Time Consistency, Learning by Doing and Infant-Industry Protection: The Linear Case


Leahy, Dermot (1994) Time Consistency, Learning by Doing and Infant-Industry Protection: The Linear Case. The Economic and Social Review,, 26 (1). pp. 59-68. ISSN 0012-9984

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Abstract

This paper examines the implications for strategic trade policy of diiferent assumptions about precommitment in a dynamic oligopoly game with learning by doing. Assuming that demands are linear, we find that the optimal first-period subsidy is increasing in the rate of learning with precommitment but decreasing in i t if the government cannot precommit to future subsidies. The infant-industry argument is thus reversed in the absence of precommitment.

Item Type: Article
Keywords: Time Consistency; Learning; Infant-Industry Protection; The Linear Case;
Academic Unit: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Finance and Accounting
Item ID: 8477
Depositing User: Dermot Leahy
Date Deposited: 18 Jul 2017 15:44
Journal or Publication Title: The Economic and Social Review,
Publisher: Tara
Refereed: Yes
URI:

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