THE CONCLUSION OF THE UN CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES BY THE EC/EU: A CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE

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1. INTRODUCTION

The European Community (now the European Union, or the ‘EU’), having already signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (hereinafter the ‘UN CRPD’, or the ‘Convention’), formally adopted the decision to accede to the Convention with Council Decision 2010/48/EC, on 26 November 2009 under the former EC Treaty. Nonetheless, at this stage, the delay in depositing ‘the instrument of formal confirmation of the Convention with the Secretary General of the United Nations’ is still postponing the formal entry into force of the Convention.

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2 The Treaty of Lisbon entered into force on 1 December, 2009, and formally abolished the distinction formerly drawn between the three pillars. With the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Union has replaced and succeeded the European Community (Art. 1(3) TEU). Thus, in the first part of this paper I will refer to the EC/EU, meaning that whilst the EC concluded the agreement, the EU that has now succeeded the EC. The EU now has an explicit legal personality, and it is subject to the obligations set out by the Convention. Unless specified otherwise, I refer only to the EC when discussing the period before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.


5 From the international law perspective, an international treaty enters into force pursuant to its own rules (e.g. Art. 45 UN CRPD) in compliance with Art. 24(1) of the 1969 Vienna Convention. The UN CRPD enters into force according to its
The UN CRPD is the first human rights treaty that contemplates the possibility that not just States, but also ‘regional integration organizations’ may become parties.\(^6\) It is also the first human rights treaty to which the EC/EU will accede.\(^7\) Thus, the conclusion of the accession to the UN CRPD by the EC/EU represents a significant opportunity to seek to gain a deeper understanding of the evolving relationship between international human rights law and EU law.

The UN CRPD itself, and the conclusion of the Convention by the EU, have attracted much attention among legal scholars.\(^8\) This paper tries to make a contribution to the debate about the EC/EU accession to the Convention from a constitutional perspective. The analysis is undertaken by reference to a broad notion of ‘European constitutionalism’, namely to the different theories that underline the progressive shift of EU law from an international organization to that of a constitutional entity.\(^9\) In particular, this paper considers the EU as a

\(^6\) Art. 45(2). This provision reads as follows: ‘For each State or regional integration organization ratifying, formally confirming or acceding to the present Convention after the deposit of the twentieth such instrument, the Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the deposit of its own such instrument’.

\(^7\) Art. 44 of the UN CRPD explicitly refers to the term ‘regional integration organization’ and defines it as an ‘organization constituted by sovereign States of a given region, to which its member States have transferred competence in respect of matters governed by the present Convention’. Many multilateral treaties use the term ‘international organization’ or ‘regional integration organization’ where it is clear that what is intended by the term is the European Community (European Union). For example, Art. 27 of the UNESCO Convention on the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions clearly mentions ‘regional economic integration organizations’. Such a provision was included solely to allow the EC’s accession to the agreement. See B. De Witte, ‘The emergence of a European System of Public International Law: the EU and its Member States as strange subjects’, in J. Wouters et al (eds.), The Europeanisation of International Law, (TMC Asser Press, 2008), 39, especially 51.

\(^8\) Although it is only one of nine major UN human rights treaties, the UN CRPD has attracted considerable attention for a variety of reasons. Apart from its formal recognition and legal promulgation at the international level of the rights of disabled persons, who have long constituted a highly marginalized and ‘invisible’ minority, the Convention is notable for its distinctive rationale and for its structure (discussed below in Section 2). See inter alia J. Kumpuvuori and M. Scheinin (eds.), United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities – Multidisciplinary Perspectives (VIKE, 2010). See also the World Bank paper: K. Guernsey et al (eds.), Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Its Implementation and Relevance for the World Bank, available at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Resources/SP-Discussion-papers/Disability-DP/0712.pdf> (accessed 20 May 2010).

\(^9\) The EU is considered a sui generis legal order (Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue
The constitutional order, with its own constitution, i.e. its own ‘supreme law of the land’, and it endeavours to evaluate the possible impact of the Convention on the EU’s constitutional identity and on the EU’s system of human rights protection.

In pure legal terms, a constitution constitutes a hierarchical legal order, itself being the supreme law of the land, and the ultimate legal reference of a legal system. The constitution is therefore regarded as independent or autonomous, to which all the other legal acts on its territory are subjected and must be in compliance with. According to the ECJ, in a line of cases starting with Les Verts (Case 294/83, Parti Ecologiste Les Verts v European Parliament, [1986] ECR 1339), the Treaties are the EU basic constitutional charter. The European Treaties seem to include all the essential elements of a constitution: fundamental rights (even deriving from external sources, both national constitutions and international documents); and organizational norms (i.e. procedural norms, norms dealing with the order of institutions, competences). The EU as constitutional system has its own constitutional court, namely the ECJ. The ECJ contributes, with its judgment, to elaborating the constitutional principles of the EU.

The European human rights system is characterized by a three-layered structure. See F. Fabbrini, ‘Judicial Review of United Nations Counter-Terrorism Sanctions in

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Intersentia
The UN CRPD commits the EU to achieving higher standards of non-discrimination with respect to persons with disability. Moreover, its remarkable content, and its underlying rationale, could potentially have a positive influence on the overall conception of human rights within the EU. This paper argues that the UN CRPD, and its implementation, may well have a profound impact not only on EU secondary law, but also on European standards of human rights protection (‘despite’ the Kadi saga), which clearly form an integral part of the ‘EU constitution’. In doing so, the paper seeks, through a case study of the European Multilevel System of Human Rights protection’, in F. Fontanelli et al (eds.), Shaping Rule of Law through Dialogue (Europa Law Publishing, 2010), 149.


It should be recalled that fundamental rights have emerged in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In the very well known Internationale Handelsgesellschaft ruling of 1970, the ECJ decided that fundamental rights formed part of the general principles of Community law that it was obliged to uphold, and that it should be guided by the constitutional traditions of the Member States in safeguarding those rights (Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft Mbh v. Einfuhrund Vorratsstelle fuer Getreide Und Futtermittel , [1970] ECR 1125). The Nold ruling reinforced this, and also referred specifically to international treaties (though not to the European Convention of Human Rights specifically) which Member States had ratified as guidelines to be followed within the framework of Community law (Case 4/73, Nold, Kohlen und Baustoffgroßhandlung v. Commission, [1974] ECR 491). The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) has special significance in that respect. See, ex multis, Case C-479/04, Laserdisken ApS v Kulturministeriet, [2006] ECR I-8089. The discourse on human rights and the attention given in official documents and debates to human rights issues has expanded greatly in the Lisbon Treaty in comparison to earlier Treaties: reference to human rights can be found in
UN CRPD, to contribute to the debate on the evolving relationship between international law and EU law.

This paper is divided into five sections. After the introduction, Section two discusses the distinctive features of the UN CRPD. Before embarking on a discussion of the constitutional significance of the UN CRPD, Section two aims to highlight the fact that the Convention tailors existing human rights to the unique situation of persons with disabilities. Section three discusses the decision on the conclusion of the UN CRPD approved by the Council on 26 November 2009. Section four briefly examines the status and effects of the UN CRPD within the EU legal system. In particular, embracing Besselink’s theory of a composite European constitution, it is considered whether the UN CRPD would be capable of being part of the constitutional dimension of the EU (i.e. could be included among the EU primary sources of law). Section five concludes the paper.

2. THE TEXT OF THE UN CRPD: A BRIEF OVERVIEW

The UN CRPD, which entered into force on 3 May 2008, is the first human rights convention adopted in the twenty-first century. It does not seek to create new

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16 Leonard Besselink criticizes Pernice’s theory of the multilevel constitutionalism. Besselink states that ‘multilevel constitutionalism’ involves inescapably the concept of hierarchy, which is not applicable to the EU. On the contrary, with the concept of ‘composite constitution’, Besselink means a constitution whose component parts mutually assume one another’s existence and a dimension of the heteronomy seems to prevail: merely looking at the treaties, in fact, it is not possible to appreciate the important contributions offered by elements which are formally external to the treaties, such as the national constitutional traditions, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and human rights treaties. See L. Besselink, A Composite European Constitution/Een Samengestelde Europese Constitutie, (Europa Law Publishing, 2007).

17 The UN CRPD (together with its Optional Protocol) was adopted by consensus by the UN General Assembly on December 13, 2006. It was opened for signature on 30 March 2007 and entered into force one year later, as did its Optional Protocol. The process of drafting the UN CRPD began in December 2001, when the government of Mexico sponsored the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee to consider proposals for a comprehensive and integral international convention to promote and protect the rights and dignity of persons with disabilities, based on the holistic approach. Previous attempts to secure an international convention had resulted only in the adoption of non-binding documents. The UN CRPD text, along with its drafting history, resolutions, and updated list of signatories and States Parties, is available at <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/convtexte.htm> (accessed 20 May 2010). See R. Kayess and P. French, ‘Out of Darkness into Light? Introducing the
rights for disabled persons, but rather elaborates and clarifies existing human rights within the disability context.\(^{18}\)

Whilst the Convention does not contain a definition of disability,\(^{19}\) it affirms the social model (as opposed to the ‘medical’ model of disability) in Article 2.\(^{20}\) The Preamble also states that disability is an evolving concept and that ‘disability results from the interaction between persons with impairments and attitudinal and environmental barriers that hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others’.

The scope of the Convention is extremely broad: the text does not simply prohibit disability discrimination, nor does it cover only civil or political rights or economic, cultural or social rights. On the contrary, the UN CRPD is built on the core and manifold concepts of the dignity of each individual and autonomy or self-determination,\(^{21}\) and it is underpinned by the principles of non-discrimination and equality, which encompass the right to reasonable accommodation.

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\(^{19}\) The question of whether or not to include a definition of disability in the Convention was controversial. Ultimately it was decided not to include a definition, since any definition would necessarily exclude some people. It was also considered that the inclusion of a definition of disability could potentially undermine the Convention’s commitment to the social model of disability. As a compromise, however, guidance was included regarding who was to be regarded as a person with a disability under the Convention. For a definition of disability, see D. Björgvinsson, ‘The Protection of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights’, in G. Quinn and O.M. Arnardóttir (eds.), The UN Convention on the Rights of persons with Disabilities: European and Scandinavian Perspectives, 129. See also R. Caldin Pupulin, ‘Nuovi approcci alla disabilità: gli orientamenti OMS nell’ICDH-2’, in R. Montani Brigo and R. Caldin Pupulin (eds.), Disabilità: quadro teorico e percorsi d’integrazione (Cleup, 2000), 13, especially 26-27.

\(^{20}\) The ‘medical’ model tends to view persons with disabilities as ‘objects’ who are to be managed or cared for. The ‘social’ or ‘human rights’ model views persons with disabilities as subjects and not objects, and it emphasizes respect for the equal human rights of persons with disabilities. On the social model, see, e.g., R. Traustadottir, ‘Disability Studies, the Social Model and Legal Developments’, in G. Quinn, O.M. Arnardóttir (eds), The UN Convention on the Rights of persons with Disabilities: European and Scandinavian Perspectives, 18. See also C. Barnes, ‘Capire il modello sociale della disabilità’, in Persona e danno, available at <http://www.personaedanno.it/cms/data/articoli/005201.aspx> (accessed 20 May 2010). This is based on the presumption of a capacity for self-directed action and behaviour, and it requires that the person be placed at the centre of all decisions affecting him/her. See <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/disability/intro.htm> (accessed 20 May 2010).
The UN CRPD is, by nature, programmatic, outlining policy in general terms, without giving a precise description of what action States Parties should take. It includes an introductory set of provisions outlining its purpose and key definitions (Arts. 1-2). Article 2 provides, *inter alia*, a comprehensive definition of discrimination, including ‘any distinction, exclusion or restriction on the basis of disability which has the purpose or effect of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal basis with others, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms’. This definition encompasses both direct and indirect discrimination, even if neither the words *direct* or *indirect* are explicitly used.  

Discrimination is also considered to include the denial of reasonable accommodation. The concept of reasonable accommodation is firmly embedded in the UN CRPD. It is explicitly mentioned in the substantive articles dealing with education, employment, liberty and security of persons and, though in slightly different terms, in the article dealing with access to justice. Further, largely as a result of Articles 2 and 5 (Equality and non-discrimination), reasonable accommodation is an implicit element of almost every one of the substantive articles (Arts. 10 et seq.).

Articles 3-9 set out general provisions, to be applied throughout the treaty text. They are significant because they are potentially capable of causing a substantive transformation in the protection of the (human) rights of persons with disabilities.

Article 3 enunciates the Convention’s general principles, which include respect for individual dignity, autonomy, and independence; respect for difference and acceptance of disability as human diversity; non-discrimination; equal opportunity; complete and meaningful participation; accessibility; equality between the sexes; and respect for children’s rights and support for their evolving capabilities. Article 3 includes, as a general principle, ‘equality of opportunity’, a term not defined in the UN CRPD itself, but clearly drawn from the UN Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities of Persons with Disabilities.

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22 Direct discrimination is characterized by the intent to treat persons with disabilities differently (and less favourably) as compared to non-disabled persons. Indirect discrimination occurs when an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons with disabilities at a particular disadvantage compared with other (non-disabled) persons. This definition is included in Employment Equality Directive 2000/78, [2000] O.J. L 303/22. The essence of the concept of indirect discrimination is that a measure or criterion that appears to be neutral has a discriminatory effect to the detriment of a certain group of persons, who should be protected against discrimination. The determination of whether or not indirect discrimination exists is characterized by two basic elements. One relates to the nature of the prohibited measure and one relates to the legitimacy of any justification. See C. Tobler, *Indirect Discrimination. A Case Study into the development of the legal concept of indirect discrimination under EC Law*, (Intersentia, 2005).

23 The concept of reasonable accommodation is defined in Art. 2 as a ‘necessary and appropriate modification and adjustments not imposing a disproportionate or undue burden’, which can ensure to disabled persons the enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with others of all human rights and fundamental freedoms.

24 See <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/dissre00.htm> (accessed 20 May 2010). The Standard Rules define ‘equalization of opportunities’ as ‘the process through which the various systems of society and the environment, such as services,
Article 4 UN CRPD requires Parties: to take measures to abolish disability discrimination by persons, organizations or private enterprises; to engage in the research and development of accessible goods, services and technology for persons with disabilities and to encourage others to undertake such research; to provide accessible information about assistive technology to persons with disabilities; to promote professional and staff training on the Convention rights for those working with persons with disabilities; and to consult with and involve persons with disabilities in developing and implementing legislation and policies and in decision-making processes concerning UN CRPD rights.

Among the provisions of general application, Article 9 in particular should be highlighted. This provision seeks to dismantle barriers by promoting different forms of accessibility in the public and private spheres, including physical, technological, economic and social accessibility, as well as information and communication accessibility. Accessibility in this regard is to be applied across the Convention both by virtue of Article 9, as well as by its inclusion as a general principle in Article 3. Article 9 is a pragmatic translation of the principle of equality. In addition, it must be read in conjunction with Article 19, which imposes a general obligation on Parties to enable persons with disabilities to live independently and to participate fully in all aspects of life.

Articles 10 through 30 enumerate the specific substantive obligations of the Convention. They ‘cover the spectrum of life activities of persons with disabilities’: the right to life (Art. 10), freedom from torture (Art. 15) and other forms of abuse (Art. 16), the right to education (Art. 24), employment (Art. 27), political participation (Art. 29), legal capacity (Art. 12), access to justice (Art. 13), freedom of expression and opinion (Art. 21), privacy (Art. 22), participation in cultural life, sports and recreation (Art. 30), respect for home and family (Art. 23), personal integrity (Art. 17), liberty of movement and nationality (Art. 18), liberty and security of the person (Art. 14), and adequate standard of living (Art. 28). The Convention recognizes that, in order to protect and respect some classical human rights, quite substantial action by Parties is required. For example, in order to grant freedom of expression and access to information to persons with disabilities, Parties must provide information in accessible formats and facilitate the use of sign languages, Braille, augmentative and alternative communication.

activities, information and documentation, are made available to all, particularly to persons with disabilities. The concept of ‘equality of opportunity’ complements the principles of non-discrimination and equality, and it reflects the social model of disability by recognizing that the inclusion of persons with disabilities requires modification of societal systems and the environment.

The Convention applies the traditional distinction between obligations which are immediately applicable and those which are to be realized progressively. For example, Article 4(2) contains an important distinction between civil and political rights, and economic, social and cultural rights. While the latter rights are subject to progressive realization, civil and political rights are immediately applicable after ratification. This means that, when ratification takes place, at least these rights must be respected in harmony with the Convention.


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For the sake of completeness, it should be added that Articles 31-40 set forth the monitoring and implementation mechanisms for the UN CRPD. These provisions respond to the need to translate the Convention’s provisions into hard domestic law, policies and good practices. Hence, even if the Convention lacks a judicial enforcement system (and even if the international para-judicial monitoring mechanism set forth by the Optional Protocol seems unable to impose serious constraints on Parties’ behaviour), it establishes a Committee of experts (Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities – see Art. 34) to monitor its implementation at the international level. In addition, it also provides for the operation of independent national level monitoring mechanisms (Art. 33).

As mentioned above, the UN CRPD is accompanied by an Optional Protocol, which recognizes the Committee as a para-judicial organ. In particular, it recognizes “the competence of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to receive and consider communications from or on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that State Party of the provisions of the Convention”.

In concluding, it must be emphasized that this overview does not contain a discussion of the contents of the Convention, nor does it cover all the norms and their meaning. It should be pointed out that the UN CRPD is comprehensive not only in terms of its substantive contents, but also in the manner in which monitoring and implementation at all levels is addressed. The rights protected by the Convention are already protected by national, supranational (EU) and international (European Convention on Human Rights – ECHR) norms and institutions. However, the

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27 Article 32 makes it clear that all international cooperation efforts, including international development programmes, should be fully inclusive of persons with disabilities.

28 Article 33(1) UN CRPD states that Parties to the Convention must designate one or more focal points within their governments for matters relating to the implementation of the Convention. According to Article 33(2), Parties to the UN CRPD must maintain, strengthen, designate or establish a framework, including one or more independent mechanisms, as appropriate, to promote, protect and monitor the implementation of the Convention. Art. 33 distinguishes between those institutions which will have responsibility for ‘implementation’ and those with responsibility for ‘monitoring’, with the former being placed in government and the latter within the national framework and civil society organizations. When designating or establishing such a mechanism, Parties must take into account the principles relating to the status and functioning of national institutions for protection and promotion of human rights (NHRIs). It must be recalled that, taking its cue from Art. 33(2), the International Coordination Committee (ICC) of National Human Rights Institutions (NHRI) is actively engaged in helping its members raise their capacity to address the issues that concern them under the Convention. A database on the activities of NHRIs with respect to disability is currently being prepared, and thematic events are being planned. Article 33(3) seeks to ensure that persons with disabilities and their representative organizations are involved in the national monitoring process.

29 The scope of this paper is limited to the EU legal order. No reference is made to the ECHR system (which is very active in the field of disability: see <http://www.coe.int/t/e/social_cohesion/soc-sp/integration/02_Council_of_Europe_Disability_Action_Plan/> (accessed 20 May 2010)).
UN CRPD represents a progressive development of existing human rights law by placing the rights of persons with disabilities within the conceptual framework of classical human rights. Traditionally, both national and international norms and decision makers have tended to explain the disadvantageous situation of disabled people as reflecting their specific impairments, physical or mental, rather than being a result of discrimination or other inadequate respect for human rights. The Convention should be understood ‘as an instrument that seeks to recast disability as a social construction and articulates protections in specific application to their human rights enjoyment’.

3. THE CONCLUSION OF THE UN CRPD BY THE EC/EU

Having given a brief outline of the UN CRPD’s contents, this Section will look at the conclusion of the Convention by the EC/EU. In this context, Council Decision 2010/48/EC, formally adopted on 26 November 2009, will be examined.

The UN CRPD is a ‘mixed agreement’. ‘Mixity’, of course, refers to the fact that part of an international agreement falls within the scope of the powers of the EC/EU and part falls within the scope of the powers of the Member States. The UN CRPD fit this description, and it was negotiated and will be ratified (concluded) by the various Member States as well as by the EU.

The EC’s competence to negotiate and sign the UN CRPD derived from Articles 13 and 95 EC, which addressed (disability) discrimination and the internal market respectively. Considering that EC competences existed in a

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30 See the various contributions in G. Quinn and O.M. Arnardottir (eds.), *The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: European and Scandinavian Perspectives*.


33 See below Section 4.

number of areas touched upon by UN CRPD provisions under the EC Treaty, the proposal concerning the conclusion of the Convention referred to a number of treaty articles as the legal bases: Articles 13, 26, 47(2), 55, 71(1), 80(2), 89, 93, 95 and 285 EC in conjunction with Article 300(2), and the first subparagraph of Article 300(3) EC. However, the final Decision on the Conclusion of the UN CRPD, adopted in November 2009 by the Council (under the EC Treaty), has only two substantive legal bases, namely Article 13 and Article 95 EC, in conjunction with the procedural provisions of Article 300(2) EC and Article 300(3) EC.

This choice of a double substantive legal basis could be criticized for two main reasons. First, it might appear to ‘minimize’ the scope of the Convention. In other words, at first sight, the use of such a double substantive legal basis seems to neglect the comprehensive scope of the Convention (which affects many and different policy fields), thereby prejudicing ex ante its implementation and its impact on the EU legal system. Second, it might appear to neglect the nature of the UN CRPD as a human rights treaty. It is submitted here, however, that the choice of the legal bases was appropriate.

Regarding the first and stronger reason for criticism, one may note that the choice of legal base must rely on objective factors which are amenable to judicial reconsideration. The objective factors in this case were the substantive legal bases provided under the EC Treaty, which were deemed sufficient to cover the scope of the UN CRPD.

Regarding the second reason for criticism, one may note that the choice of legal bases was appropriate as it reflected the nature of the UN CRPD as a human rights treaty. It is submitted here, however, that the choice of legal bases was appropriate as it reflected the nature of the UN CRPD as a human rights treaty.

35 Proposal for a Council Decision concerning the conclusion, by the European Community, of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, COM (2008) 530 final/2. Despite the fact that the UN CRPD expressly calls for action in the fields of health, education and vocational training, the proposal for the decision on the conclusion of the UN CRPD did not mention any other Treaty article, according to which the EC only had supplementary powers (e.g. Art. 149 EC regarding education, or Art. 152 EC, regarding health). Considering the theory of the ‘main predominant purpose’, the main reason for this choice may be due to the fact the EC had only a supplementary competence in these fields.

review, and the measure must be adopted on the legal base corresponding with that main purpose (‘single legal base’). If an EU measure has more than one purpose, and if one of those aims cannot be regarded as secondary to the other, the measure can exceptionally be based on more than one legal base (‘dual legal base’). The major objective of the UN CRPD, as emerging from a reading of its text, seems to be substantive equality (i.e. protecting and ensuring the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights). Given that the former EC treaty lacked an adequate legal basis for acceding to human rights treaties, as famously underlined by the Court of Justice in Opinion 2/94 (now effectively overruled by the Treaty of Lisbon), Article 13 EC, addressing discrimination on a number of grounds including disability, was the provision that best reflected the UN CRPD’s


38 Art. 1 UN CRPD.

39 Human rights were not mentioned specifically in the Treaty of Rome of 1957, although the treaty affirmed the Member States’ willingness to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty (Preamble), to improve living and working conditions and to abolish discrimination on the grounds of nationality among citizens of the Member States (Article 7). It also created freedom of movement and establishment for EEC citizens (Articles 48-58), equal treatment for men and women in the workplace (Article 119) and equal treatment for immigrant workers (e.g. Article 51). The ECJ ‘discovered’ the protection of human rights. To some extent the ECJ was motivated to create a doctrine of fundamental rights in order to protect the (sometimes fragile) principle of Community supremacy over the national law of the Member States. De Witte adds, however, that the Court’s activism was simply a response to the Community’s growing capacity to affect fundamental rights to an extent unforeseen at the time the European Communities were created. See B. De Witte, ‘The Role of the ECJ in Human Rights’, in P. Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 1999), 866. See also above footnote 14.

40 Opinion 2/94, Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, [1996] ECR I-175. The Council, in that case, asked the Court to deliver its opinion on the competence of the Community to accede to the ECHR, and on the compatibility of accession with substantive provisions and principles of EC law, in particular the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice and the autonomy of the Community legal order. The Court admitted only the first part of the request (the second part was considered inadmissible), and its reasoning referred first of all to Article 5 EC (principle of conferral) and to its theory of implied powers. The Court pointed out that no Treaty provisions conferred on the Community institutions any general power to enact rules on human rights or to conclude international conventions in this field. According to the ECJ, Art. 308 EC was insufficient as a foundation for the Community’s competence because accession would have had equally fundamental institutional implications for the Community and for the Member States, and would therefore be of ‘constitutional significance’. With the Treaty of Lisbon, accession of the EU to ECHR is provided for in Article 6(2) TEU. However, the Lisbon Treaty makes it clear that ‘[s]uch accession shall not affect the Union’s competences as defined in the Treaties’.
main purpose. In addition, as noted by Waddington, only Article 13 of the EC Treaty conferred explicit powers regarding disability upon the Community.

However, many areas of the Convention extend beyond non-discrimination. This is reflected in the second legal base of the decision to conclude the Convention by the EC/EU. Given that the internal market is an extremely broad notion that encompasses the removal of all kinds of barriers to trade, it is not surprising to find that Article 95 EC is the other cited legal base. In addition, and again as noted by Waddington, Article 95 EC has served as the legal base for instruments addressing many different areas. In some cases these instruments have had a specific disability dimension.

In addition, the declaration of competence annexed to the Decision on the Conclusion, in compliance with Article 44 UN CRPD, fully reflects the broad scope of the Convention. The declaration lists EU legislation which addresses, *inter alia*, the rights of persons with disabilities, and the extent of the EC/EU competence ensues from these legislative acts. Indeed, this declaration (like the declarations of competences included in other decisions) is only intended to specify to third countries the distribution of competence, indicating the competences that the Member States have transferred to the EC/EU under the Treaties in matters governed by the Convention. In particular, this declaration is mainly devoted to clarifying, *ex ante*, the sharing of international responsibility.

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44 As mentioned above, Art. 44 UN CRPD provides the possibility for regional organizations to become parties and (analogously to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and to other mixed agreements) contains a clause setting out separate responsibility. According to Article 44(1), the organizations acceding to the Convention must declare, in their instruments of formal confirmation or accession, the extent of their competence with respect to matters governed by the Convention, and they must inform the depositary of any substantial modification of their competence. The UN CRPD also states that the Convention shall apply to such organizations within the limits of their competence. Hence, by virtue of this declaration, the internal division of powers between the Community and its Member States in fact forms part of the agreement and ceases to be an exclusively domestic issue.


46 The declaration is clearly intended to indicate to third countries the distribution of competences between the EC/EU and its Member States. The Convention will apply to the EC/EU and will be binding upon the EC/EU within the limits of its competence as expressed in the Declaration. Thus, the UN CRPD can fictionally
Nonetheless, even bearing in mind this ‘external dimension’, the declaration, with the list of legislative instruments, clearly indicates that the Convention touches upon many different policy fields.

Finally, the choice of the legal basis for the decision concluding the agreement is very important, but it is not decisive for implementation. In Case C-178/03, the ECJ clearly stated that: ‘the fact that one or more provisions of the Treaty have been chosen as legal bases for the approval of an international agreement is not be split into two different parts, each included in the text of a unique legal act. The EC/EU and the Member States bear responsibility only where they breach the obligations they have respectively assumed. Consequently, the allocation of international responsibility follows the division of competence, irrespective of the attribution of the wrongful act. If a complaint is brought against the EU because a Member State, by applying national law, has violated the international treaty, the EU could deny responsibility because it has not assumed the relevant obligations. At the same time, Member States bear responsibility for violation of provisions falling within their competence. Indeed, even if there is a declaration of competence, the issue of international responsibility for fulfilment of the obligations under a mixed agreement remains inherently complex. There remain problems that are not completely solved; they simply move to the intra-Community level, as the powers of the EC/EU and of its Member States overlap, and as the division of competences is itself subject to a constant rebalancing. See E. Neframi, ‘International Responsibility and Mixed Agreements’, in E. Cannizzaro (ed.), The European Union as an Actor in International Relations, (Kluwer, 2002), 193. Member States are not internationally bound by provisions falling within the scope of powers of the Community, but they may still be liable under EU law. Art. 216(2) TFEU (ex-Art. 300(7) EC) imposes a duty on Member States under EU law; consequently, international breaches may be sanctioned through the general EU law enforcement machinery. But this is only an intra-Community effect, due to the fact that mixed agreements form part of EU law. The Commission may thus bring an infringement case against a Member State that has not properly fulfilled its international duty. A prominent example is the Etang the Berre case (Case C-239/03, Commission of the European Communities v French Republic, [2004] ECR I-9325). In this case, France was condemned by the ECJ for not having implemented a mixed environmental convention. That case concerned, in particular, Article 4(1)(8) of the Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution and Article 6(1) and 3 of the Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution from Land-based Sources to Discharges of Fresh Water and Alluvia into a Saltwater Marsh. The ECJ stated that these provisions fell within the Community framework because those articles were in a mixed agreement and concerned a field in large measure covered by EC law. In ensuring compliance with commitments arising from an agreement concluded by the EU institutions, ‘the Member States therefore fulfill, within the Community system, an obligation in relation to the Community, which has assumed responsibility for the due performance of the agreement’. The principle underpinning such procedural mechanisms is the duty of cooperation, which provides the foundation for managing shared competence within mixed agreements. See M. Cremona, EUI Working Paper 2006/22, especially 18 et seq.


Intersentia
sufficient to show that those same provisions must also be used as legal bases for
the adoption of measures intended to implement that agreement at Community
level'.48 This means that Treaty provisions other than those mentioned in the
Council decision can be chosen as legal bases to implement the Convention
obligations in specific fields.49

Concerning the second reason for criticism, it is submitted that Articles 13
and 95 EC do not neglect the human rights dimension of the UN CRPD.

Once again, we should consider that no other adequate legal base, other than
Article 13, was to be found, considering that recourse to Art. 308 EC could have
been contemplated only if no other provision of the Treaty were suitable.50

The Commission itself, in its 2003 Communication ‘Towards a United
Nations legally binding instrument to promote and protect the rights and dignity
of persons with disabilities’, stated that ‘a key tool in achieving equality is the
non-discrimination principle. Equal access to human rights can be guaranteed by
ensuring that people with disabilities are not discriminated against on the grounds

48 The case concerned Regulation (EC) No 304/2003 on the export and import of
dangerous chemicals, based exclusively on Art. 175 EC. This regulation implements
the Rotterdam Convention concerning the export and import of dangerous chemicals.
The Commission alleged an infringement of the EC Treaty on the ground that the
wrong legal base was chosen. According to the Commission, since the contested
regulation was an instrument whose essential purpose was to regulate international
trade of chemicals, it ought to have been adopted in the form of a Council regulation
based on Art. 133 EC, and not in the form of a regulation of the European Parliament
and of the Council based on Article 175(1) EC. The Court said that the primary
objective of the contested regulation was to implement the Rotterdam Convention.
As the Court held in Case C-94/03, Commission v Council, that Convention
specifically includes two components regulating trade and protecting human health
and the environment, which are linked so closely that the decision approving that
Convention on behalf of the Community should have been based on Articles 133
EC and Article 175(1) EC. In Case C-178/03, however, the use of the same legal
bases both for the decision approving the Convention on behalf of the Community
and for the contested regulation, which implements the Convention at Community
level, was necessary in any event, in view of the clear convergence of the provisions
of those two measures, reflecting both the concern to regulate trade in hazardous
chemicals and the concern to ensure sound management of those products and/or
to protect human health and the environment against the harmful effects of trade in
such products. The ECJ concluded that the contested regulation should have been
based on the two corresponding legal bases, namely, Articles 133 EC and 175(1) EC.
Accordingly, the Court annulled the contested measure inasmuch as it was based
solely on Article 175(1) EC.

49 The UN CRPD provisions could also serve as a sufficient legal basis for adopting an
act of implementation or application (i.e. executive measures). To take an example:
Art III GATT requires Member States to amend their tax legislation (pursuant to the
international rule and in compliance with existent EC/EU regulation in the field) and
there is no need for a separate EC/EU act requiring such amendment.

50 See, inter alia, Case 165/87, Commission of the European Communities v Council of
the European Communities, [1988] ECR 5545.
of their disability. In addition, as we will see in Section four, the Convention’s legal status and effects will be largely determined by the ECJ, and thus the choice of legal bases does not affect the possibility that the UN CRPD might become part of the constitutional core of EU law and might be considered a primary source of law.

4. THE UN CRPD: STATUS AND EFFECTS WITHIN THE EU LEGAL SYSTEM

Having traced the main features of the Convention and discussed the Council Decision concerning the conclusion of the UN CRPD, this Section examines the status of the UN CRPD and its effects within the EU legal system.

Despite the adoption of the decision to formally conclude the Convention, as mentioned above, the instrument of ratification has not yet been deposited. From a legal perspective, the reasons for such a delay in depositing the instrument of formal confirmation with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in accordance with Articles 41 and 43 of the UN Convention (as clearly established

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53 At the international level, a State or an international/regional organization that intends to become a party to a treaty must express its consent to be bound by the treaty in one of the forms prescribed by the treaty. Article 43 UN CRPD establishes that consent to be bound can be expressed through the methods of ratification, accession or confirmation. Ratification implies a two-step process, as it requires signature of the Convention by the contracting party, prior to the ratification. Signature alone does not impose on the contracting party any obligations under the treaty. Namely the act of signature does not make a State (or a international/regional organization) a party to the treaty, but it requires the signatory to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty. Signature is to be followed by ratification/accession (which is ultimately concluded by the deposit of the instrument of ratification). Ratification involves two distinct procedural acts. The first is the adoption by the State of a ratification law in compliance with its own internal (constitutional) provisions. The second one is the act through which the contracting party indicates its consent to be bound to the other contracting parties (formal deposit of the instrument of ratification). In order to complete the ratification, and to be bound at the international level, the formal deposit of the instrument of ratification is needed. The EU, in order to undertake international commitments, has to follow the internal decision-making procedure now set forth in Art. 218 TFEU (ex Art. 300 EC) and has to adopt a Council decision to conclude (i.e. ratify) an international treaty. Practice shows that, by its signature (through a Council decision), the Community agrees to submit the international treaty for internal approval. After the adoption of the Council decision, the ratification process can be completed by the deposit of the instrument of ratification at the international level.
by Art. 2 of the Council decision), are not easy to explain. However, it is apparent that the EU/EC is waiting for all the 27 Member States to complete the ratification process. This would be consistent with past practice in relation to mixed agreements. The EC has often only deposited its instrument of confirmation once all the Member States have ratified the convention at issue. However, whilst prior ratification by all the Member States before conclusion by the Community has been usual, it is not formally compulsory, since it is not expressly provided for by any (Treaty) provision. This ‘stoppage’ implies a delay in the entering into force of the Convention within the EU. However, from the international law perspective, until the date of entry into force of the Convention, the EC/EU (which has already adopted the decision to conclude the UN CRPD) must behave in good faith and must abstain from any action contrary to the international treaty. The other parties to the Convention may rely on the principle of protection of legitimate expectations in order to challenge the adoption by institutions of the States or regional organizations, during the period preceding its entry into force, of any measure contrary to the provisions of that agreement. From the EU law perspective, the UN CRPD has already become an integral part of EU legal order, even if it is not fully effective yet. Indeed, its status and (future) effects may be understood by taking into account three pillars: the autonomy of the EU legal order, the hierarchy of norms within this order, and the scope of the exclusive jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ).

54 At present, all the 27 Member States have signed the Convention, and 12 have ratified it as well, whilst 22 have signed the Protocol and 10 have ratified it. See <http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=257> (accessed 20 May 2010).
55 See J. Heliskoski, *Mixed Agreements as a Technique for Organizing the International Relations of European Community and its Member States*, (Kluwer, 2001), 48. It is a recurring problem of mixed agreements that some Member States do not manage to ratify. It is questionable whether a Member State’s delay in ratification can be sanctioned at the Community level (by the ECJ) as a breach of the duty of cooperation. It can be argued that it depends on the cause of the delay, as the national ratification process is an expression of national sovereignty and it reflects the exercise of powers not conferred (i.e. transferred) to the EC. The ECJ has been silent regarding this issue, as it has been regarding many of the general issues related to the implementation of international agreements within the EU. A general duty of cooperation between the EC and its Member States was initially affirmed in the context of mixed agreements, and it first emerged in Opinion 1/78 (Opinion given pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 228(1) of the EEC Treaty - International Agreement on Natural Rubber, [1979] ECR 2871). The Court had to adjudicate on the division of powers between Euratom and the Member States with regard to a draft Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and stated said that ‘the draft Convention […] can be implemented as regards the Community only by means of a close association between the institutions of the Community and the Member States both in the process of negotiation and conclusion and in the fulfilment of the obligations entered into’.
56 See above footnotes 7 and 8.
On the basis of the autonomy of the EU legal order (and given that neither the EC Treaty nor the TFEU specify the legal status of international norms), the ECJ has established a hierarchy of norms. The Treaties (primary law), including the Protocols, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the ECHR, form the 'constitutional bulk' of EU law; they are the 'supreme law of the land'. All international law sources (international agreements, decisions of international organizations, international customary law) are situated below the provisions of the Treaties, but above secondary EU law (regulations, directives and decisions).

From the above, we may infer that the UN CRPD is situated formally below the provisions of the Treaties. In hierarchical terms, the Convention is inferior to the provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (and the Treaty on European Union), but superior to secondary EU law. However, one important note must be made here. The Convention is itself a human rights treaty and 'represents a clarification of rights already conferred' by pre-existing international treaties (i.e. among others the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights...), by the ECHR, by EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and recognized in the constitutional traditions of the Member States. The UN CRPD is animated by the concept of equality and non-discrimination, which are firmly embedded in EU law and in the Member States’ constitutions. As seen in Section two, Articles 10

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58 Even though the EC has not yet acceded to the ECHR, the Convention is unquestionably of vital importance to Community law as a reference text on human rights. In other words, the ECHR enters into the orbit of, and co-habits with, EC law. Originally, the ECHR was important in that it helped to compensate for the absence of a Community catalogue of rights (see Case 36-75, Roland Rutili v Ministre de l'intérieur, [1975] ECR 1219). For a critical view, see, e.g., F. Van Den Berghe, ‘The EU and Issues of Human Rights Protection: Same Solutions to More Acute Problems?’, 16 European Law Journal 1 (2010), 112.

59 Member States’ common constitutional traditions belong to this ‘constitutional bulk’. They are a counterlimit, but also contribute to the interpretation of fundamental rights by the ECJ, as a consequence of Art. 53 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, of Art. 6 (2) TEU. See in this respect S. Gambino, Diritti fondamentali e Unione Europea, (Giuffrè, 2009), 53 et seq.

60 The ECJ, inter alia, in case C-239/03 (C-239/03, Commission of the European Communities v French Republic, [2004] ECR I-9325), has argued that mixed agreements concluded by the Community, its Member States and non-member countries have the same status in the Community legal order as pure Community agreements, following the so-called ‘Demirel doctrine’ (Case 12/86, Meryem Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd, [1987] ECR 3719).

61 N. Lavranos, in F. Fontanelli, et al (eds.), Shaping Rule of Law through Dialogue, (Europa Law Publishing, 2010), 122, argues that ‘from the EC law point of view, international law and Community law are not on an equal footing, but rather asymmetric in the sense that international law is subordinated to primary EC law. Any attempts to change or reverse this hierarchy of norms […] are forcefully rejected by the ECJ’.

62 M. Bell, ‘The right of Equality and non discrimination?’, in T. Hervey and J. Kenner (eds.), Economic Rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, (Hart Publishing, 2006), 91. See also M. Bell, Anti-Discrimination Law and the
to 30 UN CRPD cover political, social and cultural rights, which are also included both in the ECHR and in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In addition, the UN CRPD as a whole seems entirely consistent with the rights affirmed in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, especially those expressed in Articles 21 and 26.\(^{63}\) The content and the rationale of the Convention, discussed earlier, seem likely to become part of the fundamental constitutional core of EU law: in other words, the UN CRPD encapsulates fundamental rights which are already constitutional norms within the EU legal order.

Prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the fundamental rights to which the EU institutions and Member States (when they act within the framework of EU law) were bound were the rights found in the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and in the international human rights treaties to which they are a party; such rights were generally taken to be part of the general principles of Community law. This was partly reflected in Article 6(2) EU, and partly based on the case law of the ECJ. The same principles are now reflected in Articles 2 and 6 of the TEU. In addition, Art. 53 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights\(^ {64}\) states that the EU has to observe the heteronymous minimum standard of the ECHR and of the international agreements to which the Union (or the EC) and/or the Member States are party (while the EU could set a higher standard autonomously).

It follows that the UN CRPD, with its disability-sensitive articulation and clarification of human rights, has become part of the EU’s fundamental rights system, and by the same token reflects the EU’s values. Thus, in this respect, the UN CRPD could be part of the ‘composite constitution’ envisaged by Besselink.\(^ {65}\)

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\(^{63}\) Articles 20 and 21 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights assume a horizontal character and apply to all forms of potential discrimination. The remaining provisions of the equality chapter deal individually with specific forms of discrimination and disadvantage. Art. 26 provides that: ‘The Union recognizes and respects the right of persons with disabilities to benefit from measures designed to ensure their independence, social and occupational integration and participation in the life of the community’. These measures (i.e. measures to which Art. 26 refers) may concern education, vocational training, ergonomics, accessibility, mobility, means of transport and housing (point 26 of the Community Charter on the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers of 1989), as well as access to cultural and leisure activities.

\(^{64}\) Art. 53 reads as follows: ‘Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of application, by Union law and international law and by international agreements to which the Union, the Community or all the Member States are party, including the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and by the Member States’ constitutions’.

The UN CRPD is capable of making an important contribution to European constitutional law and to EU human rights standards. Arguably, whatever the legal bases for the decision are, the conclusion of the UN CRPD fosters the debate about the human rights dimension and standards at the supranational level.

Of course, much will depend on the ECJ’s acknowledgement of the UN CRPD. It is very well known that the ECJ usually plays a central role in determining the status and effects of international law within the EU legal system, and it is clear that the Court’s rulings will be crucial in resolving how the UN CRPD will impact on the EU legal order. This is particularly so because of the wide scope of the Court’s exclusive jurisdiction (the ‘third pillar’ mentioned above), which cannot be modified or affected by any other dispute settlement mechanism (see the MOX plant case66). The need for unity of interpretation of international agreements led the ECJ (explicitly in Demirel67) to declare its own competence as regards the interpretation of agreements under ex-Article 234 EEC (now Article 267 TFEU). With regard to the validity of an EC/EU measure under an international treaty, the Court (in a preliminary ruling) has indicated that it can only judge the measure if the treaty’s provisions have direct effect.68

67 See M.A. Stein and J.E. Lord, in G. Quinn and O.M. Arnardóttir (eds.), The UN Convention on the Rights if Persons with Disabilities: European and Scandinavian Perspectives, 33. The Court follows a more delicate approach. It considers that ‘mixed agreements concluded by the Community, its Member States and non-member countries have the same status in the Community legal order as purely Community agreements, in so far as the provisions fall within the scope of Community competence’. To the extent that the EC/EU has assumed obligations under a mixed agreement, the norms which bind it form part of EU law. In that sense they are binding on the EU and its Member States, and they are subject to the Court’s jurisdiction.

68 The invalidity of an EU measure which conflicts with an international agreement may only be invoked if the relevant provision of the agreement has direct effect. As the Court said in International Fruit with regard to the GATT, ‘before the incompatibility of a Community measure with a provision of international law can affect the validity of that measure, the Community must first of all be bound by that provision. Before invalidity can be relied upon before a national court, that provision of international law must also be capable of conferring rights on citizens of the Community which they can invoke before the courts’ (Joined Cases 21 to 24/72, International Fruit Company NV and others v Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit, [1972] ECR 1219). See also Case C-308/06, International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko) and Others v Secretary of State for Transport, [2008] ECR I-4057; N. Lavranos, Legal Interaction between Decisions of International Organizations and European Law (Europa Law Publishing, 2004), 44. In some cases the Court does not require direct effect for a provision of an international treaty to be invoked. This is the case in two instances: first, when an EC/EU act is intended to implement a particular obligation arising from an international agreement (the Nakajima exception; Case C-69/89, Nakajima All Precision Co. Ltd v Council of the European Communities, [1991] ECR I-2069); and second, when an EC/EU act expressly refers to a specific provision of an international agreement which is thus to be used as a touchstone when interpreting the act (the Fediol exception; Case 70/87,
The ECJ’s recognition of the UN CRPD as a constitutional source (namely, as a source situated at the same level of the Treaties) would plainly be of paramount importance in moving to a more complex human rights system, one that is appropriate to the wide range of challenges faced by persons with disabilities.

Even if the ECJ declined to embrace the Convention as a core source of the EU’s constitution, the Court could nevertheless (and must) clarify the effects of the UN CRPD provisions. *In abstracto*, the UN CRPD seems capable, in light of its objectives and spirit, of conferring rights upon individuals, but the provisions are literally addressed to the Parties. Thus, it might be argued, none of its provisions seems to be sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional so as to have direct effect under the standard established long ago by the ECJ. Even if this formal argument is accepted, however, the judgment of the Court in *Kingdom of the Netherlands v European Parliament and Council* provides good grounds to consider that the review of EC/EU measures in light of the UN CRPD may be possible, regardless of whether the Convention has direct effect. In that case, the Court did not consider the requirement of direct effect to be necessary with regard to the Rio de Janeiro Convention on Biological Diversity of 5 June 1992.⁶⁹ According to the Court, even if the Rio de Janeiro Convention contained provisions which did not have direct effect, that fact did not preclude review by the Court of an EU act with respect to the issue of compliance with the obligations incumbent on the EU as a party to the agreement. In addition, the judgment also highlighted that it is for the Court, in its review of the compatibility of acts of the institutions with the general principles of EU law, to ensure that the fundamental right to human dignity and integrity is observed. This case law leaves the door open to the review of EU measures in light of the UN CRPD, in particular where the EU intends to implement an obligation entered into within the framework of international rules, or if the EU act expressly refers to specific provisions of the Convention.

Even if the UN CRPD is found not to have direct effect, and even if the ECJ ultimately refuses to review the validity of EU measures in light of its provisions, these provisions are in any event relevant for the interpretation of national and EU law. Direct effect, of course, is not the only type of effect which an agreement may produce. If the wording of secondary EU law is open to more than one interpretation, preference should be given, as far as possible, to the interpretation which may render the provision consistent with the Convention.⁷⁰ International provisions (and thus those of the UN CRPD) may be also cited by the ECJ in its preliminary rulings. Here it can be recalled that the ‘UNESCO Convention on the protection and promotion of cultural diversity’ was cited in the *UTECA* case.⁷¹ The framework created by the UN CRPD may thus help the Court to develop a more

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⁷¹ *Case C-222/07, Unión de Televisones Comerciales Asociadas (UTECA) v. Administración General del Estado*, Judgment of 5 March 2009, not yet reported.
structured and coherent approach to disability rights. Such an approach could be based, explicitly or implicitly, on the social model of disability. In embracing that model the Court could distance itself, or indeed explicitly overrule, the well-known *Chacón Navas* judgment.  

As Lavranos has observed, the ECJ ‘functions as a gatekeeper that decides on a case-by-case basis what the legal effect of an international law provision is within the Community legal order’. This will apply equally to the UN CRPD.

### 5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

As is the case with almost all international conventions (and particularly for human rights provisions), the wording of the UN CRPD is open-ended. Thus, it is clear to all observers – irrespective of their stance – that the Convention’s constitutional significance will emerge from its implementation. Clearly, the UN CRPD calls on Parties to ensure and promote the full realization of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all persons with disabilities, and to this end they must, *inter alia*, adopt all appropriate legislative, administrative and other measures for the implementation of the rights recognized in the Convention.  

In the last decade, the EC/EU has developed a significant disability policy. The EC/EU’s activities regarding disability were relaunched in 1996, with

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72 Case C-13/05, *Sonia Chacón Navas v. Eurest Colectividades SA*, [2006] ECR I-6467. See L. Waddington, ‘Case C-13/05, Chacón Navas v. Eurest Colectividades SA’, 44 *Common Market Law Review* 2 (2007), 487. In *Chacón Navas*, the Court stated that the concept of ‘disability’ within the meaning of the Employment Equality Directive must be understood as referring to a limitation which results in particular from physical, mental or psychological impairments and which hinders the participation of the person concerned in professional life. Then the ECJ underlined that the concepts of ‘disability’ and ‘sickness’ are not identical. The Court stated that, by using the concept of disability in Article 1 of that directive, the legislature deliberately chose a term which differs from ‘sickness’. The two concepts therefore cannot simply be treated as being the same. The definition of disability developed by the Court is based on the medical or individual model of disability. According to the definition given by the Court and repeated above, the cause of the disadvantage (or the limitation) is the impairment, and it is the impairment which hinders participation in professional life. Therefore, the problem lies in the individual, and not in the reaction of society to the impairment or the organization of society, which excludes disabled individuals. As is clear from the discussion earlier in this paper, the ECJ’s approach is not in line with the UN CRPD, which is based, rather, upon the social model of disability.

73 N. Lavranos, in F. Fontanelli, *et al* (eds.), *Shaping Rule of Law through Dialogue*, (Europa Law Publishing, 2010), 123. The Author also states that this case-by-case approach enables the ECJ to have a flexible approach: the ECHR is fully integrated within the EU legal order, while the WTO and the UNCLOS are denied direct effect.

74 See above Section 4.

75 Indeed, there is also a relevant Council action plan for the rehabilitation of disabled workers, adopted in 1974. This was characterized by the ‘medical’ model. It is also recalled that the first broad policy instrument specifically addressing disability that was produced by the Community was a Recommendation and Guideline on Employment (Council Recommendation 86/379/EEC of 24 July 1986 on the Employment of
the European Community Disability Strategy, based explicitly on the equal opportunities model. The current EU Disability Action Plan 2003-2010 (hereinafter, simply the ‘Plan’) carries forward the 1996 Strategy and proceeds in the direction already traced by the preceding initiatives. The Plan seeks to mainstream disability issues and to achieve the full application of Directive 2000/78 establishing a General Framework for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation. In addition, many other pieces of EU legislation address disability, directly or indirectly.

Disabled People in the Community, OJ L 225/49). The Recommendation, adopted in July 1986, was a non-binding document which only advised Member States on the action they should take to promote the employment of disabled people. The Recommendation itself is a vague document which refers to the need to promote ‘fair opportunities for disabled people’. Annexed to the Recommendation is a ‘guideline framework for positive action to promote the employment and vocational training of disabled people’. The text of the guideline is relatively precise and defines, in clear terms, what actions Member States should consider taking in the fields of, e.g., job creation, sheltered employment, guidance, assessment and placement, employers and workers’ organizations, and social security. In addition to policy instruments, funding was directed towards disability-related projects. Some of the projects that participated in the early Action Programmes were funded by the European Social Fund. See L. Waddington, From Rome to Nice in a Wheelchair. The development of a European Disability Policy, (Europa Law Publishing, 2006), 4 et seq. See also S. Munoz Machado and R. Del Lorenzo, European Disability Law, (Escuela Libre, 1997), 109 et seq.

1997 C12/1.

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However, the negotiating, signing and conclusion of the UN CRPD imply that the EC/EU, together with its Member States, have assumed an obligation under international law to do something more. Clearly, the EU must now comply with the UN CRPD provisions and implement them within the EU legal order.\textsuperscript{80}

A new Action Plan is in preparation to cover the period of 2010 onwards.\textsuperscript{81} The new Action Plan should ensure the full and effective implementation of the UN CRPD.

Since, as of yet, no legislation that prohibits discrimination based on disability outside the workplace has been adopted, a new instrument to address this issue would be an urgent priority. This new instrument, when adopted, should establish a framework for the prohibition of discrimination on the ground of disability, and set a uniform minimum level of protection within the EU for people who have experienced such discrimination. The Commission proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation is certainly an important step in this direction and should be quickly approved.\textsuperscript{82} It is important to note that this proposal fully addresses discrimination on the ground of disability, and it contains several references to the UN CRPD.

The EU has also been relatively successful in mainstreaming disability into its general legislation in the area of transport. However, as underlined by Waddington,\textsuperscript{83} in light of the UN CRPD, there is a need to incorporate disability

\textsuperscript{80} The Convention does not need any particular form of transposition, but it produces full effect in the domestic legal order once it is concluded and enters into force. The fact that no act of transposition is needed is not to be confused with questions of implementing measures: namely whether the correct application of all the provisions of the UN CRPD requires particular implementation depends on their nature (and of the nature of the Convention itself). Implementation may involve no action at all for provisions which may be interpreted as having direct effect, or for negative obligations, or if EC/EU or national law already complies with the agreement. Implementation may require the adoption of general implementing legislation that is needed so as to adjust either EC/EU or national law to the EU’s international commitments. Implementation may also involve administrative or executive actions (and the incurring of certain expenditures), in which case it is more correctly described as ‘application’. See P. Eekhout, \textit{External Relations of the European Union. Legal and Constitutional Foundations}, (Oxford University Press, 2004), 27 et seq.

\textsuperscript{81} To improve the situation of persons with disabilities, the European Commission is preparing a new EU Disability Strategy for 2010 to 2020, and it has called on the public to participate in this process. A questionnaire provided by the Commission asked for the opinion of respondents on the problems persons with disabilities face, and it inquired as to how respondents thought to solve them. The results of this public consultation will be used to assess the possible impact of various options for action that can be included in the new Disability Strategy. See <http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/ipm/forms/dispach?form=disabilitystrategy3> (no longer available!).


\textsuperscript{83} L. Waddington, 15 \textit{European Law Journal} 5 (2009), 575.
accessibility standards in all internal market harmonization legislation. Many Article 95 EC Directives addressing safety, such as those concerning toys,\textsuperscript{84} do not contain any reference to disability. As such, these instruments cannot be considered in compliance with the UN CRPD.

With these few remarks it is clearly impossible to fully explore the challenges and the complexity of the implementation of the UN CRPD. Suffice it to highlight, once again, that the Convention touches upon many different fields. It clearly requires a review of all EC/EU legislation currently in force to determine whether it is possible to mainstream the rights of persons with disabilities within such legislation.

The ECJ’s acknowledgment of the constitutional value of the UN CRPD, namely the recognition that the UN CRPD is part of the EU higher law, if this comes to pass, will not be sufficient. The implementation process will therefore be of the highest importance for translating the rights provided for in the UN CRPD (and the concepts of equality, accessibility and independent living contained therein) into effective law, and for assessing, in practice, the UN CRPD’s constitutional value.

In addition, there is no guarantee that the Court’s rulings will be always in line with the UN CRPD; although the ECJ plainly sees its role as that of a guarantor of fundamental rights, the balancing of competing interests may lead to different outcomes in different cases.

In conclusion, the UN CRPD imposes an obligation to reinforce and ensure the rights of persons with disabilities in the EU legislative instruments. It is important to revisit legal instruments which do not contain a reference to disability and to see whether they could benefit from the inclusion of specific references to the rights of persons with disabilities. It should be verified whether these instruments might be used to implement UN CRPD, and if so to amend them accordingly. New EU legislation should also contribute to ensuring the rights of persons with disabilities. As the implementation of the Convention proceeds, the ‘constitutional’ value of this international instrument will also become visible.