Herman Melville's *Pierre*:
How Radical is the Critique of Christianity?

In the dark and problematic *Pierre*, the much lesser-known novel written after *Moby-Dick*, Melville provides a radical critique of Christian morality. Ironically, it is the untenable ideals fostered by Christianity that lead to Pierre's disillusionment and self-destruction. But if Christianity is subjected to such a critique, can the source of such moral beliefs - Christ himself - remain exempt from a related critical scrutiny? In any case, does not Pierre push to a further extreme the deep scepticism about a providential God the Father already evident in *Moby-Dick*?

Written just after Melville's masterpiece, *Moby-Dick*, *Pierre* has as sub-title 'The Ambiguities'. Given that the ambiguous deals in double meanings, it is not surprising to find that *Pierre* is not only structured around, but is recurrently obsessed by, doublings or dualisms. There are, for instance, a number of mirrored scenes beginning with the early reference to the 'duplicate' Glendinning that Pierre can see reflected to him in the mirror. Beyond that, there are (leaving aside the figure of his mother) the two women in Pierre's life, Lucy and Isabel, who are presented as counter-images, Lucy with her 'all-understood blue eyes' and Isabel with her 'inscrutable dark glance' (129).

Lucy, initially at least, is the appropriate icon of Pierre's early, youthful joy and innocence; Isabel, who first appears as an image haunting Pierre's imagination, combines in her face 'nameless beauty' with 'long-suffering, hopeless anguish' (49). In this regard, Lucy may be said to recall that memorable iconic face in the Romantic tradition, the face of Moneta in Keats's *The Fall of Hyperion*. (In Isabel's case, however, the image of the face is further complicated by the additional element of seduction - with unavoidable erotic connotations) - since it is essential to the novel's schema that Isabel possess the alluring characteristics of the siren, an ambiguous force that contributes to Pierre's shipwreck.) Isabel in effect is

1. Herman Melville, *Pierre*, introduction by William C. Spengemann (London, etc.: Penguin, 1996) 8. Cf. 39 ('the snow-white bed reflected in the toilet-glass ... he seemed to see in that one glance the two separate beds') and 62 (Pierre 'started at a figure in the opposite mirror. It bore the outline of Pierre, but now strangely filled with features transformed ...'). All subsequent references to *Pierre* are to this edition, with page numbers given in the main text.
2. What the poet sees in the poem is 'a wan face ... bright-blanch'd/By an immortal sickness which kills not', but compelling his attention by the beauty of her 'benignant eyes' (ll.256-65: Jack Stillinger ed., *The Poems of John Keats* (London: Heinemann, 1978), 484); in other words, the face combines, as in the case of Isabel, 'hopeless anguish' with 'nameless beauty'. One of Keats's purposes at the time of writing the poem was, arguably, to reconcile himself and his reader to tragic inevitability by affirming the presence of Beauty in Suffering.
related to 'Life's Truth' (a dark truth) which Pierre, steadfastly rejecting 'the thousand sweet illusions of Life' he had hitherto experienced in the company of Lucy, now pursues with a misplaced and absolute fervour (89, 90-91). Paul Lewis speaks of Pierre's 'fatal attraction to moral absolutism' (though in addition, like Ahab, Pierre is equally motivated by a destructive epistemological absolutism; and the complex argument at the opening of Book IX is, in fact, a warning that the search for Absolute Truth is a wholly futile undertaking).

It is, nonetheless, Pierre's moral absolutism that is at the heart of the novel. Thus he justifies his allegiance to Isabel (with an almost masochistic zeal) on the basis of his absolute commitment to the most strenuous moral idealism. Rejecting 'the dreary heart-vacancies of the conventional life', and knowing that in choosing Isabel he must be disinherited by his wealthy mother, Pierre rhapsodically offers a rhetorical welcome to 'Ugliness and Poverty and Infamy':

Oh, now methinks I a little see why of old the men of Truth went barefoot, girded with a rope, and ever moving under mournfulness as under a canopy. I remember now those first wise words, whereby our Savior Christ first spoke in his first speech to men; - 'Blessed are the poor in spirit, and blessed they that mourn'. (90-91)

As the closing words of that quotation make clear, Pierre's moral idealism takes its cue from the teachings of Christ and will be based on an imitatio Christi. One is addressing here Pierre's moral stance, and strictly speaking we remain at his point in the realm of the ethical, with the theological implications not as yet in evidence; but theology will in due course enter into the reckoning. In the meantime, we may note that it is with reference to Pierre's misplaced ethical commitment to Christian ideals that the major irony or (in this work of numerous ambiguities) the major ambiguity emerges. As Pierre himself comes close to recognizing in Book IX (he envisages the dilemma in merely hypothetical terms), by following Virtue 'to her uttermost vista, where common souls never go', he may in fact have taken 'hold on hell'; for 'the uttermost virtue' may prove but 'a betraying pander to the monstrousest [sic] vice ...' (273). This declaration Pierre makes to Isabel, and his refusal of her physical touch indicates the immediate source of his disquiet; namely, that his attraction to her, his supposed sister, in theory based on the high moral ideal of self-sacrifice for the welfare of another, is subtly vitiated by an erotic attraction which points towards the monstrous possibility of incest.

This ironic reversal from an apparently virtuous condition to its dark opposite had been anticipated by Pierre in his prophetic words in Book V. 'May heaven', he prays, 'new-string my soul, and confirm me in the

Christ-like feeling', so that he may 'square' himself 'by the inflexible rule of holy right' (106). But if, as he fears, the 'sovereign powers' forsake him, then the consequence he envisages is a dire one: 'farewell to Faith, farewell to Truth, farewell to God; exiled for aye from God and man, I shall declare myself an equal power with both ...' (107). The defiant note of that concluding statement, where, Ahab-like, Pierre envisages pitting himself against God as an equal, prepares us for the final reversal whereby Pierre, no longer self-denying and Christ-like in aspiration, assumes in his 'Titanic soul' (341) the role of Enceladus, one of the 'repulsed group of heaven-assailers' (346).4

Pierre's growing disillusionment arises from the failure of a contingent reality to live up to his absolutist expectations, or the failure of a hypocritical world to validate his moral idealism: and Murray Krieger's astute summary of the experience of the 'ethical man' applies to Pierre. The ethical man comes to realize that 'the neatly ordered and easily enacted ... rights and wrongs of his ethical assumptions are utterly inadequate to the data of his moral experience'; and, confronted by this 'moral contradiction', the ethical man is 'hopelessly adrift from his or any other moorings'. Faced with this dilemma, the ethical man has two alternatives: he can either 'float into willlessness and thus abdicate from tragic heroism, or he can surge towards the demoniac'.5 In embracing the role of the Titan, Pierre's fate is the latter: in Krieger's summary, specifically with reference to Melville's novel, Pierre's downward path is 'from Christ to Enceladus, from an almost gratuitous benefactor to an almost gratuitous murderer'; in short, 'from the light-bearing transcendentalist to that devotee of darkness, Captain Ahab' (Krieger, Tragic Vision, 202).

Setting out to imitate Christ, Pierre ironically ends up as the antithetical Enceladus,6 thus validating the truth of the explicit moral admonition provided by the narrator in Book X:

Such, oh thou son of man! are the perils and the miseries thou callest down on thee, when, even in a virtuous cause, thou steppest aside from those arbitrary lines of conduct, by which the common world, however base and dastardly, surrounds thee for thy worldly good. (176)

4. We may now, retrospectively, make sense of that cryptic Latin tag introduced early on by the narrator; Nemo contra Deum nisi Deus (14), which may be translated: 'Let no one oppose God unless he is a God himself'. The Titan is he, who, in disputing the mastery of the Supreme Power, proudly asserts his right to equal recognition.
5. Murray Krieger, The Tragic Vision (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960) 13. A striking modern instance of the moral idealist turning demoniac will be found in Martin Scorsese's Taxi Driver, where the Robert de Niro character, Travis, starting out with a moral desire to purge society of evil, himself becomes the evil destroyer. This demoniac type, it might be argued, was anticipated by such a character as Vindice in the Jacobean drama The Revenger's Tragedy.
As an example of those ‘young and over-ardent souls’ referred to in book X (175), Pierre, an ‘infatuated young enthusiast’ (180), is to become, in the narrator’s sardonic summary in Book XXII, the ‘victim’ of ‘Ideal Virtue!’ (302). And this in spite of the clear warnings against absolute moral idealism vividly enunciated in the pamphlet written by Plotinus Plinlimmon, a significant fragment of which (as it were, providentially) comes into the hands of Pierre.

For Plinlimmon’s pamphlet is essentially a refusal of moral absolutism, arguing instead for a moral pragmatism, on the basis of a metaphoric distinction between the chronometer, which unflinchingly adheres to Greenwich time, and horologicals, which, relativistically, indicate the hour of the day according to the longitude in which they operate. Greenwich time stands for the heavenly ideal in morality; by contrast, the horologicals, which measure earthly time depending on which part of the globe they are used, refer to the mundane and practical requirements in morality. Plinlimmon argues that ‘a Greenwich chronometer, keeping Greenwich time’, would be of little use ‘to the Chinaman’; so, too, it follows that ‘the God at the heavenly Greenwich’ can hardly expect ‘common men to keep Greenwich wisdom in this remote Chinese world of ours’ (212). His conclusion is both categorical and ethically challenging: ‘that, for mass of men, the highest abstract heavenly righteousness is not only impossible, but would be entirely out of place, and positively wrong in a world like this’ (213). Moreover, if anyone aspires to follow absolute moral precepts (of the kind advocated by Christ), then he would be in the position of aspiring to be ‘an angel, a chronometer’; whereas in reality he is ‘a man and a horologe’ (214). But what Pierre fails to grasp is that, in Plinlimmon’s words, ‘in things terrestrial (horological) a man must not be governed by ideas celestial (chronometrical)’. Specifically, ‘he must by no means make a complete unconditional sacrifice of himself in behalf of any other being [as Pierre does for Isabel] or any cause, or any conceit’ (214). Plinlimmon’s conclusion is that the ‘highest desirable or attainable earthly excellence for the mass of men’ is a ‘virtuous expediency’ (214). 8

7. There are numerous suggestions in the text of an aspiring angelism in Pierre (e.g., Pierre’s remark to Isabel in Book VIII that ‘we will love with the pure and perfect love of angel to an angel’ (154); cf. Isabel’s compliment to Pierre that if all men were as he then mankind would become ‘extinct in scraphim’ (156)). It is worth noting that Lucy, too, is infected in the later stages by the same kind of aspiration: thus in Book XXIII she gives thanks for her swoon and enforced fasting in that condition because in that trial ‘heaven, I feel now, was preparing me for [a] superhuman office … was wholly estranging me from this earth …’ (310).

8. It is part of the unsettled and unsettling nature of Melville’s text that, when Plinlimmon appears in the narrative, he is thoroughly repugnant in human terms. The choice at first seems to be one between diametrical opposites, A (Pierre’s moral idealism) and B (Plinlimmon’s moral pragmatism), but in a Swiftian outmanoeuvring of the reader neither A nor B is found to be acceptable. A similarly unsettling process of modification is found in the presentation of Falsgrave: first introduced as one who is (rightly?) anti-absolutist (‘Millions of circumstances modify all moral questions’ (102) – a sentiment that might be described as appealingly Aristotelian), he is finally dismissed, ignominiously, by Pierre’s mother, Mrs Glendinning as ‘a helpless and unhelpping one!’ (194). We may recall the
Although the views put forward by Plinlimmon do not in any way function as a moral norm (for in the ambiguous world of Pierre there are no clearly defined orientations, and Paul Lewis rightly notes how ‘the reader of Pierre is set adrift, like Pierre himself, in search of guiding principles’), these views do nonetheless serve as a critique of Pierre’s moral idealism. The crucial issue, however, raised by the pamphlet is one that will point us towards the radically problematic theological question at the novel’s core. Pierre, it might be said, is satirized for trying to be Christ: but is Christ himself, by extension, also satirized as a misguided moral idealist? If we re-invoke the quotation from the pamphlet (above) which advises against a man’s making ‘a complete unconditional sacrifice of himself in behalf of ... any cause’ (214), are we meant to recall Christ’s supreme self-sacrifice, and see that as misguided? True, Plinlimmon’s advice in that context is addressed to ‘the mass of men’ (214), and not to the outstanding religious leader; moreover, Plinlimmon at one point suggests that although Christ made an absolute effort ‘to live in this world according to the strict letter of the chronometricals’, yet, unlike ‘inferior beings’ (such as, we infer, Pierre) he was not eventually involved in ‘strange ... follies and sins’. Rather did he ‘remain throughout without folly or sin’ (213). Christ, it would appear, was a special case. Yet it remains difficult to detach the overt criticism of Christian morality from the source of that morality, Christ himself. H. Bruce Franklin is not the only one to be disturbed by this logical connection:

If Christ is the ultimate source for Pierre’s destructive belief in man’s godliness, then Christ in Pierre is the deceiver which he appears to be in The Confidence-Man and the ‘torturer’ which he is called in Clarel (I, xiii, 99). (The Wake of the Gods, 110)

The view that Christ, in demanding from humanity an ideal morality at variance with the pragmatic reality of living in an imperfect world, could be seen as a ‘torturer’, was independently arrived at in a famous essay by George Steiner on the Holocaust (or, as he prefers to call it, using the Jewish term, the Shoah). The context is one in which Steiner, in trying to articulate the deep causes of anti-semitism, sees in the message of Jesus one of a number of instances in the Jewish tradition of an intolerable demand for ideal behaviour. Three times in human history, he suggests,

Judaism has confronted Western man with the merciless claims and exactions of the ideal. Three times – in its invention of monotheism,

narrator’s statement in Book X, which includes the recognition that ‘the common world’ is indeed ‘base and dastardly’ (176). Such, it seems, is the unacceptable world to which both Plinlimmon and Falsgrave belong; but in keeping with the acknowledgement of dilemma, Pierre’s alternative, if heroic, is also unacceptable in its ultimate nihilism and destructiveness.

in the message of the radical Jesus, in marxian and messianic-socialism – Israel has asked of ordinary men and women more than human nature … is organically and psychically able to give.

Steiner proceeds to argue that it is this ‘blackmail of perfection’ and the fear and hatred of ‘those who demand of us a self-transcendence’ that in large part accounts for the dire reality of anti-semitism; the Jew is hated not, after all, as Deicide, but as inventor of God. 10

Additionally, however, there is in Pierre an even more radical critique of Christ and his teaching – a critique that indicts not only Christian moral idealism but Christian theological belief. Just a couple of pages prior to the introduction of Plinlimmon’s pamphlet, the narrator pointedly satirizes all ‘philosophers’ who have time and again pretended to have found the ‘Talismanic Secret’, whereby we might heal the division between our aspirational soul and a resisting or recalcitrant world. Among this ‘guild of self-impostors’ are Plato, Spinoza, Goethe and ‘many more’. The nature of the imposture – and at this point the theological implications begin to emerge – is spelled out in the concluding paragraph:

That profound Silence, that only Voice of our God, which I before spoke of [see page 204]; from that divine thing without a name, those impostor philosophers pretend somehow to have got an answer; which is as absurd, as though they should say they had got water out of a stone; for how can a man get a Voice out of Silence? (208)

H. Bruce Franklin observes that not only did Christ claim ‘to have gotten “a Voice out of the Silence”’, but, in purporting to be ‘the Logos of God’, apparently claimed to be that Voice (The Wake of the Gods 112). That ‘divine thing without a name’ was in fact, as part of Christ’s unique contribution to our understanding or image of God, given a highly specific name: Abba, meaning ‘Father’ (or even ‘Daddy’). And this claim that God has a continuing paternal concern for our welfare is central to the prayer left as part of Christ’s personal legacy, the Our Father, as well as to that most unforgettable of all the parables, that of the Prodigal Son. Yet according to an inescapable tragic logic, the sense of God as loving Father who supports us in all our trials is bound to be severely challenged, if not totally refuted, by the facts of experience. (We would probably see the Holocaust as the most spectacular challenge in recent history to any easy acceptance of a loving God’s paternal concern for humanity.) Even if such experiences do not refute the idea of God as Abba, they do, at the very least, indicate the possibility of an inevitable psychological strain imposed on the Christian imagination by the attempt to reconcile faith with fact.

HERMAN MELVILLE'S PIERRE

If, then, we have difficulty in accepting (at least in any naïve way) that God is indeed the ever-present loving Father, intimately involved with and concerned about our welfare – who sustains us, moreover, in our Christian idealism, whatever the irremediable world may insinuate – can we find an alternative (perhaps complementary) perspective on this God? That there is an alternative within the Judaeo-Christian tradition is evidenced by the tradition of the ‘hidden God’, the deus absconditus of Isaiah 45:15; a God later invoked in the seventeenth century by such a Christian thinker as Pascal: ‘God wanted to be hidden ... God being therefore hidden, any religion which does not say that God is hidden is not true.’11 Moreover, when the narrator in Pierre informs us that ‘the only Voice of our God’ is ‘Silence’ (208), he might in fact appear to be aligning himself with this respectable Judaeo-Christian tradition, and in that way staying within the bounds of orthodoxy.

Yet the matter is not that simple. For as we consider more closely the views expressed by the narrator in Pierre it seems that he is indeed tending to go outside (or against) the Judaeo-Christian frame of reference, by positing a God who is absolutely unknowable, or, if knowable at all, knowable only (as in Moby-Dick) in morally unacceptable terms. Human life, we are informed, is like God in its ‘unravellable inscrutableness’ (141): and we may attempt to measure the distance between this view and Christian orthodoxy by recalling a terse and uncompromising statement by John Henry Newman: ‘I do not see’, Newman wrote, ‘much difference between avowing that there is no God, and implying that nothing definite can for certain be known about Him ....’12

And yet, again, the matter cannot, at this point, be allowed to rest. For it may be the case that at the heart of all religious belief there is indeed an acknowledgement that God is inscrutable; and, if that is the case, then Christianity in particular may be caught in an irresolvable aporia. In a recent book, the Anglican theologian Keith Ward, surveying in a general way the religious traditions concerning God, is repeatedly obliged to acknowledge that ‘God remains finally inscrutable ....’13 Ward cites the Jewish thinker Moses Maimonides to illustrate, in his summary, that the nature of God ‘is beyond description’ (46), and the early Eastern Orthodox figure Basil the Great who described God’s ‘essence’ as ‘inaccessible’ (45): but what Ward refers to as ‘the unknowable reality which we call “God”’ (47) is so thought of not just in the Jewish and Christian traditions, but in the Indian. Thus Ward cites the eighth-century Indian philosopher and saint, Sankara, as one who accepts ‘the common classical view that God (nirguna Brahman) is completely incomprehensible’ (159-60).

12. The Idea of a University Defined and Illustrated, ed. Daniel M. O'Connell (Chicago: Loyola University, 1927) 56.
The particular problem that arises in Christian theology (and it is a deep question that is perhaps best left to theologians) is: how can one reconcile the God clearly revealed in Jesus with the inscrutable and unknowable God of the broader religious tradition? While, doubtless, the question is, for the Christian theologian, not beyond resolution (e.g., in Jesus we find a perfect obedience to the will of God, and in that sense an ethical manifestation of God’s nature and purpose), there will surely always remain a tension between the God revealed in Jesus and the hidden God of Isaiah and others. Thus, to return to Pierre, what Melville may have therein indicated is not only an ethical tension between the imperatives of Christianity and the pragmatic realities of the world, but a theological tension between God-as-known-in-Jesus, and God-as-unknowable.

As in Moby-Dick, however, the ruling Power of the world is not just inscrutable, but indifferent in His Silence, or perhaps simply absent (one major and theological question – raised in connection with the Holocaust, for instance – is whether the silence of God equates with the absence of God). It is this sense of divine indifference which lies behind the sardonic tone in which God is explicitly described: God is thus ‘the Infinite haughtiness’ (90), and the ‘hollow of His hand’ in which ‘He holdeth all of us’ is sarcastically dismissed as ‘a Hollow, truly!’ (139). Such a God cannot, obviously, be relied upon by the suffering sons and daughters of Adam.

Near the beginning of Book XXII there is introduced what one may call the Parable of the Toddler. Just as the infant must learn to live without the support of its parents, so too, the ‘soul-toddler’ must ‘learn to stand independent’ of ‘its mother the world, and its father the Deity’ (296). We are obliged, it seems, to rely on our own human resources, living without recourse to a divine overseer. It is significant, in this regard, that all three main protagonists are ironically exposed not just in their reliance upon a problematic and (in the text) finally insubstantial God, but in their fatal readiness to see the hand of God in both their personal circumstances and choices. In choosing Isabel and rejecting his mother (as well as his hereditary wealth), Pierre claims to be following his heart, but only because of his conviction that the heart is ‘God’s anointed’ (91); Isabel later informs Pierre that although the letter she wrote to him establishing the nature of their close relationship was the product of ‘immense longings’ in herself (158), yet ‘the impulse in me called thee [Pierre], not poor Bell. God called thee, Pierre, not poor Bell’ (159); and Lucy likewise interprets the personal and urgent need to go to Pierre in the city as divine ordinance: ‘God himself can not stay me, for it is he that commands me ….’ (311). Thus, in a clear abdication of moral responsibility, our choices and actions may be laid at the door of ‘God’ – in this instance, a highly serviceable concept.¹⁴

¹⁴. There are suggestions throughout that the concept of ‘Fate’ can be invoked in a similar way, culminating in Pierre’s acceptance that he is ‘the fool of Fate’ (358), as he goes forth to murder Glen.
However problematic and ambiguous Isabel may be – indeed, because of the very 'Mystery' (126) she embodies – there appears to be one valid lesson she may teach Pierre: namely, that the world is a mystery 'wholly hopeless of solution' (128). This, we might tend to argue, is the world as seen by Ishmael in *Moby-Dick*. Isabel, however, can also describe the world in terms that are close to the view of Ahab: that is, when she recalls her feeling that 'all good, harmless men and women were human beings, placed at cross-purposes in a world of snakes and lightnings, in a world of horrible and inscrutable inhumanities' (122).

In *Moby-Dick*, Ahab, convinced that the power which created the world is to be held responsible for its cruelties and suffering, seeks out that author of the universe in order not just to know that otherwise inscrutable thing, but to destroy it. In the case of Pierre, where doubts and ambiguities prevail, the suggestion is that God is indeed vindictive – a belief that inspires both Ahab's heroism and his destructiveness. And at this point it may be useful to return to the emphasis on dualisms or doublings with which this paper began. Of the numerous dualisms in the text, the further major instance concerns the two very different portraits of Pierre's father: the youthful and rakish chair-portrait (painted when the father 'was secretly in love with the French young lady' (79)), and the mature and respectable man depicted in the drawing-room painting. The dualism is further compounded by the ambiguous nature of the smile on the youthful father's face (84).

Some sixty years ago, William Braswell suggested that the two portraits 'represent (a) the orthodox view of God [the drawing-room painting], and (b) Melville's own problematic sense of God'. This is perhaps too categorically phrased: but H. Bruce Franklin holds onto the basic insight while expressing it in more acceptable terms: 'After Pierre finds “the perfect marble form” of his father imperfect, there are dark hints that his heavenly father may be equally imperfect' (*The Wake of the Gods* 104).

***

Melville's critique of Christ and Christianity begins as a critique of misplaced and (in the view expressed in *Pierre*) unworkable ethical idealism; but the ultimate source of that critique can be described as theological. Christ's 'good news' is finally unacceptable because Christ claimed that it was validated by a heavenly Father, intimately and unambiguously known to, and manifested in, Christ himself. But for Melville, the concept 'God' is consistently wrapped in ambiguity, and no clear Voice – no authoritative mandate, or definitive revelation – can issue from that problematic Silence.

15. One source for this dual representation of the father is undoubtedly *Hamlet*, in particular Hamlet's speech to his mother in the closet-scene in which he contrasts the 'ideal' father (the dead Hamlet senior) with the 'real' one (the all-too-alive Claudius), in the speech beginning 'Look here upon this picture and on this,/ The counterfeit presentment of two brothers': *Hamlet*, III. iv. 54ff., in Alfred Harbage, ed., *William Shakespeare: The Complete Works* (Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books, revd. ed., 1969) 957.