they were in danger." 9

The reasons given by the Senior Internee Officers were as follows: A Communist element was in the ascendancy in the camp. It was mentioned that Emmerich and three other N.C.O.s were the ring leaders and that control was on longer possible as orders were not being carried out and finally any efforts to punish those responsible would only aggravate the trouble as far s the officers were concerned. Quendenfeldt requested alternative accommodation for his officers and washed his hands of the affair.

A military guard was then placed on the officers quarters to protect the German officers against any other subordinate action and in hope

8 ibid.
9 ibid.
that the problem would be solved with the camp then returning to its original state. An announcement made by Colonel Flynn to speed up the return to order was that;

".....the desire of the officers to pass up control and.....that the N.C.O.s considered there should be no officers, it was represented to Quendenfeldt that if there were no officers naturally there would be no N.C.O.s and would be no one to give parole."\(^{10}\)

To enforce this, it was decided to suspend all parole temporarily for those internees not working outside the camp.

On the night of the 22 May, five N.C.O.s tried to force their way into Emmerich's quarters but were almost immediately stopped by military police. Once identified the N.C.O.s were paraded in front of the Curragh Commanding Officer and an explanation was requested of them. They expressed regret and said that they intended to give Emmerich a fright, not to hurt him, as they believed his conduct was responsible for the suspension of their parole. The following morning Kaptaen-Lieutenant Quendenfeldt;

".....made representations to the Command Officer Commanding for the removal of the police guard on the officers quarters as he then believed that their was no further danger either to himself or his officers."\(^{11}\)

It was then suggested that as the disturbances were now seemingly over that Quendenfeldt and his officers resume formal military control within the camp. This was agreed to on condition that the four named N.C.O.s be dealt with in an appropriate manner. Also, Quendenfeldt was not to be a party to any discrimination against the N.C.O.s and that he should work in close collaboration with the camp Commandant if any difficulties arose. The Kaptaen-Lieutenant accepted and the four N.C.O.s were remanded and warned of any more similar action. Emmerich still pleaded that he had been discriminated against over religious beliefs. Two others expressed loyalty to

\(^{10}\) ibid.
\(^{11}\) ibid.
their officers while the forth remained quiet. He had no English and didn't understand what was going on.

In the event of any further similar outbursts, it was suggested by the Colonel and agreed by his superior that coercive action would be taken and that those responsible would be held in the 'Glass House'. The only condition was that event would be an extreme case. Such was the severity of the incident.

Many of the parole applications I came across were usually requests for internees asking for permission to attend local dances in the general parole area. Often special parole applications would extend to Dublin or else where around the country. Only officers were also granted this privilege, having honoured previous parole time-tables. Strange requests were made and the parole system was often stretched. On one occasion the wife of a British pilot Sergeant Sutherland was to arrive at Newbridge from England in June 1943. He requested special parole to be allowed to stay out for three to four nights a week. It was granted. Also parole was requested for the marriage and honeymoon of several of the internees. Two internees were even allowed to visit sick relatives in England. They all came back to the camp.

One officer who didn't return was P.O. Paul Webester who escaped through a fortunate incident. The parole officer when marking his name on the form actually marked someone else's. He went straight to Belfast. Towards the end of the war an internee football team requested permission to be allowed to travel to Dublin to play a local team there. Their request was denied as they were due to be repatriated within the week.
CHAPTER SIX

ESCAPE

Just like their continental and cinematic counterparts Ireland's Allied internees were prone to attempting and succeeding in their bids for freedom. As for the German internees in Ireland and German POW's in Allied camps they just gave up. A very small minority, in comparison to the British and Americans even attempted to escape. They literally sat the remainder of the war out, resigned to their fate.

The first successful Allied escape from the Curragh came at 0025 hrs on 26 June 1941 when nine British Internees escaped from 'B' internment camp. What had happened was that two N.C.O.s had just returned to the camp from a visit to their legation and feigned drunkardness when approaching the camp gate. One then fell to the ground complaining of a sore stomach and began to scream. With this a number of internees ran from their huts, pouncing on the policeman at the gate and one at the billets. They them obtained the keys to the gate and ran through it. Three of these internees grabbed the policeman outside the gate, preventing him closing it and drawing his revolver. Meanwhile two internees on their way to send a wire attacked the compound guard immobilising him. At this stage all guards in the vicinity were apprehended and the nine British airmen escaped; Pilot Officers Verity, Welpey, Proctor, Mayhew, Flight Officers Ward, Holgate, Covington, Cowper and Sergeant Hobbs.

3 C.P.973. K/P/18. J.B. Holgate. ibid.
4 C.P.973. K/P/18. J.B. Holgate. ibid.
In response an immediate search was set up and the area was cordoned of with the assistance of the Local Defence Force, Local Security Force and An Garda Síochána. Three of the internees were returned, Covington, Ward and Welpey, the following day on the 27th. Although it was argued that the internees had misused the parole procedures by exploiting the situation at the gate and thus rendering their escape void, the six who succeeded were not return. Col. McNally suspended all parole applications until the matter had been cleared up.⁵

Covington, who was involved in the previous breakout was again involved in this second attempt. Himself and P.O. Calder⁶ attempted to leave the camp without signing a parole form, early January 1942. Calder distracted the guard while Covington made a dash across the wire. Covered by a guard on the far side he surrendered but Calder, seeing this shouted to him to, "...go ahead buddy, they can't shoot you; their orders are not to shoot you."⁷ He ran and succeeded in getting outside the compound but was captured by military staff approaching the compound and returned to his quarters. The main point at issue was that the internees had established that they were not to be shot when attempting to escape; information probably obtained from their Consulate. This put the staff jeopardy of losing control over the inmates, not having a force of deterrent to implement when necessary. The question was put; whether to shoot escaping internees or not. Rather than face some perilous diplomacy with the British government it was suggested that the guards be equipped with batons and given the authority to use them vigorously in the event of an escape attempt. Also it was requested that more manpower be granted to man extra posts.⁸

⁴ C.P. 875. F.O. A.R. Covington. ibid.
⁵ Extract from a file detailing irregularities in 'B' Camp; 26 June 1941. P.M. 712/1.
⁶ C.P. 1053. K/P/29. Pilot Officer John P. Calder RCAF. M.a.CBB.
⁷ P.M. 712/1. 7 January 1942. ibid.
The German internees were witness to the incident and commented on the attitude to the escapee. Both belligerents were constantly on the watch to ensure that neither got preferential treatment over the other. Being so close together this gave rise to constant suspicion. On 9 February 1942 their suspicions were relaxed when a mass escape attempt was stopped. All the Allied internees were involved except for one of the Poles who was on parole. They had prefabricated ladders and wire cutting equipment and smoke screen material. However well prepared they were they failed. This time the escapees were overpowered by their guards using their batons. Four of the internees were treated for minor injuries. In the report compiled by Commandant J. Guiney, (No. 1 Internment Camp), he stated that the situation on K-Lines was becoming extremely difficult with the Allied prisoners causing a number of disturbances and that if the German and IRA prisoners in the political camp\(^9\) co-ordinated in causing a disturbance there wouldn't have been enough men on call to cope. He was of the opinion that both camps be divorced of one another and under entirely different administration. Also there was a problem with internees bringing into the camp escape material as how else would they have acquired the smoke screen material. All internees were to be searched before entering the camp when coming off parole.

The results of a meeting held in response of the commandants recommendations were as follows. Both British and German camps were to be searched periodically. The parole form was to be uniform for both camps and they were to be separated from No. 3 Internment camp. Privileges were to be withdrawn in the event of another escape attempt, and visitors were restricted to diplomatic and sick visits. But yet again the Allied internees continued to attempt

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\(^9\) There had been a political camp situated on the Curragh since the thirties and held IRA internees, known as No. 3 Internment Camp.
escape. On 17 August 1942 thirteen men made another daring escape in three
groups and again officers Covington and Calder were among those in attempt.
Eleven were eventually captured including the above mentioned airmen after a
cordon was set up using six battalions a motor squadron and units from the
Gardai covering an area of fifty square miles.\textsuperscript{10}

Pilot Officer Wolfe was the most famous escapee, having
successfully executed his escape and was then returned to the Curragh. He had
signed out on parole but returned to get his gloves. On leaving the second time
he didn't sign a second parole form. The officer on the gate was aware of this.
Wolfe then technically off parole left for Northern Ireland. When he arrived he
explained his method of escape but was told that he in fact broke parole and
must return. It was stated by the Irish authorities that to have come off parole he
should have signed in first before leaving the second time.

The only German to escape from the camp was Konrad Neymeyr,
a lieutenant in the German airforce.\textsuperscript{11} With the help of one of his crew, Krupp,
Neymeyr succeeded in evading the signing of parole. This success was due
mainly to the fact that the Irish Camp authorities practised as a rule giving the
least possible inconvenience to the Germans due to their good conduct and their
taking exception to any undue restrictions. They were hence to be treated with
the same constraints as the British internees. A search was then made of the
general area including the picture house with no success. Then the parole forms
were checked and it was then noticed that Neymeyr had not signed one. He had
made a successful escape. He got as far as boarding a ship and was outside the
port of Lisbon in Portugal when he was caught and finally ended up in an
English POW camp; a good deal less comfortable than his previous home.

\textsuperscript{10} P.M. 712/1. 17 August 1942. M.a. CBB.
\textsuperscript{11} C.P. 850. K. Neymeyr.
Over the period of internment there were a number of belligerents who were sent home due to serious illness. One such case was in fact a successful escape bid by Jack Calder. He had been involved in all the previous attempts and was determined to get out. What Calder did was swallowed iodine and feign a suicide attempt. His diplomatic representative, Kearney didn't know what he was doing but managed to persuade the Irish authorities that it was a genuine suicide attempt. Calder was released June 1943. In fact had he waited he may have been released some months later in October when most of the 45 Allied internees were released. Once released Calder, a journalist was warned not to write about his Irish experience as the Commonwealth ministers were in negotiation with the Irish Government to release the rest of the Allied internees.

When a badly damaged Liberator landed in Galway carrying six high ranking officers, and were released, Hempel was annoyed at the behaviour of the Irish Government. He was told that the plane and its passengers were released as they were normal passenger traffic and thus non-operational and that this was behaviour practised by Switzerland and Sweden, more so to the benefit of Germany considering the proximity of their countries. Hempel had further grounds for compliant when he learned that Allied mechanics were brought over in civilian clothes to help get Allied aircraft back into the air. Violation of Irish air space by the RAF in pursuit of German planes was another bone of contention which Hempel addressed. It was said by Henning Thomsen, Hempel’s secretary that the Irish authorities were letting the British escape. The German Legation accused the Government of breaking their policy of neutrality and expected similar treatment. This was impractical for Ireland to do yet DeValera had inquired among the Allies to its feasibility but was turned down. His attitude towards internment though had definitely relaxed, in favour of the

Allies who were winning the war. Both Maffey and Kearney had finally persuaded DeValera to release a number of the internees. These were to have been on 'non-operational flights to qualify for release; they numbered thirty-three, leaving eleven still interned. These were transferred to a camp in Gormonston where they continued as before, constantly attempting escape. It was said by Hempel that this move was to make convenient the release of the remainder of the internees it being closer to the border.

On 1 May it was reported that a tunnel was found in No. 4 Internment Camp. Two internees, Wing officer Reid and Flight officer Holloway, were being observed by Captain Sutton of the Camp guard. The two were approaching a door and trying not to be seen entered with a key the vacant sleeping area marked on the diagram below. Captain Sutton then detailed a party to assist him in his search and apprehension of the two. The detail entered the compound and proceeded to the under portion of the hut, where, using torches, they caught Reid distributing earth from the tunnel. Holloway was requested to surface, which he did and the key was thus handed over. The two were then allowed to retire to their quarters. On searching the tunnel Captain Sutton recovered, a kit bag for carrying earth, one screwdriver for digging, one dry and one wet battery, a coil of flex and a bicycle lamp to light the tunnel. He then had the tunnel opened and then closed, a task which took about five hours. What usually happened was the Irish guards would let the internees dig so as to keep them occupied and before they reached their objective close it. No internee escaped through a tunnel.

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14 Duggan, pp. 220-222.
15 Taken from a report by Captain J. Sutton, 1 May 1944.
A indicates point presently reached
B indicates outer point of defence wire
Approx. distance from A to B = 10 pards
With the invasion of Europe DeValera had the remaining internees released, this happening on 8 June 1944. It was a move precipitated by the Allied success and the fact that there was no fear of German retaliation.
CHAPTER SEVEN

GERMAN NAVAL INTERNEES

In October 1943 there was an attack on the Irish Ship, S.S Kerlogue. Dr. Hempel reported that the ammunition fragments found were British. They, however had admitted the fact and paid compensation to the sailors. At the end of December the same ship frustrated attempts by the British to pick up German survivors of a naval battle that had occurred in the Bay of Biscay. The Kerlogue had been in International waters and picked up 164 survivors from the battle and brought them to Cork. Two of the survivors died on the Kerlogue while on the way. Up to this point there had only been Allied and German airmen in the internment camp. This influx had brought naval personnel to Ireland and tripled the number of internees at the Curragh and the problems of administration. On their arrival to Curragh Command the vacated British No. two camp was prepared to accommodate them.¹ There were now two German internment camps on the Curragh.

Hauptmann Kurt Mollenhauer up to this point had been Senior internee officer but with his arrival, Kaptaenleutnant Quendenfeldt, most senior officer among the survivors was to spend the next twenty months as senior internee officer.

The following document is the transcription of a meeting held to regulate for the new camp and to address problems which arose and complaints made by Mollenhauer on behalf of his men. Mollenhauer had in fact on several

¹ C.P. 796. M.a CBB
occasions submitted lists of complaints. On the birthday of Adolf Hitler they were not allowed to hoist their flag; they made a formal complaint and did so any way. On one occasion Mollenhauer had ordered his men not to attend a certain cinema in the area because it was showing "untruthful Anglo-American propaganda against Germany".² He wanted to know why such an unneutral act was being carried out in a military encampment in a neutral country. Although it has been noted that the Germans were quite satisfied with their treatment on inspection of the following section it will become clear that all was not well in the internment camp. It is not surprising that there were problems considering the scope of the camp, the liberties allowed, the informalities bestowed upon the inmates and coupled with the fact that these were soldiers no longer involved in the conflict which was at this time ravaging their home land the situation was a delicate one in the hands of the Irish Government.

The following document is reprinted by kind permission of the Military Archives, Cathal Brugha Barracks.

² C/229. M.a CCB.
1. **Purpose of Meeting.**

The meeting was held for the consideration of a number of matters arising out of the recent internment of 164 members of the German Navy rescued at sea by the K.V. "Kerlogue."

2. **Draft Standing Orders for Internment Camp.**

Draft Standing Orders for the new German Internment Camp at the Curragh were submitted by the Adjutant General. They were very fully discussed and were approved in the form attached. The Minister intimated that in conjunction with the Chief of Staff and a representative of the Department of External Affairs, he proposed to discuss the settled draft with An Taoiseach.

3. **Specific Matters relating to Standing Orders.**

The following matters, in particular, were discussed in connection with the draft Orders:

**Paragraph 1. Senior Internee Officer.** Mr. Boland mentioned that it is hoped that Kapt.-Lt. Quedenfeldt will be the senior internee officer. On that basis, the meeting considered that from the outset he should be availed of in the manner indicated in sub-paragraph 1(a) of the draft Rules.

**Paragraph 2. Medical Examination.** The Minister enquired whether, under international practice, the internees could object to medical examination. The representatives of the Department of External Affairs were of opinion that, generally, no such objection would be raised or could be sustained.

**Paragraph 7. Routine.** The meeting considered that the hour which may be prescribed for the extinguishing of lights in quarters should be strictly enforced, except in the cases of internees who are granted 'late' parole.

**Paragraph 8. Fuel, etc.** It was agreed that, in future, coal would not be issued for heating purposes and that issues for this purpose would be confined to turf and wood. The question of providing for additional issues in exceptional cases was considered but it was agreed that
such a provision would be undesirable. Colonel McNally referred to the fact that on a number of occasions, the German Internes had represented the necessity in their cases for extra food and fuel in view of the severity of the climate. Mr. Boland pointed out, however, that the German Government had already decided against food issues to the Internes in excess of the rations prescribed for the Defence Forces. He felt certain that neither the German Government nor Minister would object to the terms of paragraph 8.

Paragraph 16. Employment. Arising out of this paragraph, Mr. Boland stated that the German Minister and Kapt.-Lt. Quedenfeldt are most anxious that the new Internes should have sufficient work to keep them occupied. On the question of their employment for Army purposes (a number of them being machinists, etc.) the Chief of Staff intimated that he would not altogether favour such a course owing to the possibility of undesirable contacts with members of the Defence Forces being created. The Minister felt that, to some extent, this could be obviated by segregation.

As regards outside employment, it was mentioned that a number of the present Internes had accepted employment for a short time from the Turf Development Board and that a few of them had also been employed by private individuals within the parole area. The Minister stated that the employment of the large number of Internes now in custody involves questions of policy. Mr. Boland pointed out that licences would have to be obtained from the Department of Industry and Commerce by prospective employers, the Internes being aliens. It was agreed that any applications from the Internes to seek or accept employment would be considered on their merits as they arose.

Paragraph 17. Postal Censorship. Colonel McNally referred to the fact that Hauptmann Mollenhauer has consistently argued that the Internes cannot be obliged to submit all outgoing correspondence for censorship and that while he does not object to the examination of letters addressed abroad, he is unwilling that local correspondence addressed to friends should be censored. Both Colonel Bryan and Colonel McNally stated that they are aware that Internes are posting letters while on parole.

Mr. Boland put forward to the meeting the requirement contained in Swedish Regulations that Internes must not send or receive uncensored communications and stated that, in the view of his Department, there is ample international precedent for the application of a similar regulation to Internes in this country. The Minister enquired whether there is any evidence that the uncensored correspondence being posted by the Internes is of a dangerous nature. He felt that it might be undesirable unnecessarily to make a regulation which, in the first place, it would be difficult to enforce and, secondly, breaches of which would have to be punished, thus giving rise to discontent and ill-feeling on the part of the Internes. Colonel Bryan was of opinion that in certain circumstances, uncensored internal correspondence could become an embarrassing problem. It was eventually agreed that an
Paragraph 16, Parole. Mr. Boland intimated that the procedure set out in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) are acceptable in principle in so far as his Department is concerned. As regards sub-paragraph (c), he will enquire from the German Minister whether parole may be accepted from the naval non-commissioned officers.

In connection with sub-paragraph (c), the question of the grant of overnight parole to internees on the occasion of visits to Dublin was discussed. Mr. Boland recalled that while originally the German Minister and Government had not favoured the granting of this privilege which had been sought on behalf of the internees by their senior officer, Herr Hempel had recently asked that it be favourably considered and the Minister for Defence had been disposed to accede to the request. The matter, of course, now assumed a different aspect in the light of the big increase in the number of internees.

The Chief of Staff advanced the view that, without any specific provision being made in the Camp Orders, it might be left to the discretion of the Camp Commandant, if the senior internee officer co-operated with him in the administration of the new Camp, to grant the privilege of overnight parole to officers whenever he thought fit. Mr. Boland did not favour this suggestion as he considered that if it became known that the Camp Commandant possessed a discretionary power, it was likely that there would be continuous pressure brought to bear on the German Minister by the internees to seek the granting of the privilege in cases in which the Camp Commandant or the senior military authorities would not consider such a course desirable. He felt that it would be preferable that there should be a definite provision, no matter how restricted, in the Camp Orders.

The Minister stated that he would discuss the matter with An Taoiseach generally and with particular reference to the cases of the four Luftwaffe internees who desire to come to Dublin for the purpose of study at University College.

It was mentioned that, in a number of cases, internees were believed to have broken parole by proceeding outside the permitted parole area. It was agreed, at the request of Mr. Boland, that in all future cases of this nature, the facts will be immediately conveyed to the Department of External Affairs so that they may be reported to the internees' diplomatic representative. This will not affect the question of the imposition of appropriate punishment by way of curtailment or restriction of privileges, which may be proceeded with, once the facts are established, without awaiting the result of the diplomatic representations.

Visitation of New Camp by German Minister.

Mr. Boland stated that the German Minister had requested permission to visit the new Camp before the internees are transferred from Cork. Hauptmann Mollenhauer had represented
to the Minister that the accommodation is unsatisfactory
and he desires to be in a position to refute that allegation.

The Taoiseach and Minister for Defence propose to inspect the
Camp during the next week-end and it was agreed that immediately
afterwards, and before the internees are transferred, the German
Minister will be afforded an opportunity of visiting it.

5. Approximate Date of Transfer of Internees from Cork.

It was stated by Colonel McNally that the Camp would be ready for
occupation towards the middle of next week. It was agreed that
Kapt.-Lt. Quadenfeldt, a second officer and some non-commissioned
officers would be brought from Cork in advance of the general
transfer so that they could become acquainted with the lay-out,
etc. of the Camp. The Kapt.-Lt., would then return to Cork so as to
travel with his men to the Camp.

It was stated by the Minister that a period of month or
six weeks from the date of occupation of the new Camp should be
permitted to elapse before the Luftwaffe internees at No. 2 Camp
are transferred.

It was agreed that in the organisation of the new Camp, a
local arrangement should be made whereby an internee officer
will at all times be present in the Camp in a position
approximating to that of Orderly Officer.


It was stated by Mr. Boland that as funds are not available to
the German Minister, it may be anticipated that a request will
be made that this Department should pay and clothe the internees
(including those of the Luftwaffe) for the duration of their period
of internment. Ordinarily claims for the refund of expenditure
of this nature are not met until hostilities have concluded but
the Department of External Affairs will consider suggesting to the
German Minister that amounts equivalent to the expenditure
incurred will be placed to the credit of this country by the
German Government in Swiss francs at Geneva, according as claims
are submitted from time to time.

It was stated that, at the end of last week, the following
sums had been made available by this Department, at the request
of the German Minister, through the Department of External Affairs,
to the internees at Cork:

                      Each Officer - £2.
                      Each Warrant Officer - £1.
                      All other ranks - 15/-.

Mr. Boland will ascertain from the German Minister whether he
desires that any further payments should be made this week-end.

It was also stated that arrangements had been made by this
Department, following a request by the German Minister to the
Department of External Affairs, for the supply of civilian
clothing to the internees.

Colonel McNally stated that the German internees had earned
£400 in the manufacture of toys which they sold at Christmas and
that a refund of £700 approximately had been made to them by
the Revenue Commissioners in respect of duty on cigarettes.
Forth of this money has been divided by Hauptman Mollenhauer
between the internees in sums of £5 to £7 each and the remainder
has been lodged in a bank.

Mr. Boland stated that he would bring this position to the notice of the German Minister. A discussion followed on the undesirability of the internes having such large sums of money available to them. The question of making a rule to limit the amount which internes might have in their possession at any time was discussed but it was considered that there were many practical difficulties in the implementation of such a rule.

7. Application of New Orders to British Internes.

It was agreed that Camp Orders similar to those proposed for the German Internment Camp should be applied in the British Internment Camp.

8. Translation of Camp Orders for German Camp.

It was agreed that the Camp Orders for the German Camp should be translated into German for the information of the internes. This will be arranged by Colonel Bryan in conjunction with the Department of External Affairs. It was also decided that copies of Orders should be displayed in each hut.
CHAPTER EIGHT

HOME!

On the afternoon of 30 July 1945 Commandant James Guiney approached the internee officer Kapitaenleutnant Quendenfeldt and discussed the return of the German internees to their homeland and questioning as to where in Germany's four zones they were going.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zone</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian zone</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American zone</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British zone</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French zone</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Quendenfeldt was advised to make provision for the disposal of personal property of all men to which he agreed to do.

On the following day they met again. This time the Commandant had the arrangements by which the internees were to travel. All Germans internees were to leave within the fortnight and to either the British or American zones of occupation. They were to be treated as honourable demobilised soldiers and were not to be transferred to any other zone unless by free will and consent of the individual. Unteroffizer Kurt Kyck's wife could not travel with him but follow him later. Also, no bicycles were to be taken. The German officer requested for each internee to be given an identity card by the Irish government with accompanying documentation to certify that they were non-belligerent.

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1 Taken from a report to Army Intelligence from Commandant J. Guiney, 28 August 1945.
internees in Ireland. This was granted.²

All internees on parole in Dublin were then notified to return to camp by 7 August. Several didn't and others were breaking parole. On 8 August all present were informed of their imminent return to Germany. There was then a number of requests by the internees to return to Dublin to wind up their personal affairs. A forty-eight hour parole was granted and subsequently abused by several officers. On the 11 August parole was ceased. Commandant Guiney however put at the disposal of the internees couriers to get messages out to friends etc. Traders and tailors were also allowed to enter the camp to contract sales. An Irish Red Cross Representative, Mrs E. Ceannt called to the camp and donated £842.0.0 to be distributed to the internees; £5 to each officer and £3 to other ranks.³ The anxiety of the Red Cross for the safety of the internees on their return to Germany especially to the Russian zone was also expressed.

Prior to departure, the following items were issued to the internees:
One new pair of army boots, a new clothing bag, knife, fork, spoon, mug, plate, one army blanket, ground sheet, three ounces of carbolic soap and seventy-two hours iron rations. Three internees were married within the final three days of internment and final travel instructions were delivered to the internees. The Department of External Affairs were trying to make available German Marks for them.

Chaos reigned in the camp as the officers were unwilling to maintain order. Their billets were turned inside out in the rush to get ready to leave. The Irish authorities had deliberately held back so as not to cause any friction, but it was expected that the camp be handed over in the state in which it was received. It was not. The internees, having been informed that they were to depart at midnight fell into order and were then taken to Dublin and handed over to the Escort in charge of S.S. St. Andrew at Alexandra Basin, Dublin at

² ibid.
³ ibid.
0900 hours, on 13 August 1945.4

There were twelve internees not travelling. Three, George Fleischmann, Arthur Klanke, Bruno Arndt, were in hospital and would travel as soon as they had recovered. Alfred Heinzl having been registered as an alien in Ireland was detained at the Curragh until 29 August. Eight others had decided that they didn’t want to return. Over the next eight months the eight internees were apprehended and detained at Arbour Hill Detention Barracks. Erich Kruger and Kurt Nitz were apprehended in Co. Galway at the home of a Fianna Fail T.D. on 27 September 1945 while Bruno Hullman was captured in Grafton St. earlier that month.5 The last German to leave was Hans Beigel who was arrested at Ballsbridge in Dublin, transferred to Arbour Hill and almost immediately, handed over to a British representative on 6 April 1946.

Home for the millions of German POWs taken and held by the Belligerent forces and indeed those interned by the Neutral powers was the end of a long process that began with being moved to a ‘tent city’ some housing close to 30'000 German Soldiers per city. Then came a process of de-Nazification which took a considerable amount of time as the ardent Nazis were not keen to show themselves. When it came to actually going home to their families the German Soldier was not guaranteed that his family or home was to have survived the intensive Allied bombing or the rigorous house to house fighting of the last days of the war. Many of them, probably realising the fate and changes that awaited them in their home land, especially in the Russian Sector, wished to stay. None were allowed remain on in Ireland yet some returned, getting work, marrying and settling down in the country which played host to them as POWs during the Second World War.

4 ibid.
5 Irish Times, 27 September 1945.
Irish Historiography is an expanding and exciting discipline constituting the uncovering of Ireland's past as it was written down. The unearthing of such information that would detail Irish history is of course what makes written Irish history continually fresh and it is this which is of immense importance to the work of the history scholar. The inclusion of a bibliography in published works is a significant record of the primary material used by the author while writing on a subject. It details the material reviewed by the author, the sources deemed necessary in writing and carrying out research on that particular subject, and the manuscripts or documents available when carrying out that research. Its contribution to Irish Historiography is such that the material not previously documented is now a written record in its own right.

Untouched and slowly browning was the condition I found the Curragh 'Internment Camp Documents' in the Military Archives, situated in Cathal Brugha Barracks. This collection constitutes much of the evidence of Ireland's diplomatic manoeuvres when dealing with the opposing powers and hence are reflected in the eventual treatment of the internees.

Securely stored in a large warehouse-type room are the written remains of Irish military bureaucracy. The 'Curragh Files' are, like most everything else boxed in cardboard containers, and generally not catalogued. There are about nine of these containers, five of which were available to me for my research. In each of the containers there rests a melee of disintegrating filed papers associated with the administration of the camp and related incidents. Due to age and neglect resulting from financial restrain, what were once probably well ordered accounts of the Internment Camps inner machinations are now a mess. Although there were labels on some of the containers, and the personal files seemed to have retained there's, information didn't
always correspond with the title of the file under scrutiny. In this section of my bibliography I give a complete list of the titles of the files available and a summary of what is inside them. This I believe is historiographically significant as never before have these documents been recorded for reference. In the Military Archives itself they are progressively compiling a computer catalogue for reference and therefore my list will soon be out dated, however I hope my work will be more accessible to the historians of this period; Ireland's Emergency.

The excitement of finding material not yet used in a published work is immeasurable, especially in a chosen area of study. The research began; Administrative Correspondence.

Various department of the military were usually involved in Administrative Correspondence. The Provost Marshal's office dealt with the Irish 'Military Police' and in file: P.M. 712/1 (No. 2 file) with the escape and attempted escape of British internees. Correspondences passed between the Provost Marshal's office in Parkgate Street, Dublin and the Internment Camp on such incidents. Other issues under the heading of security were parole, P.M. 733/P, detention, P.M. 1785 and censorship, P.M. 733/C.

The first major block of files were the personal files of the German internees. Beginning with C.P. 779 each file detailed the accounts of internment and repatriation. Although 262 German Air and Naval personnel landed in Neutral Ireland, I didn't see all there files, in fact out of the fifty two Luftwaffe officers interned, I only saw ten of their files. Out of the 210 Naval personnel interned I saw none. The subsequent files encompass the British internees as well. C.P. 878. K/P/4. gives a recorded chronological account of the internment and escape of William Allen Proctor who escaped to Scotland. C.P. 994. K/P/20, details the internment of Maurice Remy, a flying officer with the Free French. The events which are covered are his internment which was on 10 June 1941, and his release was on 1 July 1943. This is documented evidence of the preference given to the Allied internees. The German internees were handed over to the British authorities in August 1945 for repatriation: C.P. 1778.
Other files I unearthed didn't deal with the actual internees but with the regulations surrounding their internment. *M.P./5/15*, covers the regulations of the treatment of prisoners of war under the Emergency Powers Act, 1940. *S/231* is concerned with the problems of Internment, while *76786* covers Diets and Rations.

Although I am only covering the history of the Curragh Camp's 'B' and 'G' Internment Camps, I have, in my bibliography also listed files on the third internment camp for civilians. I will not be examining this aspect of Internment but I did feel it necessary to include them here for historiographical purposes. They were scattered through the last container I examined and were not primarily related to my subject of study; perhaps another time.

The military history of any country also always includes the history of its prisoner of war camps, especially during World War II. The history of events in POW camps in Germany, Britain, the USA, etc. have all been documented, although being belligerents I can understand this. But what makes Ireland's contribution to this historical category unique is the fact that military personnel from both sides were locked up in the same camp. The following bibliography list the events, circumstances and the problems of the history of the Curragh Internment Camp.
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   Admitted from Cork 31 Aug. 1940. Handed over to British Authorities on 13 August 1945.


    Admitted from Cork, 31 Aug. 1940. Handed over to British Authorities on 13 Aug 1945. (Came down in the Faha Mts.).

    Admitted from Cork on 31 Aug 1940. Handed over to British Authorities on 13 Aug. 1945.

    Interned at Curragh 1 Dec. 1940. Absent from 22.00hrs -1 Jan. 1942. [Escaped!]


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APPENDIX

1. STATUTORY RULES AND ORDERS.

2. DRAFT STANDING ORDERS FOR THE GERMAN INTERNEE CAMP, CURRAGH COMMAND.

I, Oscar Traynor, Minister for Defence, in exercise of the powers conferred on me by the Emergency Powers (No.) Order, 194 (S.R. No. of 1941), and of every and any other power me in this behalf enabling, hereby order as follows, that is to say:

1. These Regulations may be cited as the Emergency Powers (No.) Order, 194, (Prisoners of War) (Internment) Regulations, 194. (Protection of Discipline of Prisoners of War) Order 194.

2. In these Regulations -

the expression "the Adjutant General" means the Adjutant General of the Defence Forces;

the expression "the Commandant" means the Officer of the Defence Forces appointed by the Adjutant General to command and administer a camp in which prisoners of war are interned and includes any officer for the time being authorised to act for the Commandant;

the word "prisoner" means a prisoner of war interned in accordance with the Rules of International Law generally accepted with regard to the treatment of prisoners of war;

the expression "Protecting Power" means the State to which the interests in Ireland of the enemy country have been confided for the period of hostilities.

3. (1) Every prisoner on admission to camp shall be required to give his true names and rank or regimental number. He shall be searched in presence of an officer of the Staff of the camp.

(2) No pressure shall be exerted on prisoners of war to obtain information regarding the situation in their armed forces or their country. A prisoner refusing to give such information shall not by reason of such refusal suffer any disadvantages.

(3) If, by reason of his physical or mental condition, a prisoner is incapable of stating his identity, he shall be handed over to the Army Medical Service.

4. Every prisoner shall, as soon as possible after his admission, be separately examined by the Medical Officer, who shall record the state of health of the prisoner on a Medical History Sheet.

5. Every prisoner shall take a bath on reception unless otherwise directed in any particular case by the Commandant.
6. (1) All personal effects of prisoners, including military uniform, clothing and kit, metal helmets, gas-masks, identity tokens, badges of rank, decorations, watches and personal trinkets shall remain their property and in their possession. Army, military equipment and military papers become the property of the State and shall be taken from the prisoners.

(2) Sums of money carried by prisoners of war may only be taken from them on the order of an officer and after the amount has been recorded. A receipt shall be given for them. Sums thus impounded shall be placed to the account of each prisoner.

7. Officer prisoners and persons of equivalent status shall be allowed to retain at any time not more than the equivalent of £5. Non-commissioned officers and men shall be allowed to retain at any time not more than the equivalent of ten shillings. All money in excess of these amounts shall be retained by the Commandant and a strict account kept of same. Arrangements for the transfer by prisoners of credit balances to their country of origin will be the subject of a special instruction.

8. (1) Each camp shall possess an Infirmary. If necessary isolation establishments shall be reserved for prisoners suffering from infectious and contagious diseases. Medical inspections of prisoners shall be arranged once a fortnight, in order to supervise the general state of health and cleanliness, and to detect infectious and contagious diseases. The clothing of prisoners shall at the same time be examined and steps taken to ensure the destruction of vermin.

(2) The Commandant’s duties in regard to the health of prisoners shall be:

(i) the Commandant shall without delay call the attention of the Medical Officer to any prisoner whose state of mind or body appears to require attention, and shall as far as possible carry into effect the written recommendations of the Medical Officer for the alteration of the discipline or treatment of any such prisoner or for the supply of any additional articles to any prisoner on medical grounds;

(ii) the Commandant shall cause to be furnished to the medical Officer daily a list of the prisoners reporting sick in the prison;

(iii) the Commandant shall carry into effect the written recommendations of the Medical Officer for separating from the other prisoners any prisoner labouring or suspected of labouring under any infectious, contagious or mental disease, and shall immediately take steps as may be necessary to prevent the spread of any contagious or infectious disease;

(iv) the Commandant shall daily cause to be furnished to the Medical Officer a list of prisoners under punishment;

(v) the Commandant shall notify to the Chaplain the case of any prisoner whose life is in danger, or
whose state of health in mind or body appears to require his attention;

(v) the Commandant shall on demand by a prisoner who has been medically treated give such prisoner an official statement indicating the nature and duration of his illness and the treatment received;

(vi) the Commandant shall ensure that prisoners have facilities for engaging in physical exercises and obtaining the benefit of being out of doors.

(3) The Medical Officer’s duties in regard to the health of prisoners shall be:

(i) the Medical Officer shall have the general care of the health of the prisoners and shall report to the Commandant any circumstances connected with the camp or the treatment of the prisoners which at any time appear to him to require consideration on medical grounds;

(ii) the Medical Officer shall every day see such prisoners as complain of illness, reporting to the Commandant in writing their fitness or otherwise. He shall daily visit the sick in the Infirmary at such times as may be necessary. He shall attend at once on receiving information of the serious illness of any prisoner;

(iii) the Medical Officer shall once every day or more often, visit every prisoner under punishment or under special discipline or any other prisoners to whom his attention is specially directed;

(iv) the Medical Officer shall frequently examine the washing places, baths, and other provision for purposes of cleanliness and sanitation, and see whether they are in efficient working order and report at once to the Commandant any defect or insufficiency therein;

(v) the Medical Officer shall frequently inspect the food of the prisoners, cooked and uncooked, and shall report to the Commandant as to the quality of the provisions and also as to the sufficiency of clothing, bedding, any deficiency in the quantity or defect in the quality of the water or any other cause which may affect the health of the prisoners;

(vi) the Medical Officer shall record day by day an account of the state of every sick prisoner, the name of his disease, a description of the medicines, diet and any other treatment which he orders for such prisoner;

(vii) the Medical Officer shall report in writing to the Commandant the case of any prisoner to which he thinks it necessary on medical grounds to call attention and shall make such recommendations as he deems needful for the alteration of the discipline or treatment of the prisoner, or for the supply to him of additional articles;

(viii) the Medical Officer shall give notice to the Commandant and the Chaplain when the sickness of any prisoner appears to him to assume an aspect of danger.
(ix) the Medical Officer shall keep a journal; a medical history sheet in the case of every prisoner; a medical case sheet in the case of every sick prisoner and such other documents and records as may be required or as may from time to time be directed by the Adjutant General;

(x) the Medical Officer shall keep such statistical records and furnish such returns relative to the health and medical treatment of prisoners and to the sanitary condition of the camp buildings as may be required;

(xi) the Medical Officer shall report periodically and from time to time as may be required on the general health and sanitary condition of the establishment, the health of the prisoners, and in reference to any other points upon which he may be required to report;

(xii) the Medical Officer shall forthwith on the death of any prisoner enter in his journal the following particulars, viz:- at what time the deceased was taken ill; when the illness was first communicated to the Medical Officer; the nature of the disease; when the prisoner died and an account of the appearance after death (in cases where a post-mortem examination is made), together with any special remarks that appear to him to be required.

9. (1) Officer prisoners and persons of equivalent status shall procure their clothing from the pay given to them and the necessary facilities whether by way of visits from tailors or the officer going out on paroles shall be afforded for this purpose.

(2) Non-commissioned officers and men shall be issued with clothing and necessaries within the scale shown in the Appendix hereto.

(3) Suitable distinguishing marks or signs may be placed on the outside clothing of prisoners of war.

10. (1) Officer prisoners and persons of equivalent status shall procure their food from the pay given to them. The management of a mess by the officers themselves shall be facilitated.

(2) Non-commissioned officers and men shall be provided with rations on the scale of that issued as ordinary rations to soldiers of the Defence Forces.

11. To enable messes to be run and to provide officers' batmen, sufficient soldier prisoners of war shall be detached for service in officers' camps.

12. (1) Officer prisoners and persons of equivalent status will be paid at the rates to be laid down in a special instruction. Soldier prisoners will not be paid unless they become entitled to working pay in accordance with the next paragraph. Working pay shall be at a rate to be laid down in a special instruction.

(2) Prisoners shall not receive pay for work in connection with the administration, interior economy and maintenance of their camps.
13. (1) Officer prisoners and persons of equivalent status shall not be compelled to work. Non-commissioned officers shall only be compelled to undertake supervisory work, but if they expressly ask for remunerative work they may be given it.

(2) The State remains entirely responsible for the maintenance, care, treatment, and payment of working pay of prisoners working for private individuals.

(3) State work required of prisoners will have no direct connection with operations of war; and no work of any kind shall be given which is unhealthy or dangerous or for which a prisoner is physically unsuited.

(4) The duration of the daily work shall not exceed that permitted for civil workers of the locality employed on the same work.

(5) Prisoners working shall be allowed a rest of 24 consecutive hours each week, preferably on Sunday.

14. Prisoners may receive postal parcels containing foodstuffs, other articles for consumption, and clothing. Parcels shall be delivered to the addressees against receipt.

15. Prisoners and camp libraries may receive books, subject to censorship.

16. The use of tobacco by prisoners is allowed.

17. Not later than one week after his arrival in camp, and similarly in case of sickness, each prisoner shall be enabled to send a postcard to his family.

Officer prisoners may send 4 letters and 4 postcards each month.

Other rank prisoners may send 2 letters and 4 postcards each month.

18. Letters, remittances of money or valuables, and postal parcels addressed to or despatched by prisoners shall be exempt from all postal or customs charges but not from charges for carriage by non-government agencies.

19. The censoring of correspondence shall be accomplished as quickly as possible. The examination of postal parcels shall be effected under such conditions as will ensure the preservation of any foodstuffs which they may contain, and, if possible, be done in the presence of the addressee or of a representative duly recognised by him.

20. The Commandant shall keep a Camp Journal; a Register of Prisoners; a punishment book; a property book; and such other books as may be required or from time to time directed.

21. The Commandant or an officer deputed by him shall visit and inspect daily the huts, cells, yards, bakehouse, kitchen, workshops, canteen and latrines.
22. The Commandant shall take every precaution to prevent the escape of prisoners and such force as may be necessary, including the use of firearms, may be resorted to in order to ensure safe custody.

23. A Canteen shall, under approved Contract Conditions, be established in each camp, where prisoners may purchase at the local market price such clothes, books, fruit, food, stationery, tobacco, cigarettes, toilet requisites, games and sports equipment, etc., as may be approved by the Commandant. The profits of the Canteen shall be utilised for the benefit of the prisoners and the fund arising will be administered by the Committee elected by the prisoners and referred to in paragraph 27 below.

24. The organisation of intellectual and sporting pursuits by prisoners shall be facilitated and encouraged.

25. Prisoners shall be permitted complete freedom in the performance of their religious duties, including attendance at the Services of their faith, provided they comply with the routine and police regulations prescribed by the military authorities.

26. (1) Officer prisoners shall salute officers of the Defence Forces who are their superiors or equals in rank. Non-commissioned prisoners shall salute all officers of the Defence Forces.

(2) Prisoners may wear their badges of rank and decorations.

(3) Regulations, orders, announcements, questions and publications of any kind shall be communicated to prisoners in a language they understand.

27. (1) The prisoners shall elect a representative committee to represent them before the military authorities and the Protecting Power. The committee will also be charged with the reception and distribution of collective consignments and the organisation of social and recreational amenities. In camps of officers and persons of equivalent status, however, the senior officer of the highest rank shall be the intermediary between the camp authorities and the prisoners. He may appoint an officer prisoner to assist him as interpreter.

(2) All facilities shall be given such representatives as are referred to in the preceding sub-paragraph for the fullest correspondence with the Camp Commandant and the representative of the Protecting Power.

28. The representative of a Protecting Power or his delegate shall be permitted to proceed to all premises occupied by prisoners and may hold conversation with prisoners, as a general rule without witnesses, either personally, or through the intermediary of interpreters.

29. Prisoners shall through their representatives have the right to bring to the notice of the Commandant their petitions concerning the conditions of captivity to which they are subjected. They have also the right to communicate with the representative of the Protecting Power on the subject. Such petitions or complaints shall be transmitted or reported to the Adjutant General, and even if found to be groundless, they shall not give rise to any punishment.
Wills and Deaths. 30. Facilities shall be afforded to prisoners for the making of their wills and other legal matters. On the death of a prisoner he shall be buried as befits a member of the Defence Forces of corresponding rank.

Transfer of Prisoners. 31. (1) Prisoners to be transferred from one camp to another shall be officially informed in advance of their new destination and they shall be allowed to take with them their personal effects and the correspondence and parcels which have arrived for them.

(2) All necessary arrangements will be made by the Commandant so that the correspondence and parcels addressed to the transferred prisoners at their former camp shall be sent on to them without delay.

(3) The sums credited to the account of transferred prisoners shall be transmitted to the Commandant of the camp to which they have been transferred.

Prisoners Information Bureau. 32. (1) As soon as possible after the admission of prisoners the Camp Commandant shall transmit to the Secretary, Prisoners of War Information Bureau, Department of Defence, Dublin, particulars of their identity and official addresses so that their families can be quickly notified.

(2) The Camp Commandant shall also transmit to the Secretary of the Bureau all particulars about internments, transfers to other camps, releases on parole, repatriations, escapes, stays in hospital and deaths, together with all other particulars necessary for keeping an up-to-date record of each prisoner.

Standing Orders. 33. The Commandant may issue Standing or other Orders, not inconsistent with any Regulations made under the Emergency Powers (No. ) Order, 194, (S. & O. No. of 19 ), relating to the organisation, maintenance, interior economy and general routine of a camp for prisoners, and for the safe custody and discipline of such prisoners and their relations with the exterior.

(L.S.) GIVEN under my Official Seal this day of 194.

MINISTER FOR DEFENCE.
1(a) Within the limits laid down by the Camp Commandant, the senior internee officer will be responsible for the efficient internal administration of the Internment Camp and for the observance by the internees of the Standing Orders issued by the Officer Commanding the Command and the Camp Orders issued by the Camp Commandant. For these purposes he may make such Rules as may be approved by the Camp Commandant.

(b) The senior internee officer will act as intermediary between the internees and the Camp Commandant.

(c) The senior internee officer may, with the permission of the Camp Commandant, use the official Internment Camp telephone for the purpose of communicating with the internees' diplomatic representative.

2. Internes will be medically examined on admission and on such other occasions as the Camp Commandant may direct.

3. The following information, which is required for the purposes of Article 77 of the International Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva, July 27, 1929), will be rendered to the Camp Staff by each internee as soon as possible after admission:

"Name (Surname and Christian Names):

Home Address:

Army (or Regimental) No.:  

Rank:
Date & Place of Birth:  
Married or Single:  
Religion:  
Christian Name of Father:  
 Maiden Name of Mother:  
Particulars of Wounds (if any):  
Name and address of Next-of-kin or other person to be notified in case of accident:  

Cleanliness.  
4. (a) Interness must keep themselves personally clean.  
(b) Interness must keep in a clean condition all buildings, installations and grounds allotted to them.  

Laundry.  
5. The laundry situated within the Internment Camp will be available for use as provided by the Camp Commandant.  

Bathing.  
6. Interness may be permitted the use of the Military Swimming Pool and Bath Houses as arranged by the Camp Commandant.  

Routine.  
7. The daily routine will be as prescribed by the Camp Commandant and will conform generally to established military practice in the Curragh Camp.  

Fuel, Rations and Barrack Services.  
8. Fuel, rations and Barrack Services will be issued in accordance with the scale prescribed for the Defence Forces.  

Canteens.  
9. Canteens may be permitted. The hours of opening and closing will be laid down by the Camp Commandant.  

Inspections.  
10. Inspection of all quarters and installations in the Internment Camp will be carried out by the Camp Commandant as often as is necessary, but at least once weekly.  

Recreation.  
11. Recreational facilities, including the use of Sports Ground, Gymnasium and equipment will be arranged by the Camp Commandant at suitable periods.
12. The Identification Card issued to an internee will be carried by him at all times.

13. Uniform will not be worn by internees outside the Internment Camp.

14. Except by permission of the Camp Commandant or as provided by paragraph 6, all military barracks, canteens and other military buildings or installations are out of bounds to internees.

15. Visits to internees at the Internment Camp will not be permitted except when approved by the Adjutant General.

16. Internees are not permitted to canvass or accept private employment without the consent of the appropriate authority, which must be sought through the Camp Commandant.

17. (a) All incoming and outgoing letters and parcels are subject to censorship. No restriction will be placed on the number of letters to be written or received by internees. The following procedure for the posting of letters and parcels will be observed:

   (i) Letters will be posted in the Post Box situated at the inside gate of the Internment Camp. They must not be sealed before posting.

   (ii) Parcels will be handed in to the Camp Commandant's Office. In no circumstances is it permissible to post a letter or parcel in any Post Box or Post Office outside the Internment Camp.

   (b) Internees must not send or receive uncensored letters or communications while on parole.
18. There are three types of parole, the grant of which is at the discretion of the Camp Commandant:—

(a) **Camp Parole.**

This parole will not extend beyond the precincts of the Curragh Camp and may be granted for any period between the hours of 09.00 hours and 17.00 hours for the purposes of collective recreation, bathing, route marches, etc. An undertaking in writing by the senior internee officer or, in his absence, by the next senior internee officer on behalf of all groups or parties leaving the Internment Camp for such purposes may be accepted by the Camp Commandant. Each group or party must be in the charge of an internee officer or non-commissioned officer.

The precincts of the Curragh Camp are defined as the area bounded by the Curragh Camp Road Barriers.

(b) **Local Parole.**

This parole may be granted daily to all internees and may extend to any place within a radius of ten miles from the WATER TOWER, Curragh Camp. Collective parole may be accepted by the Camp Commandant in respect of all the internees availing of local parole, provided that the senior internee officer signs the appropriate Parole Form which will be inserted in a Nominal Roll of the internees proceeding on parole. The Nominal Roll will be submitted to the Camp Commandant before any internee is permitted to leave the Internment Camp.

(c) **Special Parole.**

Special parole, for the purpose of visiting Dublin City, may be granted not more frequently than once weekly to each officer and non-commissioned officer.
The grant of parole beyond the precincts of the Internment Camp will be granted for any period between 9.00 hours and 17.00 hours. An undertaking in writing, signed by each internee or, in the case of an internee officer, by his senior officer on leaving the Internment Camp, must be accepted by the Commandant of the Camp before parole will be granted.

I, hereby solemnly give my word of honour that I will return to my quarters at the Curragh Camp by ___________ that while on parole I will not make or endeavour to make any arrangements whatever or seek or accept any assistance whatever with a view to the escape of myself or my fellow-internees, that I will not engage in any military activities or any activities contrary to the interests of Éire, and that I will not go outside the permitted area.

Signed ____________________________
Witnessed __________________________
Date ________________________________
Time ________________________________
Signed going out _____________________ hrs.
Signed on return _____________________ hrs.

PAROLE PROCEDURE.

1. Officers and men seeking leave of absence on parole must sign this form in the presence of the Officer of the Camp appointed for the purpose.

2. The period of parole will not be regarded as terminated until the signatory has returned to his quarters at the Curragh Camp and the signed form has been duly returned to him personally by the Officer of the Camp appointed for the purpose.
Breaches of Orders.

19. Breaches of Standing or Camp Orders on the part of an internee will be punished by the withdrawal or restriction of privileges at the discretion of the Camp Commandant.