Import Protection as Export Promotion in Oligopolistic Markets with R & D


Leahy, Dermot (1991) Import Protection as Export Promotion in Oligopolistic Markets with R & D. The Economic and Social Review,, 23 (1). pp. 93-103. ISSN 0012-9984

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Abstract

Can import protection ever act as export promotion? One reason that this is an important question is that i t has often been argued that import protection is an explanation of Japanese export success since the war. Yamamura (1986) for instance regards i t as an essential part of Japanese policy during its "rapid growth phase". He argues that: As the firms expanded, the protected markets, which had served as hot houses for the fledgling industries, became export platforms easing the risks of aggressive expansion into export markets. The idea that import protection is export promotion has been formalised by Krugman (1984) in a number of partial equilibrium non-cooperative oligopolistic trade models. The purpose of what follows is to re-examine the issue in a formal two-stage game framework in which firms choose R & D levels in the first stage and outputs in the second.

Item Type: Article
Keywords: Import Protection; Export Promotion; Oligopolistic Markets; R & D;
Academic Unit: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Finance and Accounting
Item ID: 8479
Depositing User: Dermot Leahy
Date Deposited: 18 Jul 2017 16:18
Journal or Publication Title: The Economic and Social Review,
Publisher: Tara
Refereed: Yes
URI:

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