Flanagan, Brian (2014) Rereading the Kripkean Intuition on Reference. Metaphilosophy, 45 (1). pp. 87-95. ISSN 1467-9973

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Abstract

Saul Kripke's thought experiments on the reference of proper names target the theory that the properties which identify a term's referent are the subject of an implicit agreement. Recently, survey versions of the experiments have been thought to show that intuitions about reference are culturally contingent. Proposing a revisionary interpretation, this article argues, first, that Kripke's Cicero/Feynman experiment reveals that every name user knows enough to be capable of identifying the same individual as the name's most informed users. Second, the article shows that Kripke's presentation of the Gödel/Jonah experiment is ambiguous with respect to the properties attributed to the referent. Disambiguated, the experiment fails to reveal that name users may be mistaken in every unique property they attribute. Since the experiment's ambiguity is replicated in survey presentations, cross-cultural variation in survey response fails to show that intuitions about reference are culturally contingent.

Item Type:	Article
Keywords:	intuition; reference; descriptivism; experimental philosophy; proper names; Appealing;
Academic Unit:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Law
Item ID:	8918
Identification Number:	https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12066
Depositing User:	Brian Flanagan
Date Deposited:	18 Oct 2017 14:07
Journal or Publication Title:	Metaphilosophy
Publisher:	Wiley
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com
Use Licence:	This item is available under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial Share Alike Licence (CC BY-NC-SA). Details of this licence are available here

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