A Marshall Aid Technical Assistance Team Member Refused a US Entry Visa: The 1951 Case of Irish Trade Unionist John McAteer

Peter Murray
Abstract
In October 1951 John McAteer, who had been selected by the Irish Trade Union Congress (ITUC) as a member of a team that was to visit the United States under the auspices of Ireland’s Marshall Aid Technical Assistance (TA) programme, had his application for an entry visa rejected. This paper examines this episode of Ireland’s Marshall Plan participation experience drawing upon files in the Irish National Archives. It begins by tracing the difficulties the 1945 split between rival Irish trade union congresses created for efforts to foster joint employer-trade union action within Ireland’s Marshall Aid TA programme. It then turns to the manner in which one of the union congresses, the ITUC, selected the members of its team to visit the USA and the issues raised by the selection for part of its own support base as well as for agencies of the Irish and US governments involved in Marshall Aid administration. Once McAteer had been refused a visa the ITUC decided to combine protest at his exclusion with continued participation in the TA project despite internal demands that it withdraw entirely. Briefing of the press by ITUC officers may have been responsible for press coverage that suggested that the Stormont government was to blame for the US attitude towards McAteer. No evidence to support such a contention has been found in the Irish National Archives files examined.
**Introduction**

John McAteer was a relatively unobtrusive, though far from insignificant, mid-twentieth century Irish trade union figure. In one of the labour history literature’s fairly rare references to him Terry Cradden (1993: 198) writes that ‘McAteer’s years of hard work’ in the roles of official of the National Union of Printing, Bookbinding and Paper Workers, of Secretary of Belfast and District Trades Union Council and of Secretary of the Northern Ireland Committee of the Irish Trade Union Congress (ITUC) ‘were eventually recompensed by his election as President of Congress in 1953’. But a footnote states that McAteer’s election to this office was less a recognition of this long service than something that came about ‘by way of a consolation prize’ for one brief and atypical episode of his career:

McAteer was one of six ITUC nominees for a visit to the US under the auspices of the [Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA)] in 1952. The story is a rather tortuous one, but he was refused a visa and there seem to have been three factors at work: first, that he was a known left-winger; second, that he was not a ‘national’ of the country sending the mission; and third, that Stormont had intervened against his application. In any case, the team went without him, much to the ire of McAteer’s northern supporters (Cradden 1993: 212)

The aim of this paper is to draw on material in the Irish National Archives (both government department files and the ITUC records that have been deposited there) in order to more fully reconstruct this ‘rather tortuous’ story. The context of the Productivity and Technical Assistance component of Marshall Aid programme within which proposals to send Irish employers and trade unionists on team visits to the USA were initiated and the difficulties these encountered due to the existence since 1945 of two rival trade union congresses in Ireland are first sketched. The manner in which the ITUC selected its team members and the controversies to which that selection gave rise is next described. The manner in which John McAteer’s membership of this team was constructed as being problematical through private exchanges between the Irish government and the US Embassy in Dublin as well as discussions within the Department of Industry and Commerce is then examined. Finally, the manner in which various actors reacted when the denial of a visa to McAteer became public knowledge is considered.

**Productivity and Technical Assistance as a component of Marshall Aid**

Along with dollar grants or loans for commodity purchases, Marshall Aid encompassed a Technical Assistance and Productivity Programme (USTAP). Technical Assistance (TA) primarily took the forms of individuals or teams visiting the USA to study the state of their particular art in a US context (Type A TA) or of US consultants visiting Europe to carry out analysis and dispense advice (Type B TA). Aid recipients were also urged by ECA to set up national productivity centres in which government, business and trade unions would collaborate on a benefit-sharing basis to promote the dissemination of changes that would assist in bridging the performance gap between the European and the US economies (Murray 2009: 19-45). ECA Missions to individual aid recipient states frequently encountered division between ‘free’ and ‘red’ trade unions and it was a key objective of USTAP to strengthen the former and marginalise the latter. What to do when, as in the Irish case, the trade union movement was deeply divided and anti-communist unions unwilling
to co-operate with one another were found on both sides of the divide was less obvious.

*Irish trade union congress and Labour Party splits of the 1940s*

The Irish Trade Union Congress, established in 1894, continued to operate on an all-Ireland basis after the island’s political partition at the beginning of the 1920s. But, with its affiliated unions organised on divergent local, Irish or British Isles lines, it experienced growing internal tensions. While the strongly nationalist Irish Transport and General Workers Union (ITGWU) was the main beneficiary of explosive membership growth during and after the First World War, a significant British Isles general workers union presence was also established around this time in the shape of the Amalgamated Transport and General Workers Union (ATGWU). The situation regarding large general unions was further complicated when, after a decade in the USA, James Larkin, the ITGWU leader in its early years, returned to Ireland in 1923 where he clashed with the new leadership dominated by William O’Brien and formed the breakaway Workers Union of Ireland (WUI). Among the smaller and/or more specialised unions the struggle for political independence was accompanied by a wave of Irish breakaways from amalgamated unions with British headquarters. The proportion of the membership breaking away varied but in most cases the breakaway and the original organisation were to be found co-existing in a less than amicable fashion, although the investment in enmity appears to have been considerably greater among union officials than among the rank and file (Hannigan 1981).

After plummeting during the 1920s, union membership recovered against the backdrop of industrialisation behind high tariff walls in the 1930s. As it did so, the Fianna Fail government signalled to the ITUC its intent to legislate if internal reform measures to tackle a perceived state of irrational fragmentation and internecine conflict were not forthcoming. An ITUC commission of inquiry was set up but no agreed basis for proceeding was found. Stalemate on the issue of reorganisation left the ITUC on the brink of a split in 1939 when an `advisory’ Council of Irish Unions was formed with the ITGWU at its core. The first year of neutral Ireland’s Emergency was marked by an upsurge in industrial disputes. Proposals to severely restrict the right to strike formed the initial government response but, with a growing closeness between ITGWU leaders and Fianna Fail Ministers for Industry and Commerce as its context, the focus moved towards trade union rationalisation. Here the emphasis was initially on tackling the multiplicity of unions by eliminating smaller ones but over time this shifted to excluding unions with British headquarters. In its final form the Act passed in 1941 discriminated against such unions in a number of ways, the most crucial of which related to a tribunal given power to award the sole right to organise a particular class of workers to a specific union (McCarthy 1977 202-206).

Internal division and behind-the-scenes collusion by some of their number with the government prevented the trade unions becoming an effective vehicle for popular protest in the early years of neutral Ireland’s Emergency. Within ITUC pre-existing strains were exacerbated by the strong union membership growth that wartime conditions stimulated north of the border and the active involvement in the congress that the mainly British-based union beneficiaries of this growth exhibited. By 1944 these British-based unions had a majority on the ITUC Executive and early in 1945
the Congress finally divided over attendance at a world trade union conference being hosted in London by the British TUC. For the ITGWU and a number of smaller Irish unions attendance was incompatible with Ireland’s neutrality and they withdrew to form the Congress of Irish Unions (CIU) when the sending of a delegation was approved. The Fianna Fail government’s policy after the split in congress was that ‘to build up the prestige of the Congress of Irish Unions and to treat it as the more representative organ of Trade Union opinion’.

Within the field of party politics active campaigning against the hardship and inequity of Fianna Fail’s emergency regime (O’Drisceoil 2005: 264-267) revitalised and radicalised a Labour Party, which, like the ITUC, experienced a major shift in its internal balance of forces during the Emergency years. Rapid expansion and a new activism had loosened the grip on the party’s structures long held by the largest general workers union in the state, the ITGWU. This enabled both James Larkin senior and James Larkin junior to join the party and stand successfully as Dail candidates in the 1943 general election. Industrially Larkin senior had been the bitterly detested enemy of the ITGWU leadership for the two decades since the power struggle that ended in the WUI breakaway. Politically both Larkins had – albeit in somewhat different ways - been identified with Communism and its hostility to the Labour Party over the same period although both now claimed to have severed their communist connections and professed a willingness to work amicably with former enemies within the Labour Party fold. Labour’s leader William Norton seems to have calculated that the ITGWU would not act on its threats and that a party with a broadened base could be sustained despite the bitterness of trade union rivalries.

However, as noted above, the industrial politics of the Emergency period had seen an alliance forged behind the scenes between Fianna Fail ministers and ITGWU leaders. Alleging communist penetration of the Labour Party, most ITGWU-linked TDs left to form the National Labour Party in early 1944. The split saw Labour in disarray when a snap general election in called in May 1944. Here the Fianna Fail government was also able to capitalise on a number of other issues – the “American Note” episode, the introduction of children’s allowance payments (Girvin 2006: 248-255) - to successfully restore the overall Dail majority it had lost in the previous year’s election. The Labour vote fell sharply. Eight Labour and four National Labour TDs were returned compared with the seventeen seats the united party had held after the 1943 election.

While ministerial powers of nomination were used to appoint CIU adherents and exclude ITUC ones when the opportunity arose, a Supreme Court decision that the key tribunal provisions of the 1941 Trade Union Act were unconstitutional subsequently denied the ITGWU and its satellites the really substantive membership gain benefits they might have expected to derive from alignment with Fianna Fail. When the governing party lost its overall majority in the 1948 general election, National Labour TDs defied CIU instructions and opted to join four other opposition parties – including the Labour Party - in forming a new government rather than backing a continuation of the outgoing one (Puirseil 2007: 130-131). Southern Ireland’s tiny number of Communists facilitated Labour Party reunification (which took place in 1950) by abandoning the Labour Party entryism they had practiced since the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union and launching a new party that omitted
the word Communist from its title. Inaugurating the Irish Workers League in October 1948, Spanish Civil War veteran and Emergency internee Michael O’Riordan declared that:

The politicians are talking about the country entering into military alliances if a deal can be done about partition. Already we have been committed to the Marshall Plan and are witnessing the humiliation of having a commission in our midst from a foreign country with power to interfere in our internal economic affairs. Ireland is being lined up in the Anglo-U.S. Imperialistic camp in opposition to those countries which have ended the privileges and power of their wealthy classes, but the Irish people must make it clear to the politicians that they want no part of the Imperialist war plans and have no quarrel with these countries which are building a social system along the Socialist lines James Connolly envisaged for Ireland.ii

Despite the death of James Larkin Senior and the retirement of William O’Brien in the late 1940s, trade union division was to prove more intractable than that within the Labour Party. The tortuous process of reuniting the two union congresses was not to be completed until 1959 formation of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU).

The Union Congresses and Ireland’s Technical Assistance Programme

The first Marshall Aid Irish TA projects got under way in 1949 and by the second half of 1950 Ireland’s two rival trade union congresses were engaged in discussions with the Department of Industry and Commerce about visiting the USA alongside the Federated Union of Employers (FUE). By early 1951, however, an impasse had emerged. The Irish government and the Dublin ECA Mission both favoured a single mission consisting of four FUE nominees, two ITUC nominees and two nominees from the Congress of Irish Unions (CIU). But this was unacceptable to the CIU who set out their grounds of objection on 20 April in a letter to the ECA Mission. According to the CIU `the present government and its predecessor have recognized this Congress as the most representative central trade union authority by affording us the representation of the workers of Ireland at the International Labour Organization Annual Meetings’. The letter went to assert that most of the ITUC membership was located in Northern Ireland `and would, it is presumed, participate in Technical Assistance teams from Britain under ECA’ while at least two-thirds of industrial workers in Republic were CIU union members. But, until it was ejected from office in June, the first Inter-Party Government was unwilling to move away from the model of a single team based on a 4-2-2 formula and the impasse continued.

With Fianna Fail having returned to office in June 1951 the idea of sending two larger teams immediately found favour. Formally the CIU and FUE nominees would together comprise one team and the ITUC nominees on their own another. But, with the two teams travelling at the same time, it was envisaged that arrangements could be made for both sets of trade union nominees to participate in joint activities with the FUE representatives while in the United States. By 21 June Industry and Commerce wrote to both congresses seeking six team member nominees from each. The dollar costs of the teams’ visits were to be borne by the US technical assistance programme: the non-dollar costs (principally travel to the USA) were to be shared equally between the Irish exchequer and the participating business or trade union bodies.iii

Translated into round figures, as the ITUC Secretary informed the affiliated unions with representation on the National Executive who were invited to put forward
nominations for team membership, this meant that a union would have to commit itself to paying approximately £120 should its nominee be chosen as a participant. The ITUC set 18 July as the deadline for the receipt of nominations with the Executive meeting to select participants on 20 July. By this date only two nominations had been received – Norman Kennedy by the ATGWU and John McAteer by the National Union of Printing, Bookbinding and Paper Workers (NUPBBW). Nine unions had declined to make nominations and a further three had indicated that they could not reach a decision on the matter within the time allowed. At the 20 July meeting Kennedy and McAteer were selected as team members as was the ITUC’s Secretary, Ruaidhri Roberts. In addition all affiliated unions, rather than just those represented on the National Executive, were circularised inviting nominations accompanied by the requisite financial undertaking. When the National Executive met on 10 August it had a further five nominees from which to select the remaining three team members. The ATGWU had decided to make a second nomination and others had been received from the National Union of Railwaymen (NUR), the National Union of Vehicle Builders (NUVB), the Irish Women Workers Union (IWWU) and the Irish National Teachers Organisation (INTO). As Table 1 shows, two ballots were required as two candidates were for tied for the final team place at the end of the first one. The selected team’s composition is shown in Table 2.

Table 1 Votes Cast at ITUC National Executive Meeting, 10 August 1951

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nominating Union</th>
<th>First Ballot</th>
<th>Tie-Breaking Ballot</th>
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<tr>
<td>NUR</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATGWU</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUVB</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IWWU</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTO</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tbody>
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Table 2 Selected ITUC Team Members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Richard Deasy</td>
<td>NUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sam Kyle</td>
<td>ATGWU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norman Kennedy</td>
<td>ATGWU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John McAteer</td>
<td>NUPBBW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Mulligan</td>
<td>NUVB</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ruaidhri Roberts</td>
<td>ITUC</td>
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</table>

Adverse reactions to the ITUC team’s composition

This outcome did not produce universal satisfaction. The Dublin United Trades Council on 28 August wrote to Roberts protesting ‘on the double ground that representation of women workers, and especially of ordinary workers at their trade, was most desirable in deputations of this kind’. Roberts responded that ‘the selection of members of the team was made by the National Executive by a ballot vote, as it was the view of the Executive that this was the fairest method and most likely to give due weight to the many factors involved’. A longer draft for what was ultimately a brief response states that ‘consideration was given to the desirability of including a woman worker and workers at their trade, but these are only two of the many factors
that have to be taken into account and no special representations relating to these factors were received from any organisation prior to the selection meeting’. The draft also contained the argument that ‘two of the six representatives are workers at their trade and all the members have practical experience of working at their occupations prior to appointment as trade union officials. It is also relevant to point out that the study of American collective bargaining practices and trade union activities is one of the principal functions of this team and accordingly, that the team may be of greatest benefit to the trade union movement, it is not inappropriate that the majority of its members should be full-time official of trade unions’.

Misgivings about the team’s membership were soon to extend beyond the trade union movement but outside its ranks these did not focus on the presence of two ATGWU representatives and the exclusion of the IWWU’s Miss Caffrey but rather on the position of John McAteer. On 4 September the Minister for External Affairs, Frank Aiken, received the following “Office Memorandum” from Cloyce K. Huston, Charge d’Affaires, Ad Interim of the US Embassy:

**Box 1 - Office Memorandum September 4, 1951 Subject: John McAteer, I.T.U.C. Nominee for Labor T.A. Project**

The Embassy has been informed that Mr. John McAteer has recently been nominated by the Irish Trade Union Congress as a member of the Labor team to visit the United States under the ECA Technical Assistance Program. McAteer is a member of the National Executive of the I.T.U.C. and is Secretary of the Northern Ireland Committee of the I.T.U.C. His trade union is the National Union of Printing, Bookbinding and Paper Workers, the Irish membership of which is exclusively in Northern Ireland. He resides in Belfast, and his only connection with the South of Ireland is through the I.T.U.C. He is a British subject.

In the circumstances ECA and other United States authorities concerned cannot permit McAteer’s participation in the T.A. project. It is technically impossible for ECA Dublin to permit a Northern Ireland trade unionist to be a member of a team financed as representing the Republic of Ireland. Although he is presumably a British subject, his possession of an Irish passport would not remove the technical obstacle. The Embassy will accordingly inform the Irish Department of External Affairs that McAteer’s participation in the proposed team cannot be accepted, making sure that the appropriate Irish authorities fully understand and appreciate the circumstances necessitating this decision.”
Ireland trade unionist may not be a member of a team financed as representing the Republic of Ireland’. This view represents so far as we are concerned an entirely unacceptable endorsement of the iniquitous situation which has obtained here since the British Government divided our nation in two and imposed their nationality upon a large number of Irish people who want to be recognised solely as Irish citizens.

At his meeting with Huston on 6 September Aiken emphasised the practical difficulties he might face in the Dail if McAteer’s exclusion was linked to his being a British subject and a Belfast resident – ‘on the other hand, the Minister considered it quite possible to convince the Dail that the U.S. authorities have exclusive discretion to refuse the entry of any foreigner to their jurisdiction without giving any reasons whatever’. With regard to the proposed visa refusal having any substantial political or national security grounds, Aiken and his officials were frankly sceptical:

So far as we knew, McAteer has had a clean security record for a number of years back and our police expressed the view that he should be granted a passport. In this connection the Minister expressed the view that in all probability McAteer, if permitted to accompany his five fellow delegates to America, would find himself so hustled around that, even if he wanted to, he could scarcely indulge in any undesirable activities.

Returning in conclusion to the issue of whether McAteer was to be regarded as British or Irish, ‘the Minister remarked that it was more than likely that many dual nationals had already visited America on E.C.A. schemes’.

On the day of the second meeting between Aiken and Huston, Miss Brewster of the Department of Industry and Commerce’s Labour Division was writing a report on the progress made to date towards sending the two teams to the USA. In it she highlighted the position of John McAteer in broadly similar terms to those of the US Embassy memorandum noting that his union ‘has no negotiating licence under our Trade Union Act and appears to operate solely in the Six-County area’:

It is for consideration whether we should allow Mr. McAteer to participate in this mission as a representative of the T.U.C. when the Union of which he is an official does not operate in the State. So far we have not interfered at all in the Congresses’ selections, and it may well be argued that Twenty-Six County trade unionism will benefit as a result of the participation of Mr. McAteer as a member of the [ITUC National] Executive. On the other hand, objections may be raised to the State’s financing his participation when he belongs to a union that does not operate here. The extent of the State’s financial contribution will be approximately £120 (50% of the return fare from Ireland to the States). Any information gained on this trip will no doubt be through the Unions as well as through the Congresses and it may be thought that Mr. McAteer is blocking a place on the mission which might be filled by an official of a union with substantial membership here.”
Further up the Department’s hierarchy, however, there was no inclination to engage in such consideration and when McAteer’s nomination as a team member was discussed at the regular departmental conference on 10 September a decision was taken that no objection should be raised.\textsuperscript{xii} There is no evidence of Industry and Commerce being made aware by External Affairs of the discussions that had taken place between that department and the US Embassy on the subject of McAteer’s visa. Prompted by the NUR nominee to the team, Ruaidhri Roberts during September raised with both of these departments the question of ‘whether official passports will be issued to the members of the team or whether the members of the team will travel on their own passports and make personal application for their visa to the U.S. Embassy’. External Affairs informed him that ‘official passports had been issued to certain E.C.A. Technical Assistance teams, but in such cases application is made originally from the Department of Industry and Commerce’. When he then sought clarification from Industry and Commerce, Roberts was told that ‘it is not intended to issue official passports to the participants in this Mission. Application for passports and visa should be made by the members of the Mission themselves.’\textsuperscript{xiii} Clearly the potential for political complication was much greater in a case of the refusal of a visa to an official passport holder than in the case of a refusal to the holder of a private individual’s passport. The External Affairs note responding to US Embassy memorandum states that ‘for the purpose of a journey to the United States, as member of an E.C.A. T.A. Program labor team, McAteer would be entitled to the gratis issue of an “official” passport, valid for the duration of the particular programme in contemplation’\textsuperscript{xiv}. However there is no evidence that Industry and Commerce had any communication with External Affairs on whether or not the ITUC team members should receive official passports – it seems to have made its decision by a purely internal process.

\textit{The ITUC response to the refusal of a US visa to a member of its selected team}

Formal communication of the refusal of a visa to McAteer came on 18 October, exactly a month after Industry and Commerce’s statement of its position on the provision of official passports to the team of which he was a member. This avoided stating any specific ground – ‘we find that, under the conditions governing the issuance of visas, we will be unable to accept the application of Mr. John McAteer’ – and invited the nomination of a substitute team member.\textsuperscript{ xv} On 26 October this was passed on, via Industry and Commerce, to the ITUC whose National Executive debated the matter at a special meeting on 9 November. Before the meeting was a motion calling for ‘the decision to send a team to the U.S.A. to be rescinded and that the National Executive have nothing further to do with any such proposal’. The meeting’s minutes provide the following summary of the ensuing debate:
In the course of further discussion members speaking against the motion made the following points: that the possibility of Mr. McAteer’s exclusion because he was a resident in Northern Ireland and considered to be a United Kingdom citizen had been visualised when the team was being appointed, that the terms under which the team members were nominated was a matter for the United States and that diplomatic problems were involved that could not be resolved by any action by the National Executive, that the withdrawal of the whole team would receive widespread publicity and might involve misinterpretations which would be very damaging to the Irish T.U.C. and that members of the team had undertaken personal expenditure in making preparations for the visit.

For the motion it was stated that no conditions were made as to the membership of the team when the matter was first proposed, that the Northern Ireland Committee had protested to the Northern Ireland Government against their “hand-picking” of Labour representatives, that if any undesirable publicity was directed against the Irish T.U.C. as a consequence of their withdrawal such undesirable publicity would be equally directed against Mr. McAteer personally and in his capacity as a member of the National Executive if the National Executive agreed to his exclusion and that Mr. McAteer as well as other members of the team had undertaken personal expenditure.

At the end of the debate the vote was tied with seven for and seven against. Rather than using his casting vote, the Chairman, James Larkin Junior, then sought ‘to explore the possibility of reaching a more substantial agreement between the members of the Executive’. What emerged from this exploration was agreement ‘that the team consisting of the five existing members should go to the U.S.A., that the vacancy caused by the withdrawal of Mr. McAteer should not be filled and that in notifying the Department of Industry and Commerce of this decision, the Department should also be asked to convey to the U.S. authorities a protest by the National Executive against the exclusion of Mr. McAteer’xvi. The letter sent to Industry and Commerce stated that ‘the Irish Trade Union Congress represents workers in the whole of the thirty-two counties of Ireland and accordingly they cannot appreciate the reason for any exception being made in the case of the Secretary of our Northern Ireland Committee’xvii.

The National Executive was itself the target of protests with eighteen communications from a variety of trade union bodies being received over the three months following its decision. All but one of these came from Northern Ireland – the Dublin United Trades Council was the sole voice of southern dissent. All but one called for no team to go without McAteer – the one exception was that from the National Union of Distributive and Allied Workers, Rathkenny (Co. Antrim) Branch. This called for a new northern member to be nominated in McAteer’s stead. The reply this branch received informed it that it was not possible to appoint such a substitute as ‘no guaranteed nomination was received in respect of any person from Northern Ireland other than Mr. McAteer’xviii. Meeting on 16 November the Northern Ireland Committee of ITUC unanimously adopted a resolution calling for ‘further consideration’ of the National Executive decision to send a team in the light of northern trade union feeling about McAteer’s exclusion. But on 30 November the National Executive resolved that ‘the decision of the special meeting on this matter should stand’, a position it adhered to throughout the period of protestsxix.
Press coverage of the visa refusal

The affair did not attract press coverage until after the 9 November meeting of the ITUC National Executive. Beginning by reporting the visa refusal and the ITUC protest against it, an *Irish Times* piece on 10 November then rehearsed McAteer’s trade union record before stating that:

He sided with those who favour an all-Ireland Labour Party and was a strong supporter of Mr. Jack Beattie in the recent election in Belfast, and was a member of the committee that urged the reprieve of six young Belfastmen who were condemned to death in 1944. He was also a member of the 1798 anniversary celebrations and is a brother of Mr. Sandy McAteer who was arrested and imprisoned in 1945 during a strike in Belfast.

The Northern Ireland Committee of the Irish Trade Union Congress of which Mr. McAteer is Secretary, has been conducting a campaign in recent months to secure recognition from the Northern Ireland Government but the Government has told the committee that recognition would be given only if they severed their connection with the T.U.C. in Dublin.

These ‘activities and associations of Mr McAteer’, the piece continued, ‘were given last night by some trade unionists as possible reasons for the refusal of the visa’. To these trade unionists was then attributed ‘the addition factor that Northern Ireland was still diplomatically a part of the United Kingdom and as the delegation was sponsored by the Irish Government that a difficulty may have arisen in that field’.

A shorter piece in the *Irish Press* on the same date did not attempt to identify the reason behind the refusal and in addition to his trade union offices noted only that McAteer was a member of the ‘Six-County Tourist Board’. Another *Irish Press* story on 12 November reported that no official explanation for the refusal would be provided ‘as the State Department normally does not make public their reasons for such decisions’ but that ‘in Belfast it is believed that the U.S. attitude may have been dictated by Six-County official reports on Mr. McAteer, who is prominently associated with the Anti-Partition movement’. On 11 November the *Sunday Independent* reported the story in very similar terms, making reference to McAteer’s trade union offices, his tourist board position, his all-Ireland Labour Party affiliation and his recent support for Jack Beattie:

Mr. McAteer is well-known principally for his trade union activities, but his Nationalist sympathies have never been concealed. It was believed in Dublin last night that this may have influenced the U.S. authorities in arriving at their decision. The position was further complicated for the Americans, it is thought, by reason of the fact that Mr. McAteer, who is regarded for diplomatic purposes as a British citizen, was nominated as a member of an Irish delegation.

Further coverage of the story followed the 16 November meeting of the Northern Ireland Committee of ITUC. The *Irish Press* on the following day reported that, while no official statement was issued afterwards, it was understood that the committee had expressed the view... that no T.U.C. delegation should be sent to America.
without Mr John McAteer, their secretary, being a member of it’. The report noted
the presence of Ruaidhri Roberts at the meeting and indicated that the discussion of
the matter had been lengthy. Protests from the Dublin and Belfast Trades Councils
were referred to and, for the first time, information from a US government source
made an appearance – ‘in Washington, a State Department spokesman stated that
there was no record of the case in the Department and he assumed the visa had
been refused by the U.S. Consul-General in Belfast. Only doubtful cases were
referred to Washington, he added.’ The piece concluded by providing some
biographical details of John McAteer – he was fifty years old, had served in the
British Army during the First World War and lived in the Shankill Road district of
Belfast.

The *Irish Independent* of 17 November carried a similar story. Here the Northern
Ireland Committee were reported to have ‘decided to lodge a protest against the
refusal of the visa and support any movement by the Executive Committee of the
Irish T.U.C. to cancel the visit unless Mr. McAteer is granted a visa’. It was also stated
that the Belfast Trades Council were seeking a meeting with the U.S. Consul-
General. On November 30, the day on which the ITUC National Executive
reaffirmed its position in the face of ongoing protests, the *Irish Press* reported that
the U.S. Consul-General in Belfast, Ralph Bornstein, had declined to meet a Trades
Council delegation – ‘Mr. Bornstein said that Mr. McAteer’s application did not go
through the Belfast Consulate-General and, in any case, it was not usual practice to
reveal reasons for refusal to persons other than the applicant’. The role played by
Dublin-based US Embassy or ECA Mission officials in the affair was not pursued by
the press. No comment was elicited from the third party involved in the TA project
from which McAteer was to be excluded, the Irish Government, nor from the fourth
party associated with the affair by its press coverage, McAteer’s inferred traducer,
the Northern Ireland Government.

How was the publicity described above related to the actions of the various
governmental and trade union parties involved in the TA project? ITUC officers were
active in shaping its initial content. The Minutes of the National Executive meeting
of 30 November record that ‘following discussion of press reports which had been
published the day after the special meeting [of the Executive on 9 November] it was
agreed... that the action taken the President [James Larkin Junior] and the Secretary
[Ruaidhri Roberts] in informing newspaper correspondents on the matter be
approved’. Within Industry and Commerce Miss Brewster, in responding to the
ITUC’s request that its protest be conveyed to the US authorities, on 14 November
drafted a minute to External Affairs in which ‘I did not consider it wise to quote their
remark on Mr. McAteer’s position as Secretary of the N.I. Committee since they have
no case to send him in that capacity – if they had stressed his membership of the
National Executive they might have had some case’. A handwritten addition to her
memo refers to a press cutting – apparently from the *Irish Times* of 10 November –
having subsequently come to hand and commenting that ‘in view of the life-history
expounded therein I think it more than ever inadvisable to quote the T.U.C.’s
remarks’. However her superior, Thomas Murray, opted to enclose a copy of the
ITUC’s letter with the minute sent to External Affairs adding that ‘your Department will, no doubt, convey the protest to the appropriate United States authorities’ and continuing that ‘the Congress has advised that their representatives will be ready to leave for America at any time during the first or second week in January and to request you to inform the E.C.A. accordingly’. On 20 November another Industry and Commerce officer recorded that:

I told Mr. Roberts of the Irish Trade Union Congress that Mr Cavanaugh of the E.C.A. had told us that he had seen on the paper a note to the effect that the Northern branch of the Congress were so aggrieved at the refusal of the American authorities to give a visa to Mr. McAteer that the Branch had asked headquarters to take no part in the Mission. Mr. Cavanaugh had asked us to let him know as soon as possible whether the attitude of the Congress would be influenced by the protest made by the Northern Branch. Mr. Roberts said that all he could tell me officially was that a protest had been made and that it would be considered by the Executive at the next meeting, which would be on the 30th inst. He added that he could make no unofficial statement on the position and would make no guess as to what the position of the Executive would be.

On 30 November Miss Brewster noted that ‘Mr. Roberts phoned me to inquire whether we had heard anything further as to the departure of the T.U.C. Mission for U.S.A. I said that we had not, but that we had sent on to D/Ext. Affairs their decision not to nominate anybody else in place of Mr. McAteer. I confirmed that we had neither got the impression ourselves, nor conveyed it to D.E.A. that the other five did not intend to go’. On 5 December an External Affairs officer wrote in a memo that ‘there are no grounds for formal protest as it is within the unqualified right of the US Government to act as it thinks fit in its own interests in the matter on the admittance of non US citizens to the US and I think that the most that we could do to meet the TUC here would be to convey to the ECA the latter’s disappointment and surprise at their unwillingness to facilitate Mr. McAteer. However this presumably is a matter to be decided by either by the Political and or the Protocol Division’. No further reference was found to the matter which may be presumed to have been overtaken by a series of larger events to which we now turn.

November is a wicked month

If both Irish and US governmental agencies had a clear interest in saying nothing publicly while proceeding with the business of moving forward a raft of TA projects, including the US visit of a now smaller than originally envisaged ITUC team, the passing up by the CIU of the opportunity presented by the McAteer visa refusal to sling mud at its rival requires consideration given the rancorous atmosphere accompanying the split. Were any political doubts about John McAteer really green Irish nationalist rather than red communist or fellow-travelling ones? Did the inclusion in its team of a nominee of McAteer’s union – with its London headquarters, its purely northern Irish membership and its lack of a trade union licence in the Republic - not underlines the ITUC’s essentially alien, British character? The explanation for CIU silence would appear to be that at the time the affair was
unfolding the CIU had a bigger fish to fry. As noted earlier, having the CIU/FUE team and that of the ITUC travel to the USA at the same time so that programme arrangements could create opportunities for both sets of trade unionists to take part in joint activities with employers was central to Irish and US governmental thinking from the time the two project approach was adopted. During November 1951 such plans fell apart completely. By the middle of that month a six-member CIU group had arrived in the USA without the FUE nominees that were to make up the remainder of the TA Project 44-93 team. Shortly afterwards a four-strong FUE group travelled separately to join in a very large (300 plus) European industrialists’ mission. Given McAteer’s experience, a certain irony attaches to this visit’s organisation:

The scheme on which four members of the FUE have recently departed was originally conceived as a joint European Mission under the auspices of OEEC. Exception was taken by some of the leading European manufacturers to the fact that, if this went forward as a formal TA scheme, they would be obliged to submit biographical data and to be cleared by US Security Authorities. Accordingly, a different method was found. The National Association of Manufacturers of the USA agreed to sponsor the scheme and indeed it was they who suggested (if they did not actually select) the names of the delegates from each particular country. ECA is, however, involved to the extent that they have undertaken to pay the dollar costs of the team of European employers for a period of 14 days, after which the team will be taken over by the National Association of Manufacturers.\(^{xviii}\)

While the CIU team members did have to supply biographical details and obtain visa approval, what they shared with the employers’ group was having a sponsor that enabled them to by-pass the usual TA project procedures:

This visit was originally intended as part of a joint employer/employee TA Mission in which the TUC and the FUE would also participate. Formal approval from ECA was held up because of the difficulty arising from the inclusion of Mr. McAteer in the TUC team. As a result, it was decided in October that the whole scheme should be deferred until the New Year and the three parties concerned were advised accordingly. ECA believed that after the meeting at which this was conveyed to them the CIU got in touch direct with Mr. Tobin, US Secretary of Labour, as a result of which their particular trip was approved out of turn as a separate project. The result has been, of course, to alter the whole concept of the project but ECA, Dublin, wanted us to understand that this had not been their doing and that they had to act on the instructions they got from Washington.\(^{xix}\)

The debacle of these twin TA projects involving joint employer and trade union action proved a harbinger of the fate of the wider TA programme of which they formed part. At the end of December 1951 ECA was replaced by the Mutual Security Agency (MSA). The legislation that created MSA changed the context of US aid provision from European economic recovery to strengthening ‘the mutual security and individual and collective defences of the free world’. Crucially its terms required the Irish Government to explicitly adhere to the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 - which
provided the framework for its ongoing aid programme - `as heretofore amended, including the statement of purpose contained in Section 2 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951’. This was deemed to be incompatible with Ireland’s declared foreign policy and a Memorandum to the Government advised that should refusal to adhere ‘entail the discontinuance of all further American aid to this country after the 31st December, 1951, the Minister for External Affairs considers there is no alternative but to accept the loss involved.’ The extent of the loss became clear in the middle of January 1952 with MSA deciding that ‘the only rule that would fully meet their responsibilities under the legislation was that all assistance should be terminated as of midnight on the 8th January except to the extent necessary to relieve a government of a dollar commitment which they had entered into by firm contract and to which they were irrevocably committed’. Almost all the Irish TA projects had yet to reach this stage of irrevocable commitment and of just under $900,000 authorised for Irish TA projects, only a little over $20,000 was to be expended after the aid suspension. Responsible for almost all the suspended projects, Industry and Commerce undertook a review whose recommendations were approved at the Departmental Conference held on 10 March 1952. Of the projects deprived of any dollar support about half were continued to a greater or lesser extent by Irish Government funding while half were entirely discontinued (Murray 2009: 32-34 and 49-51). The ITUC team visit was one of the survivors of this cull and, after further trials and tribulations that fall outside the scope of this paper, the five remaining nominees of August 1951 finally arrived in the USA in May 1952.
Conclusion

Terry Cradden (1993: 212) identified as the three factors at work in the refusal of a US visa to John McAteer that `first, that he was a known left-winger; second, that he was not a `national' of the country sending the mission; and third, that Stormont had intervened against his application’. In relation to the first factor what is noteworthy is how efforts on the part of ITUC leaders to avert damaging publicity both for the organisation as a whole and for McAteer personally resulted in press stories that stressed political credentials of McAteer’s that were broadly nationalist and anti-partitionist in nature – his adherence to the Irish Labour Party rather than to the unionist-with-a-small-u Northern Ireland Labour Party, his involvement in organising 1798 anniversary celebrations in Belfast and in seeking clemency for IRA activists from that city under sentence of death – rather than specifically left-wing. It was these stories that pointed the finger towards Stormont as the source of McAteer’s difficulties with the American authorities and no evidence that Northern Irish governmental action played any role in the affair can be found in the files available in the Irish National Archives. Motive for suggesting that McAteer had a `derogatory' record can certainly be attributed to Stormont agencies but Belfast-based labour movement organisations to which he gave lengthy service were not above suspicion in other quarters. For instance, the Minutes of ITUC National Executive meeting of 26 October – the day before the organisation received notification of the McAteer visa refusal - record that:

A letter from the Belfast & District Trades Union Council enclosed copies of correspondence from the British T.U.C. to the Clerical and Administrative Workers Union and asked the National Executive to consider references to the Belfast & District Trades Union Council contained in that correspondence, in particular the statement that the Belfast & District Trades Union Council was Communist-controlled and the statement that the British T.U.C. was unable to say whether the Belfast & District Trades Union Council was acknowledged by the Northern Ireland Committee of the Irish Trade Union Congressxxx.

Irish Communists had followed divergent northern and southern paths after Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941. The following month a decision was taken to dissolve the Communist Party’s only southern branch in Dublin: members were to join the Labour Party with the ultimate aim of promoting its participation in a coalition that would secure a parliamentary majority for entering the war on the side of the United Nations. North of the border the Party remained intact and for a while prospered spectacularly, basking in the reflected glory of Red Army battlefield heroics, urging Labour-Unionist coalition at Stormont and demanding maximum factory output in support of the war effort. By 1951 these glory days were long gone but the party was not without influence. The successor to McAteer as Secretary of Belfast & District Trades Union Council who on 16 November communicated to Ruaidhri Roberts its view of the McAteer visa affair - `we can only believe that this refusal is conditioned by the fear of the American authorities to have such a champion of our class in the USA at the present time’xxxii was the prominent Communist Betty Sinclair.

The files available in Dublin confirm that not being a national of the country sending the mission was indeed a ground of objection to McAteer’s membership of the ITUC team. This was formally set out in the Office Memorandum presented to Frank Aiken
on 6 September and reproduced above. The External Affairs records of the discussions that took place on that date and on 8 September also confirm that there was a security dimension to the objection. While acknowledging the right of US authorities to exclude from their state whom they wished without statement of reasons, the Irish response very forcefully rejected the nationality ground set out in the US memorandum and questioned whether McAteer had a ‘derogatory’ record which might reasonably attract Congressional criticism on the basis of a contrary Garda assessment. No disclosure of the basis of the US security concerns with regard to McAteer was recorded on this occasion and the US authorities subsequently adhered to their intention to refuse McAteer a visa while accommodating Irish official sensitivity by leaving the grounds unspecified and the issue of nationality unstated. The Office Memorandum drew the US government into partition-related issues with which it normally sought to avoid any entanglement. With anti-partition campaigning being an activity in which Fianna Fail and the parties coalescing as a governmental alternative to it were vying to outdo one another, the idea that the position this memorandum set out could secure official understanding and appreciation in Dublin was scarcely better founded than the Irish government’s ‘sore thumb’ policy of raising the island’s partition at every opportunity on the international stage had been. Moreover the exclusive conception of nationality the memorandum asserted was at odds with the wider US policy emphasis of promoting civil and military cooperation across nation-state boundaries in non-communist Europe. As the December External Affairs Memorandum for the Government on the new US Mutual Security legislation observed: “apart from the emphasis on military-security, it will be noticed that the preamble to Section 101 (a) mentions as an object of the appropriations authorised by that section “to further encourage the economic unification and political federation of Europe”. This goes much further than any previous statement of the desire of the American legislature to see the creation of a unified Europe”. That the ITUC National Executive should be evenly split over how it should respond to the refusal of a US visa to one its TA team nominees principally reflected the complex and delicate state of its relationships with the Dublin and Stormont governments. In Dublin Marshall Aid was the first context within which Dublin governmental favouring of the CIU was replaced – to the chagrin of the CIU – with an even-handed treatment of the two congresses that would broaden into sustained official support for the recreation of a unified Irish trade union centre. Withdrawal from participation in the TA programme would have jeopardised this significant ITUC gain. North of the border the ITUC’s Northern Ireland Committee of which McAteer had been Secretary since its inception in 1945 sought in an incremental fashion to secure de facto recognition from Stormont as the representative body of trade unionists with which the Northern Ireland government should routinely confer. Initially this approach achieved some success – McAteer’s Tourist Board membership was on foot of a Northern Ireland Committee nomination – and it provides the context for the reference in the Minutes of the special ITUC National Executive meeting of 9 November to how the Northern Ireland Committee had protested to the Northern Ireland Government against their “hand-picking” of Labour representatives’. With a hostile Minister of Labour as its principal architect, a general policy of Stormont government non-recognition would be instituted by 1953 and implemented for more than a decade but the NIC were able to secure the cooperation of individual unions
and broader union confederations in restricting, if not entirely preventing, labour representative 'hand-picking'. This resulted in a stand-off which was ultimately resolved more by government capitulation than by trade union concession (Mulholland 1997).

One of this stand-off’s casualties was the 1962 failure to establish in Northern Ireland a Productivity Council as part of a 'National Productivity Year' which was supposed to encompass the whole of the United Kingdom. South of the border a centre for the promotion of joint employer-trade union action was created with the establishment of the Irish National Productivity Committee in 1959, a decade after USTAP had been launched. When first preached the US ‘gospel of productivity’ had encountered too many deaf Irish ears to make a significant impact. But as both of the Irish states subsequently turned to economic planning to industrialise an agriculture-dependent economy or address problems of decline afflicting large, long-established engineering, shipbuilding and textile industries key parts of its joint action approach were to be rediscovered by Irish actors. Throughout both periods, and particularly on the ITUC side of the split, trade union leaders were to emerge as one of the Irish actor embodiments most receptive to the productivity message (Murray 2005 and 2009: 74-96). The continued project participation plus protest formula adopted by the ITUC National Executive when John McAteer was refused a US visa was an early intimation of this disposition.
NOTES
Abbreviations used in notes:
NAI National Archives of Ireland
DFA Department of Foreign Affairs
DIC Department of Industry and Commerce
DL Department of Labour
DT Department of the Taoiseach
ICTU Irish Congress of Trade Unions

1 See NAI DT S13,700 Congress of Irish Unions: uniformity of State action following recognition of

2 NAI DFA A55 Communist Activities in Ireland “To The Editor” - a handwritten note on the
two page document states “Report supplied Daily Papers but not published except brief note
in Mail herewith” (attached is clipping from Evening Mail, “Workers League” 22/10/1948)

3 NAI DL W117 E.C.A. Mission to the United States to study labour relations and
productivity: NAI DFA 305/57/112/28 Technical Assistance project no. 44/93, 44/94
Central Council of Congress of Irish Unions application to send a team of trade
unionists to the USA to study American industrial productivity and production
methods etc.

4 See correspondence in NAI ICTU 2 440 (a) Team Visit to U.S. 1952

5 NAI ICTU Box 102 Irish Trade Union Congress National Executive Minutes,
Minutes of National Executive meeting 20/7/1951, Item 2754 E.C.A. Technical
Assistance Team

6 See correspondence in NAI ICTU 2 440 (a) Team Visit to U.S. 1952

7 NAI ICTU Box 102 Irish Trade Union Congress Irish Trade Union Congress
National Executive Minutes, Minutes of National Executive meeting 10/8/1951, item
2771 E.C.A. Mission

8 NAI ICTU 2 440 (a) Team Visit to U.S. 1952 T. Waldron, Secretary, Dublin
Trades Union Council to R. Roberts, Secretary, Irish Trade Union Congress
28/8/1951, R. Roberts to T. Waldron 31/8/1951, hand-written draft reply of Roberts’
reply to Waldron undated

9 NAI DFA Secretary’s Office P220 Mr. John McAteer, T.U.C. (ECA T.A. Programme) – United
States Authorities Attitude Concerning, Office Memorandum September 4, 1951 Subject:
John McAteer, I.T.U.C. Nominee for Labor T.A. Project

10 NAI DFA Secretary’s Office P220 Mr. John McAteer, T.U.C. (ECA T.A. Programme) – United
States Authorities Attitude Concerning, Note concerning Minister’s conversations with U.S.
T.A. Project: in the same file handwritten notes for the Minister that accompanied the draft
of External Affairs note to correspond with American Embassy’s “office note” give a little
more detail on the Dublin view of the security dimension of McAteer’s position – Enquiries
made concerning McAteer’s “ideology” elicited the view (of Asst. Comm. Carroll, G.S.) that
he ought to be granted a passport because “for a number of years past he has not come
unfavourably under notice by reason of open association with Communist or “fellow-
traveller” organisations’ (underlining in original).

11 NAI DL W117 E.C.A. Mission to the United States to study labour relations and productivity,
Miss Brewster to Mr. McCarthy 6/9/1951

12 NAI DL W117 E.C.A. Mission to the United States to study labour relations and
productivity, Extract from Report of Department Conference No. 220, 10/9/ 1951
NAI ICTU 2 440 (a) Team Visit to U.S. 1952 R. Roberts, Secretary, Irish Trade Union Congress to R. Deasy, NUR 18/9/1951, Department of Industry and Commerce to R. Roberts 25/9/1951

NAI DFA Secretary’s Office P220 Mr. John McAteer, T.U.C. (ECA T.A. Programme) – United States Authorities Attitude Concerning, re John McAteer, Irish Trade Union Congress. (Labor Technical Assistance Program. E.C.A.)

NAI DFA 305/57/112/28 Technical Assistance project no. 44/93, 44/94 Central Council of Congress of Irish Unions application to send a team of trade unionists to the USA to study American industrial productivity and production methods etc. A.J. Dexter, Chief, ECA Mission to Ireland to T. Commins, Department of External Affairs 18/10/1951

NAI ICTU Box 102 Irish Trade Union Congress National Executive Minutes, Minutes of National Executive meeting 9/11/1951, Item 2847 E.C.A. Team

NAI DL W117 E.C.A. Mission to the United States to study labour relations and productivity, R. Roberts, Secretary, Irish Trade Union Congress to Secretary, Department of Industry and Commerce 9/11/1951

For this correspondence see NAI ICTU 2 439 T.U. Mission to USA Protests Against Refusal of Visa to J. McAteer

NAI ICTU Box 122 Irish Trade Union Congress Northern Ireland Committee Minutes 1950-1963, General Files 1953-1959, Northern Ireland Committee Minutes, Minutes of Northern Ireland Committee meeting 16/11/1951 Item 75 E.C.A. Technical Assistance Scheme – I.T.U.C. Team, NAI ICTU Box 102 Irish Trade Union Congress National Executive Minutes, Minutes of National Executive meeting 30/11/1951 Item 2865 E.C.A Visit to U.S.A.

“U.S. visa for T.U.C. official refused” Irish Times 10/11/1951


“McAteer exclusion T.U.C. will not send deputy” Irish Press 17/11/1951

“Protest against visa refusal” Irish Independent 17/11/1951

“TUC American tour may be called off” Irish Press 30/11/1951

NAI ICTU Box 102 Irish Trade Union Congress National Executive Minutes, Minutes of National Executive meeting 30/11/1951 Item 2865 E.C.A Visit to U.S.A.

NAI DL W117 E.C.A. Mission to the United States to study labour relations and productivity, NAI DFA 305/57/112/28 Technical Assistance project no. 44/93, 44/94 Central Council of Congress of Irish Unions application to send a team of trade unionists to the USA to study American industrial productivity and production methods etc.

NAI DL W117 E.C.A. Mission to the United States to study labour relations and productivity, Thomas Murray memorandum on meeting with Messrs. Dexter and Cavanaugh, ECA Mission to Ireland, on 16 November. OEEC is the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation, predecessor to today’s Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). It was created in 1948 to coordinate and integrate the various national aid programmes within the European Recovery Programme. It was a condition of receiving Marshall Aid that a recipient state became an OEEC member.

Ibid. In addition to the typed Memorandum on this 16 November meeting there is a handwritten note that refers to the personal relationship that existed between Maurice Tobin and Senator William McMullen of the ITGWU who was a member of the CIU team that visited the USA and suggests that Tobin’s action was prompted by McMullen.

NAI ICTU Box 102 Irish Trade Union Congress National Executive Minutes, Minutes of National Executive meeting 26/10/1951 Item 2831 Belfast & District Trade Union Council
REFERENCES