CHAPTER 11

DIASPORA FOR DEVELOPMENT: IN SEARCH OF A NEW GENERATION OF DIASPORA STRATEGIES

Mark Boyle and Rob Kitchin
National University of Ireland

Introduction

Concomitant with a calling into question of the brain drain thesis, in the past decade considerable attention has been given to the ways in which diaspora populations can and do impact the development of their homelands from their overseas locations. Whether construed as selfless patriotism and paternalism or self-promoting meddling, it is clear that at key moments in the past diaspora communities have assumed responsibilities normally held by — and in so doing challenged the autonomy of — sending states. At times, they have acted to infantilize institutions in their homelands. More recently, however, there has been growing recognition that diaspora contributions can play a more progressive and supportive role in helping sending countries to help themselves. This book subscribes to the view that at least some diaspora communities have the potential to play a positive role in the empowerment of institutions in sending states, and thereafter to undergird the emergence of these states as capable and self-determining architects of their own futures. The purpose of the book has been to map, conceptualize, scrutinize, and critique the wide variety of ways in which countries’ talent abroad mobilizes and acts to transform, improve, scale up, and fortify the capacity of public, private, and civil institutions at home.

Chronicling how diaspora groupings impact domestic institutions immediately begets a follow-up question: is it possible to proactively build and create opportunities for, design, finance, and growth of diaspora-homeland projects and, if so, how might policymakers best intervene? Many countries now believe that such interventions are not
only possible, but also necessary and advantageous, and have pioneered a new area of public policy often referred to as diaspora strategy. While most commonly championed by poorer countries, including Argentina, Armenia, China, Chile, El Salvador, Ghana, India, Jamaica, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, and Tunisia, diaspora strategies have also been pursued by comparably more advanced nations, such as Australia, Ireland, Israel, New Zealand, and Scotland. A wide range of diaspora strategies and associated diaspora schemes (institutions, instruments, policies, programs, and initiatives) have already been conceived and implemented. Moreover, many countries are now participating in a global dialogue and through joint policy transfer workshops, seminars, publications, toolkit manuals, and conferences, are identifying best practices and swapping and adapting schemes.

While some view this turn to diaspora as a mere extension of existing approaches to development, others view diaspora-centered development as a fundamental departure from existing practice. According to Thomas Faist, for instance, prior emphasis upon either state-led development (examples include the former command economies of Eastern Europe, the developmental states of Southeast Asia, and China) or market-led development (e.g. the neoliberal economic strategies pursued in the western capitalist world and some states in the developing world) has given way to a new commitment to community-led or civil society-led development in which the concept of social capital has come to occupy more central ground.¹ In this context, diaspora constituencies are being positioned by sending states as significant brokers of global economic competitiveness. The objective of the development industry now is to activate and mobilize diaspora agents as enablers of national development projects. In due course, a full audit of the philosophical shifts implied in, and the forms of development promoted by, diaspora-centered development will be required, including who benefits from such development, where, why, and how.²

This book addresses a different but related question. It places existing diaspora initiatives under critical scrutiny and asks how these initiatives might be embellished, recalibrated, and developed so as to contribute more effectively to the development of the home country. It builds a case in support of a new generation of diaspora initiatives that are better equipped to harness diaspora groupings in the building of institutions in sending states, and provides an analytical framework and a set of policy prescriptions to guide future practice. Its desire to rethink and refocus practice is rooted in the reservations it has about the unwarranted fanfare and associated cottage industry that appear to be developing around diaspora strategies. In too many cases, it is alleged, ill-defined and overly broad diaspora constituencies are being

engaged; ineffective blueprints and bureaucracies are being imposed on an already crowded landscape of organic transnational relations; and diaspora strategies are becoming all-consuming ends in themselves. There is a pressing need, it is argued, to adopt a new pragmatic or indirect approach in which specific diaspora elites and champions are prioritized; existing and successful diaspora-to-homeland ties are foregrounded; and diaspora movers and shakers are engaged only if they are able to contribute to concrete projects with clear outcomes.

While this call for a new focus undoubtedly deserves careful scrutiny, we are in broad agreement with the renewed sense of mission articulated by others in this book. This final chapter is therefore less a critical commentary on earlier chapters and more a refinement and extension of the various calls for a reorientation in practice that have been made. We structure our discussion into three sections. In Section I we provide a brief introduction to existing practice and, by way of contextualizing the call for change endorsed in the book, identify two key trends that have marked diaspora strategizing to date: the tendency for strategies to be too state-centric and the excessive emphasis placed upon general nation-building projects. In Section II we outline in greater detail the key components of the alternative pragmatic and indirect approach and draw upon the Scottish and Irish cases to illustrate the approach’s utility as a guide for policymakers and practitioners. Finally, in Section III, we identify what we consider to be a crucial supplement to the proposed framework: the importance of building what we term “enabler engagement programs,” which mobilize stakeholders and strategic allies from a) countries of destination, and in particular from the Global North, and b) sending states themselves. We examine lessons that might be gleaned from the recent European Commission-United Nations Joint Migration and Development Initiative (JMDI). We conclude by drawing together the strands of our discussion and proposing an overarching schema.

I. Diaspora Strategy: A Review of Existing Practice

A. Diaspora and Development: The Birth of a New Agenda

Historically, emigration has been viewed as a barometer of the success or failure of national economic development strategies. The loss of talent from a country was considered a sign that the strategy being pursued by that country was not working. In turn, the emigration of skilled labor from any country constituted a brain drain and was assumed to further weaken that country’s ability to develop. As
this book has shown, however, in the past two decades, countries of origin have begun to explore the ways in which emigrant populations positively impact development in their homelands from overseas. As a result, countries are increasingly interested in how the energy and talent of émigrés might most effectively be harnessed.

We have identified up to ten pathways through which diaspora populations impact the development of sending states (see Figure 1). Often these impacts are viewed as relatively isolated, if welcome, intrusions. They provide short-term remedial antidotes to failing developing strategies, but are in turn frustrated by weak domestic institutions and capacity. Rarely, however, do diaspora interventions leave domestic institutions intact. From hometown associations to agricultural cooperatives, from charities to advocacy groups, from churches and religions to medical and scientific academies, from small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to pension funds, from political parties to national arts and cultural institutions, from electoral systems to citizenship laws, from terrorist organizations to peace-keeping missions, from satellite TV media to social networking sites, from flood defense systems to disaster management, from university alumni projects to technology transfer, diaspora communities have molded, and are molding, institutions in their homelands in ways that we are only now starting to understand. While it is true that certain kinds of interventions lend themselves better to this mission than others (knowledge

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transfer and business mentoring more so than philanthropy and remittances, for instance, we believe that each and every form of intervention retains a capacity to enhance the efficacy of public, private, and third-sector institutions. Figure 1 identifies the key domestic actors and infrastructures most likely to be reworked as a direct and indirect consequence of diaspora-homeland projects.

Figure 1. How Diasporas Can Impact Sending States

1) Diaspora Advocacy and Diplomacy – Advocates, activists, agitators, and ambassadors within diaspora communities can exploit their knowledge, contacts, linguistic skills, and cultural insights to promote peace and security in their homelands, and to enhance the strategic, diplomatic, and foreign policy objectives of homelands. Institutions most affected are social movements, political parties, government departments, and NGOs.

2) Diaspora Capital Markets – Diaspora members can fuel capital markets (portfolio investment) through holding deposit accounts; securitizing remittance flows; providing transnational loans to diaspora groupings; buying diaspora bonds; and supporting diaspora mutual funds. Institutions most affected are banking institutions, pension funds, insurance companies, and government treasuries.

3) Diaspora Direct Investment – Diaspora members can invest in homelands as senior executives in transnational corporations and as venture capitalists; and also can outsource contracts to SMEs in countries of origin. Institutions most affected are government-inward investment agencies and domestic supply chains.

4) Diaspora Knowledge Networks – Diasporas can assist companies in sending countries by sharing knowledge and contacts; participating in mentoring organizations; training talented colleagues; and joining think tanks, consultation groups, and advisory councils. Institutions most affected are SMEs looking to expand and globalize.
5) Diaspora Philanthropy – Diaspora communities can provide private and voluntary donations for charitable and public good, through such vehicles as private and voluntary organizations (PVOs), religious organizations, corporations, foundations, volunteer citizens, and university and college alumni associations. *Institutions most affected are civil-society NGOs protecting vulnerable populations and universities and colleges.*

6) Diaspora Remittances – Diaspora remittance flows entail private or person-to-person transfers from migrant workers to recipients in the worker’s country of origin. *Institutions most affected are extended family networks and neighborhood and community organizations.*

7) Diaspora Return Migration – Diaspora populations can promote bilateral and multilateral agreements to restrict recruitment from especially vulnerable and at-risk countries; increase accountability among recruitment specialists and employers; establish protocols for the treatment of foreign workers; and facilitate return migration. *Institutions most affected are recruitment agencies and public and private institutions requiring specific types of talent for which there is a shortage.*

8) Diaspora Corps – Diaspora groupings can establish volunteering schemes to promote short-term visits to countries of origin to support vulnerable populations, to assist in the administration of aid, not least following a natural or human-induced disaster, and to address key skills shortages. *Institutions most affected are domestic NGOs and public service institutions.*

9) Diaspora Tourism – Diaspora visits to homelands provide an important source of revenue and foreign currency. Such visits include medical tourism, business-related tourism, heritage (or “roots”) tourism, exposure or “birthright” tours, education tourism, VIP tours, and peak experience tours. *Institutions most affected form part of the tourist infrastructure and include domestic travel companies and marketing firms.*

10) Diaspora Human-Capital Effects – The prospect of joining the ranks of a sometimes more wealthy diaspora can result in a predeparture boost in the human capital of sending states; migrants prepare for a potential exit by upgrading their competencies and skill set and increasing their likelihood of securing a re-location to a more developed labor market. *Institutions most affected are those with a stake in the domestic labor market, including training agencies and universities and colleges.*

*Source: Authors’ compilation and rendering.*

As more people have recognized the contributions that diaspora populations make to the development of sending states, it is entirely unsurprising that diaspora strategizing has emerged as an important new field of public policy for nation-states that have experienced significant out-migration. A wide range of different diaspora strategies and schemes are being developed and implemented across countries. Circumstantial differences between these strategies notwithstanding, joint policy transfer workshops, seminars, publications, and conferences are creating a growing global dialogue as to the optimum design and implementation of diaspora strategies. A number of pioneering countries and cutting-edge diaspora strategies and schemes are being identified as global exemplars of best practices and are being transferred through a myriad of routes to adopter countries, which are reworking them for their own purposes. Many countries now consider that their approach to diaspora strategizing might be enhanced if they draw from the emerging global dialogue on diaspora strategies. In the search for good practice, awareness of the more important and

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pioneering strategic interventions, institutional innovations, and policy initiatives undertaken globally is becoming a prerequisite. While not exhaustive, Table 1 lists the most commonly discussed schemes.

Table 1. Examples of Diaspora Engagement Policies Commonly Cited as International ExEMPLars of Good Practice

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diaspora-Homeland Connection</th>
<th>Frequently Cited Schemes</th>
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<tr>
<td>Diaspora Advocacy and Diplomacy</td>
<td>In part to capitalize on its history of immigration and re-emigration, Canada has developed the Global Citizens Project, designed to harness the talents of all constituencies in Canada with resources that might help the country enhance its global activities and relations (including with other countries’ diasporas in Canada, whether naturalized or not and with Canadian sympathizers living overseas, whether Canadian citizens or not. The role of Irish America in the Northern Ireland Peace Process is another example. The Clinton administration worked in conjunction with the Ireland Funds and political parties in Northern Ireland to make important contributions to building peaceable relations between Republican and Unionist constituencies.</td>
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<td>Diaspora Capital Markets</td>
<td>State of Israel Bonds - Since 1951 the State of Israel has issued bonds specifically targeted at, but not restricted to, diaspora groupings. Over US$1 billion in bonds are issued each year.</td>
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<td>Diaspora Direct Investments</td>
<td>Yozma - Established in 1993, Yozma is an Israeli scheme designed to create joint venture capital funds between the State of Israel and foreign investors, in particular Israeli diaspora members. Other examples include Chinese bamboo networks, investing into the Pearl Delta and other parts of mainland China from Hong Kong, Singapore, Australia, Canada, and the United States in particular; and the Irish Technology Leadership Group, a venture capitalist group set up by Irish entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diaspora Knowledge Networks</td>
<td>The Indus Entrepreneurs (TiE) attempts to improve the entrepreneurial skills of Indians both in India and in the diaspora through mentoring, networking, and education. TiE’s ambition is to create the next generation of Indian entrepreneurs. With 13,000 members, including over 2,500 charter members in 57 chapters across 14 countries, TiE hosts a wide range of programs and events, including TiEcon, the largest professional and networking conference for entrepreneurs. GlobalScot is an elite, global business network comprised of invited, high-achieving members of the Scottish diaspora (almost 50 percent of GlobalScot members operate at company chairperson, CEO, or president levels) established and managed by Scottish Enterprise. GlobalScot currently has over 600 members in Europe, Middle East and Africa, the United States, Asia, and Scotland. KEA New Zealand is a quasi-autonomous NGO that seeks to build broad global networks of professional New Zealanders living in New Zealand and overseas. Established in 2001, KEA New Zealand had 25,000 subscribers in over 174 countries as of 2011. It has 14 international chapters in eight countries, and employs four full-time regional managers to conduct its operations in different parts of the world. Its mission is to harness the Kiwi diaspora in the service of national economic growth. Advance Australia is an NGO-led global business and social network of Australians. Headquartered in New York, Advance Australia has over 12,000 members in 63 countries and has chapters in 14 countries. The network activates and engages overseas Australians to use their expertise, contacts, and positions of influence for Australia. It creates industry-specific networks, partners with tourist agencies in promoting tourism to Australia, and facilitates return.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diaspora Remittances</td>
<td>The Hometown Association (HTA) model and the 3x1 program, pioneered and managed by the Mexican government and diaspora, provide a template through which remittance transfers from specific destinations might be more productively put to work in specific sending-state villages and towns. The US Department of State’s Bureau of Economics, Energy, and Business Affairs introduced the US/EI Salvador/Honduras Bridge Initiative to encourage partnership working between the United States, multilateral agencies, and financial institutions and government agencies in El Salvador and Honduras to make remittance flows more impactful.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diaspora Philanthropy</td>
<td>The Ireland Funds, as well as the International Fund for Ireland and sIPI are prime examples of world-class philanthropic organizations. In the main, these funds target social disadvantage, education, and welfare, the peace process in Northern Ireland, community development, and local economic initiatives with the aim of increasing social and economic capital. The Haitian Diaspora Federation (HDF) is a cooperative umbrella nonprofit organization comprising partnerships between a range of Haitian diaspora groupings. The HDF seeks to deploy the Haitian diaspora’s resources to support relief from the devastation of a recent natural disaster and to encourage the longer-term reconstruction of Haiti.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diaspora Return Migration</td>
<td>Talent Scotland is a Scottish scheme designed to provide a one-stop shop for Scottish diasporans who wish to return to Scotland.</td>
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Prior to commenting upon the efficacy of existing schemes, it is useful to start with a brief commentary on two key trends that have marked the first decade of diaspora strategizing: first, the tendency of sending countries to fixate on building their emigration state infrastructure and influence; and second, the preoccupation within sending states with overly general diaspora-building and nation-building projects.

### B. The Fixation on Building Emigrant State Infrastructure and Influence

Alan Gamlen developed the useful notion of the “emigration state” to capture the totality of the state actors’ work in managing their relationships with diaspora communities. Gamlen suggests that countries embarking upon diaspora strategies almost always view it as necessary to build new emigration state capacities. Among the models of governance that are emerging are the simple outsourcing of diaspora strategy to voluntary and/or private-sector groups (such as in New Zealand and Australia); the establishment of nimble and flexible cross-department working groups (such as in Scotland); the establishment of diaspora units within cognate state departments and administrative units such as departments of foreign affairs (such as in Ireland and Canada), departments of home affairs, departments of heritage and culture, and enterprise and development agencies; the rooting of diaspora initiatives in prime ministerial and presidential offices (such as in Singapore); and, increasingly in poorer countries, the creation of dedicated new ministries of diaspora (such as in Armenia and India).

The central challenge facing policymakers working in the emigration state is how best to intervene so as to maximize the number and quality of diaspora-homeland ties that result in meaningful transformations of domestic institutions. According to Alasdair Rutherford, state intervention is particularly valuable when three particular types of market failure occur: network effects, transaction costs/information failure, and externalities. Firstly, market failure occurs when projects are judged to be too risky or too unproven to be tackled. Intervention to build diaspora networks can be justified if the cost of network

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<td>Diaspora Corps</td>
<td>The Taglit-Birthright Israel and MASA programs repatriate Jewish youth to Israel for short breaks and study visits in order to fortify national consciousness and cement a lifelong sense of attachment to the homeland.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diaspora Tourism</td>
<td>Scotland’s Homecoming 2009—and its main event The Gathering—was a flagship tourist campaign that sought to secure tourist visits from diasporans and use them to build longer-term relationships between Scotland and its diaspora. The Gathering 2013 is Ireland’s flagship diaspora tourism event.</td>
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Source: Authors’ compilation.

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5 Gamlen, “The Emigration State and the Modern Geographical Imagination.”
establishment proves to be a disincentive for early adopters. Governments can internalize the costs of network creation and shepherd these networks until they reach the critical size necessary to demonstrate sustainability. Secondly, market failure can occur if transaction costs and the cost of researching opportunities are high. Governments can work to produce and share information and services to bring these costs down beneath the level at which they prove to be a disincentive. Finally, market failure on account of positive externalities occurs when projects produce both private and public goods, but where the profitability of the private good is not sufficient to encourage the private actor to initiate the project. Governments can invest where the aggregate good includes, but is larger than, benefits to private citizens.6

Clearly these criteria demand that in practice judgments be made as to when and where to intervene. On a continuum, states can decide to: leave the formation of links between the homeland and the diaspora to the market or to autonomous social, cultural, and political movements, with the diaspora self-organizing its engagement with its home; work with and reenergize existing diaspora organizations and networks; nurture and regulate new and emerging diaspora connections; proactively identify potential engagements and leaders, and mobilize and cultivate them while leaving ownership of initiatives in the hands of the diaspora groupings; and directly create and run diaspora initiatives and networks, perhaps with the intention of letting the market assume responsibility at a later date. States must walk a tightrope between intervening too aggressively when limited or no intervention might be more appropriate, and failing to intervene when it might be necessary and productive. The ideal balance between too little and too much intervention varies from state to state.

We argue that while in the past states relied too heavily upon bottom-up diaspora-led initiatives, today the tendency is towards overinvestment in underproductive, centralized, and top-heavy state-led approaches. Sending countries that seek to harness the resources of diaspora populations in the service of homeland prosperity are often hampered by an insufficient understanding of the scale, nature, and impact of prior and existing transnational ties. Out of naive enthusiasm, political expediency, or vanity, they plunge into high-profile diaspora initiatives without first mapping and reflecting upon the base of existing networks. In some cases, having invested publicly and heavily, and financially as well as politically, in new emigrant state institutions and infrastructures, some states feel compelled to be seen intervening in this space. The result is all too often the imposition of unnecessary blueprints and new structures and strategies of engagement on an already dense network of effectual diaspora-homeland connections. Not only are existing networks potentially alienated and disenchanted

as a result, but the further development of spontaneous organic networks can also be stunted by the new canopy.

Therefore, a first-order issue in designing and mobilizing diaspora engagement policies is to guard against the enlargement of emigration state institutions for enlargement’s sake, and the rush by emigrant states to intervene in diaspora-homeland relationships for intervention’s sake. There is no ideal institutional framework for coordinating diaspora strategies; each country needs to create emigrant state capacities that reflect their own institutional histories; social, cultural, economic, and political needs; and the histories, structures, and organization of their diaspora. Diaspora strategies require a careful consideration of how state (and other) institutions might be best deployed, not a scaling up of emigrant states per se. Likewise, emigration states have a role to play as creators and custodians of diaspora schemes. However, interventions must always be predicated upon a prior mapping of existing diaspora-homeland relationships and an appreciation of what an additional layer of activity might contribute. A cautious approach, which treats existing diaspora-homeland connections as fragile and precious, will work better than a clumsy approach in which states act first and think later.

C. The Preoccupation with Overly General Diaspora-Building and Nation-Building Projects

Recent hype about the potential role of diasporas in the development of sending states has resulted in a flurry of projects designed to (re)build patriotism among overseas communities. A prerequisite for a successful diaspora strategy is a motivated diaspora that is willing to contribute to national development. While perhaps historically taken for granted, the social and cultural condition, empathy, and inclination of diaspora communities is now recognized to be a crucial resource. Diaspora patriotism varies in time and space, and the patriotic flame is doused and ignited by a variety of origin- and destination-specific triggers. But states can play a role in building and fostering diaspora social and cultural networks. Although at first glance a reasonably straightforward proposition, in fact such a project implies a profound shift in the ways in which nations and territory are imagined. For John Agnew, contemporary interest in building nations at home and in diasporas points to a preparedness by nation states and diaspora to de-territorialize the nation and to cast or re-territorialize the nation as a global network. Only a small number of countries have begun the task of thinking through the implications of this seismic shift in thinking about the relations that exist between geography, nations, and states. Armenia, Croatia, Ireland, and New Zealand are examples.

It is a truism that projects designed to trigger search networks are likely to be most effective in a general climate when diaspora groupings are motivated to help (in other words, feel a loyalty to the home nation); are able to exploit modern transport and information and communications technology connections; and are capable of exercising a wide range of rights as citizens of both the sending and destination countries.

Projects designed to fortify and recharge national pride in those residing abroad have made use of organized short-term visits. Two frequently-cited and classic examples of effective organized short-term visits to the homeland are the Taglit-Birthright Israel and MASA programs, which repatriate Jewish youth to Israel. Many diaspora groups have established homeland-specific social, cultural, and sporting clubs and networks, some accompanied by infrastructure such as theaters, schools, museums, sporting arenas, and libraries. Governments often support these groups through direct and in-kind funding (such as supporting cultural visits by politicians, celebrities, national icons, sporting heroes, artists, writers, and performers) as a way of maintaining cultural identity. Ireland, for example, funds creative artists to visit the diaspora, Irish sporting organizations overseas, and overseas Irish heritage resources such as the Kennedy Library in Boston. These supports are increasingly part of, and coordinated through, national cultural and heritage strategies. Countries may also provide specific services relating to cultural identity. For example, India has set up a state-sponsored genealogy service called Tracing the Roots, which engages a private company (Indiroots) to construct a family tree for a small fee. The Irish Department of Community, Rural, and Gaeltacht Affairs supports the teaching of the Irish language at institutions outside of Ireland. Similarly, the Lithuanian government funds Lithuanian schools to teach the Lithuanian language and cultural heritage to the descendant of emigrants. Some nations also make use of national honors and award systems to build diaspora loyalty by recognizing the contribution of individual diaspora members to the homeland and to society in general. For example, since 2003, the president of India has presented the Pravasi Bharatiya Samman awards to overseas citizens who have made outstanding contributions to Indian interests across the world. In 2006, KEA New Zealand started the World Class New Zealand Awards to honor New Zealanders making a significant international contribution in various spheres. In November 2010 China hosted its first high-level consultative forum, the World Chinese Economic Forum (WCEF), under the banner “Building Business Linkages and Charting New Frontiers.” Aimed at government officials, professional institutions, universities, and think tanks, as well as entrepreneurs, professionals, and investors from around the world, the forum sought to generate strategic ideas in support of what organizers deemed a “New Asian century” and the rise of China as a global superpower.

Building a sense of nationhood in a diaspora also necessitates opening up new dialogue with diaspora communities, increasingly through the
use of information and communications technologies. Some countries have set up formal consultation arrangements with their diasporas. For example, Jamaica has established the Jamaican Diaspora Advisory Board. Similarly, the following countries have recently established expatriate parliaments to consult with their diasporas about domestic and diaspora matters: Norway (Norgestinget), Finland (Ulkosuomalais-parlamentti), Sweden (Utlandssvenskarnas parliament), France (Assemblée des Français de l'étranger), and Switzerland (Organisation des Suisses de l'étranger). India has established the Prime Minister's Global Advisory Council of Overseas Indians, which meets with members of the Indian diaspora twice a year. Many countries seek to inform the diaspora about what is happening at home through newsletters and websites. Website portals, both state-sponsored (such as Connect2Canada) and run by NGOs, private organizations, or individuals (such as the Canadian Expatriate Network) that detail useful information to the diaspora in situ and about the home country, are seen by many diasporans and those seeking to serve the diaspora community as vital infrastructure. Some of these portals are very broad in nature, often including a social networking facility. Increasingly, Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, and other social networking tools are being deployed. While there exist few state-sponsored free-to-view channels aimed specifically at the diaspora, the BBC, SKY, CNN, Bloomberg, Euronews, CCTV (China), NDTV24x7 (India), NHKWorldTV (Japan), and Al Jazeera (the Arab world) all play an important role.

Citizenship in this context can be thought of as the legal status and associated rights and obligations sending governments bestow on migrant populations. These rights and obligations are civil (legal protection, guarantee of freedoms, security), political (voting and political participation), social (social security, education, housing, and health services), and economic (work and taxation) in nature. Dual citizenship refers to the ascription of various kinds of citizenship to emigrants in both the sending country and one or more destination countries. In the past decade, there has been a proliferation of countries that are prepared to offer citizenship to migrants without requiring them to renounce their citizenship status in their countries of origin. But what does this mean in practice?

Four particularly salient issues are at stake. First, embassy and consular services provide a first line of defense and assistance, and the location, resourcing, and remittance of these services needs continual updating. Second, states are faced with the question of the extent to which they are to continue providing civil, political, social, and

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economic rights to overseas citizens, for how long after departure, in what form, and to what degree. Third, the question of raising taxes on overseas émigrés is important. Only a few countries, including the United States and Israel, tax their citizens on income created irrespective of their location of residence and, even in these cases, a number of exemptions and exceptions are possible. But other forms of finance related to remittances, philanthropy, capital investment, pensions, savings, inheritance, and foreign direct investment are levied more universally. Finally, there exists the possibility of creating new models of citizenship specifically for overseas populations and indeed for any population claiming ancestral ties, no matter how distant.

It is clear that nation-building projects must be central to all diaspora strategies. Diaspora strategies cannot privilege economic ties over social and cultural networks and remain sustainable. Moreover, a diaspora strategy needs to be mutually beneficial for both home countries and diaspora populations. Furthermore, countries that know their diasporas well will be better placed to engage them. In addition, diaspora representatives need to be consulted before any diaspora strategy is rolled out; diaspora strategies that are coauthored with diaspora leaders are likely to be more effective. In many ways, social networking and culture-building strategies create a raft of intangible benefits and create a context within which it is more likely that economic strategies and development projects will be effective. But to date, nation-building projects have been launched with ill-defined aims, and there is a danger that these efforts will dissipate with little to show. The key is not to abandon nation-building projects, nor to subordinate these projects to economic imperatives. Instead, the challenge is to find an appropriate balance between projects designed to fortify social networks and cultural institutions and initiatives designed to harness diaspora populations in the development of sending states.

II. Towards a More Pragmatic and Indirect Approach: A Response to the Existing Practice

This book is one of the first to comprehensively survey and interrogate the role diasporas might play in scaling up the institutional capacities of countries of origin. Underpinning the book is the claim that if in the past the impact of diaspora communities on domestic institutions was somewhat unplanned, haphazard, and occurred by default rather than design, diaspora interventions are increasingly motivated by a desire to build domestic capacity, buttress, and upgrade institutions and infrastructure, and expand opportunities for sustainable development. Diaspora communities are actively working to help countries of origin
become more self-determining actors and more capable architects of their own development. Moreover, the book unambiguously positions itself as an advocate for such a shift. But in taking stock of the existing practice, it concludes that current practices need to be revisited if the full potential of diaspora populations is to be harnessed. In many ways, it sets out a manifesto for a new generation of diaspora strategies that are predicated upon indirect approaches and pragmatic thinking and practice.

This book proposes that diaspora constituencies are most beneficial to sending states when they serve the following functions: as antennas, detecting better active, entrepreneurial, and dynamic segments of domestic institutions; as search networks, identifying ongoing constraints and impairments in these institutions, finding solutions, and mobilizing expertise; and as Archimedean levers, bridging the competencies of the diaspora with more promising domestic institutions so as to grow and institutionalize existing capacity.10

The book draws three key distinctions: between high-resolution and low-resolution strategies; between centralized and decentralized management philosophies; and between direct (administrative) and indirect (pragmatic) approaches to diaspora engagement. High-resolution strategies target a small number of key elites and better-performing domestic institutions, whereas low-resolution strategies are pitched to an often ill-defined and overly generalized diaspora audience and fail to recognize the heterogeneity of domestic institutions. Meanwhile, diaspora strategies might be based upon formal models of government (centralized initiatives guided by a blueprint and managed by an overarching agency and strategy) or predicated upon looser forms of governance (decentralized initiatives, merely lightly incubating a portfolio of autonomous and self-sustaining diaspora interventions). Pragmatic strategies capture instances when diaspora groupings are engaged in some respects by default. In the pursuit of wider social, economic, cultural, or political projects, governments mobilize diaspora populations without necessarily thinking that they are engaged in diaspora strategizing per se. Direct approaches, in contrast, begin (and all too often end) by stoking and leveraging the energies and talents of diaspora groupings, and only later find a way in which they might serve the national interest.

The preference in this book is for high-resolution diaspora policies. Movers and shakers — both in the diaspora and in homeland institutions — who might make a significant difference constitute tens and

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hundreds, not thousands or tens of thousands. Moreover, the book juxtaposes the latter two distinctions to introduce a quadrant that maps out a series of diaspora strategy options (see Table 2). Decentralized and direct diaspora strategies seek to let a thousand flowers (in this case, self-starting diaspora organizations) bloom; they provide a diversity of engagement options and help to build diaspora patriotism, but risk dispersing effort and fizzling out without generating tangible results. Centralized and direct strategies enable a focused and strategic galvanization of the diaspora, but risk overbearing and killing initiatives that come from diaspora organizations themselves. Decentralized and indirect diaspora strategies are guided by serendipity, but they demand sophisticated, flexible, and well-networked domestic institutions. Finally, centralized and indirect diaspora strategies build diaspora engagement into the everyday working practices of domestic institutions and promote a sharing of best practices, but risk losing the specific contributions which members of diaspora might make. On this basis the book asserts that too often sending states prioritize centralized and direct agendas. Its core hypothesis is that less effort should be put into formulating and implementing centralized and direct diaspora strategies and that, since all segments of the quadrant complement each other, activity in each is necessary and more balanced strategies need to be sought.

Table 2. Kuznetsov’s Diaspora Strategy Options

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach to Diaspora Strategy</th>
<th>Direct (administrative) Agendas (diaspora as an end in itself)</th>
<th>Indirect (pragmatic) Agendas (diaspora as a tool)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Decentralized Bottom-Up Strategies | • Diverse entry points  
• Support for diaspora NGOs, associations, research groups, databases, social networks  
• Main issue: continuity, institutionalization, and impact | • Guiding serendipity  
• Managed networks and specialized NGOs  
• Main issue: requires sophisticated institutions in a home country |
| Centralized Top-Down Strategies | • Central focal point  
• Diaspora ministries and agencies  
• Main issue: self-entrenchment and stifling of initiative | • Incorporation into everyday practice  
• Reliance on diasporas as an extension of the work of sectoral agencies (e.g., diaspora as a tool for FDI promotion)  
• Contests for projects with diaspora involvement  
• Main issue: “Below-the-radar-screen” diaspora agenda; documentation and sharing of good practice |


Three central policy conclusions follow. Firstly, there should now be a greater focus on joint projects between exceptional stakeholders in home countries and elite diaspora individuals and, by implication, a reduced emphasis upon general nation-building activity, including diaspora conferences, diaspora forums, diaspora consultation, and diaspora building. The heterogeneity of diaspora populations and domestic institutions needs to be better appreciated, and energies better concen-
treated upon forging ties that can generate concrete outcomes. Secondly, the research priority must move beyond general censuses, surveys, and profiles of diaspora populations to more high-resolution case study research that better reveals how particular networks are created and developed. In support of an approach that foregrounds guided serendipity, the purpose of research should be to fine-tune policy interventions that seek to create, support, and render more effectual a small number of strategically valuable diaspora-homeland relationships. Finally, diaspora policymaking should be humble and ambitious at the same time. Perhaps in the effort to be seen creating high-profile diaspora strategies, too much is being expected of and claimed for the diaspora with respect to the development agenda. A few projects that support the rollout of a small number of high-potential domestic institutions can quickly create momentum, generate spinoff benefits, trigger exponential developments, and over time create a significant impetus for development.

**Applying the Framework to the Scottish and Irish Cases**

The indirect and pragmatic approach this book advocates, and the quadrant of diaspora strategy options it proposes, provides a tool for mapping, reflecting upon, and, where necessary, refocusing effort. The Scottish and Irish cases help to illuminate the utility of using the diaspora strategy options set forth to inform policy and practice (see Table 3). Based upon this schema, the policy diagnosis for Scotland might be to continue to preserve its focus to date on sector-led indirect projects, but also to try to move towards less muscular and more sustainable diaspora-led initiatives. While this may require some further direct nation- and diaspora-building interventions, it is likely that diasporas already have capacity that could be better harnessed. At the very least the Scottish schemes need to test the hypothesis that there is scope to be more diaspora-centered. Direct strategies should be prioritized only when there is evidence that diaspora disengagement is hampering sectorial-led pragmatic initiatives. In contrast, for Ireland, the policy diagnosis might be to continue to preserve a healthy balance between direct and indirect strategies, but also to guard against mission creep in favor of the former. There remains an abundance of commitment from the Irish diaspora. While this commitment cannot be taken for granted and needs to be continuously stoked, it would not be effective to prioritize culture- and nation-building projects. Given the Irish diaspora’s energy, commitment, and organization, the Irish state should work to further develop Ireland’s already outstanding tradition of light-touch governance. The role of the Irish state should be to unlock the potential of the Irish diaspora; there is little need to create and manage a raft of new state-controlled schemes. We expand upon these in the following section.
Table 3. Kuznetsov’s Diaspora Strategy Options: The Scottish and Irish Schemes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach to Diaspora Strategy</th>
<th>Direct (administrative) Agendas (diaspora as an end in itself)</th>
<th>Indirect (pragmatic) Agendas (diaspora as a tool)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Decentralized Bottom-Up Strategies** | Ireland  
St Patrick’s Day celebrations (global celebration run by Irish diaspora)  
WorldIrish.com and Rendezvous 353 (private web portals for Irish diaspora) | Ireland  
Irish Business Networks (66 independent networks lightly incubated by Irish government),  
The Gathering 2013 (citizen-led diaspora tourism campaign)  
The Ireland Funds (diaspora-led philanthropic organizations) |
| **Centralized Top-Down Strategies** | Ireland  
Irish Abroad Unit (unit within the Department of Foreign Affairs to oversee engagement with Irish diaspora)  
Global Irish Economic Forum (high-level network of influential Irish diasporans to advise government) | Scotland  
Global Scot (government-run elite business network)  
Homecoming Scotland 2013 (government-led diaspora tourism campaign)  
The Scotland Funds (failed government-led philanthropic organization)  
Talent Scotland (government-led relocation advisory service) |

Source: Kuznetsov, How Can Countries’ Talent Abroad Help Transform Institutions at Home?

In many ways, Scotland’s diaspora projects are pragmatic in nature. They have emerged from particular sectors within the Scottish state and have been prompted by a specific need, whether to broker the globalization of Scottish companies (GlobalScot), fill specific skill gaps (Talent Scot), or promote Scotland as a tourist destination (Homecoming 2009). The Scottish government’s International Projects Division — instituted by and guided by its International Framework, published in 2008 — seeks to promote joined-up thinking and coordination across branches of the state; for instance with respect to the diaspora-relevant work of Scottish Enterprise, Scottish Development International, and VisitScotland. In 2009 the Scottish government hosted a Scottish Diaspora Forum during which invited thought leaders were asked to propose bold new initiatives to better engage the Scottish diaspora. In 2010 the Scottish government published a well-thought-out plan and list of priorities. Some of the proposed actions were motivated by a desire to renew and fortify the “Scottishness” of the Scottish diaspora through initiatives such as Scotland Week and Tartan Day, both promoted vigorously in North America. And Scotland now identifies itself as Europe’s leading pioneer in the development of formal and systematic state-led diaspora strategies. Nevertheless its International Projects Division performs more as a nimble coordinator than as a key actor itself, and seeks to bring a range of agencies to support the plan. Projects emerge from real needs and enthusiasm, rather than engaging the Scottish diaspora for engagement’s sake.
Within Ireland, the Irish Abroad Unit, a division within the Department of Foreign Affairs, seeks to promote joined-up thinking and coordination across branches of the state; for instance, with respect to the diaspora-relevant work of Enterprise Ireland, the Industrial Development Agency, Failte Ireland, Culture Ireland, the President’s Office, and other departments within the state. The Irish state has always prioritized direct strategies in the sense that nation-building in the Irish diaspora has been pivotal to Irish government projects. In the Irish diaspora strategy, culture comes first, second, and third. Moreover, the Irish Abroad Unit has recently emerged as a dominant agency overseeing diaspora-homeland relationships. This has created a further drift towards more direct diaspora agendas. For instance, in September 2009 Ireland convened the Global Irish Economic Forum, which brought together nearly 250 of the most influential Irish diasporans from around the world to explore how the diaspora might contribute to crisis management and economic recovery, and how Ireland might create a more strategic relationship with its diaspora. This has led to the creation of the Global Irish Network, comprising 300 Irish diaspora thought leaders from 37 countries who provide advice to the Irish government. This group meets frequently in Ireland and around the globe. But it remains the case that the Irish approach continues to delegate leadership for coining and implementing specific diaspora engagement policies to sectoral agencies. For instance, Enterprise Ireland works with Irish business networks and Failte Ireland is responsible for The Gathering 2013 tourism event. Ireland, then, has a blend of direct and indirect strategies.

The Scottish schemes tend to be highly managerialist in nature. While important exceptions exist, the state functions largely as the lead player in proposing, managing, and reviewing schemes. Managerial structures and processes that emphasize accountability, transparency, productivity, and value for money underpin the Scottish schemes. Scottish government initiatives are accompanied by defined targets and associated metrics for measuring progress and success. A scheme is therefore defined as a success or failure depending on how much economic value it can be demonstrated to have leveraged over a specific (usually very short) period. There is clearly an important rationale for moving to new forms of public administration, measuring value for money, and ensuring transparency and accountability in the expenditure of public funds. Democratic systems require public confidence in the efficiency of state-run organizations. Nevertheless, such managerialism can circumscribe how schemes are conceived, structured, and run, and for all its benefits may limit the development of initiatives that would have a multitude of intangible benefits.

The Irish schemes are slowly transferring to more managerialist interventions, especially with regard to accountability and transparency of public spending, but there remains an underlying inclination to leave diaspora organizations and networks to run themselves, providing
only minimal resources (basic funding, advice, speakers, etc.), and then only when an organization or network needs to be re-energized and requires the short-term backing of the state. To that end, the Irish state supports existing organizations without seeking any control over them, and encourages the development of new social networks run by the diaspora that use the diaspora's own resources. The idea is to foster the organic growth of networks with as little government input as possible. This is partly to keep investment low, but is mainly because of a belief that organic networks are more likely to succeed than those that are highly managed. For instance, Enterprise Ireland invests selective but light resources (some of which are in-kind rather than financial) into over 60 Irish business networks around the world. The metrics used to assess this strategy focus on the quality and strength of the network, feedback from clients, and number of quotations and contracts, but there is no rigorous and robust economic metric. For Ireland, the challenge will be to find appropriate ways of measuring the success of initiatives without stifling the creativity of these efforts.

While Scotland has sought to develop a formal overarching diaspora strategy and has created a new institution to fortify its emigration state, it has effectively built pragmatic diaspora strategies: most of its schemes have stemmed from the needs and demands of sectoral agencies. But it is possible that Scotland has not paid sufficient attention to direct diaspora strategy options, and in particular to the building of Scottishness in the Scottish diaspora. Arguably, this is part of the reason why it has suffered from a tendency to excessively pursue centralized strategies; that is, to create and manage diaspora-homeland engagements. The state has had to be muscular because organic initiatives have not always emerged from the grassroots. But Scotland’s top-heavy state-led strategy has been pursued at a cost. The sustainability of projects has proven problematic (for example, the active membership base of Global Scot has shrunk), some projects have failed entirely (for example, the philanthropic Scotland Funds initiative was jettisoned after only 18 months), and some speculative projects have exposed the Scottish government to financial risks and losses (for example, The Gathering tourism project, the flagship centerpiece of the Homecoming 2009 campaign, lost money).

The Irish case runs the risk of mission creep. Ireland demonstrates the value of working simultaneously on direct and indirect strategies. The Irish diaspora is a classic example of a victim diaspora: the Irish potato famine of 1845-52, and ongoing political disputations with Britain, have been used to frame the Irish diaspora as an involuntary population emigration driven by a motif of exile. As such, Ireland has historically been assured of strong patriotism among its diaspora communities. Nevertheless, with the economic success of the country (notwithstanding the current economic crises, the Celtic Tiger wave that lasted from 1993 to 2007 brought great wealth to the country), the peace process in the North of Ireland, and the changing demographic
profile of the Irish diaspora, it is clear that Ireland can no longer take its diaspora’s commitment for granted. Ireland has grasped the fundamental importance of direct, culture-led strategies that build the Irishness of the Irish diaspora. But it threatens to take direct strategies too far, and arguably the Irish Abroad Unit has ventured into unproductive territory by launching the Global Irish Economic Forum. Ireland needs to remain vigilant and to refocus on projects that are sector driven. With *The Gathering* 2013 tourism project, which is being pioneered by Failte Ireland and Tourism Ireland, as the country’s signature diaspora engagement mechanism in 2013, it is arguably on course to do so. But because Ireland has enjoyed a vibrant and self-organizing diaspora, it has been able to pursue light-touch and decentralized approaches to the governance of diaspora-homeland initiatives. Ireland is a world-class example of a sophisticated diaspora strategy driven by the mission of guided serendipity.

III. The Importance of Building Collaborations With Partners, Stakeholders, and Strategic Allies in Destination Countries and Sending States

A. The Need for Enabler Engagement Programs

In this final section we suggest that nations might more effectively turn to indirect and pragmatic diaspora strategies if more attention were given to developing enabler engagement programs, which we define as programs that enlist and mobilize stakeholders and partners in a) destination states, and in particular the Global North, and b) sending states themselves.

While much of the focus thus far has been on innovative institutions and programs devised and implemented by sending states, it is imperative to recognize that countries of origin can only do so much to devise and mobilize diaspora strategies. What is often forgotten is that diaspora communities reside in other states, and it is likely that their experience of settlement and assimilation into these countries, and these countries’ strategic priorities and policy programs, will play a role in determining the communities’ contributions to their home state.

There are five key ways in which host countries can impact the work of the diaspora populations they host: through their aid programs, including during natural or human disasters; through their trade policies;
through their diplomatic and foreign policy agendas; through their security and military agendas; and through their refugee and immigration policies. Destination countries seeking to promote diaspora-centered development need to be attentive to the transformations they might make in all five areas to promote rather than frustrate the reach of diasporas back to homelands. How might external aid and development agendas be better served by forging connections between diaspora populations and harnessing these populations as conduits? How can diaspora populations be used to further exports from destination countries while supporting fair trade for sending countries? How might diaspora populations be harnessed to inform and improve foreign policy and international relations between destination and sending states? In what ways can diaspora groupings be encouraged to play a role in peace building in sending states, and therefore greater security in destination states? In what ways might refugee and immigration policies be improved so as to meet domestic and humanitarian (i.e., family reunification) needs while minimizing unnecessary blockages to diaspora contributions to homelands?

Only belatedly are countries that host a variety of global diasporas now demonstrating heightened interest in building partnerships with these communities to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of their own external aid and development programs. EuropeAid is a new Directorate-General (DG) within the European Union (EU) and is responsible for designing EU development policies, delivering aid through programs and projects to around 140 countries, and contributing to realizing the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). With a budget of 12 billion euros (0.56 percent of EU GDP, 9 percent of the EU budget) in 2010, the European Union dispenses over 50 percent of all development aid worldwide. Migration has rapidly gained momentum in EuropeAid programs. Alongside the management of legal migration and the asylum application system, and the curbing of illegal flows of migrants to the European Union, EuropeAid has begun to recognize the boost that diasporas can give to sending states. Through initiatives such as the Africa-EU partnership, EuropeAid is seeking to build collaborations between sending states, diaspora communities, and EU countries. Its recent Migration for Development program represents a paradigmatic example of how partnership building can result in meaningful and effectual bottom-up diaspora initiatives that are capable of radically transforming the institutional capacities of public, private, and community institutions in sending states.11

Meanwhile, in May 2011, at the instruction of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the Global Partnership Initiative (GPI), in collaboration with the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Migration Policy Institute (MPI), hosted the first-ever Secretary of State’s

Global Diaspora Forum and inaugurated a new, US-based International diaspora Engagement Alliance (IdEA).\(^2\) IdEA challenges the US external aid and development community to think anew about migration and development. It promotes partnership building for diaspora-centered development in five areas: 1) diaspreneurship, which means encouraging diaspora entrepreneurs to invest in and build enterprises as well as to stimulate trade in countries of origin; 2) diplomacy, which means strengthening the existing role of diasporas in diplomacy, advocacy, and peace building, including using nontraditional vehicles such as sports, arts, and culture; 3) This report, undertaken by the Migration Policy Institute through a USAID grant, discusses how today’s diaspora organizations, communities and individuals increasingly are seeking to influence government, media, private sectors and other prominent groups in their countries of origin and of settlement. This report provides an overview of diaspora advocacy by looking at five issues: who participates in diaspora advocacy, who or what are the “targets” in these efforts, what means are used to advance these causes, what are the issues on which they focus and the effectiveness of the efforts.

Download Report diasporacorps, which means incubating diaspora volunteerism in countries of origin; 4) This report, researched by the Migration Policy Institute through a USAID grant, examines how nearly 200,000 first- and second-generation immigrants are among the 1 million US residents who spend time volunteering abroad each year. Diasporas often have the connections, knowledge and personal drive to volunteer outside the framework of organized volunteer programs. But many also volunteer through established programs. As skilled migration and the number of U.S. youth with ancestors in the developing world grow over the coming years, the potential for both skilled diaspora volunteers and youth diaspora volunteers will increase, as this report discusses.

Download Report diaspora 2.0, which means fostering innovative communication and information technologies, not least social media, to enhance connectivity to the homeland; and 5) diasplanthropy, which means encouraging the diaspora to donate in areas such education, health, nutrition, and disaster relief in countries of origin.

But it is not only stakeholders in destination states who need to be included. Beyond the formal institutions of the emigration state, it is often the case that business, cultural, community, sporting, academic, and artistic organizations in sending states lack the capacity to lead or even to be open to and capable of benefiting from diaspora for development projects. At best these institutions are passive beneficiaries of diaspora contributions to homeland development. At worst they are of little interest to diaspora search networks and are not considered worthy of concern or effort. As such, insufficient attention has been

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paid to date to the mobilization of domestic partner institutions and programs designed to build the capacity of sending-state institutions as active stakeholders in their own rights. What is required is the stirring of interest within all public, private, and voluntary institutions in sending states so that they might be receptive to building new diaspora-to-homeland linkages. Of course not all institutions will take the opportunity. But a wider audience will be created for search networks to engage with.

The Scottish and Irish cases illustrate the importance of engaging enabling institutions within sending states. Both Scotland and Ireland have pioneered world-class high-profile diaspora tourism projects; in 2009 Scotland celebrated the Homecoming 2009 campaign and will repeat this project in 2014, while in 2013 Ireland hosted The Gathering 2013. Homecoming 2009 drew 72,000 extra visitors for Scotland and created £42 million in additional spend and 870 new jobs. The Gathering 2013 predicts that it will draw 325,000 visitors to Ireland, generating 221 million euros in added spending and 2,100 extra jobs. In both schemes stakeholders from the public, private, and community sectors were mobilized, and central to the delivery of the program.

The assumption behind the schemes was that people throughout Ireland and Scotland want to play an active part in their country’s economic renewal and development. But civil society and community organizations are insufficiently primed to engage in diaspora-tourist promotions. It is therefore the role of the state to build social capital in communities. While first and foremost a tourism event, in both cases the core legacy has been defined to include the strengthening of individuals and communities, increasing social cohesion, building community capacity, and improving local tourism structures. Consequently, in both cases the state has created universal awareness and understanding of the events throughout the country to win the active support of key influencers and stakeholders and to encourage them to organize their own local homecomings and gatherings. They have also helped build the competencies of Homecoming and Gathering organizers through town hall visits, toolkits, grant awards, and mentoring schemes.

**B. The European Commission-United Nations Joint Migration and Development Initiative**

This wider approach resonates strongly with the key tenets of the European Commission-United Nations Joint Migration and Development Initiative (JMDI). The JMDI is a four-year, 15-million-euro project designed to fortify the contribution of diaspora populations in Europe to the development of their countries of origin. The project’s aim is to encourage a bottom-up approach to harnessing migrant communities in the development of homelands (see Figure 2). Small-scale actors (such
as community groups, diaspora lobby groups, aid agencies, charities, local authorities, etc.) in both European and sending states were invited to bid for competitive grants for concrete initiatives designed to: 1) set up and reinforce networks of actors working on migration and development; 2) identify good practices in the field and share information on what actually works at the local and international levels; and 3) feed grassroots wisdom back to policymakers working at larger scales. Sixteen target countries were identified — Algeria, Cape Verde, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Georgia, Ghana, Jamaica, Mali, Moldova, Morocco, Nigeria, Philippines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, and Tunisia — and 51 projects were funded.

**Figure 2. The EC-JMDI Framework**

Small-Scale Actors in Diaspora

- Human Capital
- Human Capital
- Human Capital
- Human Capital

Small-Scale Actors in Sending State

- Human Capital
- Human Capital
- Human Capital
- Human Capital

Recommendations for Policymakers

1. Ensure project needs a migration and development focus
2. Ensure coherence between small-scale projects and broader development agendas
3. Share responsibilities with small-scale actors
4. Asses the transnational strength of partnerships
5. Assess the grounds for migrant involvement
6. Facilitate face-to-face and virtual networking
7. Match financial support with capacity-building opportunities
8. Provide one-to-one forms of support
9. Ensure long-term commitment


JMDI is designed to build four sets of “capital” in migrant communities so as to enhance the contributions these communities might make to homeland development. *Social capital* refers to the extent, density, and capacity of migrants’ social networks, not least their various connections with communities at home. An example of this is a joint project between the Mona School of Business in Jamaica and the KAJAN’s Women’s Social and Arts Enterprise in the United Kingdom, which
created an online community dedicated to improving policymaking and implementation and development planning in Jamaica. *Financial capital* denotes the economic resources migrants have at their disposal and the ways these resources might be put to productive use for both the migrant and the sending country. An example is the tripartite link between Unlad Kabayan Migrant Services Foundation Inc. and the Migrant Forum in Asia, both located in the Philippines, and the Netherlands-based Commission for Filipino Migrant Workers initiative, which seeks to better deploy remittances so as to promote personal savings as well as community development. *Human capital* refers to migrants’ education, skills, and talents, and competencies that might be transferred directly and indirectly to serve homeland labor markets. An example is the partnership between the Egyptian Agribusiness Association and the Athens Network of Collaborating Experts, which facilitates the development of aquaculture and fisheries industries in Egypt. Finally, *cultural capital* refers to migrant awareness of rights — in both sending and destination states — that might enhance their capacity to transfer ideas and values back home. An example is the collaboration between the Algerian Forum for Citizenship and Modernity and the Region of Sicily, which works to provide predeparture information about the rules, rights, and obligations Algerian migrants can expect to encounter in countries of destination.

JMDI also provides guidance to small-scale actors as to how to interact across borders. It identifies three types of alliances and considers the merits of each in different contexts. The first type is partnerships, which refers to alliances between small-scale actors that are necessary for the direct implementation of a joint plan. Partners are hands-on actors who co-own or are jointly responsible for projects. Partnerships work best when there is a joint vision, clearly defined roles, productive complementarities, effective communication, and, when needed, appropriate mediation. Stakeholders are agents who can make a significant contribution to diaspora-homeland projects at specific stages without serving as direct partners. Stakeholder engagement requires partners to map the range of pertinent stakeholders and relevant resources — in both sending and destination states — they might wish to engage and then to draw upon and to manage these organizations and resources. Finally, although they do not directly impact projects, a number of institutions set the structural parameters in which migration for development initiatives must work. Strategic allies are actors in both destination and sending countries whose position of influence and decision-making authority matter insofar as they create, delimit, and constrain the environment in which partners work. They can engage governments, international organizations, and leading policymakers to ensure that projects are better aligned with the prevailing policy environment.

Through the production of a handbook for practitioners, exemplars of best practice, practical toolkits for community organizations, a
discussion forum and blog, and the hosting of icebreaker events and practitioner networking conferences, JMDI will undoubtedly generate an ongoing legacy that will survive beyond its own life. Perhaps JMDI’s greatest impact will stem from the lessons for future practice it gleans (see Figure 2). For small-scale actors, for instance, the project recommends that attention be paid to practical matters such as migrants’ other commitments, setting realistic expectations, the scale of partnerships and their governance, equity in the division of responsibility, and equity and inclusivity in project design and delivery. Meanwhile, recommendations for policymakers include creating effective mechanisms to bring migrants and domestic actors into contact, upskilling partners in key competencies, promoting best practice, providing customized support, and engendering confidence that support for initiatives will be durable. It is by attending to these seemingly banal practical matters that partners, stakeholders, and strategic allies will be able to collaborate in the building of successful diaspora strategies.

IV. Conclusion

This book has sought to place under critical scrutiny the role of global diasporas in the development of institutional capacity in sending states. Undoubtedly the rise of diaspora-centered development agendas reflects at the least a shift in development thinking and practice; with traditional emphases upon market- and state-led development being variously supplemented, fortified, replaced, and challenged by a new focus upon diaspora networks, social capital, community, and civil-society-led development. The forms of development promoted by diaspora-centered development, including the social and spatial distribution of costs and benefits, remain to be charted in a sustained way. But it is now becoming clear that diaspora groupings can and do impact public, private, and civil-society institutions in countries of origin in significant and positive ways. It follows that the recent flourishing of interest in diaspora strategy is sufficiently well grounded to merit scrutiny and experiment. If diasporas are capable of contributing to development it is incumbent on sending states to bring forth institutions and public policies that harness and lever the talents of diaspora groupings to best effect. The purpose of this chapter has been to digest, comment upon, and develop the conceptual schema that this book has offered as a guide to the policymaking and practitioner community.

The flurry of activity that surrounds diaspora strategizing threatens to cloud the simple core mission of the enterprise: to pursue diaspora-centered development. We applaud the clarity of the conceptual framework advanced in the book, and endorse its call for a new generation of pragmatic and direct diaspora strategies that recognize the heterogeneity of both diaspora populations and institutions in sending states, prioritize triggering search networks, and seek to connect high-achieving diaspora elites with better-performing domestic institutions.
We welcome the book’s proposition of a quadrant of diaspora strategy options, cross referencing as they do centralized and decentralized and direct and indirect approaches. Countries will find it useful to map their activities onto this schema and be guided by the call for a renewed decentralized and pragmatic quadrant. We see virtue in the importance of being humble and ambitious at the same time. Case-by-case-led development may look atomized and lacking in coherence, but the sum can be greater than the individual parts. This book presents diaspora-centered development not as an alternative development philosophy or approach per se, but as a disruption of the intellectual habit within development theory and practice of searching for a silver bullet — a magic formula that will accelerate growth. While this claim needs interrogation, it is stimulating to contemplate the reality that diaspora-led development promotes serendipitous growth and as such generates unexpected and historically novel development outcomes.

We propose that the role of global diasporas in the development of countries of origin is conditioned by four mediators. The first is the development of an effective diaspora strategy in sending states, employing an appropriate mix of direct and indirect and decentralized and centralized initiatives in any given context, and the creation of an emigration state apparatus suited to implementing this policy mixture. The second are the capacities and competencies of partners, stakeholders, and strategic allies in sending states, and whether or not programs designed to mobilize, activate, and orient key enablers exist. The third is the existing scale, history, geography, and nature of particular diaspora-homeland relations, including diaspora lobbying and advocacy, diaspora capital markets, diaspora investment funds, diaspora knowledge networks, diaspora philanthropy, diaspora remittances, diaspora return migration, diaspora corps, diaspora tourism, and diaspora human-capital effects. The fourth comprises external aid, trade, diplomatic, security, and immigration priorities of partners, stakeholders, and strategic allies in destination states, particularly the more powerful states and supra-national political institutions in the global North. Figure 3 below illustrates these conditions.
We propose that there is a unique nexus between all four that energizes, and frustrates, the contributions of diaspora groupings to homeland development differently in the case of different diasporas. Diaspora schemes that are successful and that exemplify best practice are often predicated upon a strong collaborative alignment between all four sending-state diaspora strategies, stakeholder capacity in sending states, diaspora aspirations and agendas, and the priorities of destination countries. Diaspora schemes that are transferred from pioneers to adopters often have more limited success because these adopters display lesser degrees of collaborative alignment.

Should one mediator be privileged above another? Arguably, if any one of the four mediators identified assumes too much authority and fails to grasp the importance of working collaboratively, it is likely that meaningful collaborative alignments will be too difficult to achieve. While the strategic interests of stakeholders in destination countries is a neglected variable, it is important not to allow hosts to dictate terms to sending nations. Destination countries that seek to use diaspora populations to sell particular development agendas to homelands run the risk of creating a schism between these populations and their countries of origin, and weakening diaspora ties. Diaspora groupings that feel exploited are poor conduits to their homelands. Likewise, if
sending states pursue diasporas too aggressively, diaspora strategies can become clumsy, alienating diaspora communities and threatening the sovereignty of host countries, who fear the prospect of foreign interference in their internal political affairs. Meanwhile, if left to nonstate stakeholders in sending states, arguably there exists a risk that entrenched and sectional interests will stifle the capacity of search networks to find and incubate fresh but hidden high-potential talent. Finally, an overly patriotic and militant diaspora can often prove to be as much of a problem as a resource, for both sending and destination states. Diaspora communities that seek to intervene as a special interest group in the domestic affairs of their countries of origin run the risk of having their voices ignored or dismissed as too powerful given their geographical distance from the country. They might also fall prey to the accusation that they are mere “flexible citizens” who have little loyalty to their new homes.

We propose, then, that the future of diaspora-centered development requires a new generation of diaspora strategies that are predicated upon cooperation or effective partnerships between sending states, key stakeholders in sending states, diaspora populations themselves, and stakeholders in destination states. Arguably the most critical agenda for the future is to create forums, mechanisms, dialogues, and platforms through which each constituency can negotiate its interests in diaspora strategizing with an awareness of the compromises that might need to be made if the collective union is to succeed. But this cannot be a vague, aspirational, or abstract exercise. As this book has shown collaborative alignment may need to occur on a case-by-case basis and with respect to pragmatic and indirect projects that deliver concrete, demonstrable, and purposeful development outcomes. While it is especially powerful if the four tectonic plates are aligned and create fundamental and cumulative reinforcements at a structural level, it is still necessary, and even desirable, that specific diaspora-homeland projects create even temporary and brittle alignments. Even transient and hard-won collaborations can produce effective and meaningful results with a lasting legacy.
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