SECURITISATION, COUNTERTERRORISM AND THE SILENCING OF DISSENT: THE EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF PREVENT

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ABSTRACT: This paper outlines some of the implications of counterterrorist legislation, including Prevent, for the pedagogical relationship and for educational institutions. The concept of ‘radicalisation’, central to the Prevent Strategy, is one that is contested in the field of counterterrorism, yet educators are now expected to identify and refer students ‘at risk of radicalisation’. Such students are described as vulnerable throughout the policy documentation; however, the way in which vulnerability is conceptualised is resonant with colonial discourses of contagion and immunity, and it risks silencing and even pathologising the person labelled vulnerable. Prevent does not clearly define central concepts such as extremism, radicalisation, vulnerability, and this may make both students and staff fearful speaking freely in classrooms and lecture halls. Based on the experience of teaching IRA and INLA prisoners in the Republic of Ireland, the author outlines a set of philosophical and ethical principles that ought to underpin education. It is argued that education must not be subordinated to security and intelligence agendas on pragmatic, educational and ethical grounds.

Keywords: counterterrorism, CONTEST, education, prevent, dialogue, trust, vulnerability, prison

1. INTRODUCTION

This essay examines some of the implications of the Prevent legislation in the UK that has made it a statutory duty for a range of institutions and organisations, including educational institutions, to prevent terrorism. It also examines the implications of other elements of counterterrorism legislation for educators. Whilst many organisations had previously engaged with Prevent on a voluntary basis, this new legislation, setting duties on a statutory footing, has significant implications for curricula, freedom of speech, critical enquiry, the pedagogical relationship, the educational experience, and for the integrity of students, teachers and lecturers. Whilst I believe that educators have a duty to respond to, and inform the appropriate authorities about specific risks of violence, including violent extremism and terrorism, Prevent-related policy documentation appears to make unwarranted connections between ill-defined concepts of extremism, violent extremism and radicalisation. Despite critiques of the concept of ‘radicalisation’ by Kundnani (2009, 2012, 2014, 2015) and Horgan (2005, 2008a, 2008b), amongst others, Prevent appears to imply that: (i) there are linear causal
pathways of ‘radicalisation’ and clear observable indicators which can signal who is at ‘risk of radicalisation’; (ii) there is a clear causal relationship between the existence of extremist or even radical belief systems and terrorist or violent actions; and (iii) one can be ‘vulnerable’ to and indeed ‘infected’ by ideas. The concept of ‘vulnerability’ is used in this context to suggest that the ‘vulnerable’ person may either already be, or risks becoming, an extremist, violent extremist or a terrorist (HM Government, 2008, 2009, 2011a, 2011b, 2012, 2014, 2015b; House of Commons, 2010).

A clear set of philosophical and ethical principles ought to underpin education, including in prisons, in order to preserve its autonomy from security and intelligence agendas. There are real risks in failing to do so. I draw from my experience of teaching philosophy to people arrested and tried under the Offences against the State Acts who were imprisoned in Portlaoise Prison, a high-security prison in the Republic of Ireland, and from a Legacy Review called ‘Unfamiliar Voices’ (2013) that documented the National College of Art and Design’s (NCAD’s) Art in Prison programme in Portlaoise Prison, a programme that extended over 26 years from the mid-eighties. Making Prevent a statutory duty risks damaging relations of trust and openness in institutions by silencing and marginalising students and staff who might otherwise wish to engage in the exploration of difficult questions and ideas. Such a breakdown of trust can lead to alienation, disaffection and disengagement. Even if the closed mind of the extremist is a significant obstacle to the pedagogical endeavour, it is not an insurmountable one, and the fact is that extremists of many varieties exist. Insistence that any extremist, whilst in the classroom, respect the principles and rules of the educational space is perhaps a wiser, more subtle strategy than a direct intervention by an educator to challenge a student’s extremist ideology, as appears to be suggested by Prevent, in particular if only certain kinds of extremist beliefs are to be tackled under the aegis of counterterrorism. This would be an approach more cognisant of the limits of education but also of its possibilities, inviting students to think and to reflect. Education ought to be, by its nature and in its practice, anti-extremist. Good educational practices develop the ability to question and critically evaluate, the capacity to offer arguments and/or evidence, the desire to understand, the capacity to listen to others and to reflect on one’s own position, and they invite a sense of one’s fallibility and the idea that learning is a continuing process. It is an error and potentially counterproductive to argue for the cultivation of such qualities and capacities in terms of their instrumental value as part of a counterterrorist strategy.

2. ‘RADICALISATION’ AND THE STATUTORY DUTIES ACCOMPANYING PREVENT

Prevent is part of the UK’s broader Counter Terrorist Strategy (CONTEST). It concerns itself with radicalisation in the context of counterterrorism and targets all forms of terrorism and extremism, both violent and non-violent.
Particular emphasis is placed on ‘Islamist terrorism’, but the strategy also targets Irish and Northern Irish Republican paramilitary organisations and the white supremacist ideology of extreme far right groups. CONTEST includes three other strands: Prepare, Protect and Pursue. Prevent Duty Guidance for England and Wales and for Scotland both state that ‘Section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (the Act) places a duty on certain bodies, listed in Schedule 6 to the Act, to have, in the exercise of their functions, “due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism”’. The documentation states that, ‘[t]he Government has defined extremism in the Prevent strategy as vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces’ (HM Government, 2015a, p. 2). It explains that that the Prevent strategy was changed to deal with ‘all forms of terrorism and with non-violent extremism which can create an atmosphere conducive to terrorism and can popularize views which terrorists then exploit’ (HM Government, 2011c, p. 3; my italics). Radicalisation is here described ‘as the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism’ (2011c, p. 3). The guidance and the legislation imply that there is a causal and legible process that proceeds from an encounter with ideas to acts of violence. This is an empty definition of radicalisation which mobilises tautological and formal reasoning. It fails to explain what radicalisation is, what it means or even how it works.

Some definitions of radicalisation, such as that of the European Commission which focuses on ideology, describe radicalisation as ‘[t]he phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism’ (Schmid, 2013, p. 12). Although the concept of radicalisation has become a popular political shibboleth since the Madrid (2004) and London (2005) bombings (Schmid, 2013, p. iii), ‘[a]n exploration of the literature also confirms the pitfalls of profiling those individuals “likely” to become terrorists. The current propensity to focus on “vulnerable” young people in the search for causes of terrorism has produced inconclusive results’ (2013, pp. iii–iv). Someone may be an extremist but this does not mean that he or she will be violent. Someone may be a terrorist, but not an extremist or even radical (Bartlett and Birdwell, 2010; Horgan, 2005; Horgan and Taylor, 2011). As Coolsaet notes, ‘[r]ight from its inception, the notion of “radicalisation” itself was a source of ambiguity and confusion’ and he claims that ‘[m]any different expressions of an individual’s ideas and behaviour were being labelled as signs of radicalisation, and these ranged from the increased presence of girls and women wearing the hijab, men dressed in Salafi trousers, orthodox preachers and the terrorists themselves. Putting these disparate signs together into a box labelled “indicators of radicalisation” emptied the word of all explanatory meaning, turning it into a container concept’ (2015, p. 5). It was, he says, the simplicity and ambiguity of
‘radicalisation’ that made it an attractive concept. Indeed, even in the case of
members of terrorist organisations who have disengaged, there is little evidence
that disengagement results in or requires de-radicalisation (Horgan, 2008a, 2008b; Horgan and Bjørgo, 2009).

Yet, despite the considerable critical literature in the field of counterterrorism
studies, institutions, authorities and bodies in the UK now have a statutory duty
to demonstrate that they are aware of and understand the risk of radicalisation,
and their staff must know both ‘what radicalisation means and why people may
be vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism as a consequence of it. They need to
be aware of what we mean by the term “extremism” and the relationship between
extremism and terrorism’ whilst ‘also knowing what measures are available to
prevent people from being drawn into terrorism, and how to challenge the
extremist ideology that can be associated with it. They need to understand how
to obtain support for people who may be being exploited by radicalising influ-
ences’ (2015a, p. 4). Many teachers seek to counter extremist views and ideas in
schools as part of thoughtful educational practices that encourage critical think-
ing, but Prevent, as a counterterrorist strategy, only targets certain kinds of
extremist ideas. Fundamentalist and dogmatic positions, which eschew ‘funda-
mental British values’ but are not linked to terrorism even if they create, for
example, an atmosphere conducive to homophobia or sectarianism, would pre-
sumably not require action or referral under Prevent. Although the duty to
prevent terrorism is reasonable when a risk of imminent violence is suspected,
as is the case with school shootings, Prevent is not solely concerned with this
kind of immediate risk, or even with the expression of extremist views. Rather,
educators are being asked to identify and refer those students (and perhaps
colleagues) who are at risk of radicalisation (Knowles, 2012; Pilsner, 2013).
Yet, if it is the case, as Coolsaet argues, that the very notion of radicalisation is
‘ill-defined, complex and controversial’ (2008, p. 240), and if it is not clear what
is understood by ‘radicalisation’, let alone by ‘risk of radicalisation’, it is difficult
to see how that risk can be identified and managed by professionals, including
educators.

3. The ‘Risk of Radicalisation’ and the Concept of Thought-crime

Strategies that seek to embed counterterrorist strategies in educational institu-
tions, deploying preventative mechanisms and positioning them as sites of
surveillance in response to the so-called new terrorism, risk changing the nature
of educational relationships and the role of educational institutions, as I argue
through this essay. For example, the statutory duty of staff to report differences in
behaviour or visible appearance, a tendency toward isolation, a desire to belong
or an adventurous spirit, extends beyond pastoral care to counterterrorist inter-
vention in respect of monitoring students for indicators of radicalisation and
indicators that suggest that they may become radicalised. Policy documentation,
such as the guidelines for practitioners, implies that there is not only credibility,
evidence and legitimacy for the models of risk management to be mobilised, but also that clear and unambiguous indicators exist to identify the risk of radicalisation and that there is empirical evidence of effective interventions. In the broader field of studies in counterterrorism, such certainty is not replicated (Kundnani, 2009, 2012; Schmid, 2013). Nonetheless, in the policy documentation, we find statements such as, ‘[w]e believe that Prevent work to date has not clearly recognised the way in which some terrorist ideologies draw on and make use of extremist ideas which as espoused and circulated by apparently non-violent organisations, very often operating within the law. We will not change the law – we remain committed to protecting the freedom of speech which many of these extremists set out to undermine. But preventing radicalisation must mean challenging extremist ideas that are conducive to terrorism and also part of terrorist narrative’ (HM Government, 2011a, p. 12). In this respect, Prevent targets a range of sectors ‘where there are risks of radicalisation which we need to address’ (HM Government, 2011a, p. 10), and aims to reach the minority of individuals ‘who are vulnerable to radicalisation’ (HM Government, 2011a, p. 62). Efforts to target those at ‘risk of radicalisation’ appear to rest upon three key assumptions that are, in turn, related to pre-crime counterterrorist strategies: (i) there are individuals who are vulnerable to certain kinds of ideas; (ii) these individuals may not even know that they are on a pathway to terrorism; and (iii) professionals can be trained to spot the signs that indicate someone is at risk of radicalisation.

Despite an extensive literature challenging claims and policies that presuppose linear (and non-linear) relationships between radicalisation, extremism, violent extremism and terrorism (Kundnani, 2006, 2012, 2014, 2015; Githens-Mazer, 2012; Heath-Kelly, 2013; Horgan and Braddock, 2010; Richards, 2010; Sedgwick, 2010), a strategy is being implemented in educational settings that relies upon a progression model that itself rests upon on those very assumptions and models that have been challenged by experts in the field. Empirical research does not show a link between radicalisation and terrorism, or even between extremism and violence or terrorism, and it also does not show a causal connection between theological persuasion and terrorism (Gearon, 2013; Horgan, 2005; Kundnani, 2015; Spalek, 2011). It is also acknowledged that it is extremely difficult to predict who will engage in terrorism (Horgan and Braddock, 2010). If there are no clear indicators to identify those at the ‘risk of radicalisation’, no agreed legal definitions of ‘radicalisation’ or extremism (Russell Group of Universities, 2015), no clear correlation between radicalisation, extremism, violent extremism and terrorism, if the indicators outlined are so extensive as to include large portions of the population, and if the idea that radicalisation leads to terrorism has been significantly challenged, how can it be suggested teachers, lecturers, early childhood care workers and so forth can, simply by observing the ideas, dispositions, appearances and behaviours of those in their care, recognise and objectively verify indicators that purportedly show someone to be ‘at risk of radicalisation’?
Such a student may not have had any thoughts of engagement with ‘extremist’ or ‘radical’ ideas, or with ‘political violence’ and yet allegedly display behaviours or express ideas that could suggest he or she is ‘at risk of radicalisation’. In the absence of either intention or action, this diagnosis is akin to what a number of authors, citing Philip K. Dick (Kundnani, 2014; Martin, 2014; McCulloch and Pickering, 2009), call ‘thought-crime’. If, (i) one does not and cannot know whether or not one is committing an offence or whether one is on a particular pathway because the concepts and thus the law are thinly and vaguely defined; (ii) the specific claims about the stages to violent extremism and the reasons why people engage in violent extremism and terrorism appear to be, as a number of authors argue, founded on anecdote rather than evidence (Coolsaet, 2015; Horgan, 2005; Russell Group of Universities, 2015; Schmid, 2013); and (iii) the criteria for assessment and risk management do not relate to risk, but only potential risk, how can those preventative strategies now enforceable by law in educational institutions and organisations be legitimated, justified or enacted? What are the implications for the lives of students, young people and children who may be targeted, or who feel themselves to be at risk of being targeted by Prevent and Channel (the de-radicalisation multi-agency intervention programme targeting children and young people) if the absence of intent or specific action does not guarantee being found innocent?

4. The Constitution of the ‘Vulnerable Terrorist’

Increasingly, the counterterrorism and counter-radicalisation discourses of Prevent and Channel focus upon the ‘vulnerable individual’. The language of ‘vulnerability’ and ‘resilience’ is commonplace in the therapeutic society and ‘therapeutic education’ (Ecclestone, 2012; Ecclestone and Hayes, 2008). When dissent is pathologised and seen as a marker of an individual ‘vulnerable to radicalisation’, this risks silencing students and precluding dialogue about difficult and complex ideas. If alienation, disaffection and estrangement are some of the reasons that young people may turn to terrorism and violent extremism, it would seem wiser that schools create the space for sensitive questioning and exploration of issues affecting students’ lives. The way in which vulnerability is conceptualised in the case of preventative counterterrorism is reminiscent of colonial discourses about ‘infection’ and ‘contagion’ which served to ‘other’ and silence indigenous populations.

In counterterrorism discourses, the ‘vulnerable individual’ has become a synonym for the (potentially) dangerous individual and the purpose of programmes such as Prevent and Channel is to preclude this pathway. The language of vulnerability and resilience which permeates contemporary discourses about the ‘new terrorism’ extends Foucault’s notions of pastoral power and bio-governance (2003, 2004, 2007), and brings discourses about well-being, safety and care to bear on issues of (national) security. Whilst vulnerability is simply part of the human condition (Butler, 2004), these discourses suggest that vulnerability can
and should be overcome, and that life can be normalised through fostering ‘resilience’, in this case, to ideas of a particular kind. Vulnerability becomes a problematic characteristic of a person’s identity that can be resolved through expert support and intervention. Foucault (2004) showed how discourses of purity and contagion informed nationalism, identitarian politics, racism and fascism. The new variant of an old theme, common in colonial discourses, now involves reading vulnerability through the lens of the concept of immunity, or more precisely, lack of immunity or resilience in the face of radical or extreme ideas.

Chief Constable Norman Bettison, leader of Prevent, said, ‘The “virus” metaphor is particularly useful in thinking about strategies to target the most susceptible and vulnerable in our communities […] This sort of endeavour will help us to provide barriers to infection’ (Bettison cited in Heath-Kelly, 2013, p. 401). The colonial legacies bound up in such terms are in part why the use of such language in respect of Muslim communities is particularly problematic. J.M. Coetzee’s remarks on apartheid thinking, censorship and racial ecology are resonant with Bettison’s comments. He describes the operation of metaphors of infection, contagion and the ‘germ of an idea’ saying ‘it is not the contagion that is suggestible but suggestibility itself: being open to suggestion is what is suggestible […] but it is only the already-infected (already-agitated) who can be infected’ (1996, p. 182). The ‘risk of radicalisation’ strategy plays on ideas of vulnerability and immunity in respect of both the social body and the individual, and metaphors of infection and contagion have performative rather than merely descriptive force. But as Coetzee notes, mobilising ‘[c]ontagion as an explanatory model for the communication of passions amongst the mass of people has often been used in the past’ (1996, p. 180). Freud admired Le Bon’s study which named ‘susceptibility to contagion, along with heightened suggestibility, and the lowering of inhibitions against aggression, as the three main features of the psychology of the crowd’ (1996, p. 180). Arguably, the attempt to locate sources of ‘infection’ in order to treat through early intervention and build resilience continues the colonial metaphorical connections between censorship and contagion in the attempt to identify those seen as vulnerable and thus dangerous for the social body.

It is not only the individual who may be constituted as vulnerable, and hence suspect, but also the wider community to which individuals belong. A number of commentators (Bonino, 2013; Hickman et al., 2011; Kundnani, 2009; Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009) have argued that Paddy Hillyard’s (1993) descriptions of the lived experiences of Irish people in Northern Ireland and Britain at a time of internment is resonant with the way that many Muslims feel that they are being disproportionately targeted as a ‘suspect community’ by counterterrorism legislation (Choudury and Fenwick, 2011; Spalek, 2011). Individuals and communities are simultaneously constituted as risky, requiring intervention, which leads to the securitisation of community life, and also, by implication, potentially
dangerous. The emphasis in Prevent on ‘non-violent extremism’ shifts the focus from those likely to engage in terrorist violence to the ‘pool’, ‘sea’ or ‘oxygen’ that is the silent community that terrorists allegedly require to exist and persist. The majority of referrals in the Channel programme are Muslim, and even though 80% of referrals have been rejected since its introduction, students may feel that voicing dissenting and critical ideas will lead them to be labelled ‘at risk of radicalisation’. The person who becomes, or risks becoming, a terrorist is constituted as a ‘vulnerable’ person requiring holistic and psychological intervention. Perhaps this is not surprising given the therapeutic orientation of contemporary life, but it also serves as a de-legitimating and depoliticising strategy that removes considerations of questions of injustice, politics and violence from the public domain, replacing the language of ‘wrongs’ with that of ‘grievances’, and centring analysis on the individual and their ‘subjective interpretations’, rather than wider, contextual root causes and preconditions for violence, terrorism and war.

Let us reflect upon the implications of Prevent legislation in the context of other offences, such as the Terrorism Act in the UK (2006) which made the (undefined) ‘glorification’ and ‘encouragement’ of terrorism an offence (Bonino, 2013; Pantucci, 2010), and the new offence of public provocation in the Republic of Ireland which states that ‘For the purposes of this Part, public provocation to commit a terrorist offence means the intentional distribution, or otherwise making available, by whatever means of communication by a person of a message to the public, with the intent of encouraging, directly or indirectly (my italics), the commission by a person of a terrorist activity’ (Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) (Amendment) Act 2015, Section 4A). Consider the case of the young boy who when asked during an art project to imagine an Ireland of the future, says it could become smaller if England invaded, or bigger ‘if we got back the six counties’, or that of a teenager in a youth project who graffitis ‘Up the RA!’ (a slogan indicating support of the IRA) on a classroom wall. In the latter case, upon following the direction of the tutor to find out who exactly the ‘RA’ were, he comes back furious because ‘they are taxing drug dealers!’, an offence in which he had been dabbling. Would both of these cases be directed to the Channel programme? What would be the implications for these children’s future experiences of education, relationships with responsible adults and willingness to dissent openly, even if the referral is rejected? Now that Prevent is a statutory duty, it seems likely that referrals will increase, even if as a precautionary measure.

5. THE ‘TERROR OF PREVENTION’

You can obstruct anything. And then there is the political risk thing. I think common sense is needed. The problem is if you are too open and too liberal, the reaction is going to be so extreme that it destroys everything. […] You cannot allow the antagonism of the public to completely destroy… so I think there is a certain amount of balance and
judgement needed. So I think that I’d be one of those who would believe that prisoners are entitled to a voice even though, and I said this time and again to the Provos [the Provisional IRA], that I totally disagreed with what their philosophy was but I never would say that you don’t have the right to have that philosophy.

Interview with Ex-Governor of Portlaoise Prison (O’Donnell, 2013)

It is the job of the writer, says Coetzee, to ‘destroy simplistic polarities and open up complexities […] but it is the nature of the state to gravitate toward homogeneity and impose homogeneous conformity on its citizens; the presence of a sceptical diagnostic intelligence in the social body awakes its antagonism at an almost instinctive level’ (1996, p. 209). The job of educational institutions ought to be to create open spaces for dissent, listening and complexity, allowing for ideas to be expressed, discussed, heard and examined. However, Prevent, alongside the offences of indirect public provocation and glorification or encouragement of terrorism, creates a situation for students and teachers akin to the experience of ‘double consciousness’ described by Du Bois: one has to reflect upon how one’s statements, comments, beliefs, views, behaviours and readings might be interpreted by an unknown other who is positioned as expert, without having full knowledge of the framework of or criteria guiding that other’s interpretation. How can one then speak freely? J.M. Coetzee writing of censorship and the paranoia that it generates, says that ‘the diffusion of paranoia is not inadvertent; it is a technique of control’ (1996, p. 34). He quotes the Greek writer George Mangakis saying, ‘“The system is a diabolical voice for annihilating your own soul. They want to make you see your thoughts through their eyes, and control them yourself, through their point of view”. […] The paranoia is there on the inside, in their language, in their thinking, the rage one hears in Mangakis’s words, the bafflement in Kis’, are rage and bafflement at the most intimate of invasions, an invasion of very style of the self, by a contamination for which there may be no cure’ (1996, p. 34). The destruction of trust between citizens is damaging for any political system, and whilst the suspicion generated through the implementation of Prevent may lead to a withdrawal from public life for some, for others it may provoke paranoid self-doubt precipitated by the idea that one may be punished or targeted for one’s beliefs and ideas, even those which one did not know one had. This is corrosive for education, citizenship and democracy, especially if one is uncertain about what one is permitted to say or do.

Despite claims to promote critical inquiry and debate, the relatively empty definition of extremism as that of ‘opposing fundamental British values’, combined with the conflation of intelligence and evidence in the pre-crime agenda, means it is not clear what one is permitted to say without being constituted as at ‘risk of radicalisation’ or as having ‘extremist’ ideas. It ought to be a matter of real concern for democratic life and public life if students and fellow citizens begin to self-censor in institutional settings for fear of being constituted as ‘vulnerable’ [to terrorism], doubting whether they can speak, viewing their
own ideas through the lens of security agendas before weighing them up for themselves.

It is not as simple as that, saying yes they should be allowed to appear in public or express themselves . . . [Silence]. Yes, they should. I have not been asked to make that argument before. Why should people be afraid of somebody’s freedom to express themselves? Why are you afraid of what somebody has to say? If you think they are a raving lunatic that nobody supports then why are you worried about what they have to say? Why have they fear? What do they fear? Are they afraid that everybody will want to go into jail? Or do they believe that giving people freedom of expression that they are going to turn everybody else into a criminal? They don’t have much faith in society and people’s values if that is the case. Yes. People should have freedom of expression because what do people have to fear by allowing them to express themselves and if when they express themselves they are judged to be terrible and shocking and whatever, well people will be able to judge that for themselves. It is like . . . don’t burn the books.

Interview with ex-Provisional IRA Prisoner and ex-Member of the Legislative Assembly, Northern Ireland (MLA) (O’Donnell, 2013)

Reflecting on the words of the man above, an important issue for educators seems to be to find ways of acknowledging the vulnerability and risk for students in speaking freely in classrooms and institutional settings. The National Union of Students (NUS) in the UK has launched a campaign called ‘Students not Suspects’. The Universities and Colleges Union (UCU) states that Prevent will: ‘have a chilling effect upon debate and academic freedom within UK universities and colleges; create an atmosphere of mistrust within institutions and between staff and students which is at odds with academic values; create a legal duty upon institutions and staff which is vague and not achievable’ (UCU, 2015). The Russell Group of Universities released a statement which argued ‘[e]nabling free debate within the law is a key function which universities perform in our democratic society. Imposing restrictions on non-violent extremism or radical views would risk limiting freedom of speech on campus and may potentially drive those with radical views off campus and “underground”, where those views cannot be challenged in an open environment. Closing down challenge and debate could foster extremism and dissent within communities’ (Russell Group of Universities, 2015, p. 3). It highlights the tension between the requirement by law to ensure freedom of speech and the obligation under Prevent to address non-violent extremism, the problematic issue of referral when no illegal activity has taken place and the potential ramifications of the lack of clear definition of broad terms like extremism, when universities risk exposure to legal challenge.

Vulnerability in relation to power means that one cannot always know if one can speak freely so one has to be guaranteed that one will not be punished for so doing. Foucault (2001, 2005) calls this fearless speech or parrhesia. He writes, ‘First, I think that these techniques manifest a very interesting and important shift from that truth game which in the classical Greek conception of parrhesia was constituted by the fact that someone was courageous enough to tell the truth to
other people. For there is a shift from that kind of parrhesiastic game to another truth game which now consists in being courageous enough to disclose the truth about oneself” (2001, p. 143). Educational spaces must allow students to speak truthfully, having the courage to work through their views, and this political practice of *parrhesia* that is one of contestation, reflection and enquiry also brings with it the possibility of the second kind that is more closely linked to one’s own transformation, the personal *parrhesia* of which Foucault speaks. Having space and time to work through ideas, and allowing teachers and lecturers the opportunity to explore difficult topics with children and students, is part of holding open the unpredictable space of education. Rather than viewing education’s role as an instrument to remedy society’s problems – in this case to ensure national security – society is best served when educational institutions remain more or less autonomous sites of enquiry, criticality, dissent, exploration, reflection, enquiry and fearless speech, spaces in which students and educators can trust one another. Coolsaet claims that, ‘[t]he foreign fighter phenomenon is rooted in a specific youth subculture that has developed in reaction to an environment young people feel and perceive as complex, demanding, unequal and devoid of hope for improvement. It is not the result of a process of (political) radicalisation, as is often touted by authorities. It is foremost an escape from their estrangement from society and the apparent lack of empathy of society to their situation’ (2015, p. 17). If this is the case, further alienating young people in classrooms and lecture halls would seem to be both counterproductive and unjust, serving only to compound marginalization and the sense of being excluded from society. In this respect, there may be something to be learned from educators who are accustomed to working in contexts with people who have been imprisoned as ‘terrorists’ and who are often constituted as ‘violent extremists’.

6. THE AUTONOMY OF EDUCATION

The NCAD review of Art in Portlaoise Prison involved interviews and the descriptions of a range of stakeholders of the educational engagement of, amongst others, prisoners aligned with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) who were housed in Portlaoise Prison over a period of 26 years both before and after the Good Friday or Belfast Agreement which led to a ceasefire, though not one agreed to by all parties. Some of those interviewed in the Review were anti-Agreement former prisoners, colloquially known as ‘dissident republicans’, from the Republic of Ireland. The purpose of these reflections is to offer a lens with which we might critically examine the potential implications of *Prevent* legislation in educational settings, including schools in prisons, and to offer a different vision for education that preserves its autonomy and the possibility of *parrhesia*.

One of the former prison officers describes the prison in the 1980s just prior to the introduction of teachers,
You have to get perspective, there was a full-scale war going on in the North, irrespective of whether you call it the Troubles, and there was a threat of it spilling over here, especially in '81 with the H Blocks. And the government were really trying to keep a lid on the whole thing, but what happened was we were used as the battering rams with the ones [the political prisoners] they had. [...] Your life outside was restricted because the temperature was very hot. Bloody Sunday had ratcheted everything. We would have been seen as an aid to the British occupation by a large portion of people down here. What saved us was that Portlaoise was the prison town but it became very much an isolated group for self-protection.

Interview with ex-prison officer (O’Donnell, 2013)

Yet speaking of that time, a head teacher recalls,

I remember bringing a video of [the PE teacher] with these 20 big guys, all terrorists in the English eyes, and there she was whipping them all, shouting at them, roaring. Where are the officers? They couldn’t believe this. How come you can justify your existence without trying to change these guys away from their terrorism? This was in the middle of the 80s. What don’t you do something to stop them? If any teacher tried that they’d stop coming.

Interview with Former Head Teacher in Prison (O’Donnell, 2013)

In the 1980s and into the 1990s when the officers felt that the conflict in Northern Ireland risked spilling over into civil war in the Republic of Ireland, teachers in prison were not asked to be the eyes and ears of the security apparatus, were not asked to inform on their students and education was given relative autonomy and the task of helping prisoners cope with their sentence. Classes were, as they are now, attended in a voluntary capacity. Efforts were made to engage the interests, expression and passions of the men by offering an extensive and holistic curriculum that could, in the case of certain subject areas such as art and creative writing, offer spaces for critical inquiry, collaborative learning, imagination and self-determination. At a time of conflict, teachers simply educated, and education was not made subordinate to security agendas, even if it had to adapt to the specificity of the site of the prison.3

When formal education through external providers was introduced to the prison in 1984, the prison authorities were initially concerned about the risk of teachers being compromised, but as the civilian presence within the prison became normalised, this concern dissipated. Despite a number of escape attempts and a highly active and organised paramilitary organisation, it was not suggested that education classes should (i) be used as a tool for de-radicalisation, counter-radicalisation or reform, or (ii) that teachers should either involve themselves in surveillance upon or inform on their students in prison, even after the presence of prison officers in the space of the classroom was removed. The Head Teacher (above) was not altogether surprised that in the eyes of his international colleagues, the PE teacher’s existence could only be justified were she to be seen ‘rehabilitating’ her ‘terrorist’ students, but, as he remarks, they simply would not have come to class were she to have attempted to do so. He understood that if
one tries to manipulate one’s students toward non-educational ends that they have not chosen, they will resist. Even during this extremely difficult period, the parameters and autonomy of education remained circumscribed, and the integrity of the educational endeavour remained protected.4

7. Persisting with Impossible Conversations

For nearly five years, I taught philosophy classes to Republican prisoners who live on different landings in a block designated for political prisoners (or subversives in the language of Irish Prison Service) in a high-security prison. Educators cannot, as a rule, pick and choose their students, and students come to class on a voluntary basis. The men can, as one said, ‘smell’ it off you if the teacher does not want to be there. In a total institution, impositions of further control and authority are not welcomed. It is better when an educator can cultivate a renunciative ethic of creative attention as this makes space for each other, whilst allowing for the integrity of all parties to be sustained. I was aware that some of the men were initially sceptical and suspicious of my motivations given my background as an academic. Trust is essential in pedagogical relationships, in particular in the prison (Reuss, 2000) and when one is a new outsider, one’s agenda can be called into question so one must address these issues and have patience in building trust. As educators we accept everyone who is in our classroom (Buber, 1947), which does not mean agreeing with them. In the prison, as in other settings, if one tries to position education within a behavioural change framework that explicitly aims to change behaviour and beliefs, students will not engage, or will not do honestly. On political landings, they simply would not come, as such an approach fails to respect their integrity as ‘other’ and as student, viewing them instead as an ‘object’ to be changed. Even if prisons and other institutions wish to engage in the behavioural change of students, such projects should not involve educators.

At the beginning of my classes in prison, I say that I have three ‘rules’ for philosophy. The first is that we should and will disagree with one another, and dissent is to be valued. The second is that I am not trying to change anyone, and whatever transformation takes place should be on the person’s own terms, in their own time and in their own way. The third is that we adopt a principle of critical generosity in relation to authors and to one’s peers, and create together the conditions that will allow each of us to speak freely. I outline some of the relational qualities that students will need to cultivate if they are to engage wholeheartedly with philosophy, and indeed study more broadly. These include open-mindedness, questioning oneself and others, welcoming other perspectives, releasing one’s imagination, exploring one’s values, having patience, tolerating boredom, sitting with ideas, being humble, cultivating courage, confidence and voice and remaining attuned to the ethical commitment to valuing the other as other.
I want to communicate the delicate nature of these relationships, in part to show how difficult it is to develop them and how easy it is to damage them. Writing of her experiences of working in Maghaberry, a high-security prison in Antrim, Northern Ireland, Tracy Irwin (2008) pointed to the importance of ordinary forms of conviviality like sharing a cup of tea and biscuits, and the ways in which educational spaces can allow people to tell their own stories. The ethic of hospitality and welcome created by the men in the prison has allowed for the quality of openness to pervade the lived space of our philosophy classes on political landings in the prison. This comes from small gestures like making coffee or tea or even sharing cake, fruit and chocolate. These ritualised elements of the ‘invisible’ and ‘intangible’ serve to create atmospheres that invite and sustain philosophical conversations. Care is taken by all parties to ensure that boundaries are respected, and there are implicit parameters in terms of topics of discussion. For example, I won’t discuss or analyse individual cases or trials, and seldom have I been asked to. We do, however, talk about contemporary legislation and philosophy in relation to the law. We might examine Giorgio Agamben or Chantal Mouffe’s writings on Carl Schmitt, including the way in which the sovereign suspends the law, and its relation to ‘states of emergency’ or ‘states of exception’, or I could introduce Judith Butler’s meditations post 9/11 on precarious life or frameworks of war which ask questions like ‘whose life is grievable’? and ‘how can we respond to violence?’ When reflecting upon both what I will teach and how, I ask myself whether I have or could have studied or taught this material outside the prison, and if the answer is affirmative, then under the principle of normalisation, I can stand over my teaching and curriculum in the prison. Whilst Irwin emphasises the more intimate dimensions of disclosure in pedagogical settings, and such stories are part of what it means to do philosophy if it to be meaningful for students, I am more interested in the potential offered by education for critical inquiry, reflection, dissent and parrhesia (or fearless speech). Preserving the integrity of education spaces by understanding them as proto-public spaces also communicates the way in which the integrity of public institutions, including educational institutions, is valued, and serves to support the conditions for citizenship and real participation of students. Educational spaces must be driven by a finely attenuated sense of our moral equality as human beings and our political equality as citizens.

Much has been written on students and researchers in terms of the implications of de-radicalisation and counterterrorism strategies, including the importance of academic freedom; however, insufficient attention has been paid to way that teachers must also feel that they can speak freely and honestly, and the important role that students have in creating the relational space that makes this possible. Whilst the parameters of the educational space in the prison are not stated, they are observed, and these parameters matter. It is important that the teacher or student in prison is not put in a compromised position, so we don’t discuss the details of the organisations of which they are members, or are accused of so being. We don’t discuss anything related to operational issues, or
anything that might be incriminating of themselves or others. We don’t discuss names, we don’t discuss actions, I don’t liaise between people who are outside and those inside and so forth. I have been asked, out of curiosity more than anything, whether I had ever been approached by the security forces, and if I were to be so approached, what I would do. I initially said that I would find it impossible to maintain my integrity as an educator were I to be approached in such a fashion, but on reflection I felt I would have to stand over the integrity of what I do and call such extra-educational agencies to account. It is, however, a moot point, since I have never been asked to inform on or survey my students, to explain or justify my curriculum, or to censor my engagement in any way. There would be real implications if the duty to report those at ‘risk of radicalisation’ were implemented, in particular in a prison, as it undermines the student–teacher relationship, and risks teachers being viewed as ‘informants’.

My students and I are aware that our classes may be recorded but I cannot know whether this is the case. There is, of course, a significant difference between intelligence agencies or the prison service recording classes, troubling as that would be in my view, and me secretly recording my classes or sharing my observations with others in the interests of intelligence gathering or risk assessment. In the latter case, this would undermine trust. Teachers have a duty of pastoral care for their students in prison, as in any other institution, but the only circumstance in which teachers should have an obligation to inform on, or report, their students to the relevant authorities should be in the case of concern about imminent and specific threats of violence to or by that student, and educational institutions have developed reasonable and measured risk management and risk assessment approaches that support this (Gereluk, 2015).

An educator who wishes to create a space for critical enquiry and questioning is in a precarious position in the current climate. The position of educators and researchers who work with people convicted or charged with offences against the State, people who are, in the eyes of the State, already ‘extremists’, ‘terrorists’ or ‘radicalised’, is a particularly complex one. As it stands, Section 4A of the Amended Criminal Justice Bill (2015) in the Republic of Ireland may have implications for teaching philosophy to political prisoners. Again, it states, ‘For the purposes of this Part, public provocation to commit a terrorist offence means the intentional distribution, or otherwise making available, by whatever means of communication by a person of a message to the public, with the intent of encouraging, directly or indirectly, the commission by a person of a terrorist activity (my italics)’. In the case of indirect public provocation, intent is rendered ambiguous and provocation is vague – the question of direct public incitement of an act of terror is entirely another matter and would require appropriate intervention.

What constitutes provocation? What constitutes indirect provocation? Could I, as a teacher of political prisoners, or even of students who subsequently become, or who are without my knowledge, committed to political violence, be charged with indirect provocation if, unwittingly, I bring a text or discuss an
idea that a student subsequently mobilises to explain his or her support of, and even engagement in, terrorist or violent activity? What ideas and texts can I then safely bring into the space of the prison or the classroom? Might reading Socrates, Frantz Fanon, Angela Davis, Daniel Graeber or Karl Marx generate ideas that might lead someone to join a proscribed organisation? Could the mere possession of articles (Virgo, 2008) such as films or philosophy books constitute grounds for prosecution? Pedagogically, must I steer clear of rhetorical or polemical positions, or avoid outlining counterarguments for fear they might be interpreted as advocating a particular position? Should I review all my philosophical content to assess whether any of it might contribute to the ‘risk of radicalisation’ of my students, for instance, in the sense of fostering dissatisfaction with the status quo or providing arguments for the right of the people to resist the State, but then what content in political philosophy can I address? In the case of Prevent, what does it mean to teach ‘fundamental British values’? What of the Levellers or the Diggers? Hobbes, Spinoza or Locke? Anarchists like Graeber, Goldman or Kropotkin who challenge democracy, or even Badiou, Zizek or Negri? What about feminist philosophers who seek to transform existing institutions? Or Charles Taylor, Will Kymlika and other communitarian thinkers who challenge the presuppositions of liberalism? Should I continue to encourage my students to think for themselves, to develop arguments for their positions, to engage with the perspectives of others and to dissent? The curricular and pedagogical elements of Prevent and the Learning Together to be Safe toolkit suggest that that one ought to adopt an approach that encourages free speech. Yet, the broader framing and the lived experience of those who feel themselves to be members of the new ‘suspect community’, combined with the introduction of expert pastoral discourses that use the language of ‘resilience’ and ‘vulnerability’, have tended to individualise and psychologise issues such as conflict, dissent and war (Heath-Kelly, 2012, 2013; Martin, 2014), making it difficult to know what one is permitted to say and discuss. Under such circumstances, it becomes difficult to persuade students that they can speak freely and openly, especially if they are challenging the State, including State violence, or are committed to radical, and even extreme, positions, be they theological, philosophical or political. This is why trust and parrhesia matter.

Speaking of the work he had made with his teacher and film-maker, Jonathan Cummins (2009), one man who had been imprisoned as an anti-Agreement IRA prisoner reflects on the process of pedagogical and creative engagement, saying,

That is as much I want to say about that for now. See the machoism of going to prison. You know what you are and your politics. It is not about machoism, but if I was a nipper, a young buck, I became a poor republican in jail. Coming through that and learning, speaking about myself, and getting stuff sometimes dragged out of me or pulled out of me which was a good process for me. Going back to my cell and saying I didn’t really tell him that, you fool . . . You know, literally talking to myself in the cell. For me, it was very cathartic. It just happened for me at the right
time. [...] Talking about putting stuff on video. See you put a man there and say do you want to tell your story. See, it is not a propaganda exercise. It is not about the struggle. It is your story and how it affects you. You can say anything you want. There are no absolutes. Just say whatever you need to say. I can look back on my stuff. I made stuff for me kids to look back on, how I felt and what I wanted to say when I was living it and when I really felt it to get that across. Instead of sitting on a bar stool twenty-five years later making up stuff that I didn’t really ... shielding stuff from them, or embellishing. It is the cold hard, well not hard, but it is how I felt about certain things and to put that down on video. It wouldn’t have been possible to write a letter or a diary or a book or whatever. It is the visual.

This kind of honest and intimate disclosure from men involved in ‘dissident republicanism’ is unusual. Cummins’ films were made possible by a pedagogical relationship that lasted many years of working together as teacher and student. In interview, all the men from this organisation speak of the trust that they had in Cummins and of how essential it was for them.

Whilst I acknowledge that the Republic of Ireland is a different jurisdiction with different historical, educational and social legacies and traditions, my purpose in presenting learning from teaching and research in this context is to argue that education, both within the prison and in educational institutions throughout society, must preserve a space in which critical inquiry is welcomed and both students and teachers feel free to speak. Such a space must welcome robust debate, silences and students’ efforts to stumble their way around ideas. Relational qualities that students come to embody if they engage seriously in the study of subjects like philosophy, or if they develop a practice in film-making, include open-mindedness, ethical imagination, attunement to human fallibility (including their own), a willingness to develop a deeper understanding of subject matter and a desire to explore a range of possibilities for expressing and exploring their thoughts and ideas. Given these requirements, the presence of the extremist student who adopts a position that is dogmatic, fundamentalist and narrow-minded, displaying a lack of empathy for the disciplines and traditions of others and unwillingness to listen or admit the possibility of his or her own fallibility, is destructive of the educational space. It matters little whether this be for it religious, atheistic, racist, sexist, political or philosophical reasons, an extremist in the classroom makes the pedagogical space near impossible; there is no ‘other’ for the extremist. As such, education in its very practice and principles must be anti-extremist, just as genuine education must resist temptations to indoctrinate students or form their characters directly. It is important to remember that even though extremism poses significant pedagogical obstacles, this does not necessarily mean that the extremist is, or will be, violent. It is, thus, questionable whether it is appropriate to mobilise interventions in educational settings in order to combat extremism under counterterrorist legislation.

The Learning Together to be Safe toolkit seems to suggest that all terrorists are extremists; however, in my experience of teaching Republican prisoners, my students are not, at least in the context of our classes, dogmatic, unreflective,
fanatical, and nor do they hold to fixed ideas. Whilst many understand themselves be radical, their view is that they are not extremists. If they are convicted members of paramilitary organisations (rather than being on remand), they are committed to what is called ‘physical force republicanism’ which sanctions the use of political violence, although there will be disagreement in respect of the form that this should take. Many, though not all, have been convicted on membership or conspiracy charges rather than for specific acts of violence. We have had robust philosophical discussions about the question of political violence in classes, and I speak frankly and argue my position in relation to this question, as do they. I encourage striving to understand a question from multiple perspectives, including perspectives opposite to that which one holds. In classes there is agreement on some issues and disagreement on others, but we remain committed to continuing our conversation, despite considerable disagreement on certain issues. They are not a monolithic group, and some also express positions against the use of violence. Some students simply come to class to encounter new ideas and thinkers. Some say that they welcome philosophy classes precisely because the experience of philosophical inquiry and conversation stems tendencies toward dogmatism and a superficial understanding of ideas and ideologies, broadening their horizons, and opening them to thinking and questioning. In turn, I have never felt silenced or felt unable to speak freely. Seeking to directly change the behaviour and beliefs of any student would corrode the pedagogical space and our relationships. Attempts to subordinate education to other agendas, such as counterterrorism, would be viewed as coercive and lead to the disengagement of my students. To learn and to educate, one must listen, question and find ways of encountering the other in an ethic of dialogue. I agree with Hanan Alexander when he writes that ‘real conversation is possible only if we are willing to be influenced by the other’ (Alexander, 2003, p. 235). As a teacher, these classes have changed me, deepening my understanding of central philosophical questions, and I can no longer look at the world as I did before.

8. Conclusion

It is important to preserve education’s autonomy from security agendas, not only because of the difficulties with the concept of radicalisation, or because discourses of vulnerability and victimhood risk pathologising dissenting students, but also because, as Martin Buber describes rather well, ‘[a]s soon as my pupils notice that I want to educate their characters I am resisted precisely by those who show most signs of genuinely independent character; they will not let themselves be educated, or rather, they do not like the idea that somebody wants to educate them’ (Buber, 1947, p. 133). However, there is a deeper reason which is the importance of separating education from indoctrination or manipulation, and creating an open space for the pedagogical encounter. Education is not a space of absolute control. It has to permit of unpredictability and surprise both in terms of student’s response and the way in which he or she may be transformed.
through the encounter with a subject and the perspectives of others, including those of the teacher. As one former IRA prisoner said,

Firstly, even to have somebody learn, you first have to make a connection with that person and you have to have a relationship. And it is personal how that works, particularly with people in jails. That if the personal connection is made, the academic part, the knowledge that is being imparted is secondary. There is a trust. You are insisting you are coming from the authority side, and it is a very polarised side, so you are coming from that system. In order to gain that trust and for them to open to you, in order that they will learn, then they must feel that you are on their side almost, without compromising yourself. If I were in the position of an educationalist then I would spend a lot of time around that, and continue to spend a lot of time around that. It is only at a certain point that people are open to possibilities from you, when you have gained that trust.

Interview with ex-Provisional IRA Prisoner (O’Donnell, 2013).

If educators seek to explicitly and directly change the world view of their students, encouraging them to adopt a different world view, be it prescribed by the teacher, police, security forces or the State, it seems to me that most students will resist and resent such efforts, even if they appear to comply. Transformation ought rather to be in the sense of trying to create the conditions for the world to open for a student (Maldiney, 1991). To strive to impose a position damages both the delicate trust that can come to exist between student and teacher, and possibilities for creativity and autonomy in respect of subject matter. If education is not seen as a space that invites open dialogue and free speech, students will not engage and they will not open up to the kinds of transformation and questioning that the pedagogical encounter can bring in its wake.

To learn involves trust. It means opening oneself to the other, recognising one’s own fallibility and vulnerability, and even, as Hanan Alexander (2015) has said, the possibility that one is wrong. It demands humility on the part of both teacher and student. One must be able to listen to and reflect upon ideas and questions from the perspective of the other, even if one returns to one’s original position. Proper educational spaces ensure that ideas can be discussed safely, however problematic those ideas may be. Being fearful of being referred under Prevent or other counterterrorist legislation militates against this ethic; even ‘anti-extremist’ education already positions education as subordinate to an extrinsic agenda. Instead, we should think about cultivating rich practices of education that can open up critical inquiry, sensitive engagement, deep understanding of subject matter, a sense of passion and curiosity and allow for diverse modalities of expression. This kind of practice of education, by its nature, requires that students stem or suspend extremist or ideological positions, at least in class, and that they question and exercise parrhesia, moving their imaginations into the worlds and ideas of others, even the worlds of those with whom they profoundly disagree. It is this kind of approach to education that ought to be cultivated in educational institutions, an approach that allows for minds to be opened rather than formed. Only by preserving education’s
autonomy from security agendas, can pedagogical spaces and pedagogical encounters convince all parties that they can speak freely and that relations of trust will be valued and respected. Students can then allow themselves to be opened up to being transformed and moved by their encounters with ideas and through dialogue with the others who share their classroom.

9. Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

10. Notes
1 The Offences against the State Acts 1939–1998 constitute the main body of counter-terrorism legislation aimed at domestic terrorism in the Republic of Ireland. The Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005 is directed toward international terrorism and also amends the Offences against the State Acts. There was a further Amendment to Section 4 of the 2005 Act with the Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) (Amendment) Act 2015, which now includes three new offences of public provocation to commit a terrorist offence, recruitment for terrorism and training for terrorism.
2 This programme had been funded directly by the Department of Justice, and the review was commissioned by the NCAD as a legacy review to capture the knowledge and learning from the programme. The purpose of the programme was to introduce students in prison to the experience of a third-level approach to art by practising artists.
3 Whilst the NCAD programme was funded by the Department of Justice and was rolled out under the aegis of the Irish Prison Service, there was no interference in the programme by these bodies. Teachers are not required to sign the Official Secrets Act, although prison officers are required to do so.
4 Education in prison in the Republic of Ireland is mainly provided by the local Education and Training Board (ETB), previously known as the Vocational Education Committee, which offers the same courses as are offered by the ETB in the wider community. ETBs are autonomous of the Irish Prison Service and are funded by the Department of Education and Skills. Third-level provision is primarily provided by the Open University. Prisoners attend classes in a voluntary capacity. In the UK, on the other hand, whilst students in prison also access third-level education through the Open University, prisons put out tenders for prison education provision and prison education is coordinated by the Offenders’ Learning and Skills Service (OLASS) in partnership with the Department for Education and Skills (now Department for Children, Schools and Families), and the Prison Service. Contracted providers are paid by results which can create greater instability and turnover of staff. A number of other organisations and institutions are also involved in educational projects and ‘offender learning’ in the UK is part of the strategy of reducing reoffending.

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