Pastine, Ivan and Pastine, Tuvana
(2012)
Student incentives and preferential treatment in
college admissions.
Economics of Education Review, 31.
pp. 123-130.
ISSN 0272-7757
Abstract
We consider a framework in which the optimal admissions policy of a purely academicquality
oriented college implements preferential treatment in favor of the student from
the deprived socioeconomic background which maximizes the competition between candidates.
We find that the exact form of the preferential treatment admissions policy matters
for student incentives and hence for student-body diversity in equilibrium. Preferential
treatment policy in college admissions often takes, or is perceived to take, an additive
form where the score of the applicant from the deprived background is augmented by a
fixed number of points. Such a preferential treatment policy fails to incentivize students
from the deprived background. Despite the affirmative action, the level of preferential
treatment that achieves academic excellence leaves student-body diversity unchanged
compared with a background-blind admissions policy and leads to a higher intergroup
score gap.
| Item Type: |
Article
|
| Keywords: |
Affirmative action; College admissions; All-pay auction;
Contest; Tournament; |
| Academic Unit: |
Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Finance and Accounting |
| Item ID: |
5690 |
| Identification Number: |
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2011.09.005 |
| Depositing User: |
Tuvana Pastine
|
| Date Deposited: |
19 Jan 2015 15:24 |
| Journal or Publication Title: |
Economics of Education Review |
| Publisher: |
Elsevier |
| Refereed: |
Yes |
| URI: |
|
| Use Licence: |
This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available
here |
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